A21-0950

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0949
A21-0950

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. D. B. f/k/a A. D. H. (Mother)
and D. M. D. (Father) (A21-0949),

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. D. B. f/k/a A. D. H. (Mother)
and D. P. B. (Father) (A21-0950).

Filed January 24, 2022
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-JV-21-441, 73-JV-21-439

Kimberly Stommes, Stommes Law Office, LLC, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant-
mother A. D. B.)

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Atto rney, Patrick M. Moen , Assistant County
Attorneys, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent Stearns County Human Services)

Stephanie Schwegel, Waite Park, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presid ing Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant-mother A.D.B. challenges the in voluntary termination of her parental
rights, arguing that the county failed to prove a statutory basis exists to support termination,
the county failed to make reas onable efforts to reunite the family, and termination of her
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parental rights was not in the best interests of the children. Because the county’s reasonable
efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement, and
termination is in the children’s best interest, we affirm.
FACTS
These are consolidated appeals from the district court’s order terminating mother’s
parental rights to her children J.N.B. and T.M.D., born in 2020, and 2015, respectively.1
At the time of the trial, mother had four child ren, only two of whic h are a part of this
appeal.2
J.N.B. tested positive at birth for am phetamine, methamphetamine, THC, and
alcohol. As a result, respondent Stearns Co unty Human Services (the county) placed an
emergency protective care hold on all four of mother’s children and placed them into
relative foster care.
The county initiated a ch ild protection proceeding on March 25, 2020, and,
following an emergency protec tive care hearing, the district court, due primarily to
mother’s chemical dependency , ordered all four children in to the protective care of the
county for foster care placement.

1 J.N.B.’s father is D.P.B. a nd T.M.D.’s father is D.M.D, and neither father appeals the
termination of his parental rights.
2 The county petitioned to involuntarily transfer permanent legal custody of mother’s two
children who are not part of this appeal. A joint trial involving all four children occurred,
and our court separately considered an appeal of the district court’s order to transfer
permanent legal custody and remanded the matter for further findings. In re Welfare of
Children of A.D.B., No. A21-0876 (Minn. App. Jan. 18, 2022).
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On July 8, 2020, the district court adjudicated the children in need of protection or
services (CHIPS). After mother made several, mostly unsuccessful, attempts at residential
and outpatient treatment, the c ounty petitioned the district cour t to terminate her parental
rights to J.N.B. and T.M.D on January 22, 2021. The county alleged that: (1) mother was
“palpably unfit” pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 26 0C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2020); (2) reasonable
efforts had failed to correct the conditions that led to placement pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2020); and (3) the children were neglected and in foster care
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8) (2020). Trial was held on June 1 and 4,
2021. The district court, based solely upon the second alleged statutory basis, terminated
mother’s parental rights to J.N.B. and T.M.D. Mother appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court was within its discretion in concluding that reasonable efforts
failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s placement.

A. Standard of review

“We affirm the district court’s terminatio n of parental rights when at least one
statutory ground for termination is supp orted by clear and convincing evidence and
termination is in the best interests of th e child, provided that the county has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020).
“[W]e will review the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear
error, but we review its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for
involuntarily terminating pare ntal rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re
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Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan. 6, 2012). This two-part standard, reviewing findings of underlying fact for clear error
and “ultimate facts” for abuse of discretion, “i s inherent in juvenile-protection caselaw.”
Id. at 900-01.
“In applying the clear-error standard, [appellate courts] view the evidence in a light
favorable to the findings. [Appellate courts] will not conclude that a factfinder clearly
erred unless, on the entire evidence, [they] are left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed.” In re Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221
(Minn. 2021) (quotations and citations omitted). Additionally,
[the] clear-error review does no t permit an appellate court to
weigh the evidence as if trying the matter de novo. Neither
does it permit an appellate court to engage in fact-finding
anew, even if the court would find the facts to be different if it
determined them in the first instance. Nor should an appellate
court reconcile conflicting evidence. Consequently, an
appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of the
evidence to prove or demonstr ate the correctness of the
findings of the trial court.

Id. at 221-22 (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).
B. Reasonable efforts failed to correc t the conditions leading to the
children’s placement.

