Idyllwood Homeowners Association, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0903

Idyllwood Homeowners Association,
Respondent,

vs.

Town of Ideal,
Appellant,

and

Jeffrey Feltmann,
Intervenor below.

Filed March 14, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CV-20-3150

Gary A. Van Cleve, Bryan J. Huntington, Maureen A. Lodo en, Larkin Hoffman Daly &
Lindgren, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Idy llwood Homeowners
Association)

Scott A. Witty, Courtney L. Beck, Hanft Fride, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant town challenges the district court’s summary judgment determination that
the town board’s esta blishment of a cartway across respondent landowner’s parcel was
arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. We determine that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment in respondent’s favor and reversing the town board’s
resolution granting the cartway petition. We therefore reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
Jeffrey A. Feltmann (Feltmann) owns a 5. 9-acre parcel of property within the
boundaries of appellant Town of Ideal (the town). Feltmann’s property abuts land owned
by respondent Idyllwood Homeowner’s Association (Idyllwood). Idyllwood is a planned
community of Idyllwood Homes. Feltmann’s property is located between Crow Wing
County Road 39, Ideal Avenue, and Valhalla Road. Ideal Avenue ends in a cul-de-sac
about 40 feet from Feltmann’s property line. Attached below is an aerial image of
Feltmann’s property and the surrounding parc els. The landlocked Feltmann property is
outlined in blue and titled “Ideal.” Valhalla Road is a dead-end road in the bottom right
corner of the aerial picture. The cul-de-sac on Ideal Avenue is in the bottom middle of the
image. Old Milwaukee Supper Club is between the western border of Feltmann’s property
and County Road 39. This image is intended to provide the reader with a sense of the areas
in dispute.
3

Ideal Avenue was constructed as part of Idyllwood’s planned community. The
planned community was originally designed to be a low-density neighborhood secured by
cul-de-sac dead ends. There are five building sites on the cul-de-sac on Ideal Avenue, only
one of which is constructed.
In January 2020, Feltmann petitioned for a cartway to connect his landlocked
property to a public road. The petition proposed creati ng a cartway across Idyllwood’s
land from an existing trail n ear the cul-de-sac on Ideal Avenue, about 40 feet from
Feltmann’s property (the Ideal Avenue route). Attached below is a scanned image of the
proposed cartway route from the petition. This image shows the cul-d e-sac at the end of
Ideal Avenue. Although the boxes labeled “2 ” and “3” suggest that there are houses in
these areas, the area is unbuilt.

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Idyllwood opposed the petitio n asserting that the Idea l Avenue rout e would cut
through a cul-de-sac on Idyllwood’s planned community and would be more burdensome
than other potential routes. Idyllwood proposed two alterna tive routes for the cartway,
including a route from Feltmann’s property, across Idyllwood’s property, and to the end of
Valhalla Road (the Valhalla Road route).1 There is currently a snowmobile/ATV trail from
Valhalla Road to the Old Milwaukee Supper Club.
The town held a public hearing on the pe tition in February 20 20. The day before
the hearing, Idyllwood recorded an easem ent in Feltmann’s favor from Feltmann’s
property, and across Idyllwood’s property, to Valhalla Road. Feltmann and the town board
learned of the easement at the hearing. Th e town board continue d the hearing to obtain

1 Idyllwood also proposed a third route across the western p art of Feltmann’s property to
Highway 39 near the Old Milwaukee Supper Club (the Old Milwaukee Supper Club route).
This route is not at issue on appeal.

