State of Minnesota, by Jan Malcolm, Commissioner of Health in her official capacity, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0892

State of Minnesota, by Jan Malcolm,
Commissioner of Health in her official capacity,
Respondent,

vs.

The Iron Waffle Coffee Company LLC,
d/b/a The Iron Waffle Coffee Company,
Appellant.

Filed February 28, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-20-5745

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kaitrin C. Vohs, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Richard Dahl, Dahl Law Firm P.A., Brainerd, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Pr esiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
This case arises from a civil enforcement action brought by
respondent-commissioner against appellant, a coffee shop bu siness. Respondent brought
the enforcement action based on appellant’s operation of its coffee shop after its license to
operate as a food-and-bevera ge-service establishment wa s revoked by the Minnesota
Department of Health (MDH).
The district court issued a temporary injunction enjoining appellant from operating
without a food-and-beverage-service esta blishment license from MDH. Appellant
challenges the district court’s issuance of the temporary injunction and the district court’s
subsequent contempt order that resulted from appellant’s continued operation of the coffee
shop following issuance of th e temporary injunction. Becau se we discern no abuse of
discretion by the district court in the issuance of the temporary injunction or the contempt
order, we affirm.
FACTS
In June 2020, Governor Walz issued Emergency Executive Order (EEO) 20-74 in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Emerg. Exec. Ord. No. 20-74, Continuing to Safely
Reopen Minnesota’s Economy & Ensure Saf e Non-Work Activities during the COVID-19
Peacetime Emergency (June 5, 2020). EEO 20-74 incl uded provisions that placed
restrictions on the operation of food-and-beverage-service establishments in the state. Id.
The governor amended EEO 20-74 in July with the issuance of EEO 20-81, which required
Minnesotans to wear a mask or other face covering in indoor businesses and indoor public
3
settings. Emerg. Exec. Ord. No. 20-81, Requiring Minnesotans to Wear a Face Covering
in Certain Settings to Prevent the Spread of COVID-19 (July 22, 2020). EEO 20-81 applied
to food-and-beverag e-service workers, and it also requ ired those workers to wear face
coverings outdoors when it was not possible to maintain social distancing. Id. EEO 20-81
provided a limited exemption to the face-covering requirement for individuals with “a
medical condition, mental health condition, or disability that makes it unreasonable for the
individual to maintain a face covering.” Id. The governor issued EEOs 20-74 and 20-81
to help slow the spread of COVID-19. Id.; EEO 20-74.
On August 4, 2020, employees of MDH c onducted an inspection of appellant The
Iron Waffle Coffee Company LLC (Iron Waffle), a small coffee shop located near Gull
Lake. At the time, Iron Waffle had a license from MDH to operate as a food-and-beverage-
service establishment. Duri ng the inspection of the coff ee shop, MDH saw that several
staff members were not wearing masks and signs were posted informing staff and patrons
that they were free to choose whether they wore mask s. The MDH employees told Iron
Waffle to require staff to wear masks and to post signs informing st aff and patrons that
masks were required. On August 5, 2020, MDH employees again inspected Iron Waffle
and saw that three of the four staff presen t were not wearing mask s and that the signs
informing staff and patrons that masks were optional were still posted.
On August 6, 2020, MDH i ssued and sent Iron Waffle a cease-and-desist order,
telling it not to operate for 72 hours and advi sing it that the order could be lifted by
correcting specified violations of EEOs 20-74 and 20-81, including the face-covering
requirement. MDH employees observed th at Iron Waffle was co mplying with the
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cease-and-desist order by not operating on August 7, 2020. But, on August 10, 2020, they
observed that Iron Waffle was operating again and three staff members in the establishment
were not wearing masks. A week later, on August 17, 2020, MDH employees again saw
Iron Waffle in operation with staff members not wearing masks and with signs posted
informing staff and patrons that masks were optional.
On August 20, 2020, MDH sent a letter by first-class and certified mail, informing
Iron Waffle that MDH observed that its staff had not been wearing masks, that it had ten
days to respond to the letter, and that its response would be considered in determining
further enforcement action, including a possible $10,000 administrative penalty. No
response was received.
On September 11, 2020, MDH conducted an other on-site inspection and saw Iron
Waffle employees who were not wearing masks. Stacy Stranne, who identified herself to
the MDH employees as the person in charge of Iron Waffle, said she had not opened the
August 6, 2020 cease-and-desist letter until that day.
On September 24, 2020, MDH sent Iron Waffle by first-class and certified mail an
Administrative Penalty Order (APO) assessing penalties for failing to comply with the
face-covering requirement and requiring corre ctive action. MDH also informed Iron
Waffle that it could challenge the APO by reque sting a contested case hearing before an
administrative law judge within 30 days of r eceipt of the APO letter. No response or
request for a contested case hearing was rece ived by MDH. On October 30, 2020, MDH
inspected Iron Waffle and saw two employees not wearing masks and the posted signs
saying masks were optional.
5
On November 16, 2020, MDH sent a letter by first-class and certified mail to Iron
Waffle’s registered address notifying Iron Wa ffle that the correctiv e actions required by
the APO still had not been completed and, as a result, the full administrative penalty
assessed in the APO was now due. The letter also informed Iron Waffle, in bold print, that
its license to operate as a food-and-beverage -service establishment would be revoked 20
days after receipt of the letter unless the co rrective actions specified in the APO were
completed and the penalty paid by Iron Waffle. It further informed Iron Waffle that:
Since a license to operate a food and beverage service
establishment is required under Minnesota Statutes, section
157.16, subd. 1, you are require d to discontinue operating the
establishment 20 days after re ceipt of this letter, unless the
requirements of the APO have been met. Failure to discontinue
operations at that time will re sult in additional enforcement
action by MDH and by the Office of the Attorney General on
behalf of MDH.

