Cathy Spann, et al.,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A21-0931

Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J.

Cathy Spann, et al.,

Appellants,

vs. Filed: August 24, 2022
Office of Appellate Courts
Minneapolis City Council, et al.,

Respondents.

________________________

Douglas P. Seaton, James V.F. Dickey, U pper Midwest Law Center, Golden Valley,
Minnesota, for appellants.

Peter Ginder, Acting Minneapolis City Attorn ey, Gregory P. Sautter, Brian S. Carter,
Caroline M. Bachun, Assistant City Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondents.

Joseph A. Kelly, Kevin M. Beck, Rebecca Du ren, Kelly & Lemmons, P.A., Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for amicus curiae Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. The Minneapolis City Charter imposes a clear legal duty on the Minneapolis
Mayor to employ at least 0.0017 sworn police officers per Minneapolis resident.
2. The Minneapolis City Council is meeting its uncontested clear legal duty to
fund at least 0.0017 sworn police officers per Minneapolis resident.
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3. Because the Mayor has a clear legal duty to employ 0. 0017 sworn police
officers per Minneapolis resident, the district court did not err in issuing an alternative writ
of mandamus ordering the Mayor to comply with his clear legal duty, but because the City
Council is meeting its unconte sted clear legal duty to fund at least 0.0017 sworn police
officers per Minneapolis resident, the district court erred in issuing an alternative writ of
mandamus requiring the City Council to fund at least this many officers.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
This appeal requires us to determine whether the Minneapolis City Charter imposes
a clear legal duty on the Minneapolis Mayor and the Minneapolis City Council to employ
and fund at least 0.0017 sworn police officers per resident. In the fall of 2020, a group of
north Minneapolis residents sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Mayor and City
Council to employ and fund this minimum number of officers. The district court issued an
alternative writ of mandamus, concluding that the Minneapolis City Charter creates a clear
legal duty to employ and fund 0.0017 officers per resident and that the Mayor and City
Council had failed to do so. The court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals held that
the Mayor does not have a clear legal duty to employ a minimum number of officers and
that the City Council is satisfying its clear legal duty to fund 0.0017 officers per resident.
On June 20, 2022, we filed an order that affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded,
concluding that the Mayor has a clear legal duty to employ 0.0017 officers per resident and
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that the City Council is meeting its clear legal duty to fund at least this many officers. Our
opinion explains the reasons for our decision.
FACTS
In August 2020, eight residents—Cath y Spann, Aimee Lundberg, Jonathan
Lundberg, Don Samuels, Sondra Samuels, Julie Oden, Audua Pugh, and Georgianna
Yantos—filed a petition for a wr it of mandamus seeking to compel the Mayor and City
Council to employ and fund at least 0.0017 sworn police officers per Minneapolis resident.
The residents argued that sections 7.3(a) a nd 7.3(c) of the City Charter impose an
“unqualified duty” on the Mayor and City Council to employ and fund these officers. The
first provision, section 7.3(a), describes the Mayor’s power over the police department:
Police department. The Mayor has complete power over the establishment,
maintenance, and command of the police department. The Mayor may make
all rules and regulations and may promulgate and enforce general and special
orders necessary to operating the po lice department. Except where the law
vests an appointment in the departme nt itself, the Mayor appoints and may
discipline or discharge any employee in the department (subject to the Civil
Service Commission’s rules, in the case of an employee in the classified
service).

Minneapolis, Minn., Charter § 7.3(a) (2022 ). The second provision, section 7.3(c),
describes the City Council’s obligation to fund a police force:
Funding. The City Council must fund a police force of at least 0.0017
employees per resident, and provide for those employees’ compensation, for
which purpose it may tax the taxable prop erty in the City up to 0.3 percent
of its value annually. This tax is in addition to any other tax, and not subject
to the maximum set under section 9.3(a)(4).

Minneapolis, Minn., Charter § 7.3(c) (2022).
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The residents further supported their po sition that the Charter places a minimum
force requirement on the Mayor by pointing to language in pr ior versions of the Charter.
The residents noted that the Charter was am ended in 2013 and that those amendments
became effective in 20 15. When discussing the powers of the Ma yor, the 2013 Charter
stated:
The personnel of the police department shall be established and maintained
at a ratio, or as closely thereto as is possible within the limits of section 2
hereof, of not less than one and se ven-tenths (1.7) employees per one
thousand (1,000) of popu lation of the city accord ing to the latest United
States official census.

