State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1020

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Edward Valentine Forsythe,
Appellant.

Filed November 28, 2022
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-19-8469

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant argues that evidence seized as the result of a vehicle search should have
been suppressed and that he was improperly denied a Schwartz 1 hearing on alleged juror
misconduct. Because the warrant for the vehicle search was supported by probable cause
and because appellant failed to state a prima facia case for juror misconduct to justify the
Schwartz hearing, we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2021, a jury found appellant Edward Valentine Forsythe guilty of
first-degree possession of cocaine. The following facts derive from two search-warrant
applications—the first involving Forsythe’s residence and the second a vehicle in which
police found contraband.
In March 2019, a Sartell police officer assigned to the Central Minnesota Violent
Offender Task Force (the lead officer) received information from the Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension that a phone number used by Forsythe appeared to be used in a
conspiracy to sell controlled substances, primarily methamphetamine. During the next six
months, the lead officer conducted an investigation which revealed evidence that Forsythe
was selling controlled substances from his house in St. Cloud. The lead officer obtained a
search warrant which authorized a search of the house and seizure of “[d]ocumentation

1 Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960).
3
and/or keys that may indicate a separate storage facility, including but not limited to safe
deposit boxes, cabins, and/or storage units.”
The search produced evidence of drug use and distribution, as well as titles to
16 vehicles, most of which were registered to Forsythe. The lead officer had prior
knowledge of 11 vehicles registered in Minnesota to Forsythe and that “several” of these
vehicles were typically parked at the house. While other officers collected and catalogued
evidence inside the house, the lead officer “check[ed] the vehicles parked in close
proximity to Forsythe’s residence” and “observed a black in color Mercedes-Benz with no
license plates . . . parked in-between two other vehicles that were both owned by Forsythe.”
The lead officer observed two small personal safes on the back seat behind the driver’s seat
of the car.
A search of the car’s vehicle identification number revealed that it was registered in
Florida to an individual other than Forsythe. The lead officer knew, based on his
experience, that drug traffickers often store drugs and money in small personal safes. The
lead officer obtained a dog sniff of the car, and the canine handler informed him that the
dog “indicated for the presence of narcotics on the back driver side door.”
Based on these facts, and a matching vehicle title seized during the residence search,
the district court issued a search warrant for the car. Inside the safes in the car, officers
found methamphetamine, Oxycodone, cocaine, deposit receipts, and cash. Marijuana and
documents addressed to Forsythe were found elsewhere in the car.
The district court deni ed Forsythe’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the
car, and a jury found him guilty of possession of cocaine, in violation of Minn. Stat.
4
§ 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2018). The district court convicted Forsythe and sentenced him
to 150 months’ imprisonment. Forsythe filed a direct appeal, which this court stayed so
that he could pursue postconviction relief. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 4(4). In his
petition for postconviction relief, Forsythe requested a Schwartz hearing to develop alleged
evidence that a juror had not acknowledged during jury selection that he knew an assistant
county attorney. The postconviction court denied Forsythe’s request, and this court
reinstated Forsythe’s appeal.
DECISION
I. Suppression
Forsythe argues that the lead officer did not have sufficient basis to order a dog sniff
of the car and, without the dog’s alert, the search warrant for the vehicle lacked probable
cause.
“When reviewing the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, [appellate
courts] review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions
de novo.” State v. Molnau, 904 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Minn. 2017). If the facts are undisputed,
we review de novo whether the facts warrant suppression as a matter of law. State v.
Wiggins, 788 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 2010).
“[H]owever, we afford great deference to the court’s finding of probable cause and limit
our review to ensuring that the court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed.” See State v. McBride, 666 N.W.2d 351, 360 (Minn. 2003). “A warrant is
supported by probable cause if, on the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
5
State v. Holland, 865 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn. 2015) (quotations omitted). When making
this determination, we look “only to information presented in the [search warrant]
affidavit.” State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 2005).
“[A] dog sniff around the exterior of a motor vehicle located in a public place is not
a search requiring probable cause for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,” and requires,
at most, reasonable, articulable suspicion. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 132, 135
(Minn. 2002) (holding that reasonable, articulable suspicion is required to expand a stop
for an equipment violation before conducting an exterior dog sniff of a vehicle); United
States v. Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 551 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that “a dog sniff of a car parked
on a public street or alley . . . is so limited an intrusion on protected privacy interests as to
not amount to a search for Fourth Amendment purposes”), vacated on other grounds, 517
U.S. 1152 (1996). Reasonable, articulable suspicion requires only that the investigation
“was not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” State v. Munson, 594
N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).
Before the lead officer obtained a dog sniff, he observed the car, with no license
plates, parked between two other vehicles registered to Forsythe, and with two small
personal safes located on the back seat. A search of the vehicle identification number
showed that the car was registered to an individual in a different state. In the lead officer’s
experience, people selling controlled substanc es often store them in small personal safes
and “transfer titles for those vehicles they use” to transport controlled substances across
state lines.
6
These facts, combined with the proximity to Forsythe’s house, which was already
subject to a warranted search, demonstrate that the dog sniff “was not the product of mere
whim, caprice, or idle curiosity” but was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Id. And the dog’s “alert,” indicating the presence of controlled substances within the car,
was enough to support probable cause for the search warrant. See State v. Baumann, 759
N.W.2d 237, 241 (Minn. App. 2009) (“Finally, because the dog-sniff search was legal, its
result provided probable cause for the search warrant.”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009).
Because the dog sniff was legal, the search warrant for the car was supported by probable
cause and the evidence obtained from the search did not require suppression. 2
II. Schwartz Hearing
“A Schwartz hearing provides a party an opportunity to impeach a verdict due to
juror misconduct or bias. A verdict may be impeached by testimony establishing that a
juror gave false answers during voir dire that concealed prejudice or bias toward one of the
parties.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 361 (Minn. 2022).
3 A district court may
decline to hold a Schwartz hearing if the party seeking it does not establish a prima facia
case of juror misconduct or bias by “submit[ting] sufficient evidence, which, standing
alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” Id. (quotation