Finally, the letter put Iron Waffle on notice that, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 144.99, subd. 10
(2020), it could request a contested case h earing regarding MDH’s proposed action to
revoke its license, but it needed to do so within 20 days after receipt of the letter.
Iron Waffle never requested a contested ca se hearing to challenge the proposed
revocation of its license. Iron Waffle also failed to take the corrective actions set forth in
the APO. As a result, on De cember 9, 2020, respondent commissioner of health (the
commissioner) revoked Iron Waffle’s license.
On December 12, 2020, M DH conducted an inspection and found Iron Waffle
operating after its license was revoked. MDH also observed Iron Waffle providing indoor
dining with neither employees nor patrons wearing masks.
6
On December 17, 2020, the commissioner filed the complaint in this matter, along
with a request for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunctive relief, on the
basis that Iron Waffle was opera ting without a valid MDH licen se, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 157.16 (2020). On that same date, MDH personally served Iron Waffle’s manager,
Stacey Stranne, with the summons and complaint. Along with the summons and complaint,
MDH served Stranne with a motion for a te mporary restraining order and temporary
injunctive relief, and with a copy of the November 16, 2020 revocation-notice letter.
On December 18, 2020, the district cour t issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining Iron Waffle from operating as a food-and-beverage-service establishment
without a license from MDH.
On March 16, 2021, following a delay requested by Iron Waffle, a hearing was held
on MDH’s motion for a temporary injunction. On May 18, 2021, the district court issued
a temporary injunction continuing the terms of the temporary restraining order throughout
the duration of the instant litigation. In its or der, the district court expressly declined to
address arguments made by Iron Waffle rega rding the underlying decision by MDH to
revoke Iron Waffle’s license and instead focu sed on the issue raised by the complaint,
whether Iron Waffle was operating after its lic ense was revoked in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 157.16.
On June 9, 2021, in respon se to a report that Iron Wa ffle was open for business,
MDH inspected Iron Waffle and found that it was operating without a license in violation
of both Minn. Stat. § 157.16 and the temporary injunction. MDH then moved the district
court to order Iron Waffle to show cause for wh y it should not be held in contempt. At a
7
show-cause hearing on June 22, 2021, the district court held Iron Waffle in civil contempt
for its failure to comply wi th the terms of the temporary injunction (and temporary
restraining order) and issued an oral order that Iron Waffle be fined $2,000 for each day
that it operated without a license. The district court’s oral order was confirmed in a written
order for contempt filed on June 29, 2021, with the provision that the fines would begin to
accrue on the date of the oral order.
This appeal follows.
DECISION

Iron Waffle challenges the district court’s grant of a temporary injunction pursuant
to Minnesota Statutes section 144.99 (2020) barring Iron Waffle from operating as a food-
and-beverage-service establishment without a license from MDH. Iron Waffle also
contends that this court should reverse the district court’s order finding Iron Waffle in
contempt for failing to comply with the district court’s temporary-injunction order.
Minnesota law requires a license from MD H to operate “a food-and-beverage-
service establishment.” Minn. Stat. § 157.16, subd. 1. Section 144.99 authorizes the
commissioner to bring an action for injunctive relief in district court to enjoin a violation
of the provisions of chapter 157. Minn. Stat. § 144.99, subds. 1, 5.
“A decision on whether to grant a temporar y injunction is left to the discretion of
the [district] court and will not be overturned on review ab sent a clear abuse of that
discretion.” Carl Bolander & Sons v. City of Minneapolis, 502 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Minn.
1993). “A district court’s findings regarding entitlement to injunctive relief will not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous.” Haley v. Forcelle, 669 N.W.2d 48, 55 (Minn. App. 2003),
8
rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003). “It is erro r, however, for the trial court to grant
injunctive relief without evaluating specific factors.” Wadena Implement Co. v. Deere &
Co., 480 N.W.2d 383, 388-89 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 1992). A
district court’s civil contempt order is al so reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Erickson v. Erickson, 385 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. 19 86). For the reasons discussed
below, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its issuance of either the
temporary-injunction order or the contempt order.
I. The district court acted within its di scretion when it issued the temporary
injunction.

