State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0916

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nancy Jean Feltus,
Appellant.

Filed July 18, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CR-19-1218

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Justin J. Lee, Assistant County Attorney, Grand
Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn L. LaPlante, Special
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bryan , Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Following a traffic stop and search of her vehicle, appellant was convicted of
first-degree sale of a controlled substance and third-degree driving while impaired (DWI).
In this direct appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to
2
suppress evidence because (1) police unlawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop;
(2) statements appellant made regarding her drug use were elicited in violation of her
Miranda rights; (3) police lacked probable cause to arrest her; and (4) police unlawfully
searched and seized her car. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 29, 2019, a Minnesota S tate Patrol trooper initiated a traffic stop of a car
traveling on Highway 169 in Itasca County after observing the car cross over the centerline
and then over the fog line numerous times. After the trooper activated her emergency
lights, the car continued to travel for approximately a quarter mile without slowing down
before pulling over to the side of the highway. The car came to a stop on the shoulder of a
highway bridge.
The trooper approached the car and spoke to the driver, whom she later identified
as appellant Nancy Jean Feltus. An adult male passenger was also in the car. While
speaking with Feltus, the trooper observed that Feltus’s eyes were bloodshot, watery, and
glossy. The trooper also noticed that Feltus appeared to be nervous and the carotid artery
in her neck was “pulsating distinctively.” The trooper asked Feltus about her driving
conduct, and Feltus responded that she was tired after recently finishing work. The trooper
then returned to her squad car to run Feltus’s driver’s license and wait for Feltus to locate
proof of car insurance. The trooper also called for another squad car because she believed
the location of the stop was unsafe.
Upon receiving Feltus’s proof of insurance, the trooper informed Feltus that, based
on her driving conduct and other signs of impairment, she was going to have Feltus exit
3
her car and perform field sobriety testing. Feltus complied, and the trooper directed Feltus
to stand by the front bumper of the squad car. The trooper asked Feltus if she had any
weapons. Feltus pulled a portable torch out of her pocket and explained that she uses it for
beading jewelry. The trooper also asked Feltus if she had any recent brain tumors,
concussions, or injuries of any kind. Feltus told the trooper that her knees had been
operated on in the past but that it had been a while.
Before beginning the field sobriety tests, the trooper took Feltus’s pulse, which she
measured as 104 beats per minute. Feltus the n performed a series of field sobriety tests.
The first test, known as the Romberg test, required Feltus to place her feet together, tilt her
head back, close her eyes, and estimate the passage of 30 seconds. Feltus estimated the
passage of 30 seconds in approximately 24 seconds, which the trooper believed showed
that Feltus’s “internal clock [was] faster than the average person’s .” The trooper also
noticed that Feltus “had a distinct sway” during the Romberg test. Next, Feltus performed
the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which required her to track the trooper’s finger with
her eyes. While the trooper did not notice any of the standard indicia of impairment during
this test, the trooper saw that Feltus’s eyes jerked or bounced around and had a hard time
focusing on the trooper’s finger. Feltus also told the trooper during this test that she was
on the verge of falling asleep. The trooper then administered the walk-and-turn test.
Before beginning the test, Feltus lost her balance numerous times. During the test, Feltus
did not touch heel-to-toe for every step and took the incorrect number of steps before
turning. Finally, Feltus performed the one- leg-stand test, during which she swayed while
balancing, used her arms to balance, and put her foot down early. After completing the
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field sobriety tests, the trooper once again took Feltus’s pulse, which she measured to be
112 beats per minute. Based on Feltus’s performance on the field sobriety tests and the
trooper’s measurement of her pulse rate, the trooper believed that Feltus was impaired by
a stimulant drug such as methamphetamine.
The trooper then administered a preliminary breath test, the result of which indicated
that Feltus did not have any alcohol in her system. While administering the breath test, the
trooper noticed that Feltus had a number of “heat bumps,” or blisters, on the back of her
tongue. The trooper believed the presence of “heat bumps” to be consistent with
methamphetamine use. Immediately after the breath test, the trooper asked Feltus several
questions about her prior drug use. Feltus admitted that she had smoked methamphetamine
in the past but was unaware of when she had last used the drug. The trooper then told
Feltus that she was under arrest for DWI.