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additional information from the town engineers and to review Idyllwood’s easement. The
town board reconvened the public meeting in August 2020. The town board received
public comments about the pr oposed cartway routes. The town board also reviewed
documents related to the proposed cartway routes and the easement, including engineering
reports from the town engineer and from Idyllwood’s engineer.
In September 2020, the to wn board approved Feltma nn’s cartway petition. The
town board reviewed the March 2020 ea sement from Idyllwood to Feltmann but
determined this easement did not give Feltmann “meaningful access” to a public road. The
town board considered the different options for the cartway route and determined that the
proposed cartway across Idyllwood’s property to Ideal Avenue was the “most practical and
least disruptive or damaging route for the cartway.” The town board awarded damages to
Idyllwood for establishing a cartway over its property.
Idyllwood appealed the town board’s decision to the district court. Idyllwood then
moved for summary judgment challenging both the establishment of the cartway and the
award of damages. With respect to estab lishment, Idyllwood argued that Feltmann had
meaningful access from his property to a public road through the eas ement to Valhalla
Road. The town cross-moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the cartway was
properly established because Feltmann lacked meaningful access from his property to a
public road. The district court granted Idyllwood’s summary-judgment motion and denied
the town’s motion. The district court found that the town board “acted arbitrarily and
capriciously” by concluding that the property la cked meaningful access to a public road
because Idyllwood had granted Feltmann an easement. The district court reversed the town
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board’s resolution granting Feltmann’s cartwa y petition. Because the district court
determined that the town erred in establishing the cartway, it did not reach the question of
damages, and entered judgment in favor of Idyllwood.
The town appeals.
DECISION
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
“A genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact, considering the record as
a whole, could find for the nonmoving party.” Leeco, Inc. v. Cornerstone Bank , 898
N.W.2d 653, 657 (M inn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2017). We view “the
evidence in the light most fa vorable to the nonmoving part y and resolve all doubts and
factual inferences against the moving part[y].” Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc ., 929
N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “[W]hen the material facts are not in
dispute, an appellate court will review the di strict court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo.” Melrose Gates, LLC v. Moua, 875 N.W.2d 814, 819 (Minn. 2016).
A town board considering a cartway petition “acts in a legislative capacity and will
be reversed on appeal only wh en (1) the evid ence is clearly against the decision, (2) an
erroneous theory of the law was applied, or (3) the town board acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, contrary to the public’s best interest.” Horton v. Township of Helen , 624
N.W.2d 591, 595 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing Lieser v. Town of St. Martin, 96 N.W.2d 1, 5-
6 (Minn. 1959)), rev. denied (Minn. June 19, 2001). An appellate court’s review of these
issues involves statutory interpretation—a qu estion of law subject to de novo review.
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Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Bjelland, 710 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. 2006). We review a legislative
determination narrowly and will affirm even if we may have reached a different conclusion.
Horton, 624 N.W.2d at 595; see also Sun Oil Co. v. Village of New Hope, 220 N.W.2d 256,
261 (Minn. 1974) (“When judicially reviewin g a legislative determination, the scope of
review must necessarily be narrow.”).
A cartway may be requested by petition to the town board. Minn. Stat. § 164.08
(2020). The Minnesota cartway statute provides:
Upon petition presented to the town board by the owner of a
tract of land containing at leas t five acres, who has no access
thereto except over a navigable waterway or over the lands of
others, or whose access thereto is less than two rods in width,
the town board by re solution shall establish a cartway at least
two rods wide connecting the pe titioner’s land with a public
road. . . . The town board may select an alternative route other
than that petitioned for if the alternative is deemed by the town
board to be less disruptive a nd damaging to the affected
landowners and in the public’s best interest.
Id., subd. 2(a).
It is uncontested that Feltmann petitioned the town for a cartway and owned at least
five acres of land. The remaining questions are whether Feltmann had meaningful access
to his land except over the land of others, and whether the town board properly exercised
its discretion in selecting a cartway route.
A cartway petitioner is not entitled to a cartway where access to a public road
already exists and the meaningfulness of that access is not in dispute.

The cartway statute requires the town board to consider whether a property owner
has access to a public road. Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a). Idyllwood argues that
8
Feltmann is not entitled to a cartway to Ideal Avenue, because he ha s access to a public
road through the easement over Idyllwood’s property to Valhalla Road.
Minnesota law provides that a town boar d cannot grant a cartway if a legally
enforceable easement or right-of-passage to a public road already exists. Roemer v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Elysian Twp., 167 N.W.2d 497, 499-500 (Minn. 1969) (noting the cartway
statute “was not intended to apply where the petitioner has a perpetual easement running
with the land to his heirs and assigns”). In Roemer, the cartway petitioner had a permanent
easement for a road that ran wi th the land and a fforded “ingress to and egress from” the
petitioner’s property to a public road. Id. at 498. The supreme court reasoned that the
cartway statute “does not contemplate establis hing an alternative right-of-way where an
owner already has means of ingress and egress.” Id. at 499. Thus, the supreme court held
that the petitioner was not entitled to a cartway. Id. at 500.
The record shows that Idyllwood gran ted an easement to Feltmann from his
landlocked parcel, and across Idyllwood’s prope rty, to Valhalla Ro ad. As a result,
Idyllwood argues that Feltmann is not entitled to a cartway to Ideal Avenue because he has
a legally enforceable, permanent easement to a public road.2

2 The town claims that the easement is not legally enforceabl e because Idyllwood
unilaterally granted the easement the day before the first public hearing and Feltmann did
not accept the deed. Idyllwood argues the easement is le gally enforceable because
Idyllwood recorded it. Beca use we resolve this appeal on other grounds, we need not
determine whether the easement is legally enforceable.
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Whether an easement provides “meaningful” access is a question of fact for the
town board—not the reviewing court—to resolve.

