In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. M. M. R., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0901

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. M. M. R., Parent.

Filed January 31, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Jackson County District Court
File No. 32-JV-21-19

Christa J. Groshek, Groshek Law, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Thomas J. Nolan, Jr., Nolan Law Offices , Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
guardian ad litem)

Travis Smith, Smith & Johnson, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent Des Moines Valley
Health and Human Services)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M.,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges a district court order terminating her parental rights to
her minor child and denying her petition to transfer legal and physical custody of the child
to the child’s maternal grandmother. Becaus e the record supports the district court’s
determination that a statutory ground for termination exists and termination is in the child’s
best interests, we affirm. We also affirm the district court’s denial of mother’s petition to
transfer legal and physical custody.
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FACTS
Appellant A.M.M.R. is the biological mother of Child 1, born in 2009, and Child 2,
born in 2011, and the adoptive mother of Child 3, born in 2016.1 In July 2019, respondent
Des Moines Valley Health and Human Services (the county) received reports that mother
and the children were living in a home with mother’s boyfriend, a registered predatory
offender with a long history of substance abus e. The county opened an investigation to
determine whether it was safe fo r boyfriend to live in mother’s home w ith the children.
During the investigation, the county learned that mother and boyfriend abused substances,
including methamphetamine, in front of the children. One time, Child 1 texted her maternal
grandmother to report that mother and boyfriend were “going crazy,” causing the children
to feel scared and unsafe. Grandmother contacted the police. Police officers arrived at the
home and discovered that mother was under the influence of methamphetamine and unable
to properly care for the child ren. The county removed th e children from the home and
placed them in grandmother’s care that evening.
The county then filed a petition in October 2019, alleging that the children were in
need of protection or services (the CHIPS petition). Mother waived her rights and admitted
facts sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need
of protection or services. The district court transferred legal custody of the children to the
county. The county placed Child 1 and Child 2 in the care of their biological father (father)

1 Mother adopted Child 3 at birth. Mother’s sister is Child 3’s bi ological mother. Child
3’s maternal grandmother is his biological grandmother.
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and his wife. The county placed Child 3 in relative foster care with his maternal
grandmother.2 The district court adjudicated the children in need of protection or services.
In March 2021, the county filed a petition to involuntarily terminate mother’s
parental rights (TPR) to Child 3.3 The county alleged three statutory grounds in support of
termination: (1) mother substa ntially, continuously, or repeat edly refused or neglected to
comply with the duties imposed by the parent and child re lationship; (2) mother failed to
correct the conditions leading to Child 3’ s out-of-home placement despite reasonable
efforts by the county; a nd (3) Child 3 was neglected in foster care. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (5), (8) (2020).
The day after the county filed the TPR petiti on, mother filed a petition to transfer
permanent legal and physical custody of Child 3 to grandmother.
The district court held a three-day trial in the spring of 2021 on the county’s TPR
petition and on mother’s petition to transfer legal custody of Child 3 to grandmother. The
district court heard testimony from eight witnesses, including the county social worker,
mother’s drug and alcohol counselor, grandmot her, father, Child 3’s therapist, mother,
Child 3’s teacher, and the guardia n ad litem (the GAL). The district court found that the
county proved the exis tence of all three statutory grou nds for termination by clear and
convincing evidence. The district court also determined that termination of mother’s

2 Because father was not Child 3’s biological or adoptive father, the county did not consider
him to be a placement option for Child 3 at that time.
3 Mother voluntarily transferred permanent legal and physical custody of Child 1 and Child
2 to father. The county thus did not recomm end terminating mother’s parental rights to
Child 1 and Child 2. Child 3 is the only subject of this appeal.
4
parental rights was in Child 3’s best interests. The district court then terminated mother’s
parental rights to Child 3 and denied her petition to transfer legal and physical custody of
Child 3 to grandmother.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Parental rights may only be terminated for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district court may involuntarily
terminate a parent’s parental rights if (1) at least one of the statutory bases for terminating
parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) exists; (2) reasonable efforts
toward reunification were either made or were not required; and (3) the proposed
termination is in the child’s best interests. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8
(2020); .317, subd. 1 (2020); see also In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381,
385 (Minn. 2008). In district court, the county bears the burden of proving these grounds
for termination, In re Welfare of Child of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 869-70 (Minn. 2021),
and must do so by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a).
