In re the Estate of: Joseph Rocco Figliuzzi,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-1035

Court of Appeals Anderson, J.

In re the Estate of: Joseph Rocco Figliuzzi, Filed: August 31, 2022
aka Joseph Figliuzzi, aka Joe Figliuzzi, Deceased. Office of Appellate Courts
________________________

Mahesha P. Subbaraman, Subbaraman PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Eric J. Magnuson , Denise S. Rahne, Robins Kaplan LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
appellant Gina Bicknell.

Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Ryan K. Kieson, Drahos Kieson & Christopher, P.A., Bemidji, Minnesota, for respondent
Linda Grady.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. Because supervised administration in probate under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-501
(2020) is “a single in rem proceeding” in which a district court retains “continuing authority”
until final distribution of the estate or termination of the proceedings, the district court order
determining that certain wetland credits were property of the estate is not a n immediately
appealable “final order” under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g).
2. A constructive trust is not an injunction; thus, the district court order denying
the r equest for a constructive trust is not immediately appealable as the denial of an
injunction under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b).
Affirmed.
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O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
Joseph Figliuzzi created a trust for holding wetland credits worth $2.6 million.
Because of a family dispute, Figliuzzi sought to hold these credits in his own name rather
than in the trust. After Figliuzzi’s death, Gina Bicknell, one of Figliuzzi’s daughters, filed
an “Interim Pet ition to Confirm the Legal Status of Non -Probate Assets” that sought to
confirm that the trust, and not her father, owned the credits. The petition also sought to
establish a constructive trust over the disputed credits. The district court concluded that
Figliuzzi owned the credits at the time of his death and denied the petition to create a
constructive trust. Bicknell appealed. The court of appeals then dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the order regarding ownership of the credits was not
immediately appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g), and that the issue regarding
the constructive trust was moot. On appeal to our court, Bicknell asserts that the court of
appeals erred by dismissing the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Because we hold
that the district court order was not final , did not deny an injunction , and thus was not
immediately appealable under either Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g) (appeal from a “final
order”) or (b) (appeal from an order on an “injunction”), we affirm the order of the court of
appeals dismissing the appeal.
FACTS
In 1987, Joseph R. Figliuzzi created the Figliuzzi Family Trust (the Trust) . He
named himself trustee during his lifetime and named two of his daughters, Katha rine
Smrdel and Gina Bicknell, as successor co-trustees upon his death. He designated his wife
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and five children as beneficiaries of the Trust, with the Trust to be divided into equal shares
among his children upon his wife’s death. The Trust property included a 163.1-acre former
rice paddy that the Trust restored to a fully functional wetland (the restored wetland).
From 2012 to 2017, Figliuzzi acted on behalf of the Trust to establish a wetland
bank site with the restored wetland under state and federal law, creating wetland credits
that could be purchased by individuals who are required by law to replace wetlands. See
Breza v. City of Minnetrista , 725 N.W.2d 106, 108 n .3 (Minn. 2006) (describing the
wetland bank system). In 2012, the Trust granted a perpetual conservation easement over
the restored wetland to the State through the Board of Water and Soil Resources (BWSR).
See Minn. R. 8420.0705 , subp. 5 (2021) (requiring a conservation easement for all state
wetland bank sites). In 2016, Figliuzzi, acting as trustee, set up a wetland bank account for
the Trust to keep a record of the wetland credits created by the restored wetland. And in
2017, the Trust entered into a mitigation banking instrument (MBI) with the United States
Army Corps o f Engineers (Corps) to establish , under federal law, a wetland mitigation
bank with the restored wetland. The wetland credits held in the wetland bank account were
worth approximately $2.6 million.
In mid-2018, Bicknell and Smrdel supported a petition for an emergency
guardianship of Figliuzzi’s wife, against Figliuzzi’s wishes. After this event, Figliuzzi
