In the Matter of the Application of Impact Power Solutions, LLC and MN CSG 2019-29 LLC for a Conditional Use Permit.
Cited by
- In the Matter of the Application of USS Great River Solar LLC for an … Minn. Ct. App. 2022
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington 861 N.W.2d 71
- CUP Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis 633 N.W.2d 557
- Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles County Board of Commissioners 617 N.W.2d 566
- In Re Petition for Reinstatement to the Practice of Law of Dickson 656 N.W.2d 383
- St. Croix Development, Inc. v. City of Apple Valley 446 N.W.2d 392
- Yang v. County of Carver 660 N.W.2d 828
- Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Afton 323 N.W.2d 757
- Trisko v. City of Waite Park 566 N.W.2d 349
- Barton Contracting Co., Inc. v. City of Afton 268 N.W.2d 712
- Senior v. City of Edina 547 N.W.2d 411
- Big Lake Ass'n v. Saint Louis County Planning Commission 761 N.W.2d 487
- Beca of Alexandria, L.L.P. v. County of Douglas Ex Rel. Board of Commissioners 607 N.W.2d 459
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0925
In the Matter of the Application of Impact Power Solutions, LLC and MN CSG 2019-29
LLC for a Conditional Use Permit.
Filed May 9, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge
Stearns County Board of Commissioners
Patrick B. Steinhoff, Thomas F. DeVincke, Malkerson G unn Martin LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for relators Impact Power Solutions, LLC and MN CSG 2019-29 LLC)
Jay T. Squires, Michael J. Ervin, Rupp , Anderson, Squires & Waldspurger, PA,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Stearns County Board of Commissioners)
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith, Tracy
M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Relators challenge the decision of respon dent county board of commissioners to
deny an application for a conditional use permit for a solar farm. Because the reasons cited
for denial are supported by evidence in the record and are not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2020, relators Impact Po wer Solutions LLC and MN CSG 2019-29
LLC (relators), applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) for a one-megawatt community
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solar farm. The proposed site is about 7.5 acres in size and is on a larger, 113.36-acre
parcel of property in Paynesville Township, Stearns County (the county). The site is in the
“Agricultural 40” zoning district (the A-40 district). The pur pose of this district “is to
preserve the agricultural and rural characte r of land.” Community solar farms are a
conditional use within the A-40 district.
In April 2021, the county’s planning commission (the planning commission) held a
public hearing on relators’ application. Th e planning commission reviewed staff reports
and maps of the site and hear d public comments. At the e nd of the hearing, the planning
commission recommended denying relators’ application and made factual findings
supporting its recommendation. The matter then went to respondent Stearns County Board
of Commissioners (the board of commissioners). The board of commissioners held public
meetings to consider the proposed solar farm . In June 2021, the board of commissioners
adopted the planning commission’s findings of fact and denied the CUP application.
Relators seek review of the board of commissioners’ decision by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Counties may carry out planning and zoning activities to promote the health, safety,
morals and general welfare of the community . Minn. Stat. § 394.21, subd. 1 (2020).
Planning and zoning decisions will be reve rsed only if the governing body “acted
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously.” RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington , 861
N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. 2015). A decision is arbitr ary and capricious if it is an exercise of
will, rather than judgment. CUP Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557, 565
(Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001). A “[r]uling on a conditional use
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permit application is a quasi-judicial act” th at “is reviewable by writ of certiorari.”
Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Minn. 2000).
Our standard of review is deferential because a county has “wide latitude” in deciding on
permits. Schwardt v. County of Watonwan, 656 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn. 2003). Nor will
we substitute our judgment for that of a county , even if we may have reached a different
conclusion. St. Croix Dev., Inc. v. City of Apple Valley, 446 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Minn. App.
1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989).
Relators claim they are entitled to a CUP because they satisfied the standards in the
county’s zoning ordinance and the county’s decision to deny the application lacks factual
support in the record . If a municipality explicitly stat es its reasons for denying a CUP
application, as the county did here, this court examines (1) whether “the reasons given by
[the county] were legally sufficient,” and (2) whether “the reasons had a factual basis in
the record.” RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 75-76. “The pe rmit applicant has the burden of
persuading this court that the reasons for the denial either are legally insufficient or had no
factual basis in the record.” Yang v. County of Carver, 660 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. App.
2003). We therefore consider whether the county properly articulated a legal basis for its
decision, and whether there is factual support in the record supporting this legal basis.