2 Because we conclude that the dog sniff, which supplied probable cause for the vehicle
search warrant, was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion, we do not address
Forsythe’s argument that probable cause for the vehicle search warrant required the title to
the car which, he argues, was not within the scope of the search warrant for the house. For
the same reason, we do not address the state’s argument that Forsythe lacked standing to
challenge the warrant.
3 This judicially created hearing is now codified in Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(6).
Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 360 n.11.
7
omitted). Alleged juror prejudice or bias based on mere speculation is insufficient to
present the prima facia case necessary to warrant a Schwartz hearing. State v. Martin, 614
N.W.2d 214, 226 (Minn. 2000). Appellate courts review denial of a Schwartz hearing for
an abuse of discretion. Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 361.
Forsythe requested a Schwartz hearing “because a juror failed to disclose his
relationship with a member of the Stearns County Attorney’s Office during voir dire.” The
postconviction court denied a Schwartz hearing because the evidence Forsythe presented
did not “suggest an implied bias on the part of the juror” and did not “suggest that [the
juror] even knew [the attorney] . . . worked for the Stearns County Attorney’s Office.” The
record supports this conclusion.
During jury selection, the district court asked if any prospective jurors had “any
ongoing relationship with the Stearns County Attorney’s Office” or were “related to, close
to, or acquainted with anyone who work[ed] in the field of criminal justice or law
enforcement.” The juror in question did not respond to either inquiry. After Forsythe made
his direct appeal to this court, an assistant county attorney, who was not the prosecuting
attorney, realized after review of the trial transcripts that the juror was his neighbor. He
reported to Forsythe’s appellate counsel that he “believed [the juror] knew where he
worked.” (Emphasis added.) The assistant county attorney also stated that he and the juror
“got along as neighbors, but he did not consider [the juror] a close friend.”
4

4 We commend the assistant coun ty attorney’s candor and proactive steps to ensure a fair
and just proceeding. See Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(2) (requiring candor toward the
court), 3.8(d) (requiring prosecutors to disclose mitigating evidence to the accused).
8
Based upon this record, it is not clear whether the juror in fact knew of this possible
connection to the county attorney’s office. Even if the juror knew the reporting attorney
worked for the county attorney’s office, the juror could reasonably have understood voir
dire questions as referring to closer relationships than a neighbor who was not a “close
friend.” Thus, any juror prejudice or bias is mere speculation , which is insufficient to
present the prima facia case necessary to warrant a Schwartz hearing. Id.
Affirmed.