Iron Waffle contends that the district court abused its discretion when it granted the
temporary injunction, arguing that MDH was not entitled to a temporary injunction and
that MDH erred by revoking its license for alleged violations of EEOs 20-74 and 20-81.
The commissioner responds that the district court acted within its discretion when it issued
the temporary injunction becau se Iron Waffle was violati ng Minn. Stat. § 157.16 by
operating without a valid food-and-beverage -service establishment license. The
commissioner further contends that MDH’s underlying license-revocation decision was not
within the scope of the temporary-injunction proceeding.
Generally, when a district court considers whether to issue a temporary injunction,
it considers five factors commonly known as the Dahlberg factors. See Dahlberg Bros.,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. , 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (Minn. 1965); DSCC v. Simon ,
950 N.W.2d 280, 286-87 (Minn. 2020). Those factors include: (1) the parties’ preexisting
relationship; (2) the relative harms suffered by plaintiff if the injunction is denied and by
9
defendant if the injunction is granted; (3) the likelihood of each party’s success on the
merits; (4) the requirements or implications of public policy, if any; and (5) the
administrative burdens involved, if any. Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 321-22.
But when “injunctive relief is explicitly au thorized by statute proper exercise of
discretion requires the issuance of an injuncti on if the prerequisites for the remedy have
been demonstrated and the in junction would fulfill the legi slative purposes behind the
statute’s enactment.” Wadena, 480 N.W.2d at 389 (citing United States v. White ,
769 F.2d 511, 515 (8th Cir. 1985)); see also State by Ulland v. Int’l Ass’n. of Entrepreneurs
of Am., 527 N.W.2d 133, 137 (Minn. Ap p. 1995) (approving use of Wadena standard in
context of temporary injunction except when a party disputes that it was subject to the
statute to be enforced, in which case the district court must consider the Dahlberg factors),
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 1995). In other words, an injunction authorized by statute may
issue without an application of the Dahlberg factors where the statutory criteria for the
injunction are met and issuance of the injunction serves the purposes of the statute.
In its temporary-injunction order, the di strict court concluded that a temporary
injunction was supported under either standard. First, applying Wadena, the district court
concluded that the commissioner met her burden for the issuance of an injunction under
the authority of section 144.99 because Iron Waffle “continued operating after its license
was revoked” in violation of Minn. Stat. § 157.16, subd. 1, and “injunctive relief would
fulfill the legislative purpos e” of Minn. Stat. § 144.99. 1 Second, and alternatively, the

1 The court also found that it had authority to issue th e temporary injunction under Minn.
Stat. § 145.075 (2020) and issuance of the in junction would fulfill the purpose of that
10
district court concluded that an analysis of the “traditional Dahlberg factors” also
supported issuance of a temporary injunction. On appeal, Iron Waffle focuses primarily
on the district court’s Dahlberg analysis. In the interest of completeness, we address the
district court’s analysis under both Wadena and Dahlberg.
Wadena Analysis
We conclude that the issuance of the temporary injunction was a proper exercise of
the district court’s discretion under the standard set forth in Wadena because the injunction
was explicitly authorized by se ction 144.99 and fulfills the purposes of that statute. As
noted above, section 144.99 expressly authorizes the commissioner to bring an action “for
injunctive relief” in district court “to enjoin a violation” of th e provisions of chapter 157.
Minn. Stat. § 144.99, subds. 1, 5. Here, the district court found that Iron Waffle was
operating without a valid license in violation of section 157.16. Therefore, the district court
correctly concluded that the temporary inj unction was explicitly authorized by section
144.99. In addition, the issuance of the temporary injunction furthers the purpose of section
144.99 by enjoining that viola tion of law and, as the district court found, protecting “the
health and safety of [Iron Wa ffle’s] patrons and employees during the pendency of th[e]
litigation.” Accordingly, the issuance of the temporary injunction was consistent with the
standard set forth in Wadena. See Wadena, 480 N.W.2d at 389. Iron Waffle does not argue
otherwise.