We acknowledge Roemer’s holding that a petitioner is not entitled to a cartway
when a permanent easement to a public road already exists. But mere access to a public
road is not enough to defeat a cartwa y petition. The access must also be meaningful.
Minnesota law is clear that “[i]f a select ed route [for a cartway] does not provide
meaningful access to a tract of land, then it fa ils to satisfy the requi rement that a cartway
be provided.” Kennedy v. Pepin Twp. of Wabasha Cnty. , 784 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn.
2010). In Roemer, the meaningfulness of the property owner’s easement access to the
landlocked property was not in di spute, as it is here. Thus, Roemer does not control the
outcome of this case and th e relevant question becomes whether Idyllwood’s easement
provides not just access, but meaningful access, from Feltmann’s property to a public road.
Minnesota statute does not define “meaningful access.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 160.02
(2020) (definition section for roads); 164.01 (2020) (definition section for cartways). That
said, caselaw instructs that access is not meaningful if a portion of the land is inaccessible
because of a natural obstacle. The supreme court considered whether a cartway petitioner
had “meaningful” access in State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood , 20 N.W.2d 345
(Minn. 1945). The cartway petitioner in Rose owned property on both sides of a muddy
lake. Id. at 345-48. The petitioner could only access a public ro ad from one side of the
lake. Id. The supreme court determined that it was not practicable to build a road or bridge
across a muddy lake bottom to access the existing public road. Id. Thus, the supreme court
agreed that the landowner did not have me aningful access to a public road from the
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landlocked property, entitling the landowner to a cartway across a neighboring landowner’s
property. Id. at 349.
In Kennedy, a petitioner sought a cartway across a neighboring parcel of land from
the base of a bluff to a usable portion of land on the top of the bluff. 784 N.W.2d at 380-
81. The neighboring property owner objected alleging th at the petitioner already had
access to the top of the bluff by way of the bluff itself. Id. On review, the Minnesota
Supreme Court determined that the cartway petitioner lacked meaningful access from the
bottom of the bluff to the usable portion of hi s land at the top of the bluff, because of the
steepness of the terrain. Id. The supreme court considered whether it was practicable or
reasonable to build a road from the bottom of the bluff to the top of the bluff and determined
that the steepness of the bluff made it infeasible to build a road. Id. at 384. The supreme
court determined that the cartway petitioner did not have “meaningful” access as intended
by the legislature in the cartway statute. Id. at 384-85.
Here, the town board found that Feltmann lacked meaningful access to a public road
because the easement route was longer, incl uded a steep slope, potentially ran through
wetlands, and was more expensive to build. Th is decision was based on site visits to the
proposed routes, public comments, and evidence received at the public hearings, including
engineering reports from the town engineer and from Idyllwood’s engineer. The town
engineer’s report revealed that the Valhal la Road route had a steep slope, potential
wetlands issues, and would cost $109,400 to create a road up to the town’s standards.
Idyllwood’s engineer estimated that the ro ad would cost $13,500 to $28,100. But
Idyllwood’s engineer acknowledged that the Valhalla Road route had a steep slope and that
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a wetland delineation would be required before a road could be constructed. After
reviewing the evidence presented, the town board found that the Valhalla Road route set
forth in the easement was “so impracticable that it does not qualify as access” under the
cartway statute.
The district court reversed the town board’s decision and determined that Feltmann
had meaningful access to a public road becaus e of the easement to Valhalla Road. The
district court erred in granting summary judg ment on this ground. Decisions related to
public roads are “legislative in charac ter, and in no proper sense judicial.” Lieser, 96
N.W.2d at 6 (recognizing that local governmental authorities have a compelling interest in
regulating road placement and design). When a factual dispute exists over whether access
to a public road is meaningful, it is for the town board, not a reviewing court, to resolve.
The town board’s exercise of discreti on was supported by evidence, was not
arbitrary or capricious, and was not an error of law.