A district court’s decision to terminate parental rights is discretionary with that court. In
re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136-37 (Minn. 2014).
I. The district court did not abuse its disc retion when it terminated mother’s
parental rights after finding that reasonable efforts, under the direction of the
court, failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home
placement.
Mother challenges the district court’s de termination that th e county proved the
existence of a statutory basis to terminate her parental rights to Child 3—that “reasonable
5
efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the
child’s placement” under Minn. Stat. § 260C .301, subd. 1(b)(5). A reviewing court
presumes that reasonable efforts have failed if: (1) the “child has resided out of the parental
home under court order for a cumulative period of 12 months”; (2) “the court has approved
the out-of-home placement plan”; (3) the “conditions leading to the out-of-home placement
have not been corrected” as shown by the parent not “substantially [complying] with the
court’s orders and a reasonable case plan”; and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made by
the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id., subd.
1(b)(5)(i)-(iv). Only the third and fourth elements are at issue in this appeal.
“We review the termination of parental rights to determine whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s findings are
supported by substantial eviden ce and are not clearly erro neous[,]” and, in doing so,
“closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and
convincing.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. We also “review the district court’s findings of
the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its determination of whether a
particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse
of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “A finding is clear ly erroneous if it is either manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a
whole.” In re Welfare of Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation
omitted).
6
Mother failed to correct conditions leading to Child 3’s out-of-home placement.
As for the third element, th e district court found that reasonable efforts failed to
correct the conditions leading to Child 3’s out-of-home placement because mother failed
to comply with her court-ordered case plan. As explained below, the record supports this
finding. The county b ecame involved with the family in July 2019. Mother’s boyfriend
registered his address as mother’s address. The county began to investigate whether it was
safe for boyfriend to live in mother’s home with the children becaus e he is required to
register as a predatory offender. The county learned that mother and boyfriend were
abusing substances, including methamphetamine, in front of the ch ildren. Child 1 and
Child 2 were “afraid” of boy friend and uncomfortable with him moving into the home.
The county also received report s that mother failed to supe rvise the children due to her
substance use and left the children home alone . On one such occasion, Child 1 texted
grandmother that she was scared and did not feel safe. Grandmother contacted the police.
Police officers arrived at the home and discovered that mother was under the influence of
methamphetamine, “very much out of it,” and unable to properly care for the children.
Following the CHIPS adjudica tion, the county filed a cas e plan with the district
court. The district court ordered mother to comply with this case plan. The case plan
required mother to receive chemical-dep endency treatment, a ttend counseling and
medication-management appointments, and maintain safe, sober, clean, and stable housing.
The case plan also addressed requirements for boyfriend if he continued to live with
mother. Boyfriend was not permitted to be the sole caregiver for the children. Although
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the children were not liv ing in mother’s home th en, during visits w ith mother, boyfriend
was not permitted to be alone with the children.
The district court heard testimony during the TPR hearing that mother failed to
comply with her court-ordered case plan. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine in
October 2019 and November 2019. Mother began treatment and participated in her first
course of chemical-dependency treatment from December 2019 to June 2020. Mother was
initially “very successful” in treatment. Following her first course of treatment, the district
court permitted the children to have a trial home visit with mo ther in June 2020. But the
county ended the home visit a week later after receiving reports that boyfriend was acting
as the children’s sole caregiver and drove the children in his vehicle without a valid license.
The children returned for a second trial home visit on August 25, 2020. Although mother
tested positive for methamphetamine on both December 3 and December 4, 2020, the
county did not end the trial home visit. In stead, the district court ordered mother to
complete an updated ch emical-dependency evaluation. Mo ther did not begin outpatient
treatment until several months later. Her drug and alcohol counselor testified that mother
was less engaged during her second course of treatment. The counselor believed that
mother was at “a moderate risk of relapse” based on her “lack of consistent behavior, low
motivation to change her behaviors and her passive involvement in treatment.”