statute. Section 145.075 provides that, “[i]n addition to any other remedy provided by law,
the commissioner may in the commissioner’s own name bring an acti on in the court of
appropriate jurisdiction to enjoin any violation of a statute or rule which the commissioner is
empowered to enforce or adopt.” Minn. Stat. § 145.075.
11
Dahlberg Analysis
Instead, Iron Waffle challenges the district court’s analysis of the Dahlberg factors.
Iron Waffle contends that “each of the factors in Dahlberg” weigh in its favor. Its brief,
however, only addresses factors two and three. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to those
factors.
The second factor requires the district c ourt to analyze the relative harms to be
suffered by the parties if injunctive relief is granted or denied. Iron Waffle argues that the
district court abused its discretion in wei ghing the harms because a temporary injunction
would “put [Iron Waffle] out of business for the speculation about . . . employees who were
not wearing masks.” We are not persuaded that Iron Waffle has demonstrated an abuse of
discretion by the district court.
In its order, the district court properly analyzed and balanced the relative harms.
The district court considered that the temporary injunction would preclude Iron Waffle
from operating without a license but conclude d that the harm resulting to Iron Waffle’s
business from an injunction would not be significant because, lacking a license, Iron Waffle
cannot legally operate—with or without an injunction. The district court further found that
the potential harm to MDH if the injunction were denied would be considerable because
MDH could not fulfill its function of protecting the public by requiring food-and-beverage-
service establishments to have licenses. Importantly, the dist rict court found that “[t]he
prospect of irreparable harm to the public from unlicensed activity—regardless of whether
[the harm] is COVID-19 related—far outweighs the harm to a single business” from an
injunction. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s analysis of this factor.
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The third factor requires the district court to consider the moving party’s likelihood
of success on the merits. With regard to this factor, the district court concluded that the
commissioner “will likely prevail on the merits because [Iron Waffle] continued to operate
its business after its license wa s revoked[,] in violation of Mi nnesota law.” The district
court noted that “it is undisp uted that [Iron Waffle’s] license to operate was revoked and
that defendant requires a license before it can operate.” Because it is undisputed that Iron
Waffle was operating without a license in violation of chapter 157, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the district court in its analysis of the third fact or. Therefore, we conclude
that Iron Waffle has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when
it determined that the Dahlberg factors supported the issuance of a temporary injunction.
Iron Waffle’s Alternative Arguments Regarding the Underlying License Revocation
Iron Waffle also contends that the district court’s decision to issue the temporary
injunction was an abuse of discretion because MDH’s underlying administrative decision
to revoke Iron Waffle’s license was improper. This contention is the primary focus of Iron
Waffle’s brief on appeal. In support of its view that its license was not properly revoked,
Iron Waffle argues that: (1) MDH did not pr operly serve Iron Wa ffle with the letter
notifying it of the proposed revocation of its license; 2 (2) two of its employees qualified

2 This argument goes to service of the MDH revocation letter, not th e complaint in this
matter. Iron Waffle argues that service was insufficient because it was by mail rather than
by personal service. The commissioner notes that Iron Waffle makes this argument for the
first time on appeal. We do not reach the merits of this argument because it is outside the
scope of this appeal. But, if we did, we would conclude th at the argument fails because
Minn. Stat. § 144.99, subd. 10, expressly authorizes the commissioner to provide notice of
a proposed license revocation “in writing.”
13
for a medical exemption from the mask requ irement under EEO 20-81; and (3) MDH did
not have the authority to enforce the EE Os promulgated by the governor. The
commissioner counters that these arguments do not go to the merits of its current lawsuit,
which is based on Iron Waffle’s operation wi thout a MDH license—not the grounds for
the license revocation. The commissioner furt her argues that these arguments amount to
an impermissible collateral attack on MDH’ s decision to revoke Iron Waffle’s license,
which became final prior to the filing of the current lawsuit.
In its order granting the temporary injunction, the district court declined to address
similar arguments regarding MDH’s underlying decision to revoke Iron Waffle’s license,
stating:
This court has no jurisdiction to review the merits of the
revocation of [appellant’s] license to operate. If [appellant]
disagreed with the revocation of its license, its sole remedy was
an administrative appeal and a co ntested case hearing. Minn.
Stat. § 14[4].99, subd. 10 (2020) (sole recourse for challenging
validity of administrative licen se revocation is through the
contested case provisions of ch apter 14). The only path to
appeal from the outcome of a contested case proceeding is
certiorari review by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Minn.
Stat. §§ 14.63-.68 (2020). Based on [appellant’s] failure to file
an administrative appeal from any of the administrative orders,
including but not limited to the order revoking its license, the
administrative orders are fina l and non-reviewable by this
court or by any other court. Accordingly, [appellant’s]
collateral attack on the validity of [MDH’s] revocation of its
license is beyond the scope of the court’s jurisdiction and the
instant litigation.