After placing Feltus in the back of the squad car, the trooper determined that Feltus’s
car would need to be towed and impounded. She made that decision in part “due to safety
concerns as to where [the car] was parked” — specifically, “on top of a hill on a bridge,”
which made the car “hard to see.” She also made the decision because Feltus’s passenger
did not have a valid driver’s license and could not lawfully drive the car. Therefore, another
trooper who had arrived during the traffic stop gave the passenger a ride to a nearby town
and a tow truck was called. The trooper who stopped Feltus then conducted a “tow
inventory” of the car to ensure that any private property in the car was recorded before it
was towed. Inside the car, the trooper found a small container in the backseat containing
white residue, which later tested positive for methamphetamine. She also found a green
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bag in the trunk which held (1) a small round tin containing Ziploc baggies of
methamphetamine, (2) another pouch containing additional baggies of methamphetamine,
and (3) a glass pipe containing methamphetamine residue.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Feltus with first-degree sale of a controlled
substance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2018), 1 and third-degree DWI
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2018). During pretrial proceedings,
Feltus filed a motion to dismiss the case and suppress evidence. Feltus argued in relevant
part that (1) the trooper unlawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop by asking her to
exit her car to perform field sobriety tests; (2) the trooper violated her Miranda rights by
questioning her during the stop; (3) the trooper lacked probable cause to arrest her; and
(4) the search and subsequent impoundment of her car was unlawful.
The district court held a contested omnibus hearing to address the motion. At the
hearing, the district court heard testimony from the trooper who conducted the traffic stop,
an expert witness for the defense, and Feltus. The trooper testified about the circumstances
of the stop, Feltus’s arrest, and the search of her car. The state introduced a video from the
trooper’s dashboard camera showing the stop. The expert witness, a registered nurse,
opined that the trooper did not accurately take Feltus’s pulse during the traffic stop. Lastly,
Feltus testified that she has had reconstructive surgeries on both of her knees and that her
knee problems affected her ability to perform the field sobriety tests. The district court

1 The state initially charged Feltus with fifth- degree possession of a controlled substance.
By amended complaint, the state later replaced that charge with a first-degree-sale charge.
The amended complaint alleged that Feltus admitted to police after her arrest that she had
planned to sell the methamphetamine found in her car.
6
received into evidence copies of two medical records detailing Feltus’s knee conditions
after her surgeries.
Following the hearing, the district court issued a written order denying Feltus’s
motion to dismiss and suppress evidence. The parties agreed to a trial on stipulated
evidence, thereby preserving the suppression issue for appeal. The district court found
Feltus guilty of both first-degree drug sale and third-degree DWI. This appeal follows.
DECISION
When reviewing a district court’s pretrial decision on a motion to suppress evidence,
this court reviews the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its findings of fact
for clear error. State v. Brown, 932 N.W.2d 283, 289 (Minn. 2019). “A factual finding is
clearly erroneous if it does not have evidentiary support in the record or if it was induced
by an erroneous view of the law.” State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 403 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted).
Feltus raises four arguments on appeal. She contends that the district court erred by
denying her motion to suppress evidence because (1) the trooper unlawfully expanded the
scope of the traffic stop; (2) the statements she made to the trooper regarding her drug use
were elicited in violation of her Miranda rights; (3) the trooper lacked probable cause to
arrest her; and (4) the trooper unlawfully searched and impounded her car. We address
each of these arguments in turn.
7
I. The district court did not err by concluding that the trooper did not unlawfully
expand the scope of the traffic stop.

Feltus first contends that the district court erred by not suppressing the evidence
obtained during the traffic stop because the trooper unlawfully expanded the scope of the
stop. She identifies three actions by the trooper that she argues constituted unlawful
expansions of the stop: (1) the trooper asked her to exit her vehicle to perform field sobriety
tests; (2) the trooper “interrogated” her about her prior drug use; and (3) the trooper
searched her car.