In January 2021, the county ended the second trial home visit because boyfriend
was still living in the home and mother reported that boyfriend assaulted her. The county
also learned that in January, mother left the children unattended in her car for over an hour
8
while she was in a casino. Child 2 became frightened and called her mother 22 times in
one hour, but mother did not answer her phone from the casino.
In March 2021, police officers stopped mo ther for a traffic violation in Iowa.
Boyfriend’s minor daughter was in the car w ith mother. Officers discovered alcohol,
marijuana, and a pipe in the car. During th e police investigation, boyfriend’s daughter
stated that boyfriend and moth er were living together, and th at mother was helping hide
boyfriend from the authorities. Mother denied that boyfriend was part of her life. But later
that month, police officers in Iowa stopped boyfriend’s vehicle and identified mother as a
passenger in his vehicle.4
Mother claims she correct ed the conditions leading to Child 3’s out-of-home
placement because she participat ed in treatment and stopped interacting with boyfriend.
The district court acknowledged that mother was at first “ver y successful in treatment”
from December 2019 to June 2020. But the district court noted that mother tested positive
for methamphetamine twice in December 2020, after her first course of treatment. The
district court also concluded that mother co ntinued to deny respon sibility for her actions
and displayed an unwillingness to internalize the lessons presented during treatment. The
district court found that mother “continues to deny any [substance] use in December 2020,”
despite two positive methamphetamine tests. The district cour t determined that mother’s
“denial and her compliance as a defense have slowed her progression through the current
treatment.” The district court determined that mother “will not have completed the

4 Mother moved to Spirit Lake, Iowa, in April 2021, one month before the beginning of her
TPR trial.
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program and does not appear to be taking what she is learning and applying it to her daily
life.” The district court found that the county facilitated two trial home visits but terminated
both visits because mother allowed boyfriend to superv ise the children by himself,
boyfriend assaulted mother, and mother left the children in a car at a casino for over an
hour and ignored 22 calls from Child 2. The district court determined that despite the
county’s efforts, “the conditions leading to the out of home placement . . . have continued.”
The record supports the district court’s fi ndings that mother failed to abide by her
case plan and correct the conditions leadi ng to Child 3’s out-of-home placement. The
social worker testified that mother “complied with some of the recommendations in some
of the plans,” but that mother’s compliance was not “substantial[] or continuous[].” Mother
had “numerous positive [urinalysis tests]” since the children were removed from the home.
Mother also tested positive twice for methamphetamine in December 2020. Mother tested
positive for alcohol in June 2021, during her TPR trial. Mother’s alcohol and drug
counselor testified that mother succeeded during the first cour se of chemical dependency
treatment but seemed “more guarded” and “strained” dur ing her second course of
treatment. The counselor considered this “significant” because mother seemed to be “just
kind of complying, but not really taking in the experience.” The counselor does not believe
mother is motivated to change. The counselor testified that mother continues to deny that
she tested positive for drugs, despite her pos itive test results. Th e counselor assessed
mother as being at a “moderate” risk of relapse because of her inconsistent behaviors, lack
of motivation to change, and passive involvem ent in treatment. The social worker also
expressed concerns that mother continued to deny having a substance-abuse problem.
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The social worker testified that another “big problem” throughout the case was
mother’s relationship with boyfriend. The social worker noted that mother spent a lot of
time around “individuals who are not sober,” including boyfriend, which is “a huge factor
for relapse.” Additionally, although boyfriend was not permitted to supervise the children
alone, mother allowed boyfriend to be alone with the children throughout the case.
The social worker testified that mother continuously denied that boyfriend was part
of her life. That said, both of mother’s tria l home visits were terminated, in part, because
mother continued to allow boyfriend to be alone with the children. And while mother
denied at trial that she was still in contact with boyfriend, police officers in Iowa conducted
a traffic stop of boyfriend’s vehicle in Ma rch 2021—two months before the TPR trial—
and identified mother as a passenger in his vehicle. Boyfriend had a criminal court hearing
in April 2021. Boyfriend asked the court to amend his release conditions to permit him to
reside with mother until he could get into a drug-treatment program. Mother was present
for that court hearing also and asked th e court overseeing boyfriend’s case to allow
boyfriend to stay at her home.