Legal Basis for Decision
Relators claim there was not a legal basis to deny the CUP application. A municipal
council’s denial of a CUP is le gally sufficient if it is base d on reasons “relating to public
health, safety[,] and general welfare or becau se of incompatibility between the proposed
use and a municipality’s comprehensive municipal plan.” Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. City of
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Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn. 1982). Denial of a CUP is not legally sufficient if the
municipality bases its denial on land-use standards that are “unreasonabl y vague” or
“unreasonably subjective.” Trisko v. City of Waite Park , 566 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn.
App. 1997) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 1997). Generally, however,
a conflict with a comprehensive plan is a le gally sufficient ground for denying a CUP.
Hubbard Broad., Inc., 323 N.W.2d at 762-63 (affirming denial of permit for satellite station
based on incompatibility between proposed use and municipa lity’s comprehensive plan);
see also Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton , 268 N.W.2d 712, 71 7-18 (Minn. 1978)
(determining that municipality had legally sufficient reason to deny permit to mine gravel
based on inconsistency with land-use plan).
Here, the zoning ordinance authorizes th e board of commissioners to consider
whether a proposed use conforms to the comprehensive plan before granting a CUP. The
board of commissioners determined that relators’ proposed use was incompatible with the
comprehensive plan. The proposed site of th e solar farm is in the A-40 zoning district.
The purpose of this district “is to preserve the agricultural and rural character of land.” The
comprehensive plan specifically provides that agricultural areas, such as those in the A-40
zoning district, should be “agriculturally oriented.” The comprehensive plan also instructs
that only “limited” space in agricultural zones should be devoted to solar uses. Moreover,
while solar farms are permitted within the A-40 district, the comprehensive plan provides
that solar sites are to be situated “in a way that reduces conflict with adjacent land uses.”
The board of commissioners denied the application to help preserve the agricultural
character of the land. The board of commissioners also focused on the negative effects of
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a solar farm on the surrounding areas. The board of commissioners specifically questioned
the effects of the solar farm on the general welfare of the property, given the high number
of solar projects near the Paynesville area. These concerns are relevant to the “public health
or safety or the general welfare of the area affected or the community as a whole.” RDNT,
861 N.W.2d at 76 (quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 394.21, subd. 1 (listing bases
for county zoning activities). Because the county’s decision is reasonably related to the
health, safety and general we lfare of the community, the board of commissioners had a
legally sufficient basis for its decision.1
Factual Basis for Decision
Having determined that the county’s basis for denying the CUP is legally sufficient,
we next turn to whether facts in the record support the lega l basis for the decision. The
board of commissioners determined that the CUP deviated from the agricultural-use section
of the county’s comprehensiv e plan. The comprehensive pl an states that the county’s
“agricultural heritage is the root of [its] pr osperity and identity.” The agricultural-use
policies are designed to “enhance and prom ote the advancement of [the county’s]
agricultural economy.” The following considerations are relevant in determining whether
a proposed use violates the county’s agricultural-use policies:
1 Relators argue that upon a showing that a CUP application complie s with the county’s
zoning requirements, the county must grant the application. The county asserts that while
the application fit with some portions of the zoning ordinance, the proposed use deviated
from the agricultural-use provisions of the comprehensive plan. Settled Minnesota law
holds that “[a] munici pality may weigh whether the propos ed use is consistent with its
land-use plan” in deciding whether to grant a permit. Barton Contracting Co., 268 N.W.2d
at 717.
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a. Primary land uses in the “Agr icultural” areas should be
agriculturally oriented, includi ng animal agriculture, crop
production and specialized ag ricultural enterprise, in
combination with limited ag ricultural related business,
solar and wind, recreational, institutional, and open space
uses.
b. Emphasize the importance of an imal agricultu re to the
County economy by treating it as a priority land use in this
area (compared with residential or other non-agricultural
uses).
c. Encourage agricultural practices that allow for co-existence
with sensitive natural resources.
d. Encourage sustainable agricultu ral practices that protect
prime farmland and water resources for future
generation[s].
The comprehensive plan states that clean energy resources “hav[e] an increasingly
prominent role in energy systems.” The county’s goa ls in this area include
“[e]ncourag[ing] the development and use of renewable energy sy stems throughout the
county, including wind energy and solar energy. ” Yet the comprehensive plan notes that
agricultural areas shou ld remain “agriculturally orient ed,” with only “limited” space
devoted to solar uses.
