State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0969

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shane Kenneth Wallace,
Appellant.

Filed May 16, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-19-2277

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney , Jessica Bierwerth, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kyle P. Hahn, Lee A. Hutto n, III, The Hutton Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pr esiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Shane Kenneth Wallace appeals from his conviction for second-degree
criminal sexual conduct and his two convicti ons for second-degree attempted criminal
sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2012), Minn. Stat.
§ 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2014), and Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2016). Wallace argues
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that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the district court coerced
him into testifying, and (3) the district cour t improperly admitted tw o pieces of evidence
as relationship evidence. We reject Wallace’s first two arguments. As to the third, we
conclude that, though the district court erre d by admitting the challenged evidence as
relationship evidence, the error was harmless. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were proved at trial.
In 2010, Wallace began dating B.V., to whom he is now married. B.V. has several
siblings, including her younger sister S.V. In 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged
Wallace with three counts of criminal sexual conduct involving S.V. The charges were
based on three separate incidents that took place between 2 012 and 2017, when S.V. was
between 7 and 12 years old. Wallace and B.V. were dating but were not yet married at that
time.
The Three Incidents
The first incident occurred in 2012 when S.V. was seven years old. S.V. and another
sister, A.V., spent the night at the apartment that Wallace shared with B.V. S.V. and A.V.
slept together on an air mattress. During the night, Wallace woke S.V. up by pulling on her
underwear. S.V. testified that Wallace pu lled her underwear down three times. S.V.
testified that she knew that it was Wallace ba sed on his “figure.” Only Wallace and B.V.
lived in the apartment. S.V. testified that, at the time, she told no one what had happened
because she did not believe the incident to be a “big deal.”
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The second incident occurred in 2014 at a different apartment that Wallace shared
with B.V. S.V. was 10 years ol d at the time. S.V. testified that she thought the incident
occurred during the winter. S.V. was sleepi ng on the couch in the living room when
Wallace woke her up by moving her underwear. S.V. testified that she felt Wallace’s hand
touching her vagina through her underwear. The lights were on so S.V. could see Wallace.
S.V. also saw Wallace look at her underwear with his phone’s flashlight. When S.V. asked
Wallace what he was doing, Wallace looked away, grabbed a pillow, and said nothing. The
following morning, S.V. told B.V. what happened, and B.V. acted confused. S.V. also told
A.V. what happened a few days later, and S.V. told another sister, A.H.V., what happened
a few weeks later. In addition, one of S.V.’s brothers learned of th e incident. Because of
this incident, S.V. began to feel anxious and confused when she was around Wallace. A
few years after the incident, Wallace apologized to S.V., saying that he was just looking
for a lighter in the couch cushions.
The third incident occurred in March 2017 when S.V. was 12 years old. S.V. and
A.V. were again staying at Wallace and B.V.’s apartment for the night. While sleeping
with A.V. on an air mattress in the living room, S.V. woke up when Wallace took the
blanket off of A.V. The light was on, so S.V. could see that it wa s Wallace. When S.V.
asked what Wallace was doing, he grabbed th e air mattress’s pump and looked at it even
though the air mattress was not deflated. S.V. fell back asleep, but she again was awakened
because Wallace was moving her hand back and forth over his penis. S.V. moved her hand
away and turned away from Wallace. The lights were off then, and S.V. testified that she
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knew it was Wallace because of his robe. Again, no one other than Wallace and B.V. was
living in the apartment.
Effect on S.V. and Disclosure of Abuse
One of S.V.’s brothers testified that S.V. began to act differently around Wallace
starting in the fall of 2017. S. V. would hide in her room to be away from Wallace when
Wallace visited the family home. In 2019, S.V. became depressed and suicidal. Almost two
years after the third incident, S.V. told her older sister A.H.V. and one of her brothers what
had happened. These disclosure s eventually led to S.V. pa rticipating in a forensic
interview, in which she described all three incidents. After the forensic interview, the case
was referred to the police.
Relationship Evidence
At trial, over Wallace’s objection, the district court admitted as relationship
evidence two pieces of ev idence offered by the state—spec ifically, evidence concerning
two incidents that took place involving Wallac e and S.V.’s sister A. H.V. These incidents
occurred before Wallace and B.V. were married . The first incident occurred on a family
trip to Duluth in either 2013 or 2014, when A.H.V. was 17 years old. A.H.V. testified that,
while her family and Wallace were in an elevator taking a picture, Wallace placed his hand
on her buttock, which “m ade [her] feel, like, really weird afterwards.” The district court
admitted into evidence the family photo, in which Wallace is touching A.H.V. The second
incident occurred in 2016, when A.H.V. was 19 years old. A. H.V. testified that Wallace
sent her a text message that contained a por nographic image and said something like he
thought she might like it. The district court admitted the text message into evidence. A.H.V.
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testified that, at the time, she shared with her siblings that Wallace had sent her the message
and that, during the family’s Thanksgiving la ter that year, Wallace apologized to A.H.V.
for sending it. A.H.V. also testified that she could tell S.V. was hurt by Wallace’s apology
to A.H.V. because S.V. ques tioned why Wallace did not apol ogize to her, too. Before
A.H.V. testified regarding each of the two incidents, the dist rict court read the jury an
instruction stating that the jury was “not to convict [Wallace] on the basis of the—
occurrences” but that they are “for the limite d purpose of assisting. . . in determining
whether [Wallace] committed those acts with which [Wallace] is charged in this
Complaint.”
Wallace’s Decision to Testify
In opening statements, defense counsel did not comment on whether Wallace would
testify. At the close of Wallace’s case in chief, outside the presence of the jury, the district
court addressed the question of whether Wallac e intended to testify. After giving defense
counsel and Wallace time to disc uss it, the district court placed Wallace under oath for
inquiry by his counsel. Defense counsel questioned Wallace to confirm that he understood
his right to testify as well as his right to remain silent and asked Wallace whether he wanted
to testify in his own defense. Wallace stated that he did not. Following that questioning,
the district court asked the prosecutor if sh e had any questions, and the prosecutor asked
one question, confirming that Wallace understood that the decision whether to testify was
his decision. The district court then asked Wa llace several questions to confirm that he
understood that he had a cons titutional right to remain sile nt and that, while he should
consult with his lawyer and carefully consider his advice, the decision whether to testify
6
was his. The district court also asked whet her Wallace had spoken with counsel and had
been given sufficient time to make his decision. Wallace c onfirmed that he had spoken
with counsel and had been given sufficient time, and he then stated that he had changed his
mind and had decided to testify. Court was then adjourned.
When trial resumed three days later, follo wing the weekend, the district court and
defense counsel conducted a second colloquy with Wallace to confirm that his decision to
testify was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Wallace then testified in his own defense
and denied all S.V.’s accusations against him.
The jury found Wallace guilty of all thr ee counts, and the district court imposed
concurrent prison sentences of 84 months, 24 months, and 18 months. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Wallace presents three arguments on appea l: (1) that his convictions must be
reversed because the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to support them, (2) that he is
entitled to a new trial because the district court improperly coerced him into testifying when
it independently questioned him about his decision, and (3) that he is entitled to a new trial
because the district court erred by admitting evidence of prior con duct involving A.H.V.
as relationship evidence. We address each argument in turn.
I. The evidence is sufficient to support all three convictions.