The GAL echoed the social worker’s c oncerns about moth er’s inability or
unwillingness to change her behavior. The GAL testified that “as soon as we’re out of the
courtroom,” mother allows boyfriend back in her life and exhibits behaviors that are
“inconsistent” with her case plan. The GAL did not believe mother was able to place Child
3’s needs above her own. The GAL supported terminating her parental rights.
And mother’s own testimony supports the district court’s findings on this element.
At trial, counsel asked mother: “You agree, would you not, that because you’re making a
11
request that [Child 3] be placed permanently either with [grandmother] or with [father and
his wife] that by making those recommendations, you’re acknowledging [Child 3] can’t be
returned to you, correct?” Mother responded, “I am acknowledging that.” We appreciate
mother’s candor about her inabil ity to care for Child 3 at that time. But her inability to
have the child returned to her care 18 months after his removal from her home in October
2019 supports the district court’s factual findi ngs that Child 3 cannot be returned to her
care.
We therefore determine that the evidence supports the district court’s findings that
mother has not corrected the conditions that led to Child 3’s out-of-home placement.
The county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify the family.
As to the fourth element, the district court found that the county made reasonable
efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunite the family. Before a district court may terminate
parental rights, the county must either ma ke reasonable efforts at reunification or be
excused from doing so. Minn . Stat. § 260.012(a) (2020); T.R. , 750 N.W.2d at 664.
Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real,
genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W. , 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App.
2007) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). The district court considers
whether the services offered we re: (1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child;
(2) adequate to meet the n eeds of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the
circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). Finally, the district court must consider
“the length of the time the county was invo lved and the quality of effort given.” In re
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Welfare of H.K. , 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6,
1990).
The district court made detailed findings of fact about the county’s efforts to
alleviate the conditions that gave rise to th e need for Child 3’s ou t-of-home placement.
The district court determined that the services offered by the county “were relevant to the
safety and protection of [Child 3], adequate to meet the needs of the child and family,
culturally appropriate, available and accessible, consistent and timely, and realistic under
the circumstances.” These services includ ed: chemical-health se rvices for mother,
individual therapy for moth er, play therapy for Child 3, medication management,
diagnostic assessments for mother and the children, intensive family-based therapy, regular
urinalysis tests, couples counseling for moth er and boyfriend, and supervised visits.
Despite these efforts, the district court found that “the conditions leading to the out of home
placement . . . have continued.”
The record supports the district court’s reasonable-efforts findings. The social
worker testified about two courses of chemical-dependency treatment and that the county
offered “intensive family-based therapy as a whole family unit,” including mother,
grandmother, father, and all three children. Yet the social worker testified that by
September 2020, mother was “kind of just done ” with family therapy. Mother admitted
she did not complete family-bas ed therapy. In addition, mo ther acknowledged that both
attempts to return the child ren to her home failed. The county arranged two trial home
visits at mother’s home to reunify the family . But both visits we re terminated because
mother failed to comply with her court-ordered case plan.
13
Mother argues the county did not help her find programs. Mother claims the county
did not help her find services for her chemical use and that she had to seek out these services
on her own. The record betrays this claim. At trial, the attorney asked mother’s counselor
how he first became acquainted with mother. The counselor testified that he began working
with mother during he r first course of chemical-depen dency treatment when “[s]he was
referred by . . . Des Moines Valley Health and Human Services.” The attorney later asked
the counselor how mother “came into . . . programming for a second time,” whether through
“a self-referral by [mother] or . . . an external referral from elsewhere.” The counselor
responded that the social worker referred mother for the second course of chemical-
dependency treatment.5
The district court determined that the county established by clear and convincing
evidence that it made reasonable efforts to re unify mother and Child 3. The evidentiary
record supports the district court’s factua l findings, and the factual findings support the
district court’s legal conclusion, that the county made reasonable e fforts to reunify the
family under the fourth element.
Upon review of the four elements in su bdivision 1(b)(5), we determine that the
record supports the district court’s determinations that the county made reasonable efforts

5 Mother also argues that the county failed to provide adequa te family therapy services
because the original program identified by the county would not accept Child 3 due to his
age and the county failed to identify another program. Mother failed to allege sufficient
facts to support this argument and we are unable to address it. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327
N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (deeming arguments forfeited on appeal that are unsupported
by facts in record).
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to rehabilitate mother and reunify the family, and that, despite those reasonable efforts,
mother failed to correct the conditions leading to Child 3’s placement out of the home.6
II. Termination of mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
Even if a statutory basis for termination exists, the child’s be st interests are the
“paramount consideration” in a termination pr oceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7
(2020); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2 020). The district court balances
three factors in a best-interests analysis: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and
(3) any competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); see also
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (“Competing interests [of the child] include such things as a
stable environment, health considerations and the child ’s preferences.” (quotation
omitted)). We review a district court’s best -interests determination for an abuse of
discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. “[D]eterminati on of a child’s best interests is
generally not susceptible to an appellate cour t’s global review of a record, and . . . an
appellate court’s combing through the record to determine best interests is inappropriate
because it involves credib ility determinations.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 771
N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009).
The district court thoroughly and thoughtf ully weighed the statutory best-interests
factors. First, the district court considered Child 3’s interest in preserving the relationship

6 Because we affirm on this ground, we need not address the remaining two grounds for
termination. See In re Welfare of Child. of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 & n.2 (Minn. 2004)
(recognizing that only one statutory ground mu st be proven to support termination of
parental rights).
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with mother. The district court recognized that mother and Child 3 “have a connection and
bond,” and that “[v]isits betw een the two go well.” The dist rict court found that Child 3
has connections with his extended biological family, including grandmother. The district
court also acknowledged testimony from the social worker and the GAL “that these
relationships are important” and that mother “will have some role or part of [Child 3’s] life
going forward.”
Second, the district court also found that mother has an interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship. Th e district court found that mo ther loves Child 3 “and has a
bond with him.” The district court noted that mother wants to continue to have a
relationship with Child 3 and th at father agreed to facilitate visits between mother and
Child 3, provided mother remains sober. Mother argues that while father is willing to allow
mother to have contact with Child 3, “there is no guarantee under law that this relationship
will be allowed.” We acknowledge that upon termination of mother’s parental rights, “all
rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations, including any rights to
custody, control, visitation, or support ex isting between the child and parent shall be
severed.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1 (2020). But the district court credited testimony
from father and the social worker that it was in Child 3’s best interests to have contact with
mother so long as she remained sober and agreed to facilitate those visits.
Finally, the district court considered th e competing interests of the child. The
district court found that Child 3 has an interest in living in a stable, secure home, free from
chemical use, and in an environment where his caregivers prioritize his needs. The district
court found that “[i]t is this supervision and stability of [mother’s] home that has been a
16
concern through the child protection proceeding s.” The district court noted that mother
“admits she is unable to provide such an environment for [Child 3] at the current time.”
Based on these findings, the district court found it was in Child 3’s best interests to
terminate mother’s parental rights. The dist rict court’s best-interests findings are amply
supported by the record. Mother did not prov ide a safe and stable home for Child 3.
Mother used methamphetamine while Child 3 was in her care . She allowed boyfriend to
supervise the children alone. She left the children alone in a car in January while she was
inside at a casino. The county tried to reunite mother and Child 3 twice, but then terminated
both visits. The social worker testified that she did not belie ve it was in Child 3’s best
interests to be returned to mother because it would not be safe to do so. The GAL agreed
it was in Child 3’s best intere sts to terminate mother’s pare ntal rights and permit Child 3
to find stability in “a forever home.” The di strict court credited this testimony and
concluded that Child 3 had an interest in achieving a safe and stable permanent home free
from drug use, which mother could not provide.