During the public hearings, the plan ning commission and the board of
commissioners heard testimony and reviewed evidence related to how a solar farm on the
site would affect these agricultural-use policies. The commission members also visited the
site before the public hearings. The facts in the record support the county’s decision to
deny the CUP to preserve farmland in the A-40 agricultural district.
The board of commissioners received conflicting eviden ce about the character of
the land itself. The CUP application stated that the site was “nonprime farmland.” One of
the members of the planning commission disagreed with this portion of the application and
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asserted, “[it] is farmland.” Relators’ representative described the property as “kind of an
old gravel pit” with “very light” soil. The representative stated the soil “doesn’t produce
very well with conventional crops.” But the representa tive acknowledged that the
landowners were “currently farming the entire . . . farmable land. And this is . . . some of
the better stuff, but our goal is just to make sure that we maintain enough to raise . . . cattle.”
The county’s environmental services director shared a map of the area and explained that
solar projects were clustered in a “pretty limit ed area” of north Paynesville. The director
explained that there were concerns about solar projects “taking too much prime farmland”
within this limited area. Faced with conflicting statements about the character of the land,
the board of commissioners credited testimony that the land was suitable for farming or
raising animals. We defer to the board’s resolution of conflicting testimony on this issue.
See Senior v. City of Edina, 547 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Minn. App. 1996) (noting that on review
of a certiorari appeal, we do not retry facts or make credibility determinations).
The record also supports the board of co mmissioners’ exercise of its discretion to
limit the space devoted to solar uses. As stated, the comprehensive plan provides that only
“limited” space may be devoted to solar energy projects. 2 In considering this issue, the
board of commissioners discussed the proliferation of solar farms in the area. One solar
project, the MN East Regal LLC (East Regal) so lar garden, is located directly next to the
2 Relators argue that the county should have provided a definitive number of solar projects
that could be permitted in the ar ea rather than state that so lar uses could be “limited.”
Relators have identified no authority for this proposition.
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site.3 Four other solar gardens are located w ithin one mile of the site. There were
additional proposals for solar farms pending before the county, including another solar
project from East Regal on the same property. A neighbor object ed to the proposal,
asserting that the area was being “choked” with solar projects in recent years and
neighboring property owners did not want to be “surrounded” by solar farms. A member
of the planning commission stat ed that the county had “ope ned the floodgates” for solar
farms in the area, and that there were currently 90 applications within Stearns County. The
board of commissioners noted that there were “a lot” of solar farms in the Paynesville area.
There was testimony in the reco rd that McLeod County was “denying all solar projects,”
that Wright County had “put a moratorium” on solar farms, and that other counties were
also “backing off” of solar farms. Relators’ proposed solar farm would be the second solar
project on the property and the sixth solar pr oject in the north of Paynesville. The board
of commissioners found that a sixth solar farm in this one-mile area would not satisfy the
comprehensive plan to limit solar projects in agriculturally oriented areas.
The record supports the boa rd of commissioners’ decisi on to deny the application
because it did not fit the county’s objectives to preserve the agricultural nature of the land
and to limit the space devoted to solar uses. “County zoning authorities have wide latitude
3 The county approved the East Regal solar farm by administrative permit. Previously, all
proposed solar farms were required to go th rough a CUP process. The ordinance was
amended to allow the first one-megawatt sola r garden on any parcel of property to be
approved administratively. Because East Re gal received administrative approval for the
first solar garden, any later requests for a solar farm, including relators’ request, required a
CUP. Relators’ CUP application is the se cond request for a one-megawatt solar farm
located on the same parcel of record and therefore required approval from the board of
commissioners.
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in making decisions on [CUPs],” and “except in rare cases where there is no rational basis
for the decision, it is th e duty of the judiciary to exercise restraint and accord appropriate
deference to civil authorities in routine zoning matters.” Big Lake Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty.
Plan. Comm’n, 761 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Minn. 2009) (quotations omitted). And this court
“may not substitute its judgment, if there is a legally sufficient reason for [a CUP] decision,
even if it would have reached a different conclusion.” BECA of Alexandria, L.L.P. v. Cnty.
of Douglas ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs , 607 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Minn. App. 2000). Here, the
county had a legally sufficient ba sis for its decision and the fact s support this legal basis.
Given the deferential standard of revi ew, we therefore approve the board of
commissioners’ decision.4
Affirmed.
4 The county asserts it also had a rational basis to deny the CUP because of potential
construction disturban ces and environmental concerns, among other reasons. At the
hearing before this court, the county clarif ied that their primary arguments related to
preserving farmland and limiting the land devoted to solar uses.