As an initial matter, Feltus did not argue to the district court that the trooper
impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop by questioning her about her prior
drug use or by searching her car. In her motion to suppress, Feltus argued only that the
trooper impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop by “requesting [that she] exit
the vehicle to conduct driving impaired testing [sic].” In reviewing a district court’s
decision, we “generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district
court, including constitutional questions of criminal procedure.” Roby v. State,
547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). We therefore decline to consider Feltus’s newly raised
arguments and limit our analysis here to whether the trooper impermissibly expanded the
scope of the traffic stop by asking Feltus to exit her vehicle to perform field sobriety tests.
2
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the trooper did not.

2 We address Feltus’s remaining arguments concerning the impoundment and search of her
car in Issue IV of this opinion.
8
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect individuals from
“unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 10. A warrantless search or seizure is generally unreasonable.
State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021). But a police officer may initiate a
brief warrantless investigatory stop of a motor vehicle if she has a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity. Id. Under the Minnesota Constitution, each incremental
intrusion during a traffic stop must be strictly tied to and justified by one of the
following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause,
or (3) a reasonable basis for the expansion, as defined in Terry. Id. (citing
State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004)).
Here, the original purpose of the traffic stop was to investigate potential impaired
driving. The trooper initiated the traffic stop after observing Feltus’s car cross over the
centerline and fog line of the highway numerous times. There is no dispute by Feltus that
this driving conduct provided reasonable suspicion of impaired driving and justified the
initial stop. See State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (concluding that
reasonable suspicion supported traffic stop where car was reported to be driving “all over
the road” and police officer observed the car “cross and recross the fog line”). Given that
the trooper pulled Feltus over to investigate suspected impaired driving, we have no trouble
concluding that the trooper’s request that Feltus exit her car to perform field sobriety tests
was strictly tied to the original purpose of the stop. Moreover, the record reflects that the
trooper did not expand the scope of the stop to investigate any other suspected illegal
activity; rather, the trooper’s request—along with the entirety of the trooper’s actions
9
preceding Feltus’s arrest—was a continuation of her investigation into possible impaired
driving and was justified by that original legitimate purpose. We therefore reject Feltus’s
contention that the trooper impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop by asking
Feltus to exit her vehicle to perform field sobriety tests.
Feltus’s other arguments also do not support her position that the district court erred
when it concluded that the trooper did not unlawfully expand the scope of the stop. She
first argues several of the district court’s factual findings relating to the stop are clearly
erroneous. More specifically, Feltus contends that the district court clearly erred by finding
that her vehicle was “correcting itself excessively” and “weaving dangerously” prior to the
traffic stop and that there was a “considerable delay” before she pulled over to the side of
the highway. She also challenges the district court’s finding that she had “callused
fingers.” Our review of the record demonstrates that these findings of fact are reasonably
supported by the dashboard camera video and the trooper’s testimony. These factual
findings are not clearly erroneous.
Feltus next argues that the “expansion” of the stop was not supported by reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. But neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause was
required because the trooper’s request that Feltus exit her vehicle to perform field sobriety
tests was tied to the original legitimate purpose of the traffic stop. See Taylor,
965 N.W.2d at 752 (explaining that each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop must
be strictly tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose
of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) a reasonable basis for the expansion).
10
Accordingly, there is no need to reach the alternative issues of whether independent
probable cause or reasonable suspicion supported the request.
In sum, because the trooper did not unlawfully expand the scope of the stop by
asking Feltus to exit her car to perform field sobriety tests, the district court did not err by
denying Feltus’s motion to suppress evidence on that basis.
II. The district court did not err by concluding that Feltus was not entitled to a
Miranda warning.

Feltus next argues that the district court erred by declining to suppress statements
she made to the trooper regarding her prior drug use because the trooper did not first
provide a Miranda warning. “The issue of whether a suspect is in custody and therefore
entitled to a Miranda warning presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Sterling,
834 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). When the district court applied
the proper legal standard, we give considerable deference to its resolution of this
fact-specific issue. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 31 (Minn. 2016).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from
compelled self-incrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V; Minn. Const. art I, § 7 (providing
that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself”). As a safeguard for this right against self -incrimination, the United States
Supreme Court has held that a statement made by a suspect during a “custodial
interrogation” is admissible only if the statement was preceded by a Miranda warning.