In its discussion of Child 3’s best interest s, the district court also considered the
county’s recommendation to permanently place Child 3 with father and his wife. Mother
claims the district court improperly considered whether Child 3’s best interests would be
served by living with father. We acknowledge that the TPR statute “does not require
assessment of a child’s adoptability.” In re Welfare of J.M., 574 N.W.2d 717, 724 (Minn.
1998). Once a parent’s parental ri ghts have been terminated, however, J.M. does not
prohibit a district court from considering a child’s adoptability. Id. Moreover, even if the
17
district court improperly considered, and made findings on, the county’s placement
options, the outcome of the termination decision did not turn on these findings.
The district court did not a buse its discretion by consid ering Child 3’s need for a
stable home, which is a proper consideration in a best-interests analysis. The district court
balanced the competing interest of Child 3 for a safe, sober, and stable living environment
against mother’s interest in maintaining a relationship with him and determined that this
balance favored termination of mother’s parental rights. The record supports the district
court’s underlying findings on the best-interests factors, and, given that these findings are
supported, we cannot say that the district c ourt abused its discretion in concluding that
those factors balanced in favor of termina ting mother’s parental rights. Thus, the
paramount consideration of Child 3’s best interests supported te rminating mother’s
parental rights.7
In sum, because at least one statutory gr ound for termination is supported by clear
and convincing evidence and termination is in Child 3’s best interests, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by terminating mother’s parental rights to Child 3.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied mother’s transfer-
of-legal-custody petition.

7 Mother also claims the district court erred because it should have placed Child 3 in the
same legal position as his siblings. Mother does not support this argument with legal
authority, and we decline to address it. See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel
Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (d eclining to address an inadequately
briefed question); In re Child of P.T. , 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n. 1 (Minn. App. 2003)
(applying Wintz in TPR appeal); see also Melina, 327 N.W.2d at 20. We note, however,
that mother’s briefing to this court did not fully explain what she meant by putting Child 3
in the same legal position as his siblings. Thus , even if we were inclined to address her
claim on the point, our ability to do so would be limited, at best.
18
Mother challenges the district court’s deni al of her petition to transfer permanent
legal and physical custody of Child 3 to grandmother. We review a district court’s decision
on whether to transfer custody for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child. of A.I. ,
779 N.W.2d 886, 895 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. dismissed (Minn. Apr. 20, 2010).
Transferring legal custody to a fit and willing relative is one of several permanency
dispositions a district court may order in a child-protection procee ding. Minn. Stat.
§§ 260C.513, .515 (2020). Under the permanency statute, “[t]ermination of parental rights
and adoption, or guardianship to the commissioner of human services through a consent to
adopt, are preferred permanency options for a child who cannot return home.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.513(a). But “[i]f the court finds that termination of parental rights and guardianship
to the commissioner is not in the child’s best interests, the court may transfer permanent
legal and physical custody of the child to a re lative when that order is in the child’s best
interests.” Id. The permanency statute carries a pr esumption that a TPR is preferred to
transferring legal custody. See id. Minnesota law also recognizes the importance of
placing siblings together. Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(d) (2020) (“Siblings should be
placed together for foster car e and adoption at the earliest possible time . . . .”). Thus,
under a plain reading of the statute, a district court need not consider a transfer-of-custody
petition if termination of parental rights is appropriate.
The supreme court recognizes that the “t ermination of parental rights is always
discretionary with the juvenile court,” and the district court “is not required to grant or to
deny” any petition. In re Welfare of Child. of J.D.T., 946 N.W.2d 321, 328 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted). In J.D.T., the court considered whethe r a parent’s petition for an
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alternative permanency option “would automatically supplant an earlier-filed involuntary
petition” to terminate parental rights. Id. The supreme court determined that it did not:
A district court presented with petitions for both voluntary and
involuntary termination of parental rights may therefore use its
discretion to grant one, both, or neither under the termination
statute, keeping the best interests of the child as the paramount
consideration.
Id. at 328-29. J.D.T. involved competing petitions for an involuntary TPR and a voluntary
TPR, while this case involves a TPR petition and a transfer-of-custody petition. Id. at 325.
But the principle remains that a district court has wide latitude to exercise its discretion in
permanency matters in a way th at serves the best interests of the child, when faced with
competing placement alternatives. Id. at 328-29.
