State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0943

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Isaiah Charles Bracy,
Respondent.

Filed December 20, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Kirk, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-6023

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Drake D. Metzger, Jasmin Quiggle, Metzger Law Firm, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Following a shots-fired call, Saint Paul police officers encountered respondent
Isaiah Charles Bracy standing near the area of the shooting outside his home. Because the
responding officer knew him from previous shooting-related incidents, and because he was
a possible witness, she called to him to ask him about the shooting. But Bracy took off
down an alley, throwing a gun into some bushes. After being charged with unlawful
possession of a firearm and ammunition, Bracy filed a motion to suppress the evidence.
The district court ruled that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to seize him
before he took off running. The state appeals. Because we conclude that there was no
initial seizure when the officer called out to Bracy, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
The facts are uncontested. Saint Paul police officers responded to a report of shots
fired in the Capitol neighborhood. The shooter was described as wearing a red hat and a
black jacket and was likely running south. The officers observed a man standing at the
corner of Charles Avenue and Marion Street, about one block south of where the shots had
been reported. The man, later identified as Bracy, was wearing all white and had a ponytail.
One of the responding officers knew Bracy from previ ous arrests and convictions for
weapons-related offenses. The responding officer got out of the squad car and called to
Bracy, saying, “Hey Isaiah, come here.” Bracy took off down an alley. Midway down the
alley, Bracy pulled an item from his pants and threw it into heavy vegetation. Officers
later located a loaded black handgun in the vegetation and arrested Bracy. The state
3
charged Bracy with unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (2020). Bracy filed a motion to
suppress the evidence.
At the evidentiary hearing, the responding officer testified that she was part of the
Saint Paul police department’s gang unit and was familiar with the local gangs and
individuals.1 She said she has known Bracy for about five years and had between five and
ten interactions with him, including knowing that he was at the scene of a prior shots-fired
call in the Marion/Charles area. The officer considers Marion/Charles to be a high-crime
area. She knew Bracy lived a couple houses away from where he was spotted. Bracy, she
testified, looked “concerned” and was looking across the street at an apartment that was
later determined to be where the shooting took place. The officer confirmed that Bracy did
not have anything in his hands, he was not running, and he did not look like he had just
been running. Regardless, the officer testified that she intended to conduct a stop of Bracy
to ask him about the shots-fired call, particularly because of her knowledge of his criminal
history and because he was a potential witness to the shooting. No other witnesses were
questioned about the shooting.
2
The district court concluded that the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to conclude that Bracy was the suspect in the shooting or to further freeze the

1 Bracy did not testify or present evidence at the hearing.
2 Witnesses were asked specifically about Bracy running away from the officers and
throwing his gun.
4
scene. Because the evidence used to charge Bracy was obtained during an unlawful
seizure, the district court reasoned that the complaint must be dismissed. The state appeals.
DECISION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. As a
general rule, a law-enforcement officer may not make a warrantless arrest of a person
without probable cause that the person “had committed or was committing an offense.”
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 9 1 (1964). But a law-enforcement officer may temporarily
detain a person for investigatory purposes if the officer has a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the person has engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-
22, (1968); State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011). In reviewing a district
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this court applies a de novo standard of
review to the district court’s legal determinations. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008).
The more intrusive a request for identification is, the more likely that it will be
considered an investigative stop and, thus, a seizure that must be supported by suspicion
of wrongdoing. State v. Pfannenstein, 525 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. App. 1994), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 1995). A request for identification is likely to be considered a
seizure when the police engage in some other action or show of authority which one would
not expect between two private citizens. State v. Day, 461 N.W.2d 404, 407 (Minn. App.
1990), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1990). But we generally have held that it does not by
5
itself constitute a seizure for an officer to “simply walk up and talk to a person standing in
a public place.” State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Minn. 1980). We review
whether there was a seizure as a totality of the circumstances. Pfannenstein, 525 N.W.2d
at 589.
Here, the officer only called out Bracy’s name before he started running. It is
relevant that the officer and Bracy knew each other, and she merely said, “Hey Isaiah, come
here,” acknowledging their familiarity with each other. The record does not reflect that
there was any other “show of authority” or other intimidating conduct that would have led
a reasonable person to feel unable to leave. Instead, the officer’s actions were more akin
to cases where an officer walks up to a person in a public place. See, e.g., In re Welfare of
E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Minn. 1993) (moral pressure to cooperate with police officer
does not make police request “seizure”). It does not matter that the officer intended to stop
and detain Bracy, because while she was calling his name, there was still no seizure or
other intrusion because the mere act of calling his name and telling him to “come here” did
not constitute a seizure. Once Bracy took off running, however, there was reasonable
suspicion to stop and detain him.
3

3 Because we have concluded that there was no seizure when the officer called Bracy’s
name, there is no need to address the arguments that there was no reasonable suspicion to
initially call out to Bracy or whether the officer had the authority to “freeze the
scene.” However, we note that even if there was a stop, there was reasonable suspicion
based on the nature of the neighborhood and the officer’s knowledge of Bracy’s criminal
history. State v. Bellikka, 490 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn.
Nov. 25, 1992).
6
Because there was no initial seizure until Bracy started running away from the
officer, the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded.