State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0920

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Todd Richard Kalis,
Appellant.

Filed May 9, 2022
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-20-525

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jenna M. Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, William C. Lundy, Certified Student
Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lauren J. Campoli, The Law Office of Laur en Campoli, PLLC, Mi nneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Pres iding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Todd Richard Kalis challenges hi s conviction for giving a false name to
a peace officer, arguing that the district c ourt erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence because (1) the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him, and (2) he gave
a false name when he was subject to a custodial interrogation for which he did not receive
a Miranda warning. Because the officer had reasonable suspicion that Kalis was engaged
in criminal activity, and Kalis was not subject to a custodial interrogation when he provided
the false name, we affirm.
DECISION
When reviewing pretrial orders on motio ns to suppress eviden ce, we review the
district court’s factual findings for clear e rror and its legal determinations de novo. State
v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). We independently review undisputed facts
and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence must be suppressed. Id.
I. Reasonable Suspicion
Kalis contends that the false name he ga ve to a police officer must be suppressed
because he gave it when he was subject to a seizure that lacked reasonable suspicion. The
United States and Minnesota Cons titutions protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Evidence obtained by the police as the
result of a seizure without reasonable suspicion must be suppressed. State v. Diede, 795
N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).
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Under principles established by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a police officer may “stop and temporarily seize a person to investigate
that person for criminal wrongdoing if the officer reasonably susp ects that person of
criminal activity.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Reasonabl e suspicion must be based on
specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate . . . that he or she had
a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.”
Id. at 842-43 (quotations omitted). The reasona ble-suspicion standard is met “when an
officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of
his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d
390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The standard is not high, but it requires more
than an unparticularized hunch. Id.
An officer of the Lower Sioux Tribal Po lice Department testified, and video from
her body camera was submitted at the omnibus hearing. It was established that Kalis was
a guest at a casino on June 24, 2020, and shortly after midnight, the officer responded to a
call at the casino on reports that a “suspicious male” was taking pictures in the parking lot.
The officer spoke with the security supervisor who explained that his security officers had
seen a man in the parking lot who appeared to be taking pict ures of vehicles and to be
tampering with a vehicle. Th e supervisor further informed the officer that security had
confronted the man and told him to stop taking pictures, and the man came inside. Shortly
afterward, security officers saw the man appearing to take pictures inside the hotel lobby,
and they once again told him to stop. The security supervisor then contacted the police.
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When the officer arrived at the casino an d entered the hotel lobby, a casino security
officer pointed out Kalis as the suspicious ma n. Kalis was leaving the reception desk at
that time. The officer appro ached Kalis, identified herself, a nd asked to speak with him.
Kalis said that he did not want to talk and walked away from the officer. As Kalis
continued to walk away, the o fficer repeatedly ordered him to stop. She said that Kalis
could either stop and talk to her, or she would put him in he r squad car. Kalis finally
stopped in a hallway near the elevator area of the lobby.
The officer informed Kalis that she had been called to the casino because of
suspicious activity; specifically, that someone had been taking pictures of vehicles in the
parking lot and of employees. Kalis denied that he had engaged in that activity. The officer
accused Kalis of lying and asked for his ID. Kalis said that he did not have his ID with
him. The officer then asked Kalis for his first name. Kalis initially refused to provide his
name, but upon further pressure from the officer, he said that his first name was “Trong.”
The officer believed that Kalis was lying, and she continued to ask for his name.
After Kalis repeatedly refused to give his full name or to identify himself, the officer
started to escort him to her squad car. Kalis resisted and tried to take out his cell phone, so
the officer placed him in handcuffs. Once Kalis was in handcuffs, the officer obtained his
wallet and found a card with his name on it. At that point, Ka lis finally provided his full
name. The officer eventually learned that Trong was the name of the guest who was
registered to the hotel room in which Kalis was staying.
The state concedes that Kalis was subject to a seizure when he gave the false name.
For the purposes of the Minnesota Constitution, “a person has been seized if in view of all
5
of the circumstances surrounding the incide nt, a reasonable person would have believed
that he or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the
encounter.” State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995). Because the officer told
Kalis that she would put him in her squad car if he did not speak w ith her, Kalis was not
free to terminate the encounter, and we agree that he was seized.
The officer’s basis for seizing Kalis was the report from casino security that Kalis
had taken pictures of vehicles in the parking lot, appeared to have tampered with a vehicle,
and had taken pictures inside the hotel lobby after secur ity had asked him to stop. We
therefore must determine whether those facts provided a particularized and objective basis
for the officer to have suspected Kalis of criminal activity.
