State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0955

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Clifton Dale Robinson,
Appellant.

Filed August 8, 2022
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-20-1312

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges his conviction for attempted second-
degree murder, claiming that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial and
that the evidence presented against him was insufficient. In a pro se supplemental brief,
2
appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s right to a
speedy trial was not violated and there existed sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
guilty verdict. Additionally, appellant has not demonstrated that his counsel was
ineffective. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2020, appellant Clifton Dale Robinson stabbed S.D. multiple times.
Robinson was charged with attempted second-degree intentional murder, first-degree
assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. On October 15, 2020, Robinson filed a
speedy-trial demand.1 The jury trial commenced on February 16, 2021.
The following facts were presented during the jury trial. After leaving a bar near
Robinson’s apartment, S.D. met with Robinson to retrieve a bottle of alcohol S.D. had left
at the apartment earlier in the evening. The two men walked to Robinson’s apartment and
proceeded up to the second floor. S.D. was standing behind Robinson while Robinson
appeared to be unlocking the front door to his apartment. Before Robinson unlocked the
door, he turned around and stabbed S.D. multiple times in the chest and abdomen. S.D.
testified that after Robinson stabbed him, he knew that he “was in trouble” so he attempted
to flee. Robinson pursued S.D. and cut S.D. multiple times in the back, hand, and the back
of his head. Robinson continued to chase S.D. out of the apartment building and down the

1 Because Robinson was also facing other criminal matters the district court consolidated
all of Robinson’s pending matters described in court files (50-CR -20-1180, 50-CR -20-
1121, and 50 -CR-20-1312). The consolidation was for all purposes other than trial.
Robinson’s speedy-trial demand was for the matter before this court (50-CR-20-1312). A
fourth court file was subsequently consolidated with the previous matters (50-CR-20-425).
3
street until S.D. got about “three or four houses” away. Robinson returned to his apartment
and called a friend to pick him up. Police eventually arrested Robinson at his girlfriend’s
home.
S.D. ultimately was taken to a hospital and underwent surgery. S.D.’s surgeon
described the abdominal wound as “serious” because it “allowed [S.D.’s] bowel to herniate
through or protrude” out from the stab wound. The surgeon noted that “[t]he intestine was
constricted in a way that [the intestine] would have died if left there.” After the surgeon
“explored” S.D.’s abdominal wound, he found that S.D.’s small intestine had several cuts
as well. The surgeon also testified that if those cuts would have been left untreated, S.D.
could have died “from sepsis from those holes and leaking intestinal contents into [his]
abdomen.” A jury found Robinson guilty of attempted second-degree intentional murder,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018), with reference to Minn. Stat.
§ 609.17, subd. 1 (2018), and first- degree assault, infliction of great bodily harm, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2018). The jury found Robinson not guilty of
illegal possession of a firearm. See Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b (2018).
The district court adjudicated Robinson guilty of attempted second-degree
intentional murder and sentenced Robinson to 203 months’ imprisonment. The district
court did not adjudicat e guilt or impose a sentence for first-degree assault.
2 Robinson
appeals.

