Almir Puce, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0895

Almir Puce,
Appellant,

vs.

City of Burnsville, MN.,
Respondent.

Filed February 7, 2022
Reversed
Johnson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CV-19-2127

Stephen W. Cooper, St acey R. Everson, The Cooper La w Firm, Chartered, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Paul D. Reuvers, Aaron M. Bostrom, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. To comply with section 462.358, su bdivision 2b, of the Minnesota Statutes,
a municipality may impose a park-dedicati on fee only if the m unicipality reasonably
determines that it will need to acquire and develop or improve a reasonable portion of land
as a result of the municipality’s approval of a subdivision.
2. To comply with section 462.358 , subdivision 2c(a), of the Minnesota
Statutes, a municipality may impose a park-dedication fee on a subdivision only if there is
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a rough proportionality between the fee and the need for the acquisition and development
or improvement of parkland created by the proposed development, as demonstrated by an
individualized determination that the fee is related both in nature and extent to the impact
of the proposed development.
OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A property owner applied to a city for permission to redevelop residential property
for commercial use. The city approved the application but imposed a park-dedication fee.
The property owner objected to the park-dedication fee a nd sought judicial review in the
district court, which determined that the park -dedication fee is lawful. We conclude that
the city’s imposition of the park-dedication fee does not comply with a state statute because
the city did not reasonably determine that it will need to acquire and develop or improve
parkland as a result of its approval of the development application and because there is not
a rough proportionality between the park-dedication fee and any need for acquisition and
development or improvement of parkland as a result of the municipality’s approval of the
development application. Therefore, we reverse.
FACTS
In 2015, Almir Puce purchased real proper ty located at 2208 Old County Road 34
Place in the city of Burnsville . The property was zoned fo r commercial use but had a
lawful non-conforming house. Puce and his family lived in the house until 2017.
Beginning in 2018, Puce sought to redevelop the property for commercial use, in
three phases. For the first phase, Puce planned to operate an automobile dealership and a
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bakery in the existing structure. For the second phase, he planned to build a new building
for an automobile repair shop. And for the th ird phase, he planned to improve part of the
property to create an open storage lot.
In May 2018, Puce submitted an applicati on to the City of Burnsville seeking
approval of a preliminary and final plat of the property, a conditional use permit (CUP),
and variances related to signa ge and land grading. In mi d-January 2019, the City’s
planning commission reviewed Puce’s applic ation and, by a 4-to-1 vote, recommended
approval of the plat, approval of a CUP, a nd denial of the variances, subject to 17
conditions, including the payment of a park-dedication fee in the amount of $37,804.1 Puce
objected to the City’s imposition of a park-dedication fee as well as the amount of the fee.
He asked the City to waive th e fee on the ground that his pl anned automobile dealership
and bakery would not result in a need for more parkland or park services.
In late January 2019, th e city council reviewed the planning commission’s
recommendations. At a city council meeting, Puce, through counsel, again objected to the
park-dedication fee. He argued that his fu ture businesses would not increase the number
of persons living in the area or using parks in the area. In response, the city attorney stated
that there is a “need for open space created any time th at open land is developed or