Wallace first argues that the evidence is insufficient to suppo rt his convictions
because the state fail ed to prove beyond a reasonable dou bt that he engaged in sexual
contact with S.V. See Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (identifying sexual contact as an
element of the offense).
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To have engaged in sexual contact, Wallace must have committed acts with “sexual
or aggressive intent.” State v. Ahmed , 782 N.W.2d 253, 262 (M inn. App. 2010) (citing
Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11(b)(i) (2006) (defining sexual c ontact)). An act “is
committed with sexual intent when the actor perceives himself to be acting based on sexual
desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification.” State v. Austin, 788 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Minn.
App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2010).
Intent is usually established through circumstantial evidence by drawing inferences
from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances. State
v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). Fo r a conviction to be upheld based on
circumstantial evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain which, in light of
the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond
a reasonable doubt, any r easonable inference other than that of guilt.” State v. Reed, 737
N.W.2d 572, 581 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
In reviewing whether circumst antial evidence is sufficien t to sustain a conviction,
we apply a two-step inquiry. First, we identify the circumstances proved. See State v.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). In doing so, we consider only those
circumstances that are consistent with the verdict. See State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594,
599 (Minn. 2013). Conflicting evidence is cons trued in the light “most favorable to the
verdict,” and we assume “that the jury belie ved the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the
defense witnesses.” State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008).
Second, we independently “determine whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt, not
8
simply whether the inferences th at point to guilt are reasonable.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d
at 599 (quotation omitted). Here, we give no de ference to the jury’s choice between any
reasonable inferences. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. If there is any rational hypothesis
of innocence based on the circumstances prove d, then the evidence was insufficient and
the conviction must be overturned. See State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn.
2010).
A. Circumstances Proved
When the testimony and evidence submitted at trial is viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858, the state proved the following
circumstances:
Regarding the first incident:
 S.V. was seven years old at the time.
 Along with her sister, A.V., S.V. was asleep on an air mattress in B.V. and
Wallace’s apartment.

