State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0946

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Baby Gbassie,
Appellant.

Filed July 25, 2022
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-2724

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment of conviction for first- and second-degree
criminal sexual conduct, appellant argues that the district court erred by admitting
relationship evidence and, alternatively, that his second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct
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conviction was an included offense of the first-degree conviction and so must be reversed.
Because we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting relationship
evidence, we affirm appellant’s conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. But
because appellant’s conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct was for an
included offense, we reverse and remand for the district court to vacate that conviction.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Joseph Baby Gbassie with one
count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a)
(2016) (count one), and one count of second- degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.
Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2016) (count two), alleging that Gbassie had sexual contact
with then-eight-year-old G.N.
G.N.’s mother (mother) and Gbassie’s father were raised by mother’s legal guardian
(guardian). Mother considered Gbassie’s father to be her brother. From 2017 to 2018 ,
Gbassie lived in the same home as mother, guardian, G.N., and mother’s other daughter,
six-year-old W.N. On November 15, 2018, shortly after Gbassie moved out of the home,
mother was bathing G.N. and W.N., and “both girls pulled away” when mother tried to
wash their genital areas. Both children told mother and guardian that Gbassie had touched
them in their genital areas and threatened to kill them if they told anyone what had
happened. Guardian called the police.
A nurse at the Midwest Children’s Resource Center (MCRC) interviewed G.N., and
recordings of the interviews we re later received as trial exhibits. G.N. stated that Gbassie
had “put his hands between [her] legs” and on her “private part.” During a second interview
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at MCRC several months later, G.N. stated that Gbassie “put his private part in [hers].”
W.N. was also interviewed at MCRC. The state’s initial complaint charged Gbassie with
criminal sexual conduct against both G.N. and W.N. Gbassie moved to sever the charges,
and the district court granted Gbassie’s motion.
Before Gbassie’s trial on the charges involving G.N., the state moved to admit
“evidence that [Gbassie] sexually assaulted G.N.’s younger sister W.N.” The state argued
that the evidence was “relationship evidence” that would “provide[] strong context into the
family dynamics in this case” and “the alleged conduct for which [Gbassie] is charged.”
Gbassie objected. The district court granted the state’s motion, concluding that the
evidence would be “highly probative because it shows evidence of similar conduct” and
because the assaults involved similar victims, the nature of Gbassie’s relationship with the
victims was similar, and the evidence provided relevant context. The district court
determined the evidence was prejudicial to Gbassie, but not unfairly prejudicial. The
district court also stated it would give a limiting instruction to the jury.
During trial, the state presented testimony from witnesses, including G.N., W.N.,
mother, guardian, an MCRC nurse, two law-enforcement officers, and an MCRC therapist.
G.N. testified that Gbassie “touched [her] with both his private part and his hand”
and “put his fingers in [her] private parts.” G.N. testified that this had happened while
mother was at work. G.N. also testified she did not tell anyone when it happened because
Gbassie lived with them and because Gbassie had “threatened” her.
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W.N. testified that Gbassie “touched [her] in unnecessary places” and that Gbassie
threatened to kill her. W.N. testified that she told mother about what Gbassie did because
she felt safe around mother.
At this point, the district court instructed the jury that W.N.’s testimony was
“offered for the limited purpose of assisting you in determining whether the defendant in
this case committed the acts with which the defendant is charged in the complaint.” After
a brief discussion between the court and the parties out of the presence of the jury, the
district court gave the jury another instruction:
The evidence is being offered for the limited purpose of
demonstrating the nature and extent of relationship between
the defendant and other household members in order to assist
you in determining whether the defendant committed those
acts with which the defendant is charged in the complaint in
this case.

The defendant is not being tried for and may not be
convicted of any behavior other than the charged offenses in
this case. You are not to convict the defendant on the basis of
conduct involving other people not relating to the charges in
this case. To do so might result in unjust double punishment.

(Emphasis added.)
Mother testified about when G.N. and W.N. told her about Gbassie’s assaults and
also generally described her relationship with Gbassie. The district court gave no limiting
instruction during mother’s testimony. Guardian testified and described when and how
G.N. told her of Gbassie’s assault.
The MCRC nurse testified about G.N.’s first interview, when G.N. told her that
Gbassie had touched her but stopped talking after the nurse tried to get more details. The
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nurse testified that G.N. returned for a second interview and gave more details, including
that Gbassie touched her genitals with his genitals. The nurse also testified that it was not
uncommon for children to delay reporting of sexual assault.
The MCRC therapist testified that G.N. was referred to her after the first interview.
The therapist testified that G.N. seemed “quite fearful” at first and that G.N. had “delayed
reporting” the assault because she was afraid of Gbassie, who threatened to harm her.
After the parties rested, the district court gave a limiting instruction to the jury that
was largely identical to the one provided during W.N.’s testimony. The prosecuting
attorney commented on the relationship evidence during the state’s initial closing
argument, stating, “This case is just about [G.N.] and what happened to [G.N.]. The reason
that [W.N.] was called is, to put it in context and to sort of relay the family situation . . . .”
Gbassie’s attorney did not comment on W.N.’s testimony or the relationship evidence
during Gbassie’s closing argument. The jury found Gbassie guilty on both counts.
The district court sentenced Gbassie to 156 months’ confinement on count one.
During the hearing, the parties and the district court agreed that no conviction should be
entered for count two because it was a lesser -included offense of count one. Even so, the
final warrant of commitment shows a conviction on both counts but with no sentence
imposed for count two.
Gbassie appeals.

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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting relationship
evidence about Gbassie and W.N.

Over Gbassie’s objection, the district court admitted W.N.’s and mother’s
testimony about Gbassie’s assaults on W.N. under the relationship-evidence statute, Minn.
Stat. § 634.20 (2020), which allows for admission of “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by
the accused . . . against other family or household members.” “Domestic conduct” in
section 634.20 includes “domestic abuse” as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2:
“the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” as well as
“criminal sexual conduct, within the meaning of section 609.342 [and] 609.343,” when
committed against a family or household member. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(2),
(3) (2020). Relationship evidence is admissible unless its “probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
We have explained that the relationship-evidence statute allows evidence to show
“how a defendant treats his family or household members . . . [and] sheds light on how the
defendant interacts with those close to him, which in turn suggests how the defendant may
interact with the victim.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010). We
review the district court’s decision to admit relationship evidence for abuse of discretion.
State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004).
Gbassie argues the district court committed reversible error by admitting evidence
about Gbassie’s assaults on W.N. because the evidence had “little to no probative value,
and any probative value it did have was . . . outweighed by the unfair prejudice.” Gbassie
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also argues the district court committed reversible error by failing to give a limiting
instruction to the jury during mother’s testimony. We discuss each argument in turn.
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
the probative value of the relationship evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Gbassie argues that the challenged relationship evidence did not bolster witness
credibility and was impermissible propensity evidence. Gbassie also contends any
probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice because it
“portray[ed] [him] in the most negative light possible” and provided the state with an
“unfair advantage.” We are not persuaded for four reasons.
First, the challenged relationship evidence is precisely the type of “domestic
conduct” evidence that is admissible under section 634.20. Relationship evidence clarifies
a defendant’s treatment of family or household members. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 637. It
can explain or provide context for a family member’s fear of a defendant as well as the
defendant’s prior attempts to “manipulate, control, [or] restrain” that family member. State
v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017). More specifically, it may provide
context for a victim’s behavior, such as a delay in reporting abuse. State v. Word,
755 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. App. 2008). Threat and context evidence has “obvious
probative value.” Andersen, 900 N.W.2d at 441.
Evidence of Gbassie’s conduct towards W.N., including his alleged sexual assaults
and threats, has “obvious probative value” as to the state’s charges involving G.N. because
it is relevant to prove the nature of Gbassie’s relationship with G.N. and her family. Given
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that both W.N. and G.N. reported Gbassie’s assaults and threats after Gbassie moved out
of their home, the relationship evidence explains their delay in reporting.
Second, Gbassie contends the similarities between the charged offenses and the
evidence about his conduct with W.N. militate against admission. We disagree. In
Andersen, we held it was not error for the district court to admit relationship evidence that
the defendant had “previously verbally and physically abused” his significant other, who
was the victim involved in the pending charges. 900 N.W.2d at 441. Even though both the
offense charged and the relationship evidence involved the same general facts—verbal and
physical domestic abuse—and the same victim, we explained that the relationship evidence
offered context and illuminated the defendant’s relationship with household members. Id.
Third, we reject Gbassie’s argument that the admitted relationship evidence posed
a substantial risk of unfair prejudice. The district court gave limiting instructions to the
jury, the sufficiency of which is considered below. We presume the jury followed these
instructions and appropriately limited its use of the relationship evidence . State v
Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009); see also Andersen, 900 N.W.2d at
441-42(emphasizing the district court’s limiting instructions as well as the fact that the risk
of unfair prejudice must “substantially outweigh” the probative value).
The relationship evidence admitted against Gbassie was prejudicial. But we discern
no unfair prejudice on this record. “[U]nfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence,
even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by
illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635,
641 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). Because the relationship evidence was used for a
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valid purpose—to depict and provide context for Gbassie’s relationship with G.N. and her
family—we conclude any prejudice to Gbassie was not “unfair.”
Fourth, Gbassie argues that the state obtained an “unfair advantage” by admission
of the relationship evidence after the district court had severed the charges involving G.N.
from the charges involving W.N. Because Gbassie requested severance, he cannot now
complain about relationship evidence that was otherwise admissible in the severed trial. In
short, we see no “unfair advantage” to the state by granting Gbassie’s motion to sever.
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when determining that the
probative value of the relationship evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk
of unfair prejudice.
B. Any error was harmless.
Even if we assume the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
relationship evidence about Gbassie’s conduct toward W.N., any error was harmless. “An
error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it substantially influenced the
jury’s decision.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). This
determination requires that we review the record as a whole and “consider the manner in
which the evidence was presented, whether the evidence was highly persuasive, whether it
was used in closing argument, and whether it was effectively countered by the defense.”
State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Minn. 2005).
We conclude any error was harmless for four reasons. First, the testimony about
Gbassie’s assaults and threats towards W.N. was brief, and the district court’s limiting
instructions properly guided the jury’s consideration of the e vidence. Second, while the
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challenged evidence may have been “highly persuasive” as to Gbassie’s actions towards
W.N., it was not “highly persuasive” as to whether Gbassie committed the charged offense.
W.N. testified about herself and not about Gbassie’s conduct with G.N. Also, both mother
and W.N. were subject to cross -examination. Third, during closing arguments, the
prosecuting attorney commented on the relationship evidence and underscored the district
court’s limiting instruction, cautioning the jury not to use the relationship evidence as direct
proof of Gbassie’s guilt for the charge relating to G.N.
Fourth, the record as a whole contains strong evidence supporting Gbassie’s guilt.
G.N. testified in detail about Gbassie’s abuse. Her testimony was corroborated by
non-relationship testimony from mother, the MCRC therapist, and law enforcement, as
well as recordings of G.N.’s two interviews at MCRC. Thus, even if we assume the district
court abused its discretion by admitting relationship evidence related to W.N., we conclude
any error was harmless. See id. at 81 (finding error to be harmless where facts establishing
the underlying offense were corroborated by multiple trial witnesses and overall “evidence
of . . . guilt was strong”).
C. The district court’s failure to provide a limiting instruction before or
during mother’s testimony did not prejudice Gbassie or affect his
substantial rights.

Gbassie argues that the district court’s limiting instructions for the relationship
evidence were insufficient. Although a limiting instruction was read during W.N.’s
testimony and at the close of trial , no limiting instruction was given before or during
mother’s testimony. Gbassie did not request a limiting instruction at the time of mother’s
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testimony, nor did he object during trial, so our review is for plain error. State v. Meldrum,
724 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 24, 2007).
Generally, a limiting instruction should be given every time relationship evidence
is admitted as well as at the close of trial. Id. at 21. Because the district court failed to
provide a limiting instruction before or during mother’s testimony, it erred. Thus, two steps
of plain-error review— (1) error (2) that is plain—are satisfied. See id. at 20 (providing a
three-step test for correction of unobjected-to errors).
Turning to the third step, whether the error affected the defendant’s substantial
rights, we consider that “other evidence offered during trial may negate the allegation that
the probative value of other-crimes evidence is outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice.” Id. at 22. For example, in Meldrum, the district court’s error in failing to provide
limiting instructions was negated where the conviction was otherwise supported by
eyewitness testimony, a 911 call, and testimony from responding officers. Id. at 21-22.
Similarly, in State v. Frisinger, the supreme court held that the district court’s failure to
give a limiting instruction was negated where the conviction was supported by eyewitness
testimony establishing the elements of the crime. 484 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Minn. 1992).
The same reasoning applies here. Considerable evidence supports Gbassie’s
conviction, including non-relationship testimony from G.N., mother, guardian, G.N.’s
MCRC therapist, and law enforcement , as well as G.N.’s MCRC interviews. Moreover,
while the prosecuting attorney referred to relationship evidence during closing argument,
the prosecuting attorney did not suggest that the jury use it for an improper purpose, such
as to directly support any of the elements of the crimes relating to G.N. See Meldrum,
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724 N.W.2d at 22 (“[T]he prosecution did not suggest an improper use of the other-crimes
evidence.”); Frisinger, 484 N.W.2d at 31 (“[T]he prosecutor did not suggest that the jury
use the other-crime evidence for an improper purpose.”).
Finally, the district court gave an appropriate limiting instruction before the jury
retired for deliberation. For these reasons, while the district court erred by failing to provide
a limiting instruction before or during mother’s testimony, Gbassie has demonstrated no
prejudice affecting his substantial rights.
II. The district court erred in entering a conviction for second -degree criminal
sexual conduct.

Gbassie argues the district court erred by entering convictions for counts one and
two because count two is a lesser-included offense of count one. “Upon prosecution for a
crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but
not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2020). The state concedes, and we agree, that it
was error for the district court to enter convictions on both co unts. See id., subd. 1(1)
(defining “[a]n included offense” as, among other things, “a lesser degree of the same
crime”). Thus, we reverse and remand for the district court to vacate Gbassie’s conviction
for count two, second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
III. Gbassie’s pro se arguments are forfeited.
In a pro se supplemental brief, Gbassie makes many arguments for reversal. These
arguments generally allege insufficiency of the evidence at trial, deficiencies in the police
investigation of the allegations against Gbassie, and deception by the state, law
enforcement, and the victim’s family. Gbassie’s pro se brief, however, “contains no
13
argument or citation to legal authority in support of [his] allegations.” State v. Krosch ,
642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002). Thus, the issues in Gbassie’s pro se brief are forfeited,
and we decline to address them. See id. (deeming issues forfeited because pro se brief had
no legal argument or citation to legal authority).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.