Estate of William L. Pickett, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0960

Estate of William L. Pickett,
Respondent,

vs.

Rick Howell,
Appellant,

Will Hague,
defendant.

Filed May 23, 2022
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HG-CV-21-128

Jevon C. Bindman, Timothy Lovett, Maslon L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Robert F. Caldecott, Caldecott & Forro, P.L.C., White Bear Lake, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Richard Howell, White Bear Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Rick Howell was evicted from a home on th e grounds that he did not have a lease
agreement with the owner and that he breached the allege d lease agreement by allowing
controlled substances to be present in the home. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2015, Howell entered into an oral agreement to lease a home in the city of White
Bear Lake that was owned by William Picke tt, who passed away on November 12, 2020.
At that time, William’s adult son, Brandon Pi ckett, was overseas in military service.
Brandon visited Minnesota for his father’s funeral in Nove mber 2020 and returned to
Minnesota permanently after his discharge from military service in December 2020. After
his return, Brandon learned that at least th ree persons were living in the home, and he
observed pervasive drug use in and around the property. A lthough Brandon had lived in
his father’s home before his military deployment, he lived elsewhere afterward because of
the environment at the home.
Brandon retained an attorney to probate William’s estate . On April 1, 2021, the
attorney representing the estate sent a two-pa ge letter to Howell and the other residents.
The letter stated that the oral lease with William terminated upon his death, that the
residents had 30 days to voluntarily vacate the premises, and that the estate would
commence an eviction action if they did not voluntarily vacate the premises.
Howell, Will Hague, and a third resident did not vacate the prem ises. On May 4,
2021, the estate comme nced this eviction action agains t Howell, Hague, and the third
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resident. The estate alleged that the de fendants had breached the lease agreement by
allowing controlled substances, specifically methamphetamine, to be present on the
premises. The third defendant was dismissed before trial because she moved out of the
home.
The district court conducted a court tria l in July 2021. Th e estate called two
witnesses: Brandon and his sist er, Chandra Pickett. Brando n testified that, before his
father’s death, he had personally observed Hague and at least three other persons use
methamphetamine at the property. Brandon also testified that he was aware that there was
methamphetamine on the premises after his father’s death. His testimony was corroborated
by a photographic exhibit de picting Hague using methamphe tamine in the property’s
garage and another photographic exhibit depicting a baggie of white powder in Howell’s
bedroom.
Chandra testified that she pr eviously had resided in the home and, for five years,
had been in a romantic relationship with Howell. She testified that the relationship ended
in November 2020, when Howe ll obtained an order for prot ection (OFP) that prevented
her from having contact with Howell and from being present at the property. Chandra
testified that, before her exclusion from the property in November 2020, she had observed
Howell, Hague, and other pe rsons use methamphetamine at the property on many
occasions.
Howell testified that, shortly before Willia m’s death, he and William entered into
an oral lease agreement by which Howell wa s allowed to reside in the home until
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September 2021. Howell testified that he had used drugs in the past but had not used drugs
during the past year.
After trial, the district court filed an order in which it concluded that Howell and
Hague had violated the alleged lease agreemen t by using controlled substances at the
property. The district court also concluded that, after William’s death, neither Howell nor
Hague had a valid lease agreemen t that gave them a right to possession of the premises.
The district court entered judgment in favor of the estate and ordered Howell and Hague to
vacate the premises by August 2, 2021. A writ of recovery was issued on August 6, 2021,
and was served on Howell and Hague on August 9, 2021.
Howell appeals and raises five issues in his pro se brief. Hague is not a party to this
appeal.
DECISION
I. Breach of Implied Covenant
Howell first argues that the district cour t erred by finding that he breached the
alleged lease agreement.
By statute, every residential lease incl udes an implied covenant providing that
neither the landlord nor the tenant will “unlaw fully allow controlled substances in those
premises or in the common area and curtilage of the premises.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.171,
subd. 1(a)(1)(i) (2020). If a tenant breaches the implied covenant, the breach “voids the
tenant’s . . . right to possession of the residential premises” and gives the landlord the right
to commence an eviction action against the tenant. Id., subd. 2.
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The district court found that Howell br eached the implied covenant in section
504B.171, subdivision 1, “based on Mr. Howell’s admission that he previously used drugs
in the subject property, Ms. Pickett’s testim ony that Mr. Howell was still using drugs in
the subject property in November 2020, and Brandon Pickett’s testimony that the
Defendants are still using drugs in the subject property.”
Howell contends that the evidence is in sufficient because he admitted to using
methamphetamine during an earlier time period, before the term of the alleged lease;
because Chandra was excluded from the premis es during the entire term of the alleged
lease and, thus, did not have any first-hand knowledge of the premises during the term of
the alleged lease; and because Brandon di d not testify that he saw Howell use
methamphetamine during the term of the alleged lease.
Howell’s argument assumes that evidence of use of controlled substances, by him,
is necessary. The statute provides that the implied covenant is br eached if a tenant
“allow[s] controlled substances in those pr emises.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.171, subd.
1(a)(1)(i). The record contains abundant evidence of the presence of methamphetamine at
the home before William’s death, which allows a fact-finder to infer that methamphetamine
also was present after William’s death. More importantly, the record contains direct
evidence that controlled substances were on th e premises during the term of the alleged
lease. Brandon’s testimony and the estate’s photographic exhibits tend to prove that
methamphetamine was present at the property in June 2021, which is after William’s death
and during the term of the alle ged lease. Howell contends th at Brandon is not a credible
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witness, but a district court’s credibility determinations are entitled to deference. See Minn.
R. Civ. P. 52.01; Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019).
Thus, the district court did not err by fi nding that Howell violated the implied
covenant in section 504B.171, subdivision 1.
II. Right to Possession
Howell also argues that the district cour t erred by finding that he does not have a
right to possession of the premises. Specifi cally, he argues that the OFP that prevents
Chandra from being present at the property granted him a possesso ry interest in the
property.
The district court did not make any specific finding of fact or conclusion of law as
to whether the OFP gave Howell a right of possession. Howell did not provide any such
testimony or argument at trial. The argument likely has not been preserved. See Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
In any event, the argument is without merit. Howell did not introduce the OFP into
evidence as an exhibit, so he did not prove that its terms conferred on him a right to
possession of the property that then was owned either by Chandra’s father or by his estate.
It is unlikely that the OFP did so. The statute authorizing the issuance of an OFP allows a
district court to, among other things, “excl ude the abusing party from the dwelling which
the parties share” and “award temporary use and possession of property.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(2), (8) (2020); see also Swenson v. Swenson, 490 N.W.2d 668, 670
(Minn. App. 1992) (holding that district court erred by excluding abused party, not abusing
party, from shared residence). But the statute merely allows a modification of the relative
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rights of joint tenants. Nothing in the statute authorizes a district court to enlarge the rights
of a tenant of leased residential property in a way that diminishes the rights of a landlord
who is not a party to the OFP proceedings.
Thus, the district court did not err by co ncluding that Howell does not have a right
to possession of the premises, despite the ex istence of the OFP preventing Chandra from
being present at the property.
III. Disclosure of Landlord’s Authority
Howell next argues that the district court erred by not finding that Brandon did not
satisfy a statutory requirement to disclose his authority to manage the premises.
The relevant statute provides that a tenant is entitled to disclosure of “the person
authorized to manage the premises” and the landlord or the la ndlord’s agent. Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.181, subd. 1 (2020); Minn. Stat. § 50 4B.001, subd. 7 (2020). A landlord cannot
commence an eviction action if the required di sclosure was not made at least 30 days
earlier. Minn. Stat. § 504B.181, subd. 4.
The district court did not make a finding as to whether the required disclosure was
made. But the record makes clear that Howell’ s argument is without merit. On April 1,
2021, Brandon’s attorney sent Howell a letter, which stated that Brandon was the personal
representative of William’s estate, informed Howell of Brandon’s intent to commence an
eviction action, and requested that Howell vacate the premises voluntarily within 30 days.
The estate commenced the eviction action 33 days later on May 4, 2021. Furthermore, the
record reveals that Howell recognized Brandon’s authority to manage the property before