 S.V. woke up when she noticed Wallace tugging on her underwear.
 Wallace tugged on S.V.’s underwear three times.
 The lights were off at the time, but S.V. knew it was Wallace because of his
“figure.”

 Only S.V., B.V, A.V., and Wallace were in the apartment that night.

Regarding the second incident:
 S.V. was ten years old at the time.
 S.V. was asleep on a couch in B.V. and Wallace’s apartment.
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 S.V. woke up when she felt Wallace move her underwear to the side.
 Wallace had his phone’s flashlight on, and it was pointed at S.V.’s genital
area.

 Wallace was looking at S.V.’s genital area.
 Wallace’s hand touched S.V.’s vagina over her underwear.
 When S.V. asked Wallace what he was doing, Wallace moved away and
grabbed a pillow before walking away without saying anything.

 After this incident, S.V. began to act differently when Wallace was around.

 S.V. told her sisters A.V. and A.H. V. what happened shortly after the
incident and S.V.’s brother also found out about the incident.

 A few years after the incident, Wallace apologized and claimed that he was
only looking for his lighter.

Regarding the third incident:
 S.V. was 12 years old at the time.
 In March 2017, S.V. and her sister A. V. were asleep on an air mattress in
B.V. and Wallace’s apartment.

 S.V. woke up when she felt Wallace move the blanket off A.V.
 S.V. knew it was Wallace because the lights were on.
 S.V. asked what Wallace was doing, but Wallace did no t reply. Instead, he
picked up the air-mattress air pump and looked at it before leaving the room.

 S.V. fell back asleep, but later woke up when she felt Wallace moving her
hand back and forth over his penis.

 S.V. moved her hand away and turned away from Wallace.
 Even though the lights were off, S.V. could tell it was Wallace because of
the robe he was wearing.

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 Only S.V., A.V., B.V., and Wallace were in the apartment that night.

B. The circumstances proved are consistent only with guilt.
The circumstances proved ar e consistent with guilt a nd inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis of innocence. With respect to each incident, the circumstances proved
demonstrate only that Wallace was acting based on sexual desire or gratification. See
Austin, 788 N.W.2d at 792. In the first two incidents, Wallace tried to remove S.V.’s
underwear. In the second incident, Wallace was looking at S.V.’s underwear with his
phone’s flashlight and touched S.V.’s vagina over her underwear. And in the third incident,
Wallace used S.V.’s hand to touch his penis and rub it up and down before S.V. pulled her
hand away. Based on these circumstances proved there is no rational hypothesis other than
that Wallace intended to engage in sexual contact with S.V.
Wallace’s arguments to the contrary are unp ersuasive. Wallace first contends that
the evidence is insufficient because the jury’s verdict was based on unsubstantiated
testimony from S.V. He states that only S.V. testified about Wallace’s actions and that her
testimony is not credible because the lights we re off for two of the three incidents. But
S.V.’s testimony need not be corro borated to support the convictions. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.347, subd. 1 (2020) (stating that victim testimony need not be corroborated in
prosecutions for criminal-sexual-conduct charges). And we a ssume that the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. See Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d
at 858.
Wallace next argues that the evidence is insu fficient because it is consistent with
rational hypotheses of innocence. He asserts that the evidence regarding the first and third
11
incidents is consistent with the rational hypothesis that S.V.’s testimony was the “product
of fabricated memories” due to family dislik e of Wallace and that the evidence regarding
the second incident is consistent with the rational hypothesis that he was just looking for a
lighter. But these are not arguments for reasonable inferences of innocence drawn from the
circumstances proved; rather, these are arguments to find different circumstances proved.
In determining the circumstances proved, we assume that the jury believed the testimony
of the state’s witnesses, and here that includes S.V.’s testimony that Wallace pulled on her
underwear, touched her vagina through her underwear, and plac ed her hand on his penis.
These actions are consistent only with sexual intent.
In sum, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Wallace’s convictions.
II. The district court did not coerce Wallace to testify.
Wallace next argues that the district court coerced him into testifying after, with the
assistance of counsel, he invoked his right to remain silent. Wallace contends that the
district court coerced Wallace into testifying by “interrogat[ing]” and making “comments”
about his decision not to testify.
Wallace did not object at trial when the district court engaged in its colloquies with
Wallace. We review claims of unobjected -to error under the plain-error test. See State v.
Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016). “In or der to meet the plain error standard, a
criminal defendant must show that (1) ther e was an error, (2) the error was plain, and
(3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” Id.
Wallace’s argument does not satisfy even the first element of this test. It is true that
the supreme court has not required district c ourts “to perform an on-the-record colloquy
12
with every criminal defendant who does not testify.” State v. Walen, 563 N.W.2d 742, 751-
52 (Minn. 1997). But the supreme court has not forbidden district courts from engaging in
such a colloquy either. See id. (noting that “placement on the record of a defendant’s waiver
of his right to testify often will save both the court and defense counsel considerable time
at any postconviction proceeding”). When Wallace first was questioned by his counsel and
said that he would not testify, the district court and the prosecutor followed up with a few
questions confirming that Wallace understood that the decision whether to testify was his
to make. When Wallace then suddenly changed his mind and said he wanted to testify, the
district court adjourned for the day. When trial resumed three days later, the district court
took the time to again ensure that Wallace understood his rights and indeed had decided to
testify. The district court acted with appropr iate attention to Wallace’s rights. It did not
err.1
III. The district court erred by admitting what it classified as relationship evidence,
but that error is harmless.