2 See Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2018) (providing that a defendant “may be convicted
of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both”).
4
DECISION
I. Speedy Trial
Robinson argues that the 12 4-day delay in commencing trial violated his
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions
guarantee criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 6. Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b), a criminal trial must start within 60
days of a speedy-trial demand “unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date.” “If
a defendant has been deprived of his or her [constitutional] right to a speedy trial, the only
possible remedy is dismissal of the case.” State v. Osorio, 8 91 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). “W hether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a
constitutional question subject to de novo review.” Id. However, “any inquiry into a
speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of
the case.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2188 (1972).
Barker describes four factors to be considered in speedy-trial claims: (1) the length
of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a
speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192; see State
v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 245 (Minn. 2021) (applying the test articulated in Barker for a
speedy-trial challenge). These factors are to be considered in balancing “the sometimes
competing interests between the orderly prosecution of crimes that is fair to both sides and
the prompt resolution of the case by trial.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 245. “[W]hether delay
in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends
on the circumstances.” State v. Jackson, 968 N.W.2d 55, 60-61 (Minn. App. 2021)
5
(applying Barker factors to a trial delayed by chief justice order in response to COVID-19
pandemic) (quotation omitted), rev. granted (Minn. Jan. 18, 2022).
To determine whether the delay in bringing Robinson to trial violated his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, we now consider each of the Barker factors.
A. Length of the Delay
A “presumptively prejudicial” delay triggers further review. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d
at 628 (quotation omitted). Delays beyond 60 days of a defendant’s speedy-trial demand
are presumptively prejudicial. See Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 246. The longer the delay, the
less likely it can be justified by other factors. Id. at 250 (concluding that 172-day delay
was presumptively prejudicial).
On October 15, 2020, Robinson demanded a speedy trial. Robinson’s jury trial was
scheduled to begin on December 14, 2020, within the 60- day window prescribed by rule
11.09(b). On November 25, the district court postponed the trial until February, when the
courts were “supposed to open back up for trials.” Robinson’s jury trial began on February
16, 2021—1 24 days after his speedy-trial demand, triggering the presumption of prejudice.
But the “threshold conclusion that a delay is presumptively prejudicial does not end
our consideration of the length of the delay in the weighing of the Barker factors.” Id.
Robinson experienced a delay that exceeded 60 days, triggering the presumption of
prejudice; thus, we must consider the remaining Barker factors.
B. Reason for the Delay
When considering the second Barker factor, “the key question is whether the
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e] delay.” State v. Taylor,
6
869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). After
determining which party caused the delay, we consider the specific reason for the delay.
Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial to hamper the defense
weighs heavily against the state, while neutral reasons such as negligence are weighted less
heavily. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 251. “And if there is good cause for the delay . . . the delay
will not be held against the [s]tate.” Id.
Robinson was not to blame for the delay. Robinson’s trial was delayed because the
chief justice suspended jury trials throughout the state in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. See Order Governing the Continuing Operations of the Minnesota Judicial
Branch, No. ADM20-8001 (Minn. Nov. 20, 2020) (providing that “no new jury trials will
commence before February 1, 2021”). However, a criminal jury trial could be held in
person if the chief judge in the district where the trial is to be held, after consulting with
the chief justice, grants an exception. Id . Therefore, the question is whether “the [s]tate
(considering the conduct of both the prosecution and the courts) is responsible for the
delay.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 251 (emphasis added).
The record does not reveal whether the judge presiding over this trial sought an
exception to the chief justice’s no-trial order. However, we need not resolve the question
of who is responsible for the delay because the supreme court, considering identical
circumstances of delay due to the chief justice’s order suspending jury trials, concluded
that neither party was responsible for the delay. See State v. Paige, ___ N.W.2d ___ 2022
WL 2826253, at *5 (Minn. July 20, 2022) (concluding that “trial delays due to the statewide
7
orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic do not weigh against the
[s]tate”). We are bound by that decision. The second factor is neutral.
C. Asserted the Right to a Speedy Trial
It is undisputed that Robinson asserted his demand for a speedy trial. A defendant’s
assertion of his right to a speedy trial is “entitled to strong evidentiary weight in
determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.” Barker, 407 U.S. at
531-32, 92 S. Ct. at 2192-93; see also Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 252 (stating that an inquiry
of “whether and how” a speedy-trial demand is asserted “is necessarily contextual”).
“[T]he strength of an accused’s efforts to secure a speedy trial is a signal of the personal
prejudice the accused may suffer from delay since [t]he more serious the deprivation, the
more likely the defendant is to complain.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 252 (alteration in
original) (quotation omitted).
Robinson asserted his right to a speedy trial on October 15, 2020, and the district
court scheduled the jury trial to begin within 60 days of Robinson’s demand. On November
25, five days after the chief justice’s no-trial order, the district court rescheduled
Robinson’s trial to February—more than 60 days from Robinson’s demand. The record
does not indicate whether the district court sought an exception to the chief justice’s order
to conduct the trial earlier. This factor favors Robinson.
D. Prejudice to the Defendant
We consider three interests to determine whether trial delay caused Robinson
prejudice: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be
8
impaired.” See id. at 253 (quotation omitted). “[I]mpairment of the defense is the most
serious of these interests because delaying a trial could result in memory loss by witnesses
or witness unavailability.” Jackson, 968 N.W.2d at 62 (quotation omitted).
Robinson contends that his pretrial incarceration was oppressive because he was
placed “at an increased risk for contracting [COVID-19],” causing increased anxiety about
his trial. However, Robinson does not identify—nor does the record show—any tangible
harm related to COVID-19 or from his anxiety which might separate his increased anxiety
from anxiety that anyone might expect to have while awaiting a felony trial. See State v.
Strobel, 921 N.W.2d 563, 571 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’d, 932 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2019)
(noting that “the stress, anxiety and inconvenience experienced by anyone who is involved
in a trial is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice” (quotation omitted)). Robinson makes
no argument regarding the critical third interest—whether his defense was impaired—and
the record reveals none. Therefore, Robinson has not shown that he was prejudiced by the
delay. This factor favors the state.
E. Balancing the Factors
We must now balance the above factors to determine whether the state brought
Robinson to trial “quickly enough so as not to endanger the values that the speedy trial
right protects.” See Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 255. Robinson’s trial was delayed more than
60 days after his demand. During much of the delay, Robinson’s other criminal matters
were pending. Critically, Robinson has presented no argument, and we can discern none
from this record, that his defense to the criminal charges were prejudiced by the delay. The
delay was due to the chief justice’s order in response to COVID-19, which the supreme
9
court in Paige stated is not attributable to either party. Accordingly, Robinson ’s speedy-
trial right was not violated by the delay.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Robinson argues that the state failed to prove that he acted with the intent to cause
the death of S.D.3 “Rather, [Robinson’s] intent . . . was the intent required for first-degree
assault—to intentionally inflict bodily injury.”
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we “carefully examine the record
to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit
the [jury] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the conviction” and “assume the jury believed the [s] tate’s witnesses and
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn.
2012) (quotation omitted). “[W]e will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due
regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.”
Id.
To convict Robinson of attempted second-degree murder the state was required to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Robinson committed a substantial step towards