Minneapolis, Minn., Charter ch. 6, § 1 (Dec. 15, 2014 version). The residents pointed out
that this language was first proposed to be included in the Charter in 1961 and that this
language was intended to actually increase the size of the police force, not just to increase
funding.
Based on their reading of the Charter language, the residents argued that the Charter
required the City to employ and fund 743 sworn police officers in 2020 and that the Mayor
and City Council were not complying with this duty.
1 The residents alleged that at the
beginning of 2020, the City employed approx imately 825 officers but that due to
retirements, medical leave, and disability leave there were fewe r than 743 officers at the
time of the petition. Because of a hiring freeze and the City’s decision to cancel its

1 The district court ultimatel y determined that the ratio would result in 730.33 sworn
police officers based on the 2019 population estimate from the U.S. Census Bureau Quick
Facts, and the court of appeals noted that th e ratio results in 730.92 officers based on the
2020 U.S. Census, Spann v. Minneapolis City Council , 973 N.W.2d 321, 324 n.2 (Minn.
App. 2022).
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August 2020 police academ y, the residents claimed that th e City would be unable to fill
these vacancies. The residents argued that this lack of police was contributing to a surge
in violent crime. The residents asked for a peremptory writ requiring the Mayor and City
Council to immediately comply with the City Charter or an alternative writ requiring the
Mayor and City Council to show cause why they were not complying with their obligations.
In April 2021, the parties reached a stipul ation of facts and exhibits governing their
dispute. The parties agreed that there were 743 sworn police officers in the Minneapolis
Police Department as of April 10, 2021, down from 879 in early January 2020.2 By June 1,
2021, the number was projected to be down to 690 officers and remain under 700 officers
for at least a full year. This decrease was due to “an unpr ecedented departure of sworn
police officers” following George Floyd’s de ath on May 25, 2020, and the aftermath.
Specifically, 169 officers had left the departme nt, almost four times the normal rate of
attrition.3 An additional 70 “then-k nown or suspected PERA Duty Disability applicants”
had not yet left the departme nt. Despite the loss of offi cers, the 2021 city budget
“provide[d] actual funding for an average of 770 sworn officers on payroll.”
The stipulation also addressed what was being done to fill vacancies in the
department and future employment projections . The parties agreed that “[h]iring new
sworn police officers is a resour ce intensive process” and that “[t]he pipeline of potential

2 The parties do not dispute that fewer than 743 officers are presently employed by
the Minneapolis Police Department.

3 The Minneapolis Police Department expects to lose roughly 44 officers in any given
year.
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sworn officers has shrunk considerably within the last several years.” Specifically, all new
officers attend a 3-month long police academ y “to onboard and train.” Three such
academies were scheduled for 2021 and were expected to add 110 new sworn police
officers to the department. While it was still early in the 2022 budget process, the parties
agreed that the Mayor’s proposed 2022 budge t would likely include training for at least
160 additional officers, the most the department believed that it could train in a year. Based
on this information, and assuming a “return to normal attrition after the current group of
disability claimants leave the [d epartment],” the department projected that the number of
officers would hit a low of 637 in April 2022 and then begin to climb up to 757 officers
by the end of January 2023.
After a hearing, the district court issued an alternative writ of mandamus in early
July 2021.4 In its order, the district court defi ned “police force” as “all sworn police
officers currently employed by the” Minneapolis Police Department, whether “on leave or
on the ground.” The district court concluded that the City Council and the Mayor “cannot
indefinitely rely on the 2010 Census number to determine how many sworn officers must