Because a factual dispute existed as to whether the easement to Valhalla Road
provided meaningful access to Feltmann’s property, it was within the province of the town
board to find facts on that issue. If the town board determined that the easement across
Idyllwood’s property to Valh alla Road did not provide me aningful access, then it was
obligated to establish a cartway, taking into consideration the route identified in the petition
as well as alternative routes proposed. Minn. Stat. § 164.08; Kennedy, 784 N.W.2d at 383.
Thus, we next turn to whether the town board’s determination to grant the cartway
petition was based on ample evid ence, was not arbitrary or capricious, and constitutes a
proper exercise of the town board’s discretion. A town has a “mandatory duty” to establish
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a cartway upon a determination that a property owner lacks meaningful access to a public
road except over the land of others, as it did here. Rose, 20 N.W.2d at 348. The cartway
statute vests the town board with the discreti on to “select an altern ative route other than
that petitioned for if the alternative is deemed by the town board to be less disruptive and
damaging to the affected landowners and in th e public’s best intere st.” Minn. Stat.
§ 164.08, subd. 2(a). The Minnesota Supreme Court “read[s] this language to require that
a township establish the rout e requested by the petitioner unl ess the township determines
both that an alternative route will be less di sruptive and damaging to neighbors and that
the alternative route is in the public’s best interest.” Kennedy, 784 N.W.2d at 384.
Here, the town board held tw o public meetings to hear statements from interested
members of the public. The members of the town board conducted site inspections to
personally examine the Valhalla Road easement route, the Ideal Avenue route, and the Old
Milwaukee Supper Club route. The town board members al so visited the cul-de-sac
located at the end of Ideal Av enue. In addition, the town board reviewed engineering
reports from the town engineer, WSN, and from Idyllwood’s engineer, WSB, about the
viability of the competing cartway routes.
WSN showed there was a “steep slope” acr oss the proposed Valhalla Road route
and that the “[e]xisting steep grades” would complicate extending the road and require a
retaining wall. WSN explained that “Type VII wooded wetlands likely are present on the
eastern portion of the parcel,” which would require a field wetland delineation to formally
assess the presence of wetlands. If wetlands were discovered, “wetland mitigation would
be required before any construction could begin.” And “[i]nvestigation of soils to confirm
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the estimated muck excavation” would also need to be completed. The total estimated cost
of the Valhalla Road route was $109,400. WSN also cons idered the proposed cartway
route to Ideal Avenue and estimated that it would cost $5,700 to extend the roadway, and
that this route did not have steep slopes or potential wetlands.
The town board also reviewed an engineering report from Idyllwood’s engineering
firm, WSB. WSB suggested that the Valhalla Road route did not need to extend as far as
the town engineer’s estimate. WSB estimated that it would cost between $13,500 and
$28,100 to build an access road across the Valhalla Road route. WSB acknowledged that
there appeared to be a steep slope on the property, which would require more review. WSB
also stated that it could not discern any wetlands based on a visual review alone, but that a
wetland delineation would still be required. WSB’s report di d not include cost estimates
for these added services.
After holding two public meetings, inspecting the proposed sites, and reviewing the
engineering reports, the town board granted Feltmann’s petition for a cartway connecting
his property to Ideal Avenue . The town board determined that the two other proposed
routes, including Idyllwood’s proposed access road from Valhalla Road, were “not
practical.” The town board found that the Valhalla Road route did not provide meaningful
access because the route was longer, carried hi gher construction costs, and would require
road construction over terrain with a steep slope and potentially through wetlands.3

3 The district court incorrectly found that the town board’s decision was based primarily
on the cost of the different routes. The record does not support this claim. The town board
considered several factors, including the cost of construction, the steep grade of the slope
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The cartway statute vests the town with authority to ma ke these factual findings,
which the record supports. And the town board followed the requirements of section
164.08, subdivision 2(a). “[T] he selection of a route is a decision allocated by statute to
the [town board] to make in its discretion,” and it is not within a reviewing court’s power
to substitute its judgment for that of the town board in selecting a route. Kennedy, 784
N.W.2d at 384. The town bo ard acted within its broad di scretion by selecting the route
proposed in the petition and rejecting Idyllwood ’s alternative routes . The town board’s
decision was not against the evidence, based on an error of law, or arbitrary or capricious.
As a result, the district court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the town board,
granting Idyllwood’s summary-judgment motion against the town, and reversing the town
board’s decision to establish a cartway. We therefore reverse the district court’s order and
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

on the Valhalla Road route, the presence of mucky soils, and the potential issue of wetlands.
As a result, the town board’s decision was not based on the cost of construction alone.