Finally, Wallace argues that the district court erred by admitting over his objection
two pieces of evidence: (1) A.H.V.’s testimony that Wallace grabbed A.H.V.’s buttock in
2013 or 2014, along with a family photo showing the incident, and (2) A.H.V.’s testimony

1 In his reply brief, Wallace argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his
trial counsel did not object to the district co urt’s colloquy. But Wallace did not raise this
issue in his principal brief to this court, and the argument is therefore forfeited. See
McIntire v. State , 458 N.W.2d 714, 717 n.2 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 28, 1990); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02, subd. 3 (stating that “[t]he reply
brief must be confined to new matter raised in the brief of the respondent”).

13
that Wallace sent her a pornographic image in 2016, along with th e texts around that
incident.
“Evidentiary rulings rest w ithin the sound discretion of the district court, and
[appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). A district court abuses its discretion when
its “ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). To prevail
on appeal, a party usually must show error and prejudice resulting from that error. State v.
Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981). As a result, a district court’s erroneous ruling
on an evidentiary objection is reviewed for harmless error. State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d
629, 633 (Minn. 2011). A nonconstitutional error is harmless unless it “substantially
influenced the jury’s verdict.” State v. Morrow, 834 N.W.2d 715, 729 n.7 (Minn. 2013).
Generally, under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of other bad acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith. But such
evidence may be admissible for other purposes, provided the state follows the process and
meets the standards for introducing such evidence. State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn.
1965); see also State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 682, 685 (Minn. 2006).
Relationship evidence, however, is treated differently from Spreigl evidence. State
v. Zinski , 927 N.W.2d 272, 278 (Minn. 2019). Un der the relationship-evidence rule,
evidence of the defendant’s previous conduct involving the alleged victim may be
introduced to illuminate the history of the relationship between the accused and the alleged
victim to place the crime charged in the context of their relationship. Id. But relationship
14
evidence is not limited to conduct between the accused and the alleged victim. Minnesota
Statutes section 634.20 (2020) establishes a “subtype of general relationship evidence.”
State v. Bell , 719 N.W.2d 635, 638 n.4 (Minn. 2006 ). Under that statute, evidence of
domestic conduct against the victim or agai nst other family or household members may
also be admitted. Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Evidence that shows how a person treats family or
household members may inform how the person treats those close to them and may suggest
how the person may intera ct with the victim. State v. Valentine , 787 N.W.2d 630, 637
(Minn. 2010).
The district court, over Wallace’s objection, admitted A.H.V.’s testimony about the
two incidents, along with the photo and text messages, as relationship evidence. As the
state acknowledged at oral argument, the pr ecise theory for how this evidence was
determined to be relationship evidence is unclear. Having reviewed the record, we
conclude that the evidence does not qualify as relationship evidence. First, the evidence
involved a third party (A.H.V .)—and not S.V.—and thus di d not illuminate the history
between Wallace and S.V. or place the crime charged in context with the relationship
between Wallace and S.V. Second, the evidence did not satisfy the requirements of section
634.20 because it was conduct against a thir d party (A.H.V.) who was not, at the time,
Wallace’s family or h ousehold member as defined by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 634.20
(incorporating definition of “f amily or household members” in Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,
subd. 2(b) (2020)). At the time of the two incidents, A.H.V. was the sister of Wallace’s
then-girlfriend, B.V. Wallace was not relate d to A.H.V. by bloo d, by marriage, or
otherwise, nor did Wallace and A.H.V. share the same household. In sum, because the
15
evidence involving A.H.V. did not constitute relationship evidence under section 634.20
or otherwise, the district court abused its discretion by admitting it as such.2
That said, we conclude that the district court’s error is harmless. In determining
whether wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict, Minnesota courts
have considered: (1) the strength of the case against the defendant, (2) whether there was
a limiting instruction given to the jury not to ba se any conviction on the evidence, and
(3) whether the state dwelled on th e evidence during closing argument. See State v.
Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 84 (Minn. 2005) (appl ying these factors when determining
whether erroneously admitted Spreigl evidence significantly affected the verdict); State v.
Stewart, 643 N.W.2d 281, 298 (Minn. 2002) (same).
First, the evidence against Wallace was strong. S.V. provided consistent testimony
describing three discrete incidents of sexual contact. Her recollections matched Wallace’s
opportunity to commit the offenses at B.V. and Wallace’s apartments. Her testimony was
corroborated by her contemporaneous or near ly contemporaneous disclosure of one or
more of the incidents to A.V., who was sleep ing over with her at B.V. and Wallace’s
apartments during two of the incidents. Family members also testified to S.V.’s change in
behavior and her discomfort being around Wallace. There was also no evidence of a
motivation for S.V. to fabricate a story.
Second, the district court gave limiting instructions before the state introduced each
piece of the challenged evidence a nd during its final instructi ons to the jury. We assume