The district court’s conclusion that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review
MDH’s decision to revoke the license is correct.
14
State law sets forth a specific legal pro cess for a food-and-beverage-establishment
owner to challenge the revocation of its li cense by MDH. Under section 144.99, MDH
may revoke a license to operate for serious or repeated viola tions of the requirements of
section 157. Minn. Stat. § 144.99, subds. 1, 9(1). Prior to revo king the license, the
commissioner “must first notify, in writing, the person against whom the action is proposed
to be taken and provide the person an opportunity to request a hearing under the contested
case provisions of chapter 14.” Id., subd. 10. At the contested case hearing, the licensee
can raise legal objections to the proposed license revocation and present evidence in
support of its position. See Minn. Stat. § 14.02, subd. 3 (2020) (providing that a “contested
case” means a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges
of specific parties are determined after an agency hearing); Minn. Stat. §§ 14.58, 14.60-.61
(2020) (setting the procedures for a contested case hearing conducted by an administrative
law judge on behalf of the agency, including an opportunity for parties to present evidence
and argument against the proposed action). The administrative law judge, who conducts
the contested case hearing on behalf of the ag ency, has the authority to decide the legal
rights of the parties. Minn. Stat. § 14.50 (2020); Minn. R. 1400.5500 (2020). If MDH
proceeds to revoke the license after a contested case hearing, the licensee may seek judicial
review of the revocation decision by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with this court
within 30 days of the receipt of the final decision. Minn. Stat. § 14.63. But, if a licensee
does not request a contested case hearing, MDH may revoke the license without a hearing
and the revocation becomes a final agency decision. Minn. Stat. § 144.99, subd. 10.
15
The process set forth above provides the exclusive means for a food-and-beverage-
establishment owner to challenge a decision by MDH to revoke its license to operate. See
Minn. Stat. §§ 14.63, 144.99. No statute vests judicial review of MDH’s decision to revoke
a license in the district court. And, absent express statutory lang uage vesting judicial
review of an agency decision in the district courts, a petition for a writ of certiorari provides
the exclusive means for review of an agency decision. Mowry v. Young, 565 N.W.2d 717,
719 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1997); see also Dokmo v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1990) (s tating that “[c]onstitutional principles
of separate governmental powers require that the judiciary refrain from a de novo review
of administrative decisions”); Minn. Stat. § 480A.06, subd. 3 (2020) (providing that “[t]he
court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to all agencies”).
Here, the district court found, and Iron Waffle does not dispute, that Iron Waffle did
not request a contested case hearing challenging MDH’s proposed revocation of its license
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 144.99. And it did not seek review of the decision to revoke its
license by a writ of certiorari. As a result, MDH’s decision to revoke its license is a final
agency decision no longer subject to judici al review. Minn. Stat. §§ 14.63, 144.99,
subd. 10. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to
address Iron Waffle’s arguments regarding MDH’s underlying decision to revoke its
license.3

3 Because this case does not come to us on a petition for a writ of certiorari, we decline to
address for the first time the merits of Iron Waffle’s arguments relating to MDH’s decision
to revoke its license. Those arguments we re forfeited by Iron Waffle when it failed to
request a contested case hearing or petition for review by a writ of certiorari.
16
In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its issuance of the
temporary injunction prohibiting Iron Waffle from operating its coffee shop without a valid
license from MDH as required by Minn. Stat. § 157.16.
II. Iron Waffle has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion
by holding Iron Waffle in civil contempt.

In its statement of the case, Iron Waffle asserts that it appeals from both the district
court’s temporary-injunction order and the contempt order. The district court’s contempt
order was based on its finding that Iron Waffle failed to comply with the temporary
injunction. In its brief, Iron Waffle makes no argument as to why the contempt order
should be reversed. Issues not briefed on appeal are waived. State v. Butcher ,
563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1997).
To the extent that Iron Waffl e implies that reversal of the contempt order should
flow from reversal of the temporary injunction , that argument fails. As discussed above,
Iron Waffle has not demonstrated any basis for re versal of the district court’s issuance of
the temporary injunction. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by issuing the temporary injunc tion and Iron Waffle has not identified any
independent reason for reversal of the contempt order, we discern no basis for reversal of
the district court’s order holding Iron Waffle in contempt for failing to comply with the
district court’s temporary-injunction order.
Affirmed.