4 The district court issued an alternative writ of mandamus. A district court may issue
an alternative writ of mandamus or a peremptory writ of mandamus. Minn. Stat. § 586.03
(2020). An alternative writ commands “the de fendant [to] do the required act, or show
cause before the court . . . why the defendant has not done so,” either immediately or at a
later date. Id. A peremptory writ requires the defend ant to do the required act without a
show-cause option. Id. When mandamus is appropriate, the district court may issue an
alternative writ unless “it is apparent that no valid excuse for nonperformance can be
given,” in which case the district court may issue a peremptory writ “in the first instance.”
Minn. Stat. § 586.04 (2020). If the defendant shows compliance with the alternative writ,
or cause for noncompliance with the alternative writ, the a lternative writ should be
quashed, and no peremptory writ shall issue. See Minn. Stat. §§ 586.06–.09 (2020).
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be employed,” despite acknowledging that the City Charter “is clear and unambiguous”
that “any reference to population or other enumeration refers to the latest decennial federal
census.” Instead, the district court imposed an obligation “to keep up with projected census
numbers as each 10-year period approaches” a nd concluded that “[t] he City must be
proactive.” Ultimately, the district court determined that the City must fund
730.33 officers based on the 2019 population estimate from the U.S. Census Bureau Quick
Facts. In a footnote, the district court stated without citation to the record that “[t]he parties
do not dispute that ‘to fund’ also requires the City ‘to employ.’ ”
After addressing these preliminary matters, the district court concluded that the
residents had “established the essential elements required for the issuance of an alternative
writ of mandamus”: “(1) the failure of an official duty clearly imposed by law; (2) a public
wrong specifically injurious to petitioner; and (3) no other adequate specific legal remedy.”
The district court reasoned that the Mayor and City Council failed to perform their official
duties clearly imposed by law because the pa rties’ stipulated future employment
projections fell below the required 730.33 swor n police officers. In concluding “that the
failure to [adequately] fund a police force . . . constitutes a ‘public wrong’ that is
specifically injurious to” the residents, the district court determined that there was a causal
link between the increased crime that the resi dents were experiencing and the failure to
adequately fund the police. Finally, the district court concluded that the residents “cannot
seek legislative and/or positio n changes through the political process . . . because [the
residents] are not seeking ‘change’ or a ‘fix.’ ”
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The alternative writ of mandamus issued by the district court commanded the Mayor
and City Council “to immediately . . . take al l necessary action . . . to fund a police force
of at least . . . 730.33 sworn police officers or a number of sworn police officers equaling
0.0017 of the 2020 cen sus population when published . . . , whichever is higher.” 5 The
alternative writ further commanded the Mayor and City Council “to make a return of th[e]
writ specifying by affidavit what [they] have done to comply with the writ, and to file and
serve the return, or show cause before this Court why [they] have not done so, on or about
June 30, 2022.”
The court of appeals reversed the issuance of the writ. Spann v. Minneapolis City
Council, 973 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Minn. App. 2022 ). The court of appeals identified the
“central legal issue” as “whether section 7.3 of the city charter clea rly imposes a duty on
the city council and the mayor to not just fund but also to continuously employ a minimum
number of police officers.” Id. at 326. The court of appeals noted that the district court
did not reach that question because it errone ously concluded that “[t]he parties do not
dispute that ‘to fund’ also requires the City ‘to employ.’ ” Id. The court of appeals
explained that the Mayor and City Council “consistently maintain ed” throughout their
filings that the Charter only imposes a fundi ng requirement and that the Mayor and City