attempted to transfer ownership of the restored wetland and the associated wetland credits
from the Trust to himself. In late 2018, BWSR accepted Figliuzzi’s formal request t o
change the wetland bank account holder from the Trust to himself in his individual
capacity. In early 2019, Figluizzi executed a quitclaim deed on behalf of the Trust,
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transferring the restored wetland to himself . And in late -2019, t he Corps recognized
Figliuzzi as the restored wetland property owner and the responsible party for complying
with the terms of the MBI after accepting an addendum to the MBI reflecting this change.
Figliuzzi died on April 19, 2020. Soon after, the district court appointed Bicknell
as special administrator to protect Figliuzzi’s assets while locating his will. F igliuzzi had
executed a will in 2019 , in which he named his niece, Linda Grady, as his personal
representative and provided for the distribution of his estate. The will was located, and on
September 9, 2020, the court formally probated the will and approv ed Grady as the
personal representative of the estate in a supervised administration under Minn. Stat.
§ 524.3-501 (2020).
Grady submitted an initial inventory of Figliuzzi’s estate on February 4, 2021,
which included the wetland credits. In response, Bicknell filed a petition under Minn. Stat.
§ 524.3-505 (2020) asking the court to rule that the wetland credits belonged to the Trust.
Bicknell asserted that the actions Figliuzzi took in 2018 and 2019 before his death did not
successfully transfer ownershi p of the wetland credits from the Trust to Figliuzzi
personally because BWSR had a formal process for transferring ownership of the wetland
credits, and Figliuzzi did not follow that procedure. Bicknell also requested that the
wetland credits be held in constructive trust “to protect and preserve” the asset during any
ongoing ownership dispute.
On June 21, 2021, the district court denied Bicknell’s petition in a one-page order
with little analysis, concluding that the wetland credits belonged to the estat e. The court
did not address Bicknell’s request to impose a constructive trust, in effect denying her
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request. After first seeking reconsideration, Bicknell filed a notice of appeal from the June
21, 2021 order. After giving the parties an opportunity to brief whether the court of appeals
had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the court dismissed Bicknell’s appeal, holding that the
district court order on the ownership of the wetland credits was not appealable under Minn.
R. Civ. P. 103.03(g) and the request that the wetland credits be held in a constructive trust
during the pendency of any further dispute was moot and therefore not appealable under
Minn. R. Civ. P. 103.03(b). In re Estate of Figliuzzi, No. A21-1035, Order at 5–6 (Minn.
App. filed Sept. 14, 2021). We granted review on both issues of appellate jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS
This case arises from an interim order issued under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-505. Section
524.3-505 authorizes the district court to issue “[i]nterim orders approving or directing
partial distributions, sale of property [,] or granting other relief” in a supervised probate
administration. Here, Bicknell sought “other relief, ” namely, a determination that the
wetland credits were the property of the Trust and imposition of a constructive trust over
the credits during the pendency of any ongoing ownership dispute.
Minnesota Statutes section 525.71 (2020) governs appeals of probate proceedings.
Section 525.71(a) contains a list o f 17 specifically appealable orders . Section 525.71(b)
allows appeals of any order appealable under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure. And section 525.71(c) disallows appeals of certain orders. Orders under section
524.3-505 are not categorically appealable, and the parties agree that the order of the district
court in this case is not among the 17 specifically appealable orders under section
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525.71(a).1 The parties also agree that the order of the district court is not barred from
appeal under section 525.71(c).
Bicknell argues that, contrary to the conclusion of the court of appeals, the district
court order determining ownership of the wetland credits and denying a constructive trust is
immediately appealable.2 She asserts that the order falls under section 525.71(b)3 because
the ownership determination is immediately appealable under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 103.03(g) as a final order, and the constructive trust issue is
immediately appealable under Rule 103.03(b) as an injunction order .4 The question of