Mother challenges the district court’s determination that clear and convincing
evidence existed to terminate he r parental rights to the child ren J.N.B. and T.M.D. The
district court terminated mother’s parental rights “pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5)” after concluding that “following the child[ren]’s placement out of the home,
reasonable efforts, under the direction of the Court, have failed to correct the conditions
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leading to the child[ren]’s placement.” The district court’s conclusion is amply supported
by the record.
Out-of-Home Placement Plans
The district court found that the county “prepared three Out of Home Placement
Plans regarding the child[ren] with plan st art dates of: March 23, 2020; September 23,
2020; and[] March 23, 2021” which were file d in the underlying CHIPS court files and
were approved by the district court. This is supported by the record.
The relevant case plan provisions, as discussed by the district court, required mother
to:
 “comply with random urinalysis testing or any othe r form of chemical testing
requested by [the county]”

 “complete a chemical dependency evaluation and follow all recommendations”

 “abstain from all mood-altering chemicals, drugs, and alcohol”

“[A] case plan that has been approved by the district court is presumptively reasonable.”
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 388.
Conditions leading to the out-of-home placement were not corrected.
The district court found that “clear and convincing evidence exists that reasonable
efforts with [mother] have failed to correct th e conditions that led to the child[ren]’s out-
of-home placement.” This finding is supported by the record.
April 2020 Chemical-Dependency Evaluation
Mother initially underwent a chemical dependency evaluation on April 3, 2020, and
was diagnosed with “mild” to “moderate” chemical dependency . The assessment
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recommended residential treatment and abstinence from all non-prescribed mood-altering
substances.
Mother entered residential treatment on May 7, 2020. Upon admission, she was
administered a drug test which was positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. On
May 19, 2020, mother, against staff recommendations, left the residential treatment to
remove her belongings from her apartment from which she was being evicted. Upon
return, mother was administered a drug test which was positive for methamphetamine. On
June 16, 2020, on her own volition and against staff recommendation, mother left treatment
without successful completion.
June 2020 Chemical-Dependency Evaluation
On June 18, 2020, mother completed another chemical dependency evaluation
which again recommended residential treatmen t and abstinence from all non-prescribed
mood-altering substances. Mother returned to residential treatmen t in July 2020 and
reported that she “used” methamphetamine pr ior to her return. Mother successfully
completed this treatment and was discharged in September 2020.
October 2020 Chemical-Dependency Evaluation
In October 2020, mother was referred to “aftercare” after completing her residential
treatment, and she obtained an updated chemical dependency evaluation which
recommended she complete an outpatient treatment program . Mother began attending
virtual outpatient sessions on October 12. Her involvement in this program was, initially,
“very consistent and [she wa s] very involved in her group programming,” but by late
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December, mother had inconsistent attendan ce and was discharged without successfully
completing her programming because she “did not follow” program recommendations.
Failed UAs
Mother was also required to submit to UA testing four to five times per month. She
was provided instructions and she acknowledged that she was responsible for calling into
the drug testing notification system. From October 7, 2020, through May 27, 2021, mother
called in only seven times because, according to mother, “[t]here’s no point in calling” if
she did not “have a ride to go test,” and she purportedly told her social worker that she did
not have transportation. The district court, however, did no t find mother’s assertions on
this point to be credible. Instead, the district court found that mother’s social worker spoke
to her about transportation services for her UA appointments, and mother refused to “avail
herself of [those] services.”
Return to Outpatient Treatment
Mother returned to an outpatient treatment program in late January 2021. However,
mother had “difficulties with attendance” and “maintaining sobriety.” Mother tested
positive for methamphetamine from an oral sa mple provided on March 9, 2021, and on
March 29, 2021, was discharged from outpatient treatment prior to successful completion.
April and May 2021 Chemical-Dependency Evaluations
On April 13, 2021, mother obtained another chemical dependency evaluation which
diagnosed her with “severe” chemical depe ndency and recommended that she reenter
residential treatment. Mother did not follow this recommendation and, instead, obtained a
second evaluation in May of 2021 which recommended outpatient treatment. The district
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court found that, as a result, mother “has refused to follow through with the recommended
inpatient treatment.” Mother agreed to part ake in the outpatient tr eatment which was set
to begin the day after the first day of trial.
Thus, because mother has yet to complete her treatment, the record supports the
district court’s finding that the condition of mother’s chemical dependency, which led to
the children’s out-of-home placement, was not corrected.
C. The county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.3
A determination of reasonable efforts requires the district court to consider whether
services to the child and family were: “(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child,
(2) adequate to meet the n eeds of the child and family , (3) culturally appropriate,
(4) available and accessible, (5) consistent and timely, and (6) realistic under the
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020); In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886,
891 (Minn. 1996). Whether the services provided in a particular case constitute reasonable
efforts depends on the duration of the county’s involvement, the nature of the problem, and
the quality of the county’s effort. In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App.
1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). “The county’s efforts must assist in alleviating
the conditions that gave rise” to the out-of-home placement. Id. “[P]rovision of reasonable
efforts must be evaluated by the court in every case.” S.Z., 547 N.W.2d at 892. However,

3 Mother’s argument that the county failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family
relates to an element of the underlying statut ory basis invoked by th e district court to
terminate mother’s parental rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 , subd. 1(b)(5)(iv)
(“reasonable efforts have been made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family.”). Therefore, we addr ess the argument as part of our review of
whether the county showed a statutory basis to terminate parental rights.
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a detailed analysis of the factors set out in Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) is not always required.
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 904.
The district court found that the county “made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
[mother] and reunite her with the children. [The county] acted with due diligence by
attempting to provide appropriate, necessary services to enable [mother] to try to get her to
a point where she could safely parent the child.” The district court further found that the
county “referred [mother] to urinalysis testi ng, a trial home visit, chemical dependency
assessments, treatment facilities, supervised parenting time, transportation services to
parenting time, and more.” The county “also worked with [mother] to get her back into
programs that she was discharged from or wa nted to switch locations.” Though mother
did participate in some services, including chemical use assessments and completing
treatment in September of 2020,” she ultimately “did not avail herself of the services in a
manner that corrected the conditions that led to the unsafe environment.” Mother “relapsed
multiple times since completin g inpatient treatment and has failed to show sustained
sobriety.”
Mother argues that the coun ty “failed to meet its duty of reasonable efforts to
reunify” the family. The record compels our disagreement.
Given the report of J.N.B.’s prenatal e xposure to alcohol and drugs, mother was
provided a chemical -dependency evaluation which di agnosed her with chemical
dependency and recommended that she enter residential treatment and abstain from all non-
prescribed mood-altering substances. The co unty social worker met with mother and
referred her to chemical testing, chemical -dependency eval uations, treatment facilities,
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supervised parenting time, a nd transportation services. Mother sought treatment at a
facility that would permit her children to live with her, and the county was able to arrange
a trial home visit at such a facility while mother completed residential treatment.
The district court also found that the county “offered to set up transportation” for
mother, though, to take advantage of this offer she “need[ed] to tell” the county the
“specific time[s] for the rides,” and “to mess age” the county “with the scheduled pick-up
time that worked for her.” Mo ther, however, failed to do so. The record supports these
findings. The county contacted mother in May 2021 to set up transportation again for
testing and reminded mother of the importance of testing. But moth er told the county
employee that she had her own means of getti ng to the testing facilities. Mother’s two
social workers testified that they informed mother about rides for her UAs, but mother
never followed up.
Mother relies on her own testimony to argue that the county provided no assistance
with transportation for her UA testing, and ther efore, the testing services were “were not
adequate to meet the needs of [mother] an d were not realistic under the circumstances
because they were not available and acce ssible.” However, “we give considerable
deference to the district court’s findings.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d
76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012). And the district court found mother’s explanation for not
providing UA tests not credible.
Lastly, mother argues that the district cour t “utterly failed to consider . . . whether
the services offered were culturally appropriate.” Mother’s argument is not supported by
the record.
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The district court approved three out-of-h ome placement plans for each child at
issue in this case. Each plan specifically addressed mother’s “religious and cultural needs,”
and mother reported on three separate occas ions over a one-year period that the children
have “not regularly attended services of a sp iritual community.” At no point, as far as
could be deciphered from the record, did mother raise concerns that the services provided
were not culturally appropriate. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(f) (2020) (“Reasonable efforts
are made upon the exercise of due diligence by the responsible social services agency to
use culturally appropriate and av ailable services to meet th e needs of the child and the
child’s family.”); see also S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 388 (stating that a “court approved case
plan carries with it an imprimatur of reas onableness”). Additionally, generally, appellate
courts address only those questions previously presented to and considered by the district
court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); see In re Welfare of Child. of
A.I., 779 N.W.2d 886, 894 (Mi nn. App. 2010) (applying Thiele on appeal from a
termination of parental rights). Because th e question of the cultural propriety of the
county’s efforts was not previously presented to and considered by the district court, that
question is not properly before this court.
In sum, the district court did not abus e its discretion because the record amply
supports the district court’s finding that fo llowing the children’s placement out of the
home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the
condition of mother’s chemical dependency which led to the children’s placement.