1Ordinarily, a park-dedication fee is owed only when property is subdivided. See
Minn. Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2b(a), (i) (2020). In this case, Puce’s lot was created by a
subdivision in 2000. The owner of the property at that time paid a park-dedication fee on
the northern parcel of the subdivided property, which then was developed. But the owner
had no plans to develop the southern parcel of the subdivided property, which now is owned
by Puce, so the owner and the City agreed to defer the payment of a park-dedication fee on
the southern parcel until it was platted and developed.
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redeveloped and used at a higher intensity than previously used.” The city council tabled
Puce’s application to a future meeting to gather more information.
In February 2019, the City reduced the park-dedication fee from $37,804 to
$11,700. The City did so by recalculating the size of Puce ’s property and by using the
actual fair market value of Puce’s property instead of the average value of commercial
property in the city. Puce maintained his objection to the imposition of any park-dedication
fee.
In March 2019, the city coun cil considered Puce’s application for a second time. At
a council meeting, the city attorney explained the calculation of the $11,700
park-dedication fee. He stated that the three phases of Puce’s proposed development would
add 7,254 additional square feet of building stru cture to the property. He also stated that
the City’s ordinances seek to reserve parkla nd and that “most properties within [the city]
have a park within walking distance.” Councilmember Schulz asked the city attorney
where the city intended to create a new park. The city attorney answered by stating that he
was not aware of any “actual land acquisition in the foreseeable future” but that the City
typically acquires land for pa rks when oppo rtunities arise and “cont inually reviews and
enhances amenities” for existing parks. Councilmember Peterson noted that the city was
focused on expanding its trails and that there was a “gap” in the trail system near Puce’s
property, and he stated that “many resident s” could use the connected trails, including
customers of Puce’s businesses. The city attorney conclu ded by stating that business
development generally “increases the demand on public services, including parks” and that
the City uses park-dedication fees to fund “new capital improvements that enhance and
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provide additional capacity to serve developments” such as Puce’s development.
Councilmember Schulz asked the city attorney whether a park-dedication fee is appropriate
if a development does not directly cause a need for additional parkland. The city attorney
answered in the negative, explaining that the City has a form ula for calculating a
park-dedication fee that is “predicated on development having an impact and requiring the
need.” At the conclusion of the meeting, the city council voted to deny Puce’s request for
a waiver of the park-dedication fee. The council approved the plat and the requested CUP,
approved a sign variance, and denied a land-grading variance.
In May 2019, Puce commenced an action in the Dakota County District Court for
judicial review of the city council’s decision to impose a park-dedication fee. In late 2019,
Puce and the City filed cross-motions for summa ry judgment. The district court denied
both motions on the ground that there existed ge nuine issues of material fact. In January
2021, the district court conduct ed a court trial based solely on the parties’ submission of
17 exhibits. In April 2021, the district c ourt filed an order in which it concluded,
“Defendant’s imposition of a park-dedication fee in the amount of $11,700 is lawful.” Puce
appeals.
ISSUE
Does the City’s imposition of an $11,700 park-dedication fee on Puce’s
development application comply with section 462.358 of the Minnesota Statutes?

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ANALYSIS
Puce argues that the City erred by imposing a park-dedication fee in the amount of
$11,700 on his development appl ication and that the district court erred by determining
that the fee is lawful.
A.
A state statute provides that municipa lities “may by ordinanc e adopt subdivision
regulations establishing standards, requireme nts, and procedures for the review and
approval or disapproval of subd ivisions.” Minn. Stat. § 462. 358, subd. 1a (2020). Such
an ordinance “may address without limitation: the size, location, grading, and improvement
of lots, structures, public areas, streets, roads, trails, walk ways, curbs and gutters, water
supply, storm drainage, lighting, sewers, elec tricity, gas, and other utilities,” as well as
other issues. Id., subd. 2a. An ordinance regulati ng subdivisions “shall require that
subdivisions be consistent with the municipality’s official map if one exists and its zoning
ordinance, and may require consistency with other official controls and the comprehensive
plan.” Id.
In addition, an ordinance regulating subdi visions “may require that a reasonable
portion of the buildable land . . . of any proposed subdivision be dedicated to the public or
preserved for public use as stre ets, roads, sewers, electric, gas, and water facilities, storm
water drainage and holding areas or ponds and similar utilities and improvements, parks,
recreational facilities as defined in section 471.191, playgrounds, trails, wetlands, or open
space.” Id., subd. 2b(a). The term “reasonable portion,” as used in the statute, means “that
portion of land which the evidence reasonably establishes the munici pality will need to
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acquire for the purposes stated as a result of approval of the subdivision.” Collis v. City of
Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976). “The municipality must reasonably
determine that it will need to acquire that portion of land for the purposes stated in this
subdivision as a result of approval of the subdivision.” Minn. Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2b(e).
Furthermore, as an alterna tive to taking a reasonable po rtion of the buildable land
of any proposed subdivision, a municipality “may choose to accept a cash fee as set by
ordinance from the applicant for some or all of the new lots created in the subdivision,
based on the average fair market value of th e unplatted land for which park fees have not
already been paid.” Id., subd. 2b(c). “Cash payments re ceived must be placed by the
municipality in a special fund to be used on ly for the purposes for which the money was
obtained.” Id., subd. 2b(f). The cash payments “must be used only for the acquisition and
development or improvement of parks, recreational facilities, playgrounds, trails, wetlands,
or open space based on the approved park systems plan” and “must not be used for ongoing
operation or maintenance of parks, recreational facilities, playgrounds, trails, wetlands, or
open space.” Id., subd. 2b(g).
Whether a municipality takes a reasonabl e portion of the bu ildable land of a
proposed subdivision or exacts a cash payment, “[t]here must be an essential nexus
between the fees or dedication . . . and the municipal purpose sought to be achieved by the
fee or dedication,” and “[t]he fee or dedication must bear a rough proportionality to the
need created by the proposed subdivision or development.” Id., subd. 2c(a).
The supreme court, in interpreting an earlie r version of the statute, explained that
the statute places limits on a municipality’s authority to regulate subdivisions:
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[T]he possibility of arbitrarin ess and unfairness in [the]
application [of subdivision regula tions] is . . . substantial: A
municipality could use dedication regulations to exact land or
fees from a subdivider far out of proportion to the needs created
by his subdivision in order to avoid imposing the burden of
paying for additional services on all citizens via taxation. To
tolerate this situation woul d be to allow an otherwise
acceptable exercise of police power to become grand theft. But
the enabling statute here prev ents this from occurring by
authorizing dedication of only a ‘reasonable portion’ of land
for the purposes stated. We th erefore uphold the statute as
constitutional.

