Megan Marie Johnson, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0906

Megan Marie Johnson,
Respondent,

vs.

Richard Preston Blackwell,
Appellant.

Filed March 21, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HR-CV-20-148

Maria E. Maier, Robin L. Dietz-Mayfield, St . Paul & Ramsey Coun ty Domestic Abuse
Intervention Project, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Richard P. Blackwell, Stillwater, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge ; Reilly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s order granting respondent’s petition for a
harassment restraining order (H RO), arguing that the district court improperly excluded
evidence and violated his due-process rights. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Appellant Richard Preston Blackwell a nd respondent Megan Marie Johnson were
in a romantic relationship from August to N ovember 2019. Blackwell continued to visit
Johnson’s apartment building almost daily after the relationshi p ended. On February 12,
2020, Blackwell unexpectedly approached Johnson outside, walked her to her apartment,
and “put his foot in [her] door and wouldn’t let the outside door shut.” Johnson called the
police and they escorted her sa fely inside her apartment bu ilding. In February 2020,
Johnson petitioned for an HRO for a period of two years, asserting that Blackwell
“followed, cornered, and hara ssed [her] on a daily basis,” “pushed his way into [her]
apartment complex,” and “harassed [her] friends.”
Blackwell’s behavior continued to escalat e. On March 19, Johnson’s apartment
manager found Blackwell sitting on the floor outside Johnson’s apartment unit and called
the police. On March 23, Blackwell approa ched Johnson in her apartment building and
refused to leave. Blackwell pinned Johnson against the wall, grabbed her arm, and twisted
her arm to take her phone out of her hand . Blackwell again appeared at Johnson’s
apartment building on March 26, April 8, and April 18. Blackwell also followed Johnson
“many times” in his car. He followed her to work, waited for her after work and followed
her “wherever [she] was going,” followed her to the gym, and followed her to a friend’s
house. Johnson estimated that Blackwell followed her a “[m]inimum of three” times a
week.
The district court held an HRO hearing on six dates between September 2020 and
April 2021. The district c ourt heard testimony from Johnson and Blackwell. Following
3
the hearing, the district court granted Johnson’s HRO petition from the bench. The district
court found Johnson’s testimony credible and did not find Blackwell’s testimony credible.
The district court issued an order formally granting a two-year HRO on behalf of Johnson
and against Blackwell. The district court de termined there were reasonable grounds to
believe Blackwell harassed Johnson by following, monitoring, or pursuing her. The district
court also credited Johnson’s statements th at Blackwell’s conduct had a “substantial
adverse effect on her mental health, safety, security, and privacy.”
Blackwell then requested a ne w trial. The district court denied the request.
Blackwell now appeals the district court’s order granting the HRO.1
DECISION
We review a district court’s decision wh ether to issue an HR O for an abuse of
discretion. Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). A district court
abuses its discretion “if it ma kes findings of fact that ar e not supported by the record,
misapplies the law, or resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts
on record.” Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn. App. 2019). We also give
“due regard” to the “district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Kush
v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29,
2004). We review questions of law de novo. Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761.

1 Blackwell sought review of the order denying his request for a new trial. We construed
the appeal as taken from the April 25, 2021 order granting Johnson’s HRO petition.
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I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
Blackwell challenges the district court’s evid entiary rulings. In general, relevant
evidence is admissible in a court proceeding. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if
it offers “any tendency to make the existence of any fact th at is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. A distri ct court may exclude evidence based on
materiality, lack of foundation, remoteness, re levancy, or evidence wh ich is cumulative.
Johnson v. Washington County , 518 N.W.2d 594, 601 (Minn. 1994); see also Minn. R.
Evid. 403 (authorizing district court to exclude relevant evidence for “undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumula tive evidence”); 801(c) (defining hearsay);
901(b)(1) (discussing foundation). We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an
abuse of discretion. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 281-82 (Minn. 2008).
Blackwell represented himself in the hearings.2 Blackwell cross-examined Johnson
over several days between January and April 2021.3 Blackwell tried to question Johnson
with “80-some exhibits,” including copies of emails and screenshots from his phone. In
many instances, Blackwell asked Johnson about these materials but did not seek to admit
them into evidence. The district court advised Blackw ell that he was “not allowed to ask
questions about exhibits that are not admitted.”