the April 1, 2021 letter was sent to him.
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Thus, the district court did not err by not finding that Brandon did not disclose his
authority to manage the premises.
IV. Discovery Motion
Howell next argues the district court erred by denying his motion to compel
discovery.
In the Ramsey County housing court, the rules of civil procedure apply, except to
the extent that they are “in c onflict with applicable statutes.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 601.
Under the rules of civil procedure, a party generally must respond to discovery requests
within 30 days. Minn. R. Civ. P. 33.01(b), 34.02(c)(1), 36.01. Because an eviction action
is a summary proceeding, the rules governing housing court require parties to “cooperate
with reasonable informal discovery requests.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 612. Upon request, the
district court “may issue an order for an expedited discovery schedule.” Id. No housing-
court rule modifies the 30-day response time in the rules of civil procedure. This court
applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s ruling on a discovery
motion. Sehlstrom v. Sehlstrom, 925 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Minn. 2019).
Howell served interrogatories on the estate on July 4, 2021, only ten days before
trial began on July 14, 2021. Three days before trial, Howell moved to compel answers to
the interrogatories or to dismiss the eviction action due to the lack of answers. At the outset
of trial, Howell asked the district court to rule on the motion. The estate’s attorney argued
that answers to the interrogatories were not yet due. The district court denied the motion.
It is significant that the district court did not order an expedited discovery schedule
for this case. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 612. Consequently, the estate’s discovery responses
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were not due until after the day of trial, whic h is when the district court denied Howell’s
motion. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 33.01(b).
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Howell’s motion to
compel discovery or to impose discovery sanctions.
V. Evidentiary Ruling
Howell last argues that the district c ourt erred by admitting into evidence the
photographic exhibits that tend to show th e presence of controlled substances on the
premises in June 2021. Howell contends th at the exhibits are inadmissible on the ground
that they lack authenticity because they were excerpted from a video-recording.
Before trial, Howell filed a motion to exclude the estate’s photographic exhibits on
various grounds. The district court denied that motion at the outset of trial without a
detailed explanation. During trial, Howell a sserted objections to three of the estate’s
photographic exhibits. The obj ections caused the estate’s a ttorney to elic it additional
testimony from Brandon to lay a foundation fo r the photographic exhibits based on his
first-hand knowledge of the persons and places depicted in the photographs and the person
who created the photographs. The district court construed the objections to be challenges
to foundation and overruled the objections. The district court did not abuse its discretion
by overruling Howell’s foundation objections. See Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807,
829 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. May 31, 1995).
For the first time on appeal, Howell invokes the best-evidence rule and argues that
the district court should not have admitted the photographs without admitting the entire
video-recording from which the photographs were excerpted. Again, this argument likely
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has not been preserved. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. Nonetheless, it is without merit.
The best-evidence rule applies only if a party seeks “[t]o prove the content of a writing,
recording, or photograph.” Minn. R. Evid. 1002. Brandon did not seek to prove the
contents of a photograph; rather, he sought to use photographs to prove another fact—that
controlled substances were present on the premises. See Minn. R. Evid. 1002, 1977 comm.
cmt.; see also 11 Peter N. Thompson, Minnesota Practice Series—Evidence § 1002.01, at
792 (4th ed. 2012). In addition, a duplicate generally is “admissible to the same extent as
an original unless . . . a genuine question is rais ed as to the authenticity of the original.”
Minn. R. Evid. 1003. In this particular situation, a phot ograph may be considered a
duplicate of an original video-recording. See United States v. Perry, 925 F.2d 1077, 1082
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding that still photographic image excerpted from video-recording was
duplicate and that its admission did not violat e best-evidence rule). In addition, Howell
did not challenge the authenticity of the vide o-recording. Accordingly, the admission of
the photographic exhibits did not violate the best-evidence rule.
Thus, the district court did not err by overruling Howell’ s objections to Brandon’s
introduction of photographic exhibits.
Affirmed.