State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966)). Accordingly, “a Miranda warning is required if a suspect
11
is both in custody and subject to interrogation.” Id. A person is “in custody” if, “based on
all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person . . . would believe that he or she
was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Horst, 880 N.W.2d at
30-31. Whether a person has been placed in “custody” in a Fifth Amendment analysis is
distinct from the issue of whether a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment—“[t]he [custody] test is not whether a reasonable person would believe he or
she was not free to leave.” Sterling, 834 N.W.2d at 168 (emphasis added) (quotation
omitted). Factors that typically indicate a person is in custody include questioning at the
police station, the suspect being told she is a prime suspect, police restraining the suspect’s
freedom of movement, the suspect making a highly incriminating statement, the presence
of multiple officers, and police pointing a gun at the suspect. Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 31.
Factors that suggest a person is not in custody include “briefly questioning the suspect”
and “a nonthreatening environment.” Id.
A motorist subject to a traffic stop is usually not in custody for Miranda purposes.
State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 882-83 (Minn. 1986). This is because two features of
the ordinary traffic stop mitigate the risk that the person questioned will be unduly impaired
in her free exercise of her right against self-incrimination: (1) “traffic stops are
presumptively temporary and brief” and (2) “the typical traffic stop involves circumstances
such that the motorist does not feel completely at the mercy of the police.” Id. (citing
Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 437 -39 (1984)). Because traffic stops are usually
conducted in public by only one or two officers and the questioning that occurs is typically
12
limited, most traffic stops do not involve the same type of prolonged questioning and
“police dominated” atmosphere that was at issue in Miranda. Id.
Here, the record demonstrates that the trooper’s questioning occurred under the
following circumstances. The questioning took place during a traffic stop, on the shoulder
of a public highway, in front of the trooper’s squad car. The questioning was conducted
by only one trooper, and the questioning itself lasted approximately one minute and
20 seconds. The trooper did not exert any physical control over Feltus either before or
during the questioning, and it was not until after the questioning was complete that the
trooper informed Feltus that her detention would not be temporary. Furthermore, as the
district court found, the trooper’s demeanor was collected and amicable throughout the
stop, and the trooper never cited her authority as a police officer to pressure F eltus to
comply. In light of this record evidence, the circumstances of the trooper’s questioning
cannot be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest.
Feltus’s arguments do not persuade us otherwise. She first asserts that she was in
custody during the trooper’s questioning because “[t]he totality of the circumstances
reveals . . . Feltus was under the direction and control of [the trooper] for the entire period
that [she] was outside of her vehicle.” But a person is not in custody during a traffic stop
simply because an officer directs her actions; rather, the stop must exert pressures upon the
individual that so impair her free exercise of her right against self -incrimination that a
Miranda warning is required. See Herem, 384 N.W.2d at 882- 83 (concluding that
defendant was not in custody when officer ordered him to sit in a police car for a short
13
time). For the reasons set forth above, such pressures were not present during the stop at
issue in this case.
Feltus also suggests that the length of the stop converted it into a custodial situation.
“[A]n extension of the duration of a stop beyond the time necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the stop is unreasonable.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 371. However, there is
no indication in the dashboard camera video that the trooper unreasonably prolonged the
stop. The traffic stop lasted a relatively short period of time —approximately 22 minutes
from the time of its initiation to Feltus’s arrest. During that time, the trooper had a brief
initial discussion with Feltus, checked Feltus’s driver’s license, waited for Feltus to
produce proof of insurance, and conducted the field sobriety tests. The trooper performed
these activities expeditiously and did nothing to unreasonably prolong the stop. Moreover,
as mentioned above, the record demonstrates that the trooper’s time spent questioning
Feltus was very brief.
Next, Feltus asserts that the trooper’s questioning was custodial because the trooper
began the questioning by saying “So, let’s talk.” But “the mere fact that there are coercive
aspects to the interrogation does not mean that the interrogation necessarily is custodial.”
State v. Sirvio, 579 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). In sum,
considering the totality of the circumstances of the stop, we conclude that no reasonable
person in Feltus’s position would have concluded that the stop was custodial in nature.