Collis, 246 N.W.2d at 26.
The City has an ordinance regulating subdivisions, which provides, in part:
Pursuant to Minnesota statutes, section 462.358,
subdivision 2a, the city council shall require all developers
requesting platting or replatti ng, or the development of
unplatted land in the city to contribute lands . . . to be dedicated
to the public for their use as e ither parks, playground, public
open space, trail systems, water ponding, public lands or to
contribute an equivalent amount of cash.

Burnsville, Minn., Code of Ordinances (BCO) § 11-4-8(A) (2013). The City’s ordinance
contains a formula for determining the amount of land to be dedicated or, alternatively, the
amount of a park-dedication fee:
The dedication formula for commerc ial and industrial district
development shall be five percent (5%) of the gross land area.
Where the city council elects to take cash in lieu of land, such
contribution shall be based up on land dedication requirement
multiplied by the average cost per acre by z oning district as
established, from time to time, by the city council.

BCO § 11-4-8(E).

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B.
Puce argues that the city co uncil and the district court erred for four reasons. First,
he argues that the City’s ordinance regulating subdivisions is facially inconsistent with
subdivisions 2b(e) and 2c(a) of section 462. 358 in that the ordinance requires a park-
dedication fee equal to five percent of the value of commercial property, regardless whether
such an amount is equivalent to the value of “a reasonable portion of the buildable land”
of a proposed subdivisi on. Second, he argues that th e City’s imposition of an $11,700
park-dedication fee on his development applic ation violates subdivisions 2b(e) and 2c(a)
of section 462.358. Third, he argues that the City’s ordinance regulating subdivisions is
facially inconsistent with federal and state constitutional provisions concerning takings of
property and that the City’s imposition of a park-dedication fee in this case also is
unconstitutional on an as-applied basis. And fourth, he argues that the City has violated
subdivision 2b(f) of section 462 .358 by not segregating th e funds received from park-
dedication fees and not ensuri ng that the funds are used fo r a proper purpose. Because
facial challenges generally are disfavored , we begin by considering Puce’s second
argument. See McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 831 N.W.2d 518, 522-23 (Minn. 2013).
Before considering Puce’s second argume nt, we must determine the appropriate
scope and standard of review. Judicial review of a municipality’s zoning decision springs
from the following statute:
Any person aggrieved by an ordinance, rule, regulation,
decision or order of a governing body or board of adjustments
and appeals acting pursuant to sections 462.351 to 462.364
may have such ordinance, rule , regulation, decision or order,
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reviewed by an appropriate remedy in the district court, subject
to the provisions of this section.

Minn. Stat. § 462.361, subd. 1 (2020). On a ppeal from a district court’s review of a
municipality’s zoning decision, this c ourt reviews the municipality’s decision
“independent of the findings and conclusions of the district court.” Northwestern College
v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn. 1979); see also C.R. Investments, Inc.
v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. 1981). If the record of proceedings
before the municipality is clear and complete , judicial review is based on only that
record. Swanson v. City of Bloomington , 421 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 1988) (reviewing
city’s denial of application to subdivide lot ). But a district court may “receive additional
evidence only on substantive issues raised and considered by the municipal body and then
only on determining that the additional evidence is material and that there were good
reasons for failure to present it at the municipal proceedings.” Id. In this case, the City
offered, and the district court admitted, three exhibits that were not before the city council.
Puce does not challenge the district court’s ad mission of those exhibits, and neither party
challenges the record relied on by the district court.
The parties disagree about the standard of review. Puce argues that a de novo
standard of review applies on the ground th at his argument is based on the meaning of
section 462.358 and on a factual record consisting solely of exhibits. Meanwhile, the City
argues that a clear-error standard of review applies. Our standard of review is
deferential. Swanson, 421 N.W.2d at 311. We ask “whether the zoning authority’s action
was reasonable” and whether there is “a reasonable basis for the decision” or, on the other
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hand, whether the decision is “unreaso nable, arbitrary or capricious.” Id. (quotations
omitted). The supreme court recently summarized the standard of review as follows:
We will reverse a governing body’s decision regarding
a conditional use permit application if the governing body
acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously. Schwardt v.
Cnty. of Watonwan, 656 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn. 2003). There
are two steps in determining whether a city’s denial was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or ca pricious. First, we must
determine if the reasons give n by the city were legally
sufficient. C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Vill. of Shoreview , 304 N.W.2d
320, 325 (Minn. 1981). Second, if the reasons given are legally
sufficient, we must determine if the reasons had a factual basis
in the record. Id.

RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington , 861 N.W.2d 71, 75-76 (Min n. 2015). To the extent
that we must interpret a statute or an ordinance, we apply a de novo standard of review for
that limited purpose. See id. at 75; City of Morris v. Sax Investments, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 1,
5 (Minn. 2008). Because we are obligated to look through the district court’s decision and
review the City’s zoning decision independently, we do not apply a clear-error standard of
review to the district court’s decision. Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 415
n.4 (Minn. 1981) (citing Northwestern College, 281 N.W.2d at 868 n.4).
C.
Puce’s second argument has two parts. He first contends that the City’s imposition
of a park-dedication fee violates subdivision 2b(e) of section 462.3 58 on the ground that
the City did not make “any individualized assessment of what, if any, new park need was
created by granting” his development application. He asserts that the City does not have
any evidence that its approval of his developm ent application will result in an increase in
expenditures on parks. In response, the City contends that any development inevitably
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causes an “influx” of people and, “[l]ogically, an influx to the area will increase the use of
the nearby public facilities, parks, and trails.”
The first question is whether “the reasons gi ven by the city were legally sufficient.”
See RDNT , 861 N.W.2d at 75-76. As far as the re cord reveals, the City’s reasons for
imposing a park-dedication fee on Puce are not stated in writing. 2 At oral argument, the
City’s appellate attorney asked this court to find the City’s reasons for its decision in the
transcript of the city council meeting at which the decision was made. But the meeting
transcript does not reveal any reasons shared by a majority of the city council. There was
a discussion of various issues raised by Puce’s application, including the park-dedication
fee as well as the height of signage and the grading of land near a stormwater pond. At the
end of the discussion of Puce’s application, there was a motion to approve the application
as a whole, subject to certain conditions. But there was no motion specifically relating to
the park-dedication fee.
Nonetheless, our review of the meeting tr anscript reveals that the city council was
under the mistaken assumption that it could impose a park-dedication fee simply because
it was approving additional development, without making a reasonable determination that
it will need to acquire and deve lop or improve a reasonable po rtion of land as a result of
the City’s approval of Puce’s development application. This requirement is found in Collis,