Here, the district court found that “[i]n co nsidering what is in [Child 3’s] best
interest, the stability prov ided by adoption is in [his] best interest.” The district court
provided a thorough explanation to support its determination and the record supports this
decision. Father lives with his wife, Child 1, Child 2, and two other children. Father and
his wife are willing to take Child 3 into their home and incorp orate him into their family.
Father is also willing to work with grandmothe r and mother to facilitate contact with the
children. The county consider s father’s home to be a fitti ng placement for Child 3. The
social worker noted that father and Child 3 “have always known each other,” and Child 3
“appears really comfortable” with father and views him as a “father figure.” The social
worker observed Child 3 in father’s home and noticed that he “played nicely.” The GAL
also observed Child 3 in father’s home and stated that “he was very comfortable in that
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setting.” Father and his wife have been cooperating with the foster care licensing and the
adoption-home-study process.
Mother testified in support of her petition to transfer custody of Child 3 to
grandmother. Mother is concerned that she and grandmother will not see Child 3 as often
if father and his wife adopt him. Grandmother claimed Child 3 did not like to go to father’s
home and wanted to stay with her. Grandmother testified that at first she “got along great”
with father and his wife and th at everyone went “the extra m ile” to allow the siblings to
see one another. But grandmother testified that the relationship became strained when the
county filed the perman ency petition. Grandmother belie ves this tension arises from
differing discipline styles and an incident in which grandmother snuck a cell phone to 4-
year-old Child 3 against father’s wishes.
The GAL considered grandmother’s statemen ts about father and his wife to be
“inconsistent” with her own observations. And the GAL is concerned about Child 3
remaining permanently in grandmother’s care. The GAL believes Child 3 has a right to be
raised with his siblings and have “a forever home” where he can establish roots and be part
of a family.
Both the GAL and the social worker we re concerned about grandmother getting
Child 3 to school. The GAL testified that Ch ild 3 will get a more c onsistent educational
experience with father and his wife, with fewer disruptions to his school year. By contrast,
the GAL did not believe grandmother was “veste d in that education.” The record shows
that Child 3 “missed a lot of schooling” while he was living with grandmother. And the
social worker testified that several of thes e absences did not seem to be for “legitimate
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reasons.” The social worker was concerned that living with grandmother could hinder
Child 3’s schooling.
Grandmother disagreed with the county’s contention that she did not get Child 3 to
school regularly. Child 3’s teacher testified that Child 3 missed school often, but she did
not believe these absences were illegitimate. But the social worker testified that she had
concerns that grandmother was not meeting Child 3’s educational needs. The social worker
testified that grandmother did not believe children of his age should be in preschool. The
social worker stated that grandmother did not take Child 3 to school when the roads were
icy, when it was too cold, or when the temperatures dropped below zero. The social worker
stressed that “school [is] still in session” during cold days, and Child 3 was “still expected
to be there.” The social worker estimated that Child 3 missed between 20 and 30 school
days during the school year. By contrast, the social worker testified that father and his wife
“get the kids to school” and will meet Child 3’s educational needs.
The GAL testified that Chil d 3’s emotional needs will be better met with father.
The GAL stated that in her opinion, Child 3 should be “allowed to be adopted, with his
siblings.” The social worker similarly testified that she be lieves Child 3’s best interests
will be served by terminating mother’s parental rights and “then, adoption of [Child 3] by
[father and his wife] into the home where his two sisters live.” The social worker did not
believe transfer of custody to grandmother would be in Child 3’s best interests. The district
court’s decision reflects that it found the te stimony of these witnesses credible, and we
defer to these credibility determinations. See In re Welfare of L.A.F. , 554 N.W.2d 393,
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396 (Minn. 1996) (“Considerable deference is due to the district court’s decision because
a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.”).
On review, we determine that the district court’s decision adheres to the permanency
statute and controlling caselaw. As a result, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s determination that the best intere sts of the child sup ported an involuntary
termination of mother’s parental rights and did not support a transfer of legal and physical
custody.
Affirmed.