Rylee Pool, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1007

Rylee Pool,
Relator,

vs.

Premise Health Employer Solutions, LLC,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed April 4, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 39972803-1

Derek Thooft, Thooft Law, LLC, Eagan, Minnesota (for relator)

Premise Health Employer Solutions, LLC, Brentwood, Tennessee (respondent-employer)

Katherine Conlin, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent-department)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pr esiding Judge; Connolly , Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Relator Rylee Pool appeals an unemploym ent-law judge’s (ULJ) determination that
she is ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was discharged due to employment
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misconduct. Because the record supports the ULJ’s finding that Pool accessed a colleague’s
medical record without a business purpose in violation of her em ployer’s policy, and
because that action constituted employment misconduct, we affirm.
FACTS
Pool worked full-time for Premise H ealth Employer Solutions, LLC, from
December 2019 until May 1, 2020. Premise Health provides primary and occupational
health services to large corporate clients. Pool was a client-care technician and receptionist
for Premise Health, and her job duties included answering phones, scheduling
appointments, managing the office’s proxy email accounts, and updating medical records.
Pool’s assigned duties required accessing medical records. She was trained that she needed
to have a business reason to access a medical record.
On April 16, 2020, Pool filed a report with the Minnesota Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (MNOSHA) regardin g COVID-19-related safety concerns at
Premise Health. That same day, she informed Premise Health’s health-center manager that
she had complained to MNOSHA.
Four days later, in reviewing the office proxy email accounts as part of her job
duties, Pool saw an email from a supervisor who was replying to an automatically
generated manager notification that an empl oyee—who was also a patient—was out sick
with COVID-19 symptoms. After reading the email, Pool accessed the employee’s medical
record. The health-center ma nager observed Pool accessing the colleague’s medical
records and directed Pool to get out of the record. Pool told the health-center manager that
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she was in the record because she needed to know why th e colleague was out sick and
because they all needed to be aware of the colleague’s COVID-19 symptoms.
Premise Health reviewed the incident and determined that Pool had not violated the
federal Health Insurance Port ability and Accountability Ac t (HIPAA) but had violated
Premise Health’s policy requiring a business purpose to access medical records. Citing this
policy violation, Premise Health terminated Pool’s employment.
Pool applied for unemployment benefits, and respondent Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED) administratively determined that Pool’s
actions were not employment misconduct and that she was therefore eligible for benefits.
Premise Health appealed that decision. Foll owing an evidentiary hearing that included
testimony from Pool and the health-center manager, the ULJ found that Pool “intentionally
accessed a client’s record without a business reason.” The ULJ found the health manager’s
testimony credible and based the finding on th at testimony. The ULJ found that Pool’s
explanation that she had a business reason to access the record was “not credible.”
The ULJ concluded that Pool’s conduct “seriously violated the standards of
behavior [Premise Health] had the right to reasonably expect because she violated a known
policy that sought to protect health information.” The ULJ concluded that Pool’s action
constituted employment misconduct, rendering her ineligible for unemployment benefits
per Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4 (2020).
Pool submitted a request for reconsideration, which was denied. Pool appeals.
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DECISION
We may reverse or modify a ULJ’s decision if the relator’s substantial rights have
been prejudiced because the ULJ’s “findings , inferences, conclusion, or decision” are
unsupported by the record, arbitrary or capricious, or affected by other error of law. Minn.
Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).
An employee generally is ineligible fo r unemployment benef its if she “was
discharged because of empl oyment misconduct.” Minn. St at. § 268.095, subd. 4(1).
Whether an employee engaged in conduc t that disqualifies her from unemployment
benefits is a mixed question of fact and law. Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d
452, 460 (Minn. 2016). The determination of whether an employee committed a particular
act is a question of fact. Cunningham v. Wal- Mart Assocs., Inc. , 809 N.W.2d 231, 235
(Minn. App. 2011). “Factual findings are revi ewed in the light most favorable to the
decision, giving deference to the credibility determinations made by the ULJ, and will not
be disturbed when the evidence substantially sustains them.” Lawrence v. Ratzlaff Motor
Express Inc., 785 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2010).
Whether the factual findings establish employment misconduct is a question of law, which
we review de novo. Id.
A. The record supports the ULJ’s factual finding that Pool violated company
policy.

