In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: L. H., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0872

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: L. H., Parent.

Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-21-122

Theresa R. Paulson, Thrive Legal Services, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant father L.H.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Robert Hamilton, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Deborah Best, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this juvenile-protection appeal, appellant challenges the district court’s decision
terminating his parental rights. Appellant argues that the agency violated a specific
statutory obligation and that th e district court erred in deny ing the motion for a new trial
on this basis. Because appellant failed to rais e the alleged statutory violation prior to the
motion for a new trial, we conclude that he has forfeited the argume nt. Appellant also
argues that the district court abused its disc retion when it determined that termination of
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appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s be st interests. Because the district court’s
analysis of the applicable best interests factors was consistent with logic and the facts, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
FACTS
On February 18, 2021, respondent Ramsey County Social Services Department (the
agency) filed a petition to terminate the parent al rights of appellant L.H. (father) to his
child, born in August 2020 (the child).1 The child’s mother (mother) was the sole custodian
of the child. About two weeks after the ch ild was born, the agen cy received a report
concerning the father’s threatening conduct. Mother had a no-contact order against father
due to a domestic incident that occurred before the child was born. The agency investigated
and completed a child-protection intake assessment. Mother to ld the agency worker that
she was not having contact with father at the time, but mother and father both said that they
wanted father to have a relationship with the child.
The case proceeded to trial. At the beginning of the trial, father’s attorney
acknowledged the statutory presumption that father was palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent-child relationship because of the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his
other three children, under Minnesota Statut es section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4)