5 The court of appeals took notice that the 2020 U.S. Census states that the population
of Minneapolis is 429,954. Spann, 973 N.W.2d at 324 n.2. Applying the minimum
“0.0017 employees per resident” requirement found in section 7.3(c) of the Charter results
in 730.92 sworn police office rs. 973 N.W.2d at 324 n.2. The parties do not dispute this
calculation. For ease of reference, we will refer to the duty at issue as the duty to fund and
employ 731 officers.
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Council did not concede at the district court hearing that “to fund” requires the City “to
employ.” Id.
The court of appeals concluded that although the current language of section 7.3(c)
unambiguously “imposes a duty on the city council to continuously fund a minimum
number of sworn police officers,” section 7.3(a) “does not direct the mayor to employ any
certain number of officers.” 973 N.W.2d at 327. The court of appeals recognized that “it
is logical to conclude that if the city counc il provides funds . . . then the mayor must use
those funds for their designated purpose,” but held that this logical inference did not create
“a nondiscretionary ‘duty clearly imposed by law’ that may be controlled through a writ of
mandamus.” Id. (quoting Mendota Golf, LLP v. C ity of Mendota Heights , 708 N.W.2d
162, 171 (Minn. 2006) (emphasis added)). The court concluded its analysis by noting “that
the mayor’s duty to maintain the police depa rtment is a discretionary duty” and that,
because the Mayor was “actively exercising his discretion to address the shortage of sworn
officers,” there was “no need for mandamus to set that discretion in motion.” Id. at 329.
Judge Connolly wrote separately “because [he thought] it is illogical that there is a
clear . . . duty to fund a certain number of sworn officers, but no clear duty to employ
them.” Id. at 330 (Connolly, J., concurring specially). Nevertheless, he agreed that “the
city charter provides no clear duty to employ a certain number of sworn officers.” Id. He
noted that his decision was “also influenced by the city’s representations at oral argument
that the mayor is making a good- faith effort to hire the specif ied number of officers that
has already been funded.” Id.
We granted the residents’ petition for further review and motion to expedite.
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ANALYSIS
This appeal asks us to reinstate an a lternative writ of mand amus, issued by the
district court, requiring the Mayor and City Council to show cause why they have not
employed and funded at least 731 sworn police officers, the equivalent of 0.0017 officers
per resident based on the 2020 Census. Th e residents ask three specific questions:
(1) whether section 7.3 of the City Charter imposes a clear legal duty on the Mayor to
employ at least 731 officers, (2) whether the City Council is factually meeting its
uncontested clear legal duty to fund at least 731 officers, and (3) based on our conclusions
to the first two questions, whether the dist rict court appropriate ly issued a writ of
mandamus ordering the Mayor and City Council to employ and fund at least 731 officers.
I.
We first address whether the Mayor has a clear legal duty to employ a police force
of at least 731 sworn police officers under the C ity Charter. This question requires us to
interpret the City Charter, a legal que stion that we review de novo. Vasseur v. City of
Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467, 469–70 (Minn. 2016) (per curiam).
Section 1.3(d) of the City Charter govern s the Charter’s construction. Minneapolis,
Minn., Charter § 1.3(d) (2022). Under secti on 1.3(d)(2), “the canons of construction and
other principles of interpretation in the Mi nnesota Statutes apply to this charter.”
Accordingly, we rely on general principles of statutory interpretation to guide our analysis.
Our first step when interp reting a statute is to dete rmine whether the statutory
language is susceptible “to more than one re asonable interpretation,” that is, whether the
statute is ambiguous. Roberts v. State , 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020). When
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determining whether a statute is ambiguous, “[w]e read [the] statute as a whole and
interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). If the statute is unambiguous, our analysis ends, and “we
interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resor ting to the canons of
statutory construction.” State v. Serbus , 957 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2021) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation ma rks omitted). If there is more than one reasonable
interpretation, however, “we may consider th e canons of statutory construction” to
determine which reasonable interp retation we should adopt. Id. at 88; see Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16 (2020).
The interpretation advanced by the Mayor and City Council is reasonable. Focusing
exclusively on section 7.3 of the City Charter, they argue that the City Council has a clear
legal duty to fund 731 sworn police officers in section 7.3(c), but the Mayor’s “complete
power” over the police department in section 7. 3(a) is not subject to an implicit duty to
employ this same number of officers.
Section 7.3(a) grants the Mayor “ complete power over the establishment,
maintenance, and command of the police de partment,” without explicit limitation.
Minneapolis, Minn., Charter § 7.3(a) (emphasis added). “Complete” means “[a]bsolute.”
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 377 (5th ed. 2011); see Minn.
Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020) (“[W]ords and phra ses are construed according to . . . their
common and approved usage . . . .”). “Power ” is defined to mean , among other things,
“[t]he ability or official capacity to exercise control; authority,” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language, supra, at 1382, and “[t]he legal right or authorization
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to act or not act,” Power, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Accordingly,
section 7.3(a) is a grant of absolute cont rol or authority “ove r the establishment,