Kalis emphasizes that taking pictures in a public place is not criminal conduct. He
argues that, because the officer was called to investigate non-criminal behavior, she lacked
a particularized and objective basis to susp ect him of criminal ac tivity. This argument
ignores the officer’s testimony at the omnibus hearing that casino security had reported
that Kalis not only took pictures of vehicles, but also a ppeared to have tampered with a
vehicle. Tampering with a motor vehicle is a criminal offense. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.546(2) (2020) (stating that it is a misd emeanor to intentiona lly “tamper[] with or
enter[] into or on a motor vehicle without the owner’s permission”).
In his brief, Kalis does not meaningfully address the allegation that he tampered
with a motor vehicle in the parking lot. Bu t at the omnibus hearing, Kalis questioned the
officer about that claim, mentioning that she never asked Kalis about that alleged conduct
and that the prosecutor did not charge him with such an offense. And during oral arguments
6
Kalis contended that the officer did not actua lly suspect him of ta mpering with a motor
vehicle. We disagree that those facts demo nstrate that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion that Kalis had tampered with a mo tor vehicle. Although the officer did not
specifically confront Kalis about the claim th at he had tampered with a vehicle, she
nevertheless testified at the omnibus hearing that casino security had informed her of that
activity before she questioned Kalis. Add itionally, reasonable suspicion is based on the
officer’s knowledge at the time of the stop. Jobe v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 609 N.W.2d
919, 922 (Minn. App. 2000); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (explaining that reasonable
suspicion is judged on “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure”). It
is therefore irrelevant that the police never uncovered any evidence that Kalis had tampered
with a motor vehicle or that the state never charged him with that crime.
Even if we disregard the allegation that Kalis had tampered with a motor vehicle, it
is undisputed that the officer received a report from casino s ecurity that Kalis had taken
pictures of vehicles in the parking lot. A person’s innocent activity can create reasonable
suspicion to justify a stop. State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998). The
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “ Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop
innocent people.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000). As such, the mere fact
that taking pictures of vehicles is not a cr ime does not necessarily mean that the officer
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Kalis. Instead, the proper inquiry is whether Kalis’s
behavior led the officer to re asonably conclude that criminal activity might have been
afoot. That standard is satisfied here. Taking pictures of vehicles in a casino parking lot
is unusual behavior. There may be plausible, innocent explanations for that conduct, but
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there are also several criminal explanations for it. For example, as the state pointed out, a
person may be attempting to make false license plates modeled on real ones, looking for a
vehicle to steal, or stalking someone. Moreover, security officers told Kalis to stop taking
pictures in the parking lot, but shortly afterw ard he started taking pictures in the hotel
lobby. Kalis’s refusal to obey the directives of casino secu rity heightened the suspicion
that he may be engaged in criminal activity. Considering that reasonable suspicion is a low
standard, Kalis’s unusual behavior allowed the officer to reasonably conclude that criminal
activity might have been afoot.
Kalis maintains that, even if the initia l seizure was reasonable, the officer
unreasonably expanded the seizure by continui ng to detain him. During a stop, each
incremental intrusion “must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which
rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364
(Minn. 2004) (quotations omitted). An intrusion not strictly tied to the circumstances that
made the initial stop permissible must be supp orted by “at least a reasonable suspicion of
additional illegal activity.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012).
The officer expanded the stop when she arre sted Kalis after he continually refused
to identify himself. Kalis provided a false name to the officer before that point. Although
Kalis had insisted that he did not take any pictures before he gave a false name, the officer
did not believe him and accuse d him of lying. The officer was not required to end her
inquiry solely because of Kalis’s averments. Therefore, the officer did not expand the stop
before Kalis gave a false name to her.
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In sum, the officer had reasonable suspic ion that Kalis was engaged in criminal
activity based on the casino security’s reports th at Kalis had taken pict ures of vehicles in
the parking lot, appeared to have tampered with a motor ve hicle, and continued to take
pictures in the lobby after secu rity asked him to stop. Acco rdingly, she was justified in
stopping him and asking him to identify himself. The district court did not err by denying
Kalis’s motion to suppress his false name based on lack of reasonable suspicion.
II. Probable Cause
During oral argument, Kalis claimed that the officer needed probable cause to
threaten to arrest him for failing to identify himself, and that the officer would not have
learned his true identity or realized that he ga ve a false name if she had not arrested him.
