Joshua Raymond Armendariz, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0882

Joshua Raymond Armendariz, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 11, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File Nos. 07-CR-17-4136, 07-CR-17-4198, 07-CR-18-319, 07-CR-18-5197

Joshua Raymond Armendariz, Waseca, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Pres iding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Joshua Raymond Armendariz appeals from the district court’s summary
denial of his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.
FACTS
Between October 2017 and January 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged
Armendariz with multiple offenses in seven separate court files. In February 2019,
Armendariz and the state reached a global re solution. Armendariz pleaded guilty to the
following charges: threats of violence, 1 Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016); fleeing a
police officer in a motor vehi cle, Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2016); third-degree
driving while impaired (DWI), Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2016); felony domestic
assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2016); and felony violation of a no-contact order,
Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1) (2016). Un der the terms of the agreement, all other
charges, and three additional court files, would be dismissed at sentencing. The agreement
also called for concurrent sentencing so long as Armendariz remained law abiding between
his plea hearing and sentencing. If he did not, the state could seek permissive consecutive

1 Armendariz entered an Alford plea to the threats of violence offense. An Alford plea
permits “a court to accept a defendant’s guilty plea, even though the defendant [maintains]
his innocence, where the State [demonstrates] ‘a strong factual basis for the plea’ and the
defendant clearly [expresses] his desire to enter the plea based on his belief that the State’s
evidence would be sufficient to convict him.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn.
2007) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)).

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sentences for any or all of the offenses. 2 Following the plea hearing, Armendariz was
charged with several new offenses. At his sentencing hearing, the state sought consecutive
sentencing. The district court imposed consecutive sentences totaling 69 months and three
days in prison.
Armendariz, represented by counsel, then f iled a direct appeal, which was stayed so
he could pursue postconviction relief. In the district court, Armendariz moved to withdraw
his guilty pleas and requested th at his motion be heard by a different judge than the one
who had presided over his plea and sentenci ng hearings. The case was assigned to the
same judge. In a written order, the distri ct court addressed Arme ndariz’s allegation of
judicial bias, corrected one of the sentences that had improperly included a three-month
custody enhancement, and deni ed Armendariz’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Armendariz then reinstated his direct appeal, challenging only the district court’s denial of
his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. On appeal, he argued that the district court’s
decision to impose consecutive sentences violated his plea agreement. State v. Armendariz,
No. A19-1059, 2021 WL 79797, at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 11, 2021), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 30, 2021). We affirmed, concluding that the district court was entitled to impose