maintenance, and command of the police de partment” to the Mayor, which includes the
right to act or not act. Included in section 7. 3(a) is the power to hire police department
employees. This hiring power resides only in the Mayor and, in some limited cases, in the
department itself—which the Mayor has “com plete power” over. Minneapolis, Minn.,
Charter § 7.3(a) (“Except where the law vests an appointment in the department itself, the
Mayor appoints . . . any empl oyee in the department . . . .”). As the Mayor and City
Council argue, section 7.3(a) does not expressly require the Mayor to hire a fixed number
of police officers.
Section 7.3(c), by contrast, does impose an explicit duty on the City Council; “[t]he
City Council must fund a police force of at least [731 sworn police officers], and provide
for those employees’ compensation.” Minne apolis, Minn., Charter § 7.3(c). When
interpreting statutes, “ ‘[m]ust’ is mandatory.” Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15a (2020); see
Minneapolis, Minn., Charter § 1.3( d)(1) (“[E]ach term used in this charter has the same
meaning as in the Minnesota . . . statutes . . . .”). Further, the 731 officer minimum appears
in a provision entitled “Funding,” suggesting that it is in fact a fund ing provision, not an
implicit employment requirement. See Minneapolis, Minn., Charter § 1.3(d)(3) (“[E]ach
heading is a part of the charter, and may be us ed in interpreting its provisions . . . .”).
Finally, the duty to provide minimum fundi ng is imposed upon the City Council, which
has no direct control over po lice department hiring. See Minneapolis, Minn.,
Charter § 7.3(a). Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude (as the Mayor and City Council
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argue) that the City Council’s obligation unde r section 7.3(c)—to “fund a police force of
at least [731 officers] and provide for th ose employees’ compensation”—is a funding
obligation limited to the City Council and does not provide any limitation on the Mayor’s
“complete power” under section 7.3(a) to establish and maintain the police department.
The conflicting interpretation offered by the residents is not reasonable. The
residents argue that the use of the word s “establishment” an d “maintenance” in
section 7.3(a) when granting the Mayor “complete power over the establishment,
maintenance, and command of the police department” reasonably transforms section 7.3(c)
from what appears to be a minimum funding provi sion applicable to a different branch of
government with no police officer hiring aut hority (the City Coun cil) into a minimum
employment provision imposed on the Mayor. We disagree.
The terms “establishment” and “maintenance” cannot be reasonably read to do the
work that the residents’ interpretation requires. “Establish” means “[t]o cause . . . to come
into existence or begin operating,” The American Heritage Dic tionary of the English
Language, supra, at 608, and “maintain” means “[t]o keep up or carry on; continue,” id. at
1058. There is no dispute that the Minneapol is Police Department has been brought into
existence and continues to exist; sworn police officers are employed, and hiring efforts are
ongoing. Accordingly, the residents’ interpretation fails to cross the threshold of
reasonableness.
But an alternative reasonable interpretation is presented based upon section 1.3(b),
which states that although the “charter fully restates and supersedes every prior version . . .
except as this charter or an amendment explicitly provides otherwise, the charter does not
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affect . . . the . . . composition . . . of any . . . department . . . or the . . . powers[] or duties
of any officer.” Minneapolis, Minn., Charter § 1.3(b) (2022). In other words, when it
comes to the powers or duties of an offi cer like the Mayor, or the composition of a
department like the police department, a Char ter amendment only a ffects a substantive
change on those matters if the amendment “explicitly provides” that it is intended to do so.
Section 1.3(b), therefore, is not a typical supersession clause stating that the current
language supersedes all prior versions. Instead, by its plain terms, section 1.3(b) expressly
commands that when the Mayor’s powers or duties or the police department’s composition
are at issue, the court must ascertain whether any amendment to the relevant language was
intended to be substantive. If that was th e express intention of the amendment, the
amended language alone controls. But section 1.3(b) correspondingly requires that if the
language at issue was the product of a no n-substantive amendmen t, then the amended
language cannot affect the Mayor’s powers or duties, or the police department’s
composition.
Here, nothing in the language of section 7. 3 or the ballot question presented to the
voters in 2013 that resulted in the current langua ge “explicitly provides” that it is altering
the duties of the Mayor in relatio n to the police department. See The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language , supra, at 625 (defining “explicit” as “[f]ully and
clearly expressed; leaving nothing implied”); Explicit, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) (defining “explicit” as “[c]lear, open, direct, or exact” or “[e]xpressed without
ambiguity or vagueness; leaving no doubt”). Instead, the curre nt language of section 7.3
is the product of a 2013 am endment (effective in 2015, see Minneapolis, Minn., Charter
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§ 1.2 (2022)), completely revising the Ch arter, which was put to the voters as
“moderniz[ing] the Charter” and “redraft[ing] its provisions for brevity and in plain
language.”6 Because the 2013 amen dment did not explicitly pr ovide for a substantive
change in the Mayor’s powers, section 1.3(b) can reasonably be read to require that
section 7.3 carry over the Mayor’s pow ers and duties from the prior Charter. 7 Cf. City of
Golden Valley v. Wiebesick, 899 N.W.2d 152, 159 (Minn. 2017) (rejecting an interpretation
of the Minnesota Constitution that “would contra dict the official representation made to
the voters that the 1974 changes were meant to ‘improve [the constitution’s] clarity . . .