1 But some orders under section 524.3 -505 that grant certain types of relief may be
appealable under section 525.71(a). Compare Minn. Stat. § 525.71(a)(3), (12) (allowing
appeal of orders authorizing the sale of real estate and determining distribution,
respectively), with Minn. Stat. § 524.3-505 (authorizing the court to issue interim orders
approving or directing the sale of property and approving or directing partial distributions).

2 Bicknell does not dispute that the district court’s conclusions in its June 21, 2021
order would be reviewable on an appeal from the final judgment. Cf. Gordon v. Microsoft
Corp., 645 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 2002) (“Generally, interlocutory appeals are
disfavored and, ordinarily, only ‘final judgments’ are appealable.”). Instead, Bicknell’s
argument is that the “[s]peedy and efficient administration of probate depends on the
immediate appealability” of the order here.

3 Minnesota Statutes section 525.71(b) provides that “[a]ppeals to the court of appeals
may also be taken from any other properly appealable order pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure.”

4 Bicknell also argues that the constructive trust issue is appealable under Rule
103.03(g). But because Bicknell failed to raise this issue in her petition for review, we do
not address it. See State v. Hunn, 911 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 2018) (holding that an issue
not raised in the petition for review is forfeited). Additionally, Bicknell argues that we
should address the merits of the appeal despite not raising it in her petition for review.
Although we ma y choose to address an issue not raised in a petition for review in the
interests of justice, we do so only rarely; we see no reason to conclude that an exception to
the general rule applies here. See Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co. , 781 N.W.2d 578 , 584 n.2
(Minn. 2010).
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whether the order is immediately appealable therefore depends on how we interpret these
two rules as they relate to supervised administration in probate. We review the interpretation
and application of statutes and the rules of appellate procedure de novo. In re Estate of
Janecek, 610 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn. 2000); St. Croix Dev., LLC v. Gossman, 735 N.W.2d
320, 324 (Minn. 2007).
I.
We first address whether Rule 103.03(g) permits immediate appeal of the ownership
determination made by the district court in its June 21, 2021 order on Bicknell’s petition .
Appeals are allowed from any “final order . . . affecting a substantial right made in an
administrative or other special proceeding.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g). An order is
“final” under Rule 103.03(g) when “the matter is conclusively terminated so far as the court
issuing the order is concerned,” and the court anticipates no further action on the matter. City
of Chaska v. Chaska Township, 135 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Minn. 1965). This happens when the
court “finally determines some positive legal right of the appellant relating to the action.”
Weinzierl v. Lien, 209 N.W.2d 424, 424 (Minn. 1973). An order is considered final when
“it determine[s] all issues presented to the court in the [particular] proceeding.” In re
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 699 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Minn. 2005).
Bicknell argues that the order was final because it ended the district court’s inquiry
as to ownership of the wetland credits, a positive legal right, by concluding that the estate
owned the credits. After the district court issued the order, Bicknell contends, it would no
longer consider any legal arguments about ownershi p of the wetland credits . This would
conclusively terminate the matter of ownership. Grady counters that the order was not
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final because the district court issued it as an interim order in a supervised administration.
She argues that i nterim orders are not final because, by definition, interim orders are any
order other than the final order. Grady asserts that the ownership determination was not
final because it represented just one aspect of the district court’s ongoing authority over
the wetland credits that would continue until termination of the supervised administration.
We agree with Grady. Supervised administration in probate provides for a “single
in rem proceeding to secure complete administration and settlement of a decedent’s estate.”
Minn. Stat. § 524.3-501. Supervised administration differs from other probate
proceedings, which require a district court to consider each proceeding involving the same
estate as independent of one another. See Minn. Stat. § 524.3-107 (2020). In contrast, the
court in a supervised administration exercises ongoing supervision and authority over the
estate until final distribution of the estate or “other order terminating the proceeding. ”
Minn. Stat. § 524.3-501.
The district court is authorized to issue interim orders during the pendency of the
supervised administration to approve or direct partial distribution, sell property, or grant
other relief. Minn. Stat. § 524.3-505. Instead of the district court holding i ndependent
proceedings for all issues in the probate of an estate, the district court in supervised
administration can grant interim orders until the close of probate proceedings via final
distribution or termination. Interim orders under section 524.3-505, then, are not final for