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II. The district court was within its discreti on in concluding th at termination of
mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

“Even when statutory grounds for termina tion are met, the district court must
separately find that termination is in the child’s best interests.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92.
In analyzing the best interests of the child, the district court must consider “(1) the child’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relations hip; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship; and (3) a ny competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare
of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii)
(same). “Competing interests include health considerations, a stable environment, and the
child’s preference.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92. “[T]he best interests of the child must be
the paramount consideration” and “[w]here the interests of parent and child conflict, the
interests of the child are paramount.” Minn . Stat. § 260C.301, su bd. 7. On appeal,
appellate courts “review a district court’s u ltimate determination that termination is in a
child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. Additionally,
“[b]ecause the best-interests analysis involves credibility determinations and is generally
not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of a record, we give considerable
deference to the district court’s findings.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (quotation omitted).
Mother argues that the record does not supp ort the district court’s conclusion that
clear and convincing evidence shows it is in the best in terests of the children to
involuntarily terminate mother’s parental rights. We disagree.
The record shows that Mother has been unable to find safe and stable housing since
the children were removed from her custody. Except for J.N.B.’s unsuccessful 41-day trial
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home visit, the children have not resided with mother throughout this proceeding. During
the trial home visit, mother failed to bring J.N.B. to a medical appointment and failed to
reschedule that appointment. On several occasions, mother has been both discharged from
treatment without completing that treatment, and relapsed. Mother’s chemical dependency
is still a concern because her most recent chemical dependency evaluation recommended
that she enter residential treatment, which sh e has refused to do. Therefore, the record
supports the district court’s conclusion that termination is in the children’s best interest.
Mother argues that the district court “did not specifically make a finding regarding
the child’s interest in preserving the parent-c hild relationship.” The record belies this
claim. The district court acknowledged that the children seem “comfortable around” and
“enjoy[] visits” with mother, and mother “wishes to preserve the parent-child relationship,”
but that the children have “s pent limited time with her.” It concluded that “although
[mother] wishes to preserve the parent-child relationship . . . the child[ren]’s competing
interests are in favor of termination.”
The district court also found that the chil dren were “currently in a safe, stable
environment” and “meeting developmental milestones,” which is supported by the record.
J.N.B. is “doing great” in his placement and is “growing appropriately, [and] meeting his
milestones.” Furthermore, despite concerns with fetal alcohol sp ectrum disorders and
diagnosed sensory concerns, “he’s doing very well; he’s walking, meeting milestones,
growing appropriately.”
As for T.M.D., “[h]e experiences many be havior challenges but he is doing well
overall. Services are being put in place and have been put in pl ace, assessments are
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continuing. But overall in th e home with the provider he ’s doing well.” T.M.D. “is
cognitively delayed” though “[n]ot signifi cantly enough to wh ere he’s on an IEP
[individualized education program].” Theref ore, the competing interests of the children
favor termination.
Lastly, mother argues that the district court “erroneously concluded that [her]
chemical dependency is still a concern that would impact th e children’s safety” and that
“[t]he conditions at the time of the hearing do not show that [mother] continued to abuse
chemicals or that her chemical dependency was still a concer n such that it would impact
the children’s safety.”
“[E]vidence relating to termination must address conditions that exist at the time of
the hearing,” and the evidence must also show “the conditions giving rise to the termination
will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 901 (quotation
omitted); In re Welfare of P.R.L. , 622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 2001). The district court
may consider the past, but the primary consideration should be “the projected permanency
of the parent’s inability to ca re for his or her child.” S.Z., 547 N.W.2d at 893 (quotation
omitted). The record sh ows that the present condition of mother’s chemical dependency
will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period based on mother’s failure to complete
outpatient treatment and moth er’s refusal to reenter re sidential treatment despite
recommendations that she do so.
First, the district court found not credible mother’s testimony denying that she has
chemical dependency issues with methamphetamine or amphetamine and we defer to the
district court’s credibility finding. See J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92. Second, although mother
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completed residential treatment in September 2020, the evidence supports the district
court’s determination that moth er “did not avail herself of the services in a manner that
corrected the conditions that le d to the unsafe environment.” As the district court found,
she “relapsed multiple times since completing inpatient treatment,” and she “failed to show
sustained sobriety.” Given mother’s failure to complete outpatient treatment and mother’s
refusal to reenter residential treatment despite recommendations to do so, the record shows
that the present condition of mother’s chemical dependency will continue for a prolonged,
indeterminate period.
Accordingly, the district court was within its discretion to conclude that termination
of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.
Affirmed.