6 The 2013 ballot question stated in full:

Shall the Minneapolis City Charter be amended in the form of a complete
revision which (1) modernizes the Char ter; (2) redrafts its provisions for
brevity and in plain language; (3) reorga nizes the Charter into nine articles,
and groups related provisions together; (4) removes from the Charter certain
provisions for possible enactment into ordinance; and (5) retains the current
role and relationships of City boards and commissions?

Minneapolis, Minn., Charter Editor’s Note.

7 Although not specifically at issue in this appeal, the ballot question for the Charter
amendments in 2021 informed the voters th at the amendments were intended to reflect a
substantive change in the Mayor’s powers in relation to other departments. The 2021 ballot
question asked voters: “Shall the Minneapolis City Charter be amended to adopt a change
in its form of government to an Executiv e Mayor-Legislative Council structure to shift
certain powers to the Mayor, consolidatin g administrative authority over all operating
departments under the Mayor, and eliminatin g the Executive Committee?” Minneapolis,
Minn., Ordinance 2021-056 (Nov . 19, 2021). In contrast, the 2013 Charter amendment
(effective in 2015) did not flag for the voters an intended substantive change in the Mayor’s
powers concerning the police. Nothing we say here, however, should be read as
discouraging charter cities, such as Minnea polis, from making effo rts to improve the
organization, length, and clarity of their charters; those efforts are commendable, but cities
must signal to voters when substantive changes are intended.
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without making any consequential changes in its legal effect’ ” (alte rations in original)
(citation omitted)).
Language from the prior Charter reflects that the Mayor’s powers were subject to a
duty to employ a police force with a minimum number of officers. The section of the prior
Charter entitled “Powers of Mayor over Police–Chief” provided that “[t]he mayor shall be
vested with all the powers . . . connected with and incident to the establishment,
maintenance, appointment, re moval, discipline, control a nd supervision of [the] police
force, subject to the limitations herein contained.” Minneapolis, Minn., Charter ch. 6, § 1
(Dec. 15, 2014 version) (emphasis added). The 2013 Charter specif ically required that
“[t]he personnel of the police department shall be established and maintained at a ratio,
or as closely thereto as is possible within the limits of section 2 hereof, of not less than one
and seven-tenths (1.7) employees per one thousand (1,000) of” the City’s population based
on “the latest United Stat es official census.” Id. (emphasis added). Section 2, in turn,
concerned the City Council and imposed a funding requirement that, “[f]or the sole purpose
of maintaining the personnel of the Police Department as provided in Section 1 hereof, the
City Council . . . shall levy a ta x annually . . . in such amount as is necessary to maintain
the Police Department personnel ratio,” subject to a “three (3) mills on each dollar” ceiling
on such a levy. Id. § 2. In other words, the version of the Charter before the non-
substantive amendment in 2013 makes clear that the Mayor must establish and maintain a
police force at the 0.0017 ratio , or as close to that number as possible if taxation limits
prevent the City Council from fully meeting its funding obligation.
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These two reasonable alternative interpre tations—one based on section 7.3 alone
and the other also relying on section 1.3(b)—giv e rise to an ambiguity that permits us to
consider not just the current language of the Charter, but also prior versions of the law, “the
occasion and necessity for the law,” “the circumstances under which it was enacted,” “the
mischief to be remedied,” “the object to be obtained,” and “the contemporaneous
legislative history.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16; see Minneapolis, Minn., Charter § 1.3(d)(2)
(stating that “the canons of construction and other principl es of interpretation in the
Minnesota Statutes apply to this charter,” unless the charter provides otherwise).
The history on this issue is clear. The provision that would ultimately become
section 7.3(c)’s funding provision was clearly meant to address a crime wave in the early
1960s and actually bring on board 180 additional police officers to combat that crime wave.
This intent is reflected in the ballot question posed to the voters in 1961, which asked
whether the Charter should be amended “to increase the Police Force by establishing a ratio
of 1.7 employees per 1,000 residents.” And this historical understanding of the provision
as an employment requirement—not just a funding requirement—was clearly expressed in
the Charter before the 2013 revision that went into effect in 2015. See Minneapolis, Minn.,
Charter ch. 6, § 1 (Dec. 15, 2014 version). Tellingly, the City effectively conceded as
much in its brief, by making no argument that its interpretation of the current Charter could
stand if ambiguity were found. In light of the current Charter’s instruction that the current
“charter does not affect . . . the . . . composition . . . of any . . . department . . . or the . . .
powers[] or duties of any offi cer,” Minneapolis, Minn., Charter § 1.3(b)(2)–(3), and the
representation to the voters that the 2013 amendments were to be primarily non-substantive
18
updates for brevity and plain language, see Minneapolis, Minn., Charter Editor’s Note, the
fact that the prior Charter required the Mayor to actually employ 731 officers compels us
to conclude that the Mayor has a clear legal duty to employ 731 officers based on the 2020
U.S. Census.
II.
We next address whether the City Coun cil is meeting its uncontested clear legal
duty to fund at least 731 sworn police officers under section 7.3(c) of the Minneapolis City
Charter. See Minneapolis, Minn., Charter § 7.3(c). The parties stipulated that “[t]he 2021
budget provides actual funding for an average of 770 sworn officers on payroll.” The 2021
budget was the only budget in existence at the time the district court issued its mandamus
order. The stipulation of facts is binding on the residents for this dispute.8 See Ketterer v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Chippewa Cnty., 79 N.W.2d 428, 435 (Minn. 1956); Anderson v.
Anderson, 225 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Minn. 1975) (expl aining that stipulated facts “take the
place of evidence” and “that a stipulation cannot ordinarily be repudiated or withdrawn by
one party without the consent of the other pa rty except by leave of the court for cause
shown”).
“Actual” is defined as “[e] xisting in fact; real.” Actual, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019). Therefore, for this dispute, the City Council provi ded “real” funding or