We disagree that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest Kalis. Probable cause to arrest
exists when the police “have a reasonable belief that a certain person has committed a
crime.” In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Minn. 1997). After Kalis said that
his first name was “Trong,” the officer sugg ested that the name wa s not Kalis’s actual
name. Kalis then repeatedly insisted that he did not have to identify himself. That
behavior—as opposed to claiming that “Tro ng” truly was his firs t name—provided the
officer with a reasonable belief that Kalis’s initial response was not his real first name.
Therefore, the officer had pr obable cause that Kalis had gi ven a false name, and it was
reasonable for the officer to arrest him.
III. Miranda Warning
Kalis contends that the officer was required to issue a Miranda warning before
asking for his name because he was subject to a custodial interrogation. Both the United
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States and Minnesota Constitutions protect criminal defendants from being compelled “to
be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. To protect
the right against self-incrimination, the polic e must use “procedura l safeguards” when a
suspect is subject to a “custodial interrogation.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966). Those procedural safeguards include wa rning the suspect that he has the right to
remain silent and the ri ght to an attorney. Id. If the police do not provide a Miranda
warning, then any statements the suspect makes during a custodial interrogation are
inadmissible at trial. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 30 (Minn. 2016). Because the officer
did not provide a Miranda warning, Kalis argues that his statements—including the false
name he gave—must be suppressed.
The issue here is whether Kalis was subj ect to a custodial in terrogation when the
officer asked him to identify himself, t hus requiring the officer to provide a Miranda
warning. There are two prongs to this inquiry: whether th e defendant was “in custody,”
and whether the police conduct ed an “interrogation.” State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719,
724 (Minn. 1998). When the facts are undisputed, as they are here, we review the district
court’s determinations on both prongs de novo. State v. Heinonen, 909 N.W.2d 584, 590
(Minn. 2018); State v. Wiernasz, 584 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1998).
Regarding the first prong, “[a]n interr ogation is custodial if, based on all the
surrounding circumstances, a re asonable person under the ci rcumstances would believe
that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” State v.
Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Mi nn. 2010) (quotation omitted). As relevant here,
factors that suggest that an interrogation is custodial include officers restraining the
10
suspect’s freedom, the presence of multiple officers, and offi cers pointing a gun at the
suspect. Id. Factors that indicate that an interrogation is not custodial include the suspect’s
freedom to leave at any time, a nonthreateni ng environment, and the suspect’s ability to
make phone calls. Id. at 491-92.
Here, the officer clearly restrained Ka lis’s freedom. She ordered him to stop
walking away from her and threatened to put him in her squad car. She also told him that
he could go to jail if he di d not identify himself. Additi onally, the body-camera video
shows that multiple security officers were positioned down the hallway and were
preventing Kalis from leaving. Those circum stances demonstrate that the encounter was
somewhat threatening. But even though Kalis was not free to terminate the encounter, the
test “is not whether a reasonabl e person would believe he or she was not free to leave.”
State v. Champion, 533 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. 1995). Instead, as discussed above, the test
is whether a reasonable person would believe he was in police custody to the degree of a
formal arrest. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d at 491. Here, th e officer questioned Kalis in the
hallway of a casino. She was the only officer who questioned him and was in the immediate
area. She never drew a gun. Kalis was not placed in hand cuffs or otherwise physically
restrained until well after he gave a fals e name to the officer. Based on those
circumstances, the interview did not rise to the level associated with a formal arrest. Thus,
Kalis was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he gave a false name.
Regarding the second prong of the Miranda inquiry, an interrogation occurs when
a suspect is subject to “either express que stioning or its functi onal equivalent.” Rhode
Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). The “functional equivalent” of express
11
questioning is “any words or acti ons on the part of the police . . . that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301
(footnote omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Cour t has indicated that the disclosure of a
suspect’s name is not incriminating testimony protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Evans v. State , 788 N.W.2d 38, 45 (M inn. 2010) (briefly
discussing the issue in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for failure
to argue a Fifth Amendment violation); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542
U.S. 177, 191 (2004) (stating that disclosure of the suspec t’s name is likely “to be
incriminating only in unusual circumstances”). We agree that asking a suspect to provide
his name is not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. As
such, Kalis was not interrogated for Miranda purposes when he was asked to provide his
name.
In sum, Kalis was not subject to a custodi al interrogation when he gave a false name
to the officer. The of ficer therefore was not required to provide a Miranda warning, and
Kalis’s statements were admi ssible. The district court did not err by denying Kalis’s
motion to suppress.
Affirmed.