Finally, Feltus argues for the first time on appeal that she was in custody during the
trooper’s questioning because state law makes it a crime to refuse to comply with the
trooper’s directions or attempt to flee the scene. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169.02, subd. 2,
14
609.487, subd. 3 (2018). We decline to address this argument because it was not presented
to or considered by the district court. See Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357. We also note that the
United States Supreme Court has rejected a similar line of reasoning. See Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 436- 40 (noting that “[u]nder the law of most [s]tates, it is a crime either to
ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission,” but nonetheless concluding that questioning of a motorist during a routine
traffic stop was not a “custodial interrogation” requiring a Miranda warning), cited with
approval in Herem, 384 N.W.2d at 882-83.
In short, Feltus fails to point to any aspect of the traffic stop prior to her arrest that
suggests that the stop had a coercive atmosphere akin to a formal arrest. Therefore, Feltus
was not in custody prior to her arrest, and she was not entitled to a Miranda warning before
questioning. We conclude that the district court did not err by denying Feltus’s motion to
suppress evidence on that basis.
III. The district court did not err by concluding that the trooper had probable
cause to arrest Feltus for DWI.

Feltus next argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress
evidence found during the search of her vehicle after her arrest because the trooper lacked
probable cause to arrest her for DWI. The determination of whether probable cause exists
is a mixed question of fact and law. Otto v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 662
(Minn. App. 2019). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
legal determinations de novo. Id. When reviewing a district court’s probable cause
determination, “[t]he duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the officer had a
15
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause for arrest for DWI existed.”
Reeves v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 751 N.W.2d 117, 120 (M inn. App. 2008) (quotation
omitted).
An officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect for DWI “when the facts and
circumstances available at the time of arrest reasonably warrant a prudent and cautious
officer to believe that an individual was driving while under the influence.” Id. “Probable
cause requires something more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary
for conviction.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011). “The inquiry is
objective, and the existence of probable cause depends on all of the facts of each individual
case.” Id. But, where the officer stops a driver, one objective indication of intoxication
can constitute probable cause to believe a person is under the influence. State v. Kier, 678
N.W.2d 672, 678 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 15,
2004).
Here, the district court determined that the total sum of the trooper’s observations
of Feltus supported probable cause for arrest. The district court reasoned that the trooper
observed sufficient indicia of impairment, including Feltus’s driving conduct, her
demeanor, and her performance on the field sobriety tests.
Feltus challenges the district court’s probable cause determination on the ground
that it failed to consider and make adequate factual findings regarding evidence she
presented at the contested omnibus hearing. At the hearing, Feltus testified and presented
medical reports related to the physical condition of her knees. She stated that she has had
surgeries on both of her knees, resulting in pain and a limited range of motion, and “can’t
16
use just one leg to support [herself].” She testified that her knee problems affected her
ability to perform the field sobriety tests during the traffic stop. Feltus also presented the
testimony of an expert witness, who opined that the trooper’s method of measuring Feltus’s
pulse during the traffic stop likely resulted in an overestimation of her pulse rate. The
expert witness testified that the proper method for taking a pulse would be to either count
the person’s heartbeats for 15 seconds and multiply that number by four or count the
heartbeats for 30 seconds and multiply by two. The expert witness opined that the trooper
likely miscalculated Feltus’s pulse rate because she took Feltus’s pulse for 43 seconds the
first time and 32 seconds the second time.
Feltus contends that the district court failed to consider the evidence she presented
regarding her bilateral knee condition and her expert’s testimony regarding the trooper’s
measurement of her pulse, and she argues that this evidence undermines the district court’s
determination that the trooper had probable cause to arrest her for DWI. She further asserts
that the district court clearly erred in its factual findings regarding her performance on the
walk-and-turn and one -leg-stand tests, and clearly erred by finding that she “collectively
failed” the field sobriety tests, because her testimony and the medical reports show that she
has balance issues that explain her poor performance on those tests. For the reasons set
forth below, we conclude that the district court did not err in its factual findings, adequately
considered the evidence presented at the contested omnibus hearing, and did not err by
determining that the trooper had probable cause to arrest Feltus for DWI.
First, we discern no clear error in the district court’s factual findings. The trooper’s
testimony and the dashboard camera video support the district court’s factual findings that
17
Feltus exhibited poor balance on the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests and that Feltus
“collectively failed” the field sobriety tests.
Second, the district court’s order demonstrates that it adequately considered the
evidence Feltus presented at the omnibus hearing. The district court indicated that it
considered the evidence regarding Feltus’s physical condition and assigned it little weight,
noting that it was “not convinced by [Feltus’s] explanations for her driving conduct, her
demeanor, and her performance through the field sobriety testing.” The district court also
acknowledged the expert testimony regarding the trooper’s measurement of Feltus’s pulse.
In doing so, the district court emphasized that, even if it were to omit the evidence of
Feltus’s pulse rate from its analysis, “there remains sufficient indicia of intoxication to
support probable cause to arrest.” The district court’s order thus shows that it considered
all the evidence presented at the contested omnibus hearing, including the evidence
presented by Feltus, before determining that the trooper had probable cause to arrest Feltus
for DWI.
3 To the extent that Feltus asks us to reweigh the evidence she presented, we
decline to do so. Our review of the district court’s findings of fact is for clear error and the
clear-error standard “does not permit an appellate court to weigh the evidence as if trying

3 We also note that, while the district court’s order shows that it considered the evidence
Feltus presented at the contested omnibus hearing, Feltus’s challenge to the district court’s
probable-cause determination fails for an additional reason. The probable-cause inquiry is
objective and based on the totality of the circumstances, not an after-the-fact explanation.
State v. Olson, 342 N.W.2d 638, 640-41 (Minn. App. 1984); see also State v. Hawkins,
622 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Minn. App. 2001) (explaining that mere possibility of an innocent
explanation for conduct does not negate probable cause). Accordingly, to the extent the
district court did not consider additional evidence of Feltus’s medical condition that was
not known by the trooper at the time of Feltus’s arrest, the district court did not err.
18
the matter de novo.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted).
In any event, even without the trooper’s observations regarding Feltus’s pulse rate
and poor balance on the walk -and-turn and one-leg- stand tests, the evidence of the
trooper’s remaining observations of Feltus prior to her arrest adequately support the district
court’s probable cause determination. These observations include the following: prior to
the stop, Feltus’s car crossed over the centerline and fog line of the highway numerous
times; Feltus had bloodshot, watery, and glossy eyes ; Feltus appeared nervous, and her
carotid artery was “pulsating distinctively”; Feltus had a portable torch in her pocket, which
the trooper believed indicated methamphetamine use; Feltus estimated the passage of
30 seconds in 24 seconds, which the trooper believed showed “[i]mpairment caused by a
[central nervous system] stimulant”; during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Feltus’s
eyes jerked or bounced around and had a hard time focusing on the trooper’s finger; Feltus
told the trooper that she was on the verge of falling asleep, which the trooper believed
indicated that Feltus was on the “downside effect” of a stimulant drug; Feltus had “heat
bumps” on the back of her tongue, which in the trooper’s training and experience indicated
methamphetamine use; and Feltus admitted to the trooper to using methamphetamine in
the past. These observations included more than one objective indication of intoxication
and provided the trooper a substantial basis for concluding that there was probable cause
to arrest Feltus for DWI. See Kier, 678 N.W.2d at 678. Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court did not err by determining that the trooper had probable cause to arrest Feltus
for impaired driving.
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IV. The district court did not err by determining that the trooper lawfully searched
and impounded Feltus’s car.

Feltus next contends that the inventory search and impoundment of her car was
unlawful and that the district court therefore erred by declining to suppress the evidence
found in her car. As stated above, when reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion
to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its
findings of fact for clear error. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
Inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement. State v. Rohde, 852 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 2014). “Inventory searches are
considered reasonable because of their administrative and caretaking functions,” which
“serve to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure
against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.”
Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502 (quotation omitted). Because the act of impoundment “gives
rise to the need for and justification of the inventory search, the threshold inquiry when
determining the reasonableness of an inventory search is whether the impoundment of the
vehicle was proper.” Id. (quotation omitted).