2The record before this court contains an unsigned draft of a six-page document with
findings of fact related to Puce’s application. The minutes of the city council’s March 5,
2019 meeting state that a motion was made, seconded, and passed to, among other things,
adopt findings of fact. But a signed copy of the findings is not in the record. In any event,
the unsigned draft does not specifically disc uss the legal or factua l basis of the park-
dedication fee.
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which concerned a facial challenge to a prior ve rsion of the statute and a city ordinance.
The supreme court held that the statute wa s not unconstitutional specifically because the
statute prevented municipalities from “us[ing] dedication regulations to exact land or fees
from a subdivider far out of proportion to the needs created by his subdivision in order to
avoid imposing the burden of pa ying for additional services on all citizens via taxation.”
Collis, 246 N.W.2d at 26 (emphasi s added). The statute wa s constitutionally valid, the
supreme court reasoned, because it “authoriz[ed] dedication of only a ‘reasonable portion’
of land for the purposes stated.” Id. The statute has since been amended in various ways,
but it continues to authorize dedication of only “a reasonable portion” of land, see Minn.
Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2b(a), and that limitation limits a municipality’s ability “to exact
land or fees,” Collis, 246 N.W.2d at 26 (emphasis added). To comply with section 462.358,
subdivision 2b, of the Minnesota Statutes, a municipality may impose a park-dedication
fee only if the municipality reasonably determines that it will need to acquire and develop
or improve a reasonable portion of land as a result of the municipality’s approval of a
subdivision. Accordingly, th e City’s decision to impose a park-dedication fee on Puce’s
development application does not have a proper legal basis.
The second question is whether “the [City ’s] reasons had a factual basis in the
record.” See RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 76. To support it s argument on this issue, the City
cites to three exhibits. One exhibit is a 2017 master plan for the City’s parks system, which
describes various recommendations for future actions. But that document predates Puce’s
application and, thus, does not show that the City’s approval of Puce’s development plans
would require the acquisition of more parkland. Another ex hibit is a map of the area
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surrounding Puce’s property, but the map cont ains no information about whether Puce’s
development plans would cause more park usage. The third exhibit is a transcript of the
city council’s March 5, 2019 meeting. As discussed above, there was only a brief and
general discussion at that meeting about Puce’ s development and a gap in nearby trails.
That discussion does not provide a sufficient factual basis, even under our deferential
standard of review, for a reasonable determ ination that the City’s approval of Puce’s
development plans would give rise to a need to acquire and develop or improve parkland.
Rather, the transcript shows that the City imposed a park-dedication fee simply by applying
its five-percent formula. The City has cited no other facts in the record to indicate that the
City’s approval of Puce’s application actually would cause an identifiable increase in park
usage and, thus, a need for new or improved parkland. Accordingly, the City’s decision to
impose a park-dedication fee does not have a proper factual basis.
Thus, the City violated su bdivision 2b(e) of section 462.358 when it imposed a park-
dedication fee on Puce.
D.
Puce also contends that the City’s impos ition of a park-dedication fee violates
subdivision 2c(a) of section 462.358 on the grounds that there is not an “essential nexus”
between the park-dedication fee and its purpose and that ther e is not a “rough
proportionality” between the $11,700 park-d edication fee and the need for new or
improved parkland, if any, as a result of the City’s approval of Puce’s development
application. See Minn. Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2c(a). We construe Puce’s argument to
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challenge the factual basis of the City’s reasons for imposing a fee. See RDNT, 861 N.W.2d
at 75-76.
The parties’ arguments require the court to ascertain the meaning of the terms
“essential nexus” and “rough proportionality.” The terms are not defined by statute. See
Minn. Stat. § 462.352 (2020). We ordinarily in terpret a statute according to the ordinary
meaning of the words used in the statute. See, e.g., Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963
N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn. 2021). But in certain situations, we interpret a statute according
to the specialized meaning of the words used in the statute. See, e.g., State v. Bowen, 921
N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. 2019). “Whether to ascribe a technical or special meaning [to a
word or phrase] depends in part upon the context in which the word appears.” Id.
(quotation omitted; alteration in original); see also Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 884 N.W.2d
621, 624, 627 (Minn. 2016).
It is apparent that the terms “essen tial nexus” and “rough proportionality” in
subdivision 2c(a) have a specia lized meaning in the context of the exaction of a fee or a
dedication of real property as a condition of the approval of a land-use application. In
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), a state agency conditioned a
building permit on the requirement that beach front landowners allow a public easement
across their property. Id. at 828. The United States Supreme Court held that the imposition
of the easement violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause because the commission’s