2 Courts generally accommodate self-represented litigants. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629
N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). Still, such litigants are “g enerally held to the same
standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Id.
3 The district court granted Blackwell several continuances, over Johnson’s objections, to
compile and organize his exhibits.
5
The district court also excluded many of Bl ackwell’s exhibits because they lacked
foundation or constituted hearsay. For exampl e, Blackwell sought to introduce an email
into evidence. Johnson’s counsel objected on hearsay and foundation grounds. The district
court sustained the objection and explaine d that Blackwell needed the sender or the
recipient to authenticate the email.
Additionally, much of the excluded evidence was cumulative. Many exhibits were
meant to show that Blackwell a nd Johnson were in a romantic relationship. But Johnson
readily acknowledged that she wa s previously in a romantic re lationship with Blackwell.
The district court noted that much of Blac kwell’s testimony was “cumulative” because it
was already “established that [he] had a relationship with [Johnson].” Yet the district court
did permit Blackwell to introduce several photogra phs of the parties in to evidence. The
district court also advised Blackwell that he could discuss his exhibits during his own
testimony when he could lay foundation for them. During his own opportunity to present
his case, however, Blackwell did not offer any exhibits into the record.
Blackwell does not identify which exhibits th e district court excluded, or why the
evidentiary rulings were improper. “Parties before this court have an obligation under the
rules of civil appellate procedure to cite to the specific part of the record that supports each
factual assertion.” Regner v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 652 N.W.2d 557, 563 (Minn. App. 2002).
Failure to do so may lead to forfeiture of a party’s arguments. Brett v. Watts, 601 N.W.2d
199, 202 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1999). Blackwell does not
identify which of the approxim ately 80 exhibits were wr ongly excluded. Moreover,
Blackwell cannot claim the district court erred by excluding exhibits that he, himself, did
6
not offer. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to exclude
evidence because the exhi bits lacked foundation, containe d hearsay statements, or were
cumulative.
Finally, any error committed by the district court in excluding Blackwell’s exhibits
was harmless because the excluded exhibits were cumulative of other testimonial evidence.
Relief on appeal “rests upon the complaining party’s ability to demonstrate prejudicial
error.” Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Minn. 1997) (quotation
omitted). The district court di d not abuse its discretion here. The district court advised
Blackwell that he could not admit an exhibit without laying the proper foundation for it
and excluded cumulative evidence related to the parties’ romantic relationship. These
rulings comply with the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Blackwell has not been prejudiced
by the exclusion of this evidence. Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding some of Blackwell’s exhibits.
II. The district court did not violate Blackwell’s due-process rights.
Blackwell claims the district court viol ated his due-process rights by limiting his
testimony and denying him an opportunity to fully present his case. The fundamental due-
process requirements are notice and an opportunity to be heard. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes,
823 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn. 2012). Whether these rights have been violated is a question
of law we review de novo. Plocher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 681 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn.
App. 2004).
The HRO hearing occurred over six hear ing dates. Johnson and Blackwell
presented testimony at the hearing. The direct examination of Johnson spanned 12
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transcript pages. Johnson te stified about her previous romantic relationship with
Blackwell, his conduct toward her following the end of their relationship, and the steps she
took to file the HRO petition. The district court then permitted Blackwell to cross-examine
Johnson. Blackwell cross-examin ed Johnson for four days and the record of this cross-
examination spans over 200 transcript pages. The district court then gave Blackwell a
chance to testify. Blackwell’s testimony covers nearly 70 transcript pages.
The district court provided Blackwell la titude because of his status as a self-
represented litigant. But the record shows that Blackwell did not keep his comments or
testimony focused on the HRO petition. Instead, Blackwell argued with the district court
judge and refused direct orders from the dist rict court. Blackwell also repeated his
testimony and discussed matters outside the HRO petition. The district court warned
Blackwell many times not to argue with the court and attempted to redirect him back to the
merits of the HRO petition. Despite repeated warnings, Blackwell continued to argue with
the district court and provide cumulative or i rrelevant evidence. The district court then
engaged in the following exchange with Blackwell:
Court: All right. Mr. Blackwell, I’m warning you. This is
gonna be one of your last warnings before I end
this hearing, and we will conclude. Do you
understand?
Blackwell: No, Your Honor, I sh ould be allowed to speak
clearly and concisely.
Court: You are refusing to follow the directives from this court.
You continue to argue when you disagree with
the Court’s decisions. You have wasted much
time by continuing to argue when you don’t get
your way.
Blackwell: That’s clearly not true.
8
When Blackwell refused to co mply with the district court’s orders and remained
argumentative and disruptive, the district court ended Blackwell’s testimony and
concluded the hearing.4
The HRO statute requires the district court to conduct a hearing before issuing an
HRO. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subds. 3, 5(b )(3) (2020). And the re cord shows that the
district court gave Blackwell a full and fair opportunity to be heard. See Haefele v. Haefele,
621 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that due process requires a hearing to be
fair, practicable, and reasonable), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001). Here, the district
court held a six-day hearing, heard testimony from both parties, admitted several exhibits
into evidence, gave Blackwell a great deal of time to cross-examine Johnson, and permitted
Blackwell to present his own testimony.
Even if the district court failed to vindicate Blackwell’s due-process rights, there is
no basis for reversal because the error—if any—was harmless. A party asserting a due-
process violation must show prejudice to obtain relief on that ground. In re Child of B.J.-
M., 744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008); see also Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr. Inc.,
237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975) (requiring appellant to establish both error and resultant
prejudice); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring re viewing court to disregard harmless
error). Blackwell testified at length that he was previously in a romantic relationship with
Johnson, something Johnson di d not dispute. As a result, Blackwell’s testimony on this
point was cumulative. Blackwell was given ample opportunity to cross-examine Johnson