3 Robinson contends that because S.D. “was not killed” Robinson could not have had “the
specific intent to kill [S.D.]” But Robinson did not have to cause the death of S.D. t o be
guilty of attempted second-degree murder. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, subd. 1, .19,
subd. 1(1).
10
intentionally causing S.D.’s death without premeditation. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17,
subd. 1, .19, subd. 1(1). Attempted second-degree murder is a specific-intent crime. See
State v. Bakdash, 830 N.W.2d 906, 912 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 6,
2013). The phrase “[w]ith intent to” is defined to mean “that the actor either has a purpose
to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause
that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2018). Meaning, a person may be found
guilty of attempted second-degree murder if he believes that his act will result in death.
See Arredondo v. State , 754 N.W.2d 566, 572 -73 (Minn. 2008) (affirming second-degree
intentional murder verdicts “if the defendant believed his act would result in death”
(quotation omitted)).
Generally, a person’s intent is proven through circumstantial evidence. State v.
Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000); see also State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594,
598-99 (Minn. 2013) (applying circumstantial-evidence test to first- degree premeditated
murder). Intent to kill may be inferred from the nature and manner of the killing. See State
v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Minn. 1992). Intent to murder may also be based on
evidence that demonstrates the “deliberate and intentional use of a [dangerous] weapon,
the natural result of which could well have led to the victim’s death.” State v. Geshick, 168
N.W.2d 331, 332 (Minn. 1969) (affirming attempted first-degree murder conviction where
a single knife wound was shallow); see also Wolfe v. State, 293 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Minn.
1980) (stating that act of stabbing victim with a blade in chest was sufficient evidence to
support a finding of intent to kill).
11
Where, as here, “the direct evidence of guilt on a particular element is not alone
sufficient to sustain the verdict,” we apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review
to that element. See Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). Circumstantial
evidence is “evidence from which the [jury] can infer whether the facts in dispute existed
or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
“[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not
required with direct evidence.” Id.
In assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we conduct a two- part
analysis. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329-30 (Minn. 2010). “The first step is to
identify the circumstances proved.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598. We defer to the jury’s
credibility determinations because “the jury is in a unique position to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence before it.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600.
Second, we consider whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with a rational hypothesis other than guilt. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 329-30.
“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a
whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclu de beyond a reasonable
doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473
(Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). In this second step, no deference is given to the jury’s
verdict. Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.
A. Circumstances Proved
The circumstances proved by the state related to Robinson’s intent to attempt to kill
S.D. are as follows:
12
• Robinson stabbed and cut S.D. multiple times in the chest,
abdomen, back, hand, and head;