8 During briefing before our court, the resi dents filed a motion to supplement the
record, asking us to consider the 2022 Minneapolis City Council Adopted Budget, a related
Mayor’s Budget Presentation, and a December 2021 Star Tri bune article related to the
police department’s funding. Because our review is based on the record at the time that
the writ issued, and because the residents are bo und by their stipulation of facts, we deny
the motion to supplement the record and do not consider those later-created materials.
19
funding “existing in fact” for 770 sworn police officers in 2021. Because the City Council
provided funding “existing in fact” for 770 officers—more than the 731 minimum required
under the Charter—the City Council did not violate its clear legal duty to provide funding
for the police force.
In arguing otherwise, the residents confla te “to fund” with th e number of sworn
police officers actually employed by the Minneapolis Police Department. They argue that
because there are fewer than 731 officers cu rrently employed, ther e cannot possibly be
sufficient funding for 731 officers. But, besides stipulating th at there is in fact “actual
funding” for more than the required minimum number of officers, having sufficient funds
for a certain number of positions does not mean that all funded pos itions will necessarily
be filled. Factors beyond funding go into filling vacant positions—such as the number of
qualified applicants and training capacity. A ccordingly, the residents’ argument is not
persuasive. Based on the parties’ stipulation, we hold that the City Council is meeting its
clear legal duty to fund at least 731 officers.
III.
We turn now to the question of whethe r the district court properly issued an
alternative writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is prim arily employed to either
“compel the performance of an official duty clearly imposed by law” or “to compel the
exercise of discretion when that exercise is required by law.” Mendota Golf, LLP v. City
of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 171 (Minn. 2006). But “mandamus does not control
the particular manner in which a duty is to be performed and does not dictate how discretion
is to be exercised.” Id.
20
To obtain a writ of mandamus, the resident s had to show that the Mayor and City
Council “(1) failed to perform an official duty clearly imposed by law; (2) that, as a result,
the [residents] suffered a public wrong specifically injurious to the [residents]; and (3) that
there is no other adequate legal remedy.” N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Metro. Council ,
684 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 586.01
(2020) (“The writ of mandamus may be issued . . . to compel the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins as a duty . . . .”); Minn. Stat. § 586.02 (2020) (“The writ
shall issue on the information of the party bene ficially interested, but it shall not issue in
any case where there is a plain, speedy, and ad equate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.”). Only the first prong of the mandamus analysis is before us: whether the Mayor
and City Council “failed to perform an official duty clearly imposed by law.” N. States
Power Co., 684 N.W.2d at 491; see Spann, 973 N.W.2d at 326 (“[The Mayor and City
Council] challenge only the first of these elemen ts in this appeal.”). When, like here, the
district court issued its writ of mandamus based on a legal determination, we review the
appropriateness of that writ de novo, based on the record at the time that the writ issued.
Madison Equities, Inc. v. Crockarell, 889 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Minn. 2017).
A.
We first address whether the alternative writ of mandamus was appropriately issued
to compel the Mayor to employ at least 731 sworn police officers or show cause why he
has not done so. Although we have already concluded that the Mayor has a clear legal duty
under section 7.3 of the City Charter to employ 731 offi cers—and the Mayor stipulated
that there was projected to be fewer than 731 officers in the police department from
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June 2021 to at least the start of January 2023—this conclusion does not resolve whether
an alternative writ was appropriate here.
The Mayor argues that the al ternative writ issued by the district court improperly
dictates how he must exercise his hiring disc retion. To determine whether the alternative
writ issued by the district court improperly dictates how the Mayor’s hiring discretion is to
be exercised, we must consider what the wr it actually commands th e Mayor to do. Here,
the writ commands the Mayor “to immediately . . . take all necessary action required by the
Court’s Order . . . to fund a police force of at least [731 sworn police officers].” The district
court’s order is clear that it equates funding with employment. Accordingly, the writ
requires the Mayor to employ at least 731 office rs but does not instruct the Mayor how to
do so; it simply commands him to do so through “all necessary action.”9
The line between when mandamus appropriately “compel[s] the performance of an
official duty clearly imposed by law” and when mandamus inappropriately “dictate[s] how
discretion is to be exercised” can be unclear. Mendota Golf, LLP, 708 N.W.2d at 171. But
here we hold that the alternativ e writ issued by the district court is an appropriate use of
mandamus. Key to this conclusion is that the writ commands only th at the Mayor fulfill
what is a clear legal duty—employing a minimum of 731 sworn police officers—and does
not instruct the Mayor how to reach that number of officers. See, e.g. , id. at 173–74