4 Our review of the transcript shows that the district court exhibited a great deal of patience
in conducting the hearing.
9
and submit testimony and evidence. Thus, we conclude that the di strict court did not
violate Blackwell’s due-process rights by ending the hearing.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the HRO.
A district court may issue an HRO if it determines “that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd.
5(b)(3) (2020). “Harassment” includes “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts,
words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial
adverse effect on the safety, security, or priv acy of another, regardless of the relationship
between the actor and the intended target.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2020). “[S]ection 609.748
requires both objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser and an
objectively reasonable belief on the part of th e person subject to harassing conduct.”
Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 5 67 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2006).
We construe Blackwell’s appeal as a challenge to the district court’s HRO findings.
Based on the testimony and evidence presen ted at the hearings, the district court
determined that Blackwell engaged in harassing behavior by watching Johnson’s apartment
building, sitting outside her residence, and following her to her workplace and to her gym.
Two or more instances of harassing conduct constitute “repeated incidents” under the HRO
statute. Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 844. The district court determined that Blackwell’s conduct
negatively affected Johnson’s mental health, safety, security, and privacy. Sufficient
evidence in the record supports the district court’s order.
10
And the district court explicitly stated that it found Johnson’s testimony credible
and did not find Blackwell credible. Generally, we defer to the district court’s opportunity
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 843-44. The record amply supports the
district court’s determination that Blackwell engaged in objectively unreasonable conduct,
and that Johnson had an objectively reasonable belief of a substantial adverse effect on her
safety, security, or privacy. Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 567.
Finally, we commend the district court for its patience and concern in dealing with
this matter. Because sufficient evidence supports the district court’s decision to grant an
HRO in Johnson’s favor, and because the district court properly applied the law, we affirm.
Affirmed.