stated goal of preserving visual access to th e ocean lacked an “essential nexus” to the
permit condition. Id. at 836-37. In Dolan v. City of Tigard , 512 U.S. 374 (1994), a city
planning commission conditioned approval of a property owner’s expansion of her
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business on her compliance with two sets of land dedications. Id. at 379-80. The United
States Supreme Court held that the land dedications were uncompensated takings because,
although a nexus existed betw een the commission’s stated purpose and the dedications,
there was not a “rough proportionality” between the proposed development’s impact and
the dedications. Id. at 386-96.
After the Supreme Court’s opinions in Nollan and Dolan, the legislature amended
section 462.358 by inserting the concepts of “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality.”
See 2004 Minn. Laws ch. 178, § 3, at 243. Since that amendment, the United States
Supreme Court has held that, to comply with the Takings Clause, monetary exactions also
must satisfy the essential-nexus and rough-proportionality requirements. Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. , 570 U.S. 595, 614 (2013). In light of the specialized
meaning of the terms “essentia l nexus” and “rough proportio nality” in this context, we
interpret those terms in subdivision 2c(a) in the manner in wh ich they are used in federal
takings caselaw. See Bowen, 921 N.W.2d at 766; Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624, 627.
Consequently, we first ask whether there is “an essential nexus between the fees or
dedication imposed under subdivision 2b and the municipal purpose sought to be achieved
by the fee or dedication.” Minn. Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2c(a). Under federal constitutional
caselaw, a governmental entity may establish an essential nexus if there is a connection
between a legitimate state inte rest and a permit condition. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; see
also Kottschade v. City of Rochester , 537 N.W.2d 301, 307- 08 (Minn. App. 1995)
(analyzing takings claim), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 1995). This is not an onerous
requirement, and it may be satisfied if there is merely a logical connection between the
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legitimate state interest and the exaction of a dedication or fee. For example, in Nollan,
the Supreme Court reasoned that there was an essential nexus between the governmental
interest in protecting visual access to the ocean and a permit condition requiring a viewing
spot of the ocean on the appellant’s private pr operty. 483 U.S. at 836. In this case, the
City decided to impose a park-dedication fe e to fund the acquisition and development or
improvement of parkland arising from Puce’s development of his property. That purpose
satisfies the essential-nexus test.
We also ask whether there is “a rough proportionality” between the park-dedication
fee and “the need created by the proposed su bdivision or development.” Minn. Stat.
§ 462.358, subd. 2c(a). For purposes of federal constitutional caselaw, the Supreme Court
has stated, “No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some
sort of individualized determination that th e required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development.” Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. Moreover,
a municipality “must make some effort to quantify its findi ngs in support” of a taking
beyond conclusory statements about the possible impact. Id. at 395-96. In Dolan, the city
required the property owner to dedicate a 15-foot strip of land on her property for use as a
pathway for pedestrians and bicyclists. Id. at 380. The city calculated that the property
owner’s development would ge nerate approximately 435 ad ditional trips per day on the
city’s streets. Id. at 395. But the Supreme Court reas oned that the city had not satisfied
the rough-proportionality requirement becaus e the city’s finding that the pedestrian
pathway could offset the projected increase in street traffic was a conclusory statement and
a “far cry” from a finding that the pathway will offset such an increase. Id. at 395-96. The
Supreme Court also reasoned that the city must achieve its "policy of providing a
continuous pathway system" "by condemnation unless the required relationship between
petitioner's development and added traffic is shown." Id. at 395 n.10.
In this case, there is nothing in the record that is an "individualized determination"
concerning the "nature and extent" of "the impact of the proposed development," let alone
an "effort to quantify" that impact. See id. at 391, 395-96. Furthermore, it is apparent that
the City determined the amount of the $11,700 park-dedication fee solely by applying the
five-percent formula in its ordinance. BCO § 11-4-8(E). Accordingly, there is not a rough
proportionality between the park-dedication fee and any need for the acquisition and
development or improvement of parkland as a result of the City's approval of Puce's
development application.
Thus, the City violated subdivision 2c(a) of section 462.358 when it imposed a park­
dedication fee on Puce's development application.
DECISION
For the reasons stated above, the City's decision to impose an $11,700 park­
dedication fee on Puce was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. See RDNT, 861
N.W.2d at 75-76. Having resolved Puce's second argument in his favor, it is unnecessary
to resolve his first, third, or fourth arguments. Given the circumstances surrounding the
City's erroneous decision, the appropriate remedy is reversal of the district court's decision
and the City's decision, without a remand for further proceedings. See In re Livingood,
594 N.W.2d 889, 893-95 (Minn. 1999).
Reversed.
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