9 Although we conclude th at the Mayor has a clear le gal duty to employ 731 sworn
police officers based on sections 7.3 and 1.3(b)(2)–(3) of the Charter—rather than the
district court’s erroneous assertion that “[t] he parties do not disput e that ‘to fund’ also
requires the City ‘to employ’ ”—the basis of this duty does not alter the end result required
by the district court’s alternative writ of mandamus.
22
(quashing a writ of mandamus issued by the district court that instructed the defendant how
it was to bring its comprehensiv e land use plan into conformity with its zoning ordinance
but remanding to the district court to issue a new writ that commanded the defendant to
reconcile its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance as required by statute). For instance,
the district court did not command the Mayor to raise wages, offer incentive bonuses,
advertise positions, lower hiring standards, or hold more training academies—all of which
would have inappropriately cont rolled the Mayor’s discretion. Instead, the Mayor retains
his discretion about how best to reach the 731 officer minimum, but he must meet it or show
cause why he has not done so.
The Mayor also argues that his efforts to increase retention and hiring in the
Minneapolis Police Department (much of which are representations about what the Mayor
has done since the alternative writ issued) de monstrate that he is actively exercising his
discretion and, as a result, the alterative writ of mandamus is inappropriate. Although we
have no reason to question thes e representations, there are two flaws with this argument.
First, as discussed above, the writ was issued to compel performance of a clear legal duty
imposed by law—to employ 731 sworn police officers. This is not a situation where
mandamus seeks to compel the exercise of discretion, for there is no discretion in the
required end result. Second, the Mayor’s efforts after the alternative writ was issued have
no bearing on the inquiry here as to whether the district court erred in issuing the alternative
writ of mandamus based on the record before the court at the time. Instead, these efforts
should be appropriately considered by the distri ct court upon return of the alternative writ
to determine whether cause exists for the Mayor’s inability to reach the 731 officer
23
minimum.10 See State ex rel. Rose Bros. Lumber & Supply Co. v. Clousing, 268 N.W. 844,
846 (Minn. 1936) (explaining that “[t]he [district] court is b ound to consider the situation
as it exists as of the time of the hearing on the question whether a peremptory writ should
issue”). If after reviewing this evidence the distri ct court determines that cause has been
shown for why the Mayor has not complied with the alternative writ, the alternative writ
should be quashed and no pere mptory writ shall issue. See Minn. Stat. §§ 586.06–.09
(2020).11
B.
We end our analysis with the alternative wr it of mandamus as it relates to the City
Council. Because, as we previously concluded, the City Council is meeting its uncontested

10 The Mayor concedes that “[w]ith the pr esent headcount in the [Minneapolis Police
Department] it is fair to ad mit that the required number w ill not be reached by June 30,
2022,” the return date for the writ set by the district court.

11 The Mayor and City Council also argue that the district court should not have issued
the writ of mandamus because, at the time the order was issued, only the 2010 census was
available and there were more than 650. 38 sworn police officers employed by the
Minneapolis Police Department—the number required based on the 2010 population—
despite stipulating that the number of officers was projected to be below this number by
January 1, 2022. The Mayor and City Council did not advance this argument at the court
of appeals, and it is therefore forfeited. See In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 379
(Minn. 1990) (“The failure to raise and preserve an issue before the court of appeals
constitutes a [forfeiture] in a subsequent appeal to this court.”). Mo reover, the court of
appeals noted that “the parties agree that the requisite number [of officers that the City
Council was required to fund, and the Mayor was required to employ] should be determined
with reference to the since-released 2020 census data.” Spann, 973 N.W.2d at 324 n.2.
The Mayor and City Council did not request cross-review on that point, and so we do not
consider any argument that we should look to the 2010 census data in evaluating the district
court’s writ of mandamus order. See Abrahamson v. St. Louis County School Dist. ,
819 N.W.2d 129, 137 n.4 (Minn. 2012).
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clear legal duty to fund at least 731 sworn police officers, the district court erred in issuing
the alternative writ requiring the City Council to fund at least 731 officers.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in pa rt, reverse in part, and remand to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.