Pool argues that the ULJ erred by findin g that she violated company policy by
intentionally accessing her colleague’s medical record without a business purpose.
Pool argues that she had a business purpose because her job duties included
reviewing her employer’s proxy email account and, if it showed that an employee was to
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be absent, checking the employee’s medical record to ensure that a manager was notified.
The ULJ found Pool’s explanation not credible. The ULJ instead found credible the health-
center manager’s testimony that the ema il that Pool reviewed was an email from the
manager and acknowledged the employee’s absence, so it was evident from the email itself
that the manager had been no tified, leaving no reason for Pool to access her colleague’s
medical record.
Pool contends that the ULJ’s credibility determinations were erroneous. To support
this argument, Pool cites the factors listed in Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless Services, Inc., 726
N.W.2d 525 (Minn. App. 2007), which are part of a standard jury instruction for evaluating
witness credibility. She applies each factor to the facts of this case and asserts that together
they establish that the health-center manage r was not credible. She contends that the
manager had limited knowledge of the incident , acted in a dismissive manner throughout
the hearing, and gave conflicting testimon y about the employer’s policy on accessing
medical records. But we review the ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to
the decision and give deference to the ULJ’s credibility determinations. Lawrence, 785
N.W.2d at 822. The ULJ found the health-cen ter manager’s testimony to be “detailed,
forthcoming, and . . . a logical explanation for the chain of events.” The ULJ also observed
that the health-center manager’s testimony was based on firsthand knowledge. These
determinations are supported by the record.1

1 Pool also suggests that she was discharg ed not for violating company policy but in
retaliation for having filed a complaint with MNOSHA. An applicant is disqualified from
benefits if the person is discharged “be cause of” employment mi sconduct. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 4(1). If the true reason fo r the discharge was retaliation for having
engaged in protected conduct, th e applicant is not ineligible for unemployment benefits.
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B. Pool’s conduct constituted employment misconduct.
Pool also argues that the ULJ erred by determining that her conduct constituted
employment misconduct. She contends that her conduct was not a serious violation of her
employer’s standards of behavior and that, even if it was, it fell within two exceptions to
the definition of employment misconduct.
Employment misconduct is defined, in pa rt, as “any intentional, negligent, or
indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job, that is a serious violation of the standards of
behavior the employer has the right to reas onably expect of the employee.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2020). If conduct involved only a si ngle incident, “that is an
important fact that must be considered in deciding whether the conduct rises to the level of
employment misconduct.” Id., subd. 6(d) (2020). But a si ngle violation can constitute
employment misconduct. Schmidgall v. Filmtec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 2002).
Even if the conduct constitutes a serious violation of an em ployer’s behavioral
standards under the statutory definition of em ployment misconduct, a statutory exception
may apply. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b) (2020). Relevant here, an action does not
constitute employment misconduct if it was “conduct an averag e reasonable employee
would have engaged in under the circumstances” or if it constituted a “good faith error[] in
judgment if judgment was required.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(4), (6).

