State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0926

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Cory Wiedeman,
Appellant.

Filed May 16, 2022
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CR-19-2328

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Nearly five years into a 50-year harassment restraining order, appellant Christopher
Wiedeman went to A.Y.’s apartment to speak to her, violating that order. He was charged
with—and eventually pleaded guilty to—one count of harassment. Wiedeman moved for
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downward durational and dispositional departures. The district court denied the motions
and Wiedeman appealed. Because the district court justified the denial of the dispositional
departure using Wiedeman’s criminal histor y, and because it expressly considered the
arguments for a durational departure, the dist rict court acted within its discretion when
denying the departure motions. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2014, Wiedeman was served with a harassment restraining order that prohibited
contact with A.Y. for 50 years. 1 It was the third harassmen t restraining order prohibiting
Wiedeman from contacting A.Y. And Wiedeman had been convicted of violating one of
these harassment restraining orders seve n times between 2008 and 2016. But in
October 2019, Wiedeman went to A.Y.’s apartm ent to try to talk to her and “make peace
with her.” A.Y. called the police. Wiedem an was charged with one count of harassment
(third or subsequent violation in ten years).2
Wiedeman pleaded guilty. He moved for a downward dispositional departure, and
in the alternative a downward durational departure. Wiedeman orally gave his reasons to
the district court for both departures. For the dispositional departure, he emphasized his
amenability to probation due to hi s remorse. And he highlight ed that this instance of
harassment was not violent.
The district court expressly acknowledge d that it considered all the arguments
before denying both departur es in a written order. Althou gh it explicitly rejected both

1 Facts come from the plea hearing. Wiedeman is not challenging his guilty plea.
2 Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 4(b) (2018).
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departures, the district court’s reasoning on ly specifically mentioned the denial for a
dispositional departure. The district court stated three reasons for denial: (1) even though
it was a non-violent offense, it was A.Y.’s third no-contact order against Wiedeman;
(2) Wiedeman has a “concerning” history of alcohol, methamphetamine, and marijuana
use; and (3) he has an extensive criminal history beyond the HRO violations. The district
court sentenced Wiedeman to 41 months’ imprisonment and $200 in fines and fees.
Wiedeman appeals.
DECISION
Wiedeman challenges the district court’s or der in two ways: that the district court
abused its discretion by (1) fa iling to dispositionally depart when factors supported his
amenability to probation, and (2 ) not explicitly justifying its denial of a durational
departure.
“We afford the [district] court great di scretion in the imposition of sentences and
reverse sentencing decisions only fo r an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto ,
855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). “[T]he Guidelines state that when substantial and
compelling circumstances are presen t, the judge ‘may’ depart.” State v. Kindem ,
313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). Substantial and compelling circumstances are those that
make a case atypical. Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Minn. 2003). A departure is
not mandatory, and an appellate court will re verse a sentencing court’ s refusal to depart
only in a “rare” case. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7. Although the district court is required to
give reasons for departure, an explanation is not required when the court considers reasons
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for departure but elects to impose the presumptive sentence. State v. Theisen, 363 N.W.2d
867, 869 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied, (Minn. May 18, 1985).
I. The district court justified its reas ons to deny a down ward dispositional
departure.

First, Wiedeman argues that the district court abused its disc retion when it denied
his motion for a downward dispositional departure because he raised factors that supported
his amenability to probation.
A dispositional departure typically focuses on characteristics of the offender that
show whether they are “particularly amenable to individualized treatment in a probationary
setting.” State v. Wright , 310 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Minn. 1981); see also State v. Trog ,
323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (citing the “defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse,
his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of frie nds and/or family” as
relevant factors that may justify a dispositional departure). For a downward dispositional
departure, a district court may consider both offender- a nd offense-related factors.
State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Mi nn. App. 2018) (citing State v. Chaklos ,
528 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 1995)).
Here, the district court considered Wied eman’s arguments for a departure and,
although it was not required to do so, justified its reasons supporting the conclusion that
Wiedeman was not amenable to probation. It noted Wiedeman’s frequent violations of the
same 50-year HRO, his chemic al dependency, and “extensi ve criminal history,” all
findings supported by the record. This decision was not “against logic and the facts in the
record” that would justify a reversal. State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn. 2015).
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Because the district court considered Wiedeman’s prior record when concluding he
was not amenable to probation, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Wiedeman’s motion for a downward dispositional departure.
II. The district court co nsidered the arguments fo r a downward durational
departure.

Next, Wiedeman argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion for a downward durational departure without explicitly addressing Wiedeman’s
arguments supporting one.
A durational departure is a sentence that departs in length from the presumptive
guidelines range. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.5.b (2020). A durational departure must be
based on factors that reflect the seriousness of the offense, not the characteristics of the
offender. Chaklos, 528 N.W.2d at 228. A downward durational departure is justified only
if the defendant’s conduct was “significantly less serious than that typically involved in the
commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson , 376 N.W.2d 413, 4 15 (Minn. 1985).
Minnesota courts have consistently held that an “explanation is not required” for the denial
of a durational departure, so long as the di strict court considered the arguments and the
defendant was sentenced with in the presumptive sentence. State v. Van Ruler ,
378 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. App. 1985).
Here, the district court did just that—it expressly noted that it considered all of
Wiedeman’s arguments before denying his alternative argument for a downward durational
departure. And the 41-month sentence was within the presumptive sentence. Because the
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district court only needed to consider the ar guments for a durational departure, and it did
so, it did not abuse its discretion.
In sum, the district court acted within its wide discretion when it denied the motions
for downward dispositional and durational departures.
Affirmed.