For impoundment to be proper, it must be conducted pursuant to standardized
criteria. Id. at 503. Moreover, “the [s]tate must have an interest in impoundment that
outweighs the individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches
and seizures.” Rohde, 852 N.W.2d at 264 (quotation omitted). The state’s interest in
impounding a vehicle will outweigh an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures if the vehicle is “impeding traffic or threatening public safety and
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convenience.” Id. at 265 (quotation omitted). Additionally, the state has an overriding
interest in impounding a vehicle if necessary “to protect the defendant’s property from theft
and police from claims arising therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted). The state has the
burden to prove that the inventory-search exception to the warrant requirement applies in
a particular case. Id. at 263.
The district court determined that two circumstances supported the trooper’s
decision to impound Feltus’s car. First, the court found that the car’s location presented a
public safety concern for other vehicles on the roadway. Second, the district court found
that “the search comported with the [s]tate’s interest in protecting [itself] from claims” of
theft. Feltus challenges both bases for the district court’s determination. We are not
persuaded by either challenge.
First, the record supports the district court’s finding that the location of Feltus’s car
posed a threat to public safety. The trooper testified that, following Feltus’s arrest, she
decided to impound Feltus’s car and have it towed “due to the safety concerns as to where
[the car] was parked.” The trooper testified that she was concerned that the car was parked
“on top of a hill on a bridge” and was “hard to see.” The trooper also testified that, after
she initiated the stop, she called for another trooper because the stop was “located at an
unsafe spot.” This testimony reasonably supports the district court’s finding that the car’s
location threatened public safety, and it distinguishes this case from Gauster, on which
Feltus relies. See 752 N.W.2d at 504 (affirming finding that a car did not create a safety
hazard justifying impoundment because “the vehicle was on the shoulder of a rural road in
the middle of the afternoon”).
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Feltus argues that the dashboard camera video contradicts the trooper’s testimony.
She asserts that the video shows that her car was parked on a gradual incline rather than on
top of a hill and that traffic was passing her parked car without issue, indicating that the
vehicle was sufficiently visible to oncoming traffic. She also asserts that the car’s location
on a bridge did not create a risk to public safety and that, because it was parked on the
shoulder of the highway, the car was in a safe location. We are not persuaded. The record
evidence, including the dashboard camera video, reasonably supports the district court’s
finding that the location of Feltus’s car threatened public safety. The district court’s finding
in this regard is not clearly erroneous. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221, 223 (noting factual
findings that are reasonably supported by the record are not clearly erroneous; “it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
to the contrary” (quotation omitted)).
Second, separate and apart from the public-safety rationale, the district court
properly determined that the trooper’s authority to protect Feltus’s property justified
impounding the car. “This authority arises when it becomes essential for the police to take
custody of and responsibility for a vehicle due to the incapacity or absence of the owner,
driver, or any responsible passenger.” Rohde, 852 N.W.2d at 265 (quotation omitted).
Here, no one was available to drive Feltus’s car away from the scene because Feltus was
under arrest at the time the trooper decided to impound the car, and Feltus’s passenger
lacked a valid driver’s license. Feltus does not dispute these findings. Instead, she argues
only that she or her passenger could have arranged for someone else to retrieve her vehicle
if the trooper had given them the opportunity. But an officer is not required to offer an
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arrested person such an opportunity before impounding her property. See id. at 266
(recognizing that the United States Supreme Court held in Colorado v. Bertine ,
479 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1987), that police were not required to offer an arrested driver an
opportunity to make alternative arrangements before impounding his van). Because Feltus
was under arrest and her passenger did not have a valid driver’s license, the trooper was
authorized to impound and search the car for the purpose of protecting Feltus’s property
and the police from related claims of theft.4 The district court did not err by declining to
suppress the evidence discovered during the search of Feltus’s car.
Affirmed.

4 Feltus also argues that the trooper was required to wait four hours before impounding her
car under Minn. Stat. § 168B.04, subd. 2(b)(1)(i) (2020). We decline to address this
argument, which Feltus raises for the first time on appeal. See Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357.