1 The district court previously terminated father’s parental rights to three other children in
2018. When father failed to appear at the admit/deny hearing and failed to participate in
the services offered by the ag ency, the district court involu ntarily terminated father’s
parental rights to those three children, conclu ding that father had exposed the children to
domestic violence in their home, failed to pr ovide for their needs, and had not made any
changes in his parenting. The district court also determined that te rmination of father’s
parental rights to those children was in the children’s best interests.
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(2020). The attorney told the district court that he did not have any evidence to rebut that
presumption and that he wished for the tria l to focus solely on the issue of whether
termination was in the child’s best interests. The district court heard testimony from father,
mother, a social worker, and the guardian ad litem (GAL).
The district court admitted evidence showing father’s criminal history, including
incidents of domestic violence against mother. For instance, according to this evidence, in
April 2020, father put mother in a chokehold to the point that she was unable to speak or
breathe. Father knew that mother was five months pregnant with the child at the time. As
a result of the domestic assault, the district court issued a domestic-abuse no-contact order
prohibiting father from having any contact with mother. Father pleaded guilty to felony
domestic assault relating to this incident in December 2020. In add ition, on February 5,
2021, father allegedly came to mother’s apartment and punched her in the face. Father was
charged with felony domestic assault and viol ating an order for protection. Father was
incarcerated pending a criminal trial on these charges at the time of the TPR trial.
The social worker and the GAL testified a bout father’s history of domestic abuse
against mother and against another individual. The social worker believed that, because
the children in the previous TPR proceeding had witnessed domestic abuse and father had
not made any efforts since then to change his behavior, the child was at risk of witnessing
or experiencing abuse. Simila rly, the GAL opined that termin ation of father’s parental
rights was in the child’s best interests because of father’s “very long, troubling history of
domestic violence” and because he had not taken steps to address his chemical health,
mental health, and domestic violence history.
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Mother testified that she op posed the termination of father’s parental rights. She
told the district court that she was currently able to provide for the child by herself but that
financial assistance from father would be helpful. Mother testified that, if father’s parental
rights were terminated, it would be difficult for her to support the child by herself.
After the trial, the district court issued an order terminating father’s parental rights.
The district court credited the GAL’s testimony opining that termination was in the child’s
best interests, despite mother’s desire for father to financially support the child. The district
court found that father’s behavior had no t improved since the previous TPR proceeding
and that father had continued his pattern of domestic abuse against his partners. The district
court weighed the best interests factors and determined that father’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship was “outweighed by [the child’s] competing interests to live
in a home free of domestic violence [and] chemical abuse and have caregivers with stable
mental health.” The district court concluded that terminati on of father’s parental rights
was in the child’s best interests.
After the TPR decision, father filed a mo tion for a new trial. He challenged the
district court’s determination that termination was in the child’s best interests, highlighting
the child’s interest in receivi ng financial support from father. Father also raised a new
argument. He argued that the county attorney violated Minnesota Statutes, section
260C.503, subdivision 2 (2020), because although the agency performed an initial intake
interview in August 2020, the county attorney did not file the TPR petition until February
2021. The district court denied father’s motion for a new trial, reasoning that it had
appropriately balanced the be st interests factors and notin g that father presented no
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evidence showing that he had attempted to pr ovide financial support for the child. The
district court also declined to grant a new trial based on the lapse in time from August 2020
through February 2021. Specifically, the district court determined that the statute did not
obligate the county attorney to file the term ination petition prior to February 2021, so no
statutory violation had occurred. In addition, the distri ct court observed that father failed
to raise the argument at trial and concluded that father made no showing that the proceeding
would have been different if the county attorney had filed the petition prior to February
2021. Father appeals.
DECISION
I. Timing of Filing TPR Petition
Father first argues that the county attorney violated a specific obligation to file the
termination petition in August 2020 and becaus e the county attorney failed to do so, the
district court erred when it denied the motion for a new trial. Because father failed to raise
this argument prior to his posttrial motion, we deem the argument forfeited.
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.503 provides that “[t]he responsible social services
agency must ask the county a ttorney to immediately file a termination of parental rights
petition when,” among other reasons, “the child’s parent has lost parental rights to another
child through an order involuntarily termin ating the parent’s rights.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.503, subd. 2(a)(4). The statute further provides, “The county attorney shall file a
termination of parental rights petition unless the conditions of paragraph (d) are met.” Id.,
subd. 2(a). Father contends that the count y attorney did not comp ly with the statute
because it did not “immediately” file a TP R petition after the child was born in August
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2020, but instead filed the petition in February 2021. The district court acknowledged that
the statute requires the agency to request that the county attorney immediately file a
termination petition, but the district court concluded the statute did not place any obligation
on the county atto rney to immediately file the petition or to file the petition within any
specific time frame.
We need not reach the merits of father’s argument because he did not raise it until
his posttrial motion. See Antonson v. Ekvall , 186 N.W.2d 187, 189 (Minn. 1971)
(determining that a claim was raised “too late” when it was first suggested in a motion for
a new trial); Allen v. Cent. Motors, Inc., 283 N.W. 490, 492 (Minn. 1939) (determining that
a factual argument was “too late” when firs t raised in a motion for amended findings);
Grigsby v. Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d 716, 726 (Minn. App. 20 02) (“[A] issue first raised in a
post-trial motion is not raised in a timely fashion”). Although father could have moved to
dismiss the petition or for some other remedy prior to the trial, father chose not to raise the
argument until after the district court terminated his parental rights. Because the argument
regarding the agency’s statutory obligation was raised “too late,” we deem it forfeited.
II. Balancing of the Best Interests Factors
Father also challenges the district court’ s determination that termination of his
parental rights was in the child’s best interests. We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in weighing the best interests factors.
To terminate parental rights, the district court must determine, among other things,
that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child. of R.W., 678 N.W.2d
49, 55 (Minn. 2004). The best interests of the child are the “paramount consideration” in
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a TPR proceeding. Minn. Stat . § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020); In re Welfare of S.Z. , 547
N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996). When the interests of the parents and the interests of the
child conflict, the child’s interests prevail. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. In determining
whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the district court is to
balance three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship;
(2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing
interest of the child.” In re Welfare of Child of K.L.W., 924 N.W.2d 649, 656 (Minn. App.
2019), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 8, 2019); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii)
(instructing district courts to make specific findings on the three factors).
We give “considerable deference to the district court’s decision to terminate parental
rights.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). Similarly,
we will not reverse a district court’s best interests determination absent an abuse of
discretion. In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), rev.
denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is
against logic or the district court’s uncontested factual findings. In re Welfare of A.M.C.,
920 N.W.2d 648, 660 (Minn. App. 2018).
Father argues that termination was not in the child’s best interests because the child
had an interest in receiving financial support from father and terminating his parental rights
would cut off the child’s access to support. He relies on In re Welfare of Alle, 230 N.W.2d
574 (Minn. 1975), for the proposition that childre n have an interest in receiving financial
support from their parents and that termination of parental rights is contrary to the child’s
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best interests when it results in the child being depe ndent on just one parent for financial
support. We are not convinced for two reasons.
First, contrary to father’s argument, Alle d o e s n o t c o m p e l r e v e r s a l . T h a t c a s e
involved an adoptive father who wished to voluntarily terminate his parental rights. 230
N.W.2d at 576-77. The supr eme court determined that th e father did not have a good
reason for wanting to terminate his parental rights and that it was not in the children’s best
interests to no longer receive financial support from the father. Id. Alle’s reasoning is not
persuasive in the context of an involunt ary TPR proceeding in which the child has
competing interests weighing in favor of termination.
Second, the district court’s decision is not against logic or the facts in the record.
The district court considered the child’s inte rests in having a safe and stable environment
and living free from domestic vi olence and chemical abuse. The district court noted
father’s history of domestic abuse and found that he had not changed his behavior since his
parental rights to his other three children had been terminated. It credited the testimony of
the social worker, who expressed a concern th at the child was at ri sk of witnessing or
experiencing domestic abuse. The district c ourt’s reasoning is neither against logic nor
contrary to the facts. The district court appropriately weighed the competing factors and
concluded that any financial interests in ma intaining the parent-ch ild relationship were
outweighed by the child’s need for a safe and stable environment. We discern no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s weighing of the best interests factors.
Affirmed.