2 The district court had discretion to impose consecutive sentences without departing from
the sentencing guidelines. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a (Supp. 2017) (stating that a
district court may impose permissive consecutive sentences “if the presumptive disposition
for the current offense(s) is commitment,” and “[i]f the o ffender is being sentenced for
multiple current felony convictions for crimes on the list of offenses eligible for permissive
consecutive sentences”); Minn. Sent. Guidelin es 6 (Supp. 2017) (listing the offenses
eligible for permissive consecutive sentences).
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consecutive sentences under the terms of the pl ea agreement, and therefore did not abuse
its discretion in denying Armendariz’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Id. at *4-6.
Shortly thereafter, Armendariz filed a petiti on for postconviction relief in the district
court. In his postconviction petition, Armendariz raised the following three claims: (1) the
district court erred by failing to recuse from the earlier postconvic tion proceedings after
exhibiting bias at sentencing, (2) the distri ct court erred by sentencing him to a longer
duration than was called for under his plea ag reement, and (3) his sentences are unlawful
because they are based on an incorrect criminal history score. The district court summarily
denied the postconviction petition.
Armendariz appeals.
DECISION
Armendariz argues that the district court erred in denyi ng his postconviction
petition. Appellate courts “review the denial of a postconviction pe tition for an abuse of
discretion.” Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2020). A district court abuses its
discretion by exercising its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, basing its
decision on an erroneous view of law, or making clearly erroneous factual findings.
Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017).
Where, as here, a defendant has already taken a direct appeal, “all matters raised
therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be c onsidered upon a subsequent
petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976).
Issues that were raised on direct appeal, or could have been raised on direct appeal, are said
to be “Knaffla barred” if they are raised again, wh ich means that a court cannot consider
5
them. Zumberge v. State, 937 N.W.2d 406, 411 (Minn. 2019). In these circumstances, the
Knaffla rule always applies unless there are exceptional circumstances. Zumberge, 937
N.W.2d at 411-12. Exceptio nal circumstances exist wher e (1) a postconviction petition
presents “a novel legal issue . . . that was una vailable at the time of the direct appeal” or
(2) “the interests of justice require review.” Id.
Applying these principles here, we conclu de that two of the three issues that
Armendariz raises in hi s postconviction petition are Knaffla barred. First, Armendariz
argues that the district court judge assigned to his case was biased against him and should
have recused from his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was filed during the stay
of his direct appeal. Although the district court ruled on this issue, Armendariz did not
pursue it in his subsequent appeal to our court. Because the issue was known to
Armendariz at the time of his direct appeal but not raised, it is barred under Knaffla. See
Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 2008) (explaining that judicial-bias claims not
raised on direct appeal after conviction are Knaffla-barred).
Second, Armendariz argues that the distri ct court erred by imposing a different—
and longer—sentence than the one that was promised at th e time of his plea agreement.
But he raised this issue in his direct appeal to our court, and we determined that the plea
agreement allowed the district court to sentence consecutively if he failed to remain law
abiding. See Armendariz, 2021 WL 79797, at *6. Moreover, we concluded that the district
court did not err in finding that Armendariz failed to remain law abiding and in imposing
consecutive sentences on that basis. Id. Because we previously decided that the district
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court permissibly sentenced Armendariz to cons ecutive prison terms after he violated the
conditions of his plea agreement, his second claim is also barred under Knaffla.3
A district court does not abuse its discretion when it denies claims for postconviction
relief that are procedur ally barred by the Knaffla rule. Zumberge, 937 N.W.2d at 411.
Because Armendariz’s claims of judicial bias and improper deviation from the plea
agreement are Knaffla barred, the district court did no t abuse its discretion in summarily
denying them.4
Armendariz’s final issue is a challenge to his criminal history score. He argues that
the district court erred in sentencing him be cause “the court was not presented with a
correct criminal history score within the sentencing worksheet.” Although Armendariz did
not raise this issue in the district court, a defendant cannot waive or forfeit review of the
calculation of his criminal-history score because a sentence based on an incorrect criminal-
history score is an illegal sentence, which ca n be corrected at any time under the rules of
criminal procedure. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9; State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d
141, 147-48 (Minn. 2007). But after a dire ct appeal, the defendant bears the burden of

3 Armendariz has not alleged special circumstances that would preclude the application of
Knaffla.

4 We also note that the district court was not required to hold a hearing on Armendariz’s
postconviction petition. When “t he petition and the files . . . conclusively show that the
petitioner is entitled to no relief,” the dist rict court may deny a postconviction petition
without a hearing. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020). Moreover, the district court may
summarily deny a postconviction petition when it raises issues that an appellate court has
already decided in the same case. Id., subd. 3 (2020).

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proving that a criminal history score is inacc urate when bringing such a challenge under
the criminal procedure rules. Williams v. State, 910 N.W.2d 736, 743 (Minn. 2018).
We have carefully reviewed Armend ariz’s sentences and the corresponding
sentencing worksheets in the record. We note that the sentencing worksheet for one of his
four convictions—the conviction for threat s of violence, which was sentenced first—
erroneously included a three-month custody enhancement. But while his first appeal was
stayed, the district court corrected this erro r, reducing the 33-month sentence originally
imposed to the presumptive sentence of 30 months without the enhancement.
The remaining sentencing worksheets in the record reflect the presumptive
sentences for concurrent sentencing. Becaus e a district court generally must reduce a
defendant’s criminal history score to zero when imposing consecutive sentences, the
presumptive sentences listed on those work sheets are incorrect for the purpose of
consecutive sentencing. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.b (Supp. 2017) (providing that,
when sentencing consecutively, the district court must use a criminal history score of zero,
or the mandatory minimum if longer, to determine the presumptive duration). But although
the district court sentenced Armendariz co nsecutively, it did not impose the sentence
durations included in the sent encing worksheets. Rather, the district court imposed three
consecutive sentences of 12 months and one day. Those sentences reflect the presumptive
duration for the offenses of fleeing a police o fficer in a motor vehicle, felony domestic
assault, and felony violation of a no-contact order as calcul ated using a zero criminal
history score. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A, 5.A (Supp. 2017). Thus , although the
district court did not state on the record that it had reduced Armendariz’s criminal history
8
score to a zero in sentencing those offenses, we can infer from the sentences imposed that
it did. Because Armendariz received sentences that reflect the use of a correct criminal
history score, he has not shown that they are unlawful.
Affirmed.