See Scheunemann v. Radisson S. Hotel , 562 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. App. 1997). Whether
the true reason for a discharge was employment misconduct or retaliation is a question of
fact for the factfinder. See id. Here, the ULJ found that the reason for Pool’s discharge was
misconduct, not retaliation for her MNOSHA complaint. This finding is supported by the
record. The health-center manager testified th at she encouraged Pool to report possible
workplace violations and that Premise Health fired Pool ba sed on her violation of its
medical-records policy.
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Serious Violation of Standards of Behavior
Pool advances several arguments for why her conduct was not an intentional, serious
violation of her employer’s standards of behavior. She asserts that her conduct fell within
the parameters of her job; that it was not a HIPAA violation and was simply a violation of
Premise Health’s policy, which was not communicated to her; and that it involved a single
incident by an otherwise good employee.2
The arguments are unavailing. As for the parameters of her job, the ULJ found, in a
decision supported by the record as explained above, that Pool lacked a business reason to
access her colleague’s medical records. Similarly, with respect to Premise Health’s policy,
the record—including the health-center manager’s testimony—supports the ULJ’s finding
that Pool was aware of her employer’s exp ectation that medical records be accessed only
for business reasons. And Pool did not dispute before th e ULJ knowing that Premise
Health’s policy required a business reason to ac cess medical records. With respect to the
fact that the conduct involved a single incident, while that fact must be considered, see
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(d), it is not determinative, see Schmidgall, 644 N.W.2d at
806.
In general, an employee’s refusal to ab ide by an employer’s reasonable policies
constitutes employment misconduct. Id. at 804. In healthcare businesses, this court has
recognized the impo rtance of maintaining confid entiality in patient records. Grp. Health
Plan, Inc. v. Lopez , 341 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn. App. 198 3) (“[A] violation of patient

2 Pool also argues that she did not share the accessed information with anyone else. But the
issue of whether Pool shared the information with other parties was not a part of the ULJ’s
decision and is not necessary for this court to address on appeal.
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records confidentiality is misconduct.”). P ool had access to medical records at her
employer for business purposes. By accessing the record of a coll eague and client for
personal, non-business reasons, P ool abused her access privile ges, and her intrusion into
the colleague’s private medical record was a serious violation of her employer’s reasonable
standards. The ULJ therefore correctly concluded that Pool ’s action constituted
employment misconduct.
Reasonable-Employee Exception
Pool contends, though, that her conduc t falls within two exceptions from the
statutory definition of employment misconduct: conduct that a reasonable employee would
have taken under the circumstances, see Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(4); and conduct
that constituted a good-faith error in judgment, see id, subd. 6(b)(6).
As to the reasonable-employee exception, Pool argues that the COVID-19 pandemic
led to her taking on more re sponsibility and changes in he r job duties. She argues that
because of these extra responsibilities, she checked the colleague’s medical record to make
sure that “nothing got misse d.” She argues that other co workers engaged in the same
conduct. But this argument amounts to a restatement of Po ol’s explanation that she had a
business reason to check the record, which the ULJ found not to be credible. The
reasonable-employee exception therefore does not apply.
As to the error-in-judgment exception, Po ol argues that her conduct meets this
exception given her history as an excellent employee. But Pool does not make any
argument for why she would ha ve had to use her judgment in deciding whether to access
the record beyond a reiteration of the argumen t that she needed to do so for a business
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purpose—an assertion that was rejected by the ULJ as not credible. This exception, too, is
inapplicable.
Pool cites the statute’s remedial purpose to argue that the employment-misconduct
provision of the unemployment -benefits statute must be narrowly construed to favor an
eligibility determination. See Minn. Stat. § 268.031, subd. 2 (2020). And she argues that
recent legislative changes reflect evolving standards favoring eligibility—specifically,
changes making high-school students eligib le for unemployment-insurance benefits,
following this court’s ruling that Minnesota high-school students we re not categorically
ineligible to receive pandemic unemploymen t assistance under a federal pandemic-relief
act. See In re Muse , 956 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. App. 2021 ). But the provisions of the
unemployment-benefits statute governing ine ligibility based on employment misconduct
are not ambiguous. Wilson, 888 N.W.2d at 459-60; see also Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6
(2020). And applying those provisions accord ing to their plain la nguage and consistent
with judicial precedent, we conclude that th e ULJ did not err by de termining that Pool’s
conduct was employment misconduct rendering her ineligible for benefits.
Affirmed.