2 The state offers no other basis for admission of the evidence involving A.H.V.
16
the jury followed those instructions. See State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 578 (Minn. 2009).
We observe that those instructions did not fo llow the standard instruction for relationship
evidence. Instead, they were the standard instruction for other-bad-acts evidence under
Spriegl. But, while the standard relationship-evidence instructions and the standard other-
bad-acts instructions are not identical, they both advise that the evidence is admitted for
the limited purpose of helping the jury de termine whether the de fendant committed the
charged acts. And both advise that the defe ndant is not being trie d for and may not be
convicted of any behavior other than the charged offense. Compare 10 Minnesota Practice
CRIMJIG 2.01, 3.16 (2021 ) (reciting the standard Spreigl evidence limiting instruction),
with 10 Minnesota Practice CRIMJIG 2.07 (2021) (reciti ng the standard relationship
evidence limiting instruction). Th e district court’s limiting in structions thus support a
determination of harmless error.
Third, the state did not dwell on the cha llenged evidence in its closing arguments.
It did not argue that those incidents showed a propensity to commit sexual abuse and that
Wallace therefore committed the abuse that was charged. In its principal closing argument,
the state discussed only the incident involvi ng the pornographic text message and did so
for two purposes: to establish that B.V. was a biased witness in favor of Wallace because
she supported him even when he engaged in misconduct with another sibling, A.H.V.; and
to challenge the credibility of Wallace’s testimony that he accidentally sent those messages
to his then-girlfriend’s sister. The state argued that the theory of “accident, misinterpreting,
misunderstanding” was “a pretty common thre ad” in the case. Defe nse counsel in his
closing argument spoke about both incidents, challenging the accuracy of the evidence and
17
the significance of the incidents. The prosecutor returned to the pornographic-text evidence
briefly in rebuttal, emphasizing that Wallace was not being tried for that conduct but that
the text message showed that Wallace claims an “accident” and has loose boundaries when
it comes to his then-girlfriend’s sisters. While this latter use of th e evidence is more
troubling, on the whole the state did not unf airly dwell on the two incidents in closing
arguments.
Finally, we note that the evidence itself was not overly prejudicial. One incident
involved a pornographic text sent to a 17- year-old—it did not involve sexual misconduct
with a child. And the other incident, which th e state did not even discuss in its closing
arguments, involved an alleged grabbing of A.H.V.’s buttock in a crowded elevator while
taking a family photo—an incident that A.H.V. even acknowledged on cross-examination
she was not “for sure” was intentional. Thus, although the district court erred by admitting
the challenged evidence, the error was harmless.
Affirmed.