A21-0970 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Nancy J. Peterson, Relator,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed March 7, 2022

Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0970

Nancy J. Peterson,
Relator,

vs.

St. Cloud Hospital,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed March 7, 2022
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 38178337-3

Nancy J. Peterson, St. Cloud, Minnesota (pro se relator)

St. Cloud Hospital, St. Cloud, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Relator Nancy Peterson appeals an unemployment-law judge’s (ULJ) determination
that she is ineligible for employee benefits. Because substantial evidence supports the
ULJ’s determination that Peterson has not shown that she had a good reason to quit caused
by her employer, we affirm.
FACTS
Relator Nancy Peterson began working for St. Cloud Hospital (SCH) on January
27, 2020, as a scheduling assistant. In this role, Peterson answered calls from patients in a
room where three other colleagues also conducted scheduling phone calls. Peterson had
difficulty hearing patients over the phone and made mistakes entering information.
Peterson does not have any known medical issue making it difficult for her to hear. She
also told the ULJ that she was not confident in the job because the training was too short.
When Peterson explained to her supervisor that she was having trouble hearing patients on
the phone because of the noise in the room, her supervisor encouraged her to apply for
other jobs within the hospital system. Her supervisor also told Peterson that if she had
trouble answering the phones, she did not have to answer phones as part of her work.
Accordingly, Peterson did not answer the phones, but found that there was little else to do
in her position, and her coworkers appeared irritated that Peterson did not have to answer
phone calls.
On March 9, 2020, Peterson complained again to her supervisor, this time asking
what she should do because she did not have enough work to do. Her supervisor told
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Peterson she could leave her keys on her desk and then leave, so Peterson did so. Peterson
applied for unemployment benefits nine days later.
The ULJ determined that Peterson quit employment and that none of the exceptions
to ineligibility for employment benefits applied, specifically neither the exception for good
reason caused by the employer nor the exception for quitting unsuitable employment within
30 calendar days of beginning employment applied to Peterson. The ULJ therefore
determined Peterson was ineligible for unemployment benefits. Peterson appealed.
DECISION
“A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the employment was, at
the time the employment ended, the employee’s.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (2020).
“An applicant who quit[s] employment is ineligible for all unemployment benefits” unless
he or she qualifies under one of the enumerated exceptions to ineligibility. Id. , subd. 1
(2020).1
“In unemployment benefits cases, we review the ULJ’s findings of fact in the light
most favorable to the decision and will not disturb those findings as long as there is
evidence in the record that reasonably tends to sustain them.” Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr.,
Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Whether the applicant falls
under an exception to ineligibility for quitting employment is a question of law, which we

1 Both the ULJ and respondent addressed the exception to ineligibility that allows
employees who quit “within 30 calendar days of beginning the employment and the
employment was unsuitable” to receive unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 1(3). Peterson does not challenge the ULJ’s determination on this exception.
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review de novo. Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App.
2000); Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. App. 2012).
One exception to ineligibility for unemployment benefits is if an applicant quit
employment because of a good reason caused by the employer. Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 1(1). “What constitutes good reason caused by the employer is defined exclusively
by statute.” Rootes v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc. , 669 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn. App. 2003).
A good reason caused by the employer is “a reason: (1) that is directly related to the
employment and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker;
and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed
rather than remaining in the employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (2020).
Peterson claims that she was subject to adverse working conditions: her workspace
was noisy due to coworkers answering calls in the same room that she was, the training
was insufficient, and when SCH told her that she did not need to answer phones if it was
too difficult, Peterson was not assigned other tasks. Peterson argues that “irreconcilable
differences and being frustrated [were] good reasons to leave.” Peterson does not claim
that the ULJ made mistakes in its factual finding.
2 We therefore review her argument de
novo. See Rowan, 812 N.W.2d at 883.

2 Peterson implies that the ULJ erred by finding that “others appear to have not had similar
problems or they were able to overcome them.” Peterson claims on appeal that “[o]ne
other coworker talked to our supervisor and said the other coworker talked loudly so she
had a hard time hearing also.” Peterson did not present this evidence to the ULJ; therefore,
the ULJ could not consider this, and nor can we, so this argument fails.

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Here, the working conditions— a noisy work environment, brief training, and
irritated coworkers—were directly related to Peterson’s employment and were adverse to
Peterson. The primary issue then is whether these conditions would have compelled “an
average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in the
employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a). “‘Good cause’ to quit has been defined
as a reason that is ‘real, not imaginary, substantial not trifling, and reasonable, not
whimsical; there must be some compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous
circumstances.’” Cook v. Playworks, 541 N.W.2d 366, 368 (Minn. App. 1996) (quoting
Ferguson v. Dep’t of Emp. Serv., 247 N.W.2d 895, 900 n. 5 (1976)). This objective
standard is “reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman, and not to the
supersensitive.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Peterson’s argument that the room was too noisy for a reasonable person to remain
in employment is unavailing. SCH changed the circumstances of Peterson’s employment
so that she was not required to answer calls. Then, Peterson felt uncomfortable because
she did not have enough tasks to complete while her coworkers continued to answer the
phones and commented on Peterson’s idleness.
3 Under the circumstances here, it is likely
that a reasonable person would continue employment rather than quit.
In response to Peterson’s claim that “irreconcilable differences and being frustrated
are good reasons to leave[,]” respondent Department of Employment and Economic
Development (DEED) cites Portz v. Pipestone Skelgas, in which this court said that a good

3 Peterson does not appear to challenge the ULJ’s determination that her co-workers’
actions would not have compelled an average, reasonable worker to quit.
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reason caused by the employer “does not encompass situations where an employee
experiences irreconcilable differences with others at work or where the employee is simply
frustrated or dissatisfied with his working conditions.” 397 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Minn. App.
1986). We agree that Portz supports the ULJ’s determination that frustration with the work
environment is not a good reason for quitting caused by Peterson’s employer.
The undisputed factual record supports the ULJ’s determination that the
circumstances here did not create a good reason attributable to the employer for Peterson
to quit employment. Although Peterson’s work environment may have caused her
frustration, the circumstances were not such that they would have compelled an average,
reasonable person to quit and become unemployed.
Affirmed.