• S.D. did not provoke Robinson prior to being stabbed;

• Robinson continued stabbing and cutting S.D. while S.D.
attempted to flee;

• Robinson pursued S.D. outside of the apartment building;

• S.D. required immediate and extensive medical treatment
to save his life;

• Robinson did not treat S.D.’s wounds or call 911; and

• Robinson fled the scene after the attack.

B. Reasonable Inferences from the Circumstances Proved
We next determine whether the circumstances proved, viewed as a whole, “exclude
beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d at 473 (quotation omitted). Our review of the record reveals no reasonable
inferences other than guilt.
Robinson used a knife to cause serious and life-threatening wounds to S.D.,
Robinson pursued S.D. down the stairs and attacked S.D. a second time, Robinson began
to pursue S.D. outside before returning to his apartment, and Robinson did not attempt to
provide S.D. with aid or call an ambulance. See Moore, 481 N.W.2d at 361 (stating that
intent to kill may be inferred from the nature and manner of the killing). Based on the
circumstances proved, there is no reasonable inference other than guilt.
13
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Robinson’s pro se supplemental brief contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to request an omnibus hearing.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 685-86, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn.
2020).
We apply the two-prong test set forth in Strickland to determine whether a defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372. The Strickland test
requires Robinson to prove that: (1) his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness”; and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
See Zumberge v. State, 937 N.W.2d 406, 413 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted). The claim
must satisfy both of the Strickland prongs, meaning that if only one prong is met the claim
fails and we need not apply the second prong. Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 217
(Minn. 2016). For the reasons we describe below, Robinson cannot show that the
proceeding would be different even if his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.” See Zumberge, 937 N.W.2d at 413 (quotation omitted).
Robinson argues that his counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to
request an omnibus hearing to challenge the basis of probable cause supporting the search
warrant of the apartment building where the incident occurred. Because the basis for the
14
state’s evidence presented to the jury did not derive from the search of Robinson’s
apartment, Robinson cannot satisfy the second Strickland prong.
The state presented evidence that Robinson stabbed and cut S.D. multiple times in
the chest, abdomen, back, hand, and head. S.D. testified that on July 3, 2020, he “was
stabbed” by Robinson. See State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (stating
that uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness may be sufficient to support a
conviction). The emergency-room physician testified that S.D. required “immediate” life-
saving procedures. One of the police officers testified that S.D.’s clothing was “soaked in
blood.” When the officer asked what happened to S.D., he was told that “[S.D.] had been
stabbed.” Officers followed a tr ail of “blood spots” from where S.D. was found to
Robinson’s apartment building. Once officers arrived at the building they found “blood on
the outside door.” And through a window, officers saw “blood in the area inside as well.”
This evidence was independent from evidence obtained from the search of Robinson’s
apartment and, as we explained above, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Officers executed a search warrant for Robinson’s building and found the following
in the hallway leading to Robinson’s apartment: a “piece of a knife handle”; a “tennis
shoe”; a “baseball cap”; a blood trai l on the floor; and a cellular phone “on the ground
outside [Robinson’s] apartment door.” Inside Robinson’s apartment, officers found the
following: blood on the floor of the living room, bedroom, and kitchen; a bottle of alcohol;
the “blade portion of the knife” without a handle; and a portion of a knife handle matching
“the portion of the handle” found at the bottom of the stairs. Nothing found in the
apartment was essential to the jury’s verdict.
15
In sum, there was not “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [alleged]
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” See
Zumberge, 937 N.W.2d at 413 (quotation omitted). Because Robinson failed to satisfy the
second prong of the Strickland test, we decline to address the first prong—whether his
counsel’s representation was objectively unreasonable. See Swaney, 882 N.W.2d at 217.
Affirmed.