the purpose of appealability under Rule 103.03(g). Thus, the interim order of the district
court determining that the wetland credits belonged to the estate was not final. Because
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the order lacks finality, it cannot be appealed under Rule 103.03(g) , and Bicknell is not
entitled to relief on this ground.
II.
Next, we address the appealability of the district court’s denial of Bicknell’s request
for a constructive trust under Rule 103.03(b). An appeal is allowed “from an order which
grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an injunction.” Minn. R. Civ. P. Rule
103.03(b). We have also applied this rule to orders that grant or deny injunctions in effect
but not in name. See Howard v. Svoboda, 890 N.W.2d 111, 114–15 (Minn. 2017).
Bicknell asserts that the constructive trust issue is appealable under Rule 103.03(b)
as a denial of injunctive relief because constructive trusts include mandatory injunctions,
or, in the alternative, have the effect of an injunction. In contrast, Grady argues that the
plain text of Rule 103.03(b) does not apply to constructive trusts because they are not
injunctions, and even if constructive trusts have the effect of an injunction, our case law
does not support treating the district court order in this case as a denial of an injunction.
Determining whether a constructive trust is an injunction requires examining the
key features of each. An injunction, for its part, can be either preventive or mandatory. A
preventive injunction restrains a party from acting and preserves the status quo of the
parties until the court determines their rights. Bellows v. Ericson, 46 N.W.2d 654, 658–59
(Minn. 1951). In contrast, a mandatory injunction requires a party to act, which sometimes
may change the status of the parties, but still very often with the goal and effect of restoring
the original status quo. Id. A preliminary or temporary injunction, whether preventive or
mandatory, is particularly focused on preserving or restoring the status quo during the
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pendency of the matter. Id. at 659. A temporary injunction ensures that “the effect of the
judgment” is not “impaired by the acts of the parties during the litigation.” Berggren v.
Town of Duluth, 304 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn. 1981). The party seeking an injunction must
establish the absence of an adequate legal remedy and the necessity of the injunction to
prevent irreparable harm. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs. , 278 N.W.2d 81, 92
(Minn. 1979).
A constructive trust requires the holder of the title to property to convey that
property to another that has a superior equitable ownership claim. Knox v. Knox , 25
N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 1946) ; see also Wilcox v. Nelson , 35 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn.
1949) (“A constructive trust is a remedial device by which the holder of legal title is held
to be a trustee for the benefit of another who in good conscience is entitled to the beneficial
interest.”). A constructive trust is appropriate when the district court determines by clear
and convincing evidence that, after considering the legal ownership of the property and
any equitable claims to the property , the constructive trust is required to prevent unjust
enrichment. In re Estate of Eriksen , 337 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1983). A constructive
trust does not preserve the status quo; rather, it attempts to equitably right a wrong in the
absence of a remedy at law.
Although a constructive trust directs one party to affirmatively act by conveying
property to another, it does not create an injunction. The imposition of a constructive trust
is unrelated to the preservation or restoration of the status quo , which is generally a key
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feature of injunctions .5 Additionally, there is “no unyielding formula” that we follow to
impose a constructive trust. Iverson v. Fjoslien, 213 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Minn. 1973). In
contrast, we consider five factors when determining whether a temporary injunction is an
appropriate remedy. Miller v. Foley, 317 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1982). Our differing
treatment of these remedies confirms that constructive trusts are n either injunctions nor
equivalent to injunctions . Thus, the district court’s denial of the constructive trust is not
appealable as a denial of an injunction under Rule 103.03(b).
Although at times we have allowed appeals under Rule 103.03(b) of orders that
grant or deny injunctions in effect but not in name, we do not do so here. Bicknell sought
a constructive trust to “protect and preserve ” the wetland credits during the pendency of
any ongoing dispute. Even assuming Bicknell requested a constructive trust with the intent
of receiving injunctive relief, her intent is not determinative. Instead, when determining
whether we will treat a district court order as one that effectively grants or denies an
injunction, we look to whether the court analyzed the motion or petition as one requesting
an injunction, whether it reviewed any of the equitable factors for injunctive relief, or
whether it considered the merits of the underlying action when addressin g the requested
relief. See Howard, 890 N.W.2d at 114–15; City of Rochester v. Kottschade, 896 N.W.2d
541, 545 n.1 (Minn. 2017). Here, t he district court did not analyze the request for a

5 Constructive trusts are used as a remedy in many different contexts. See, e.g., Knox,
25 N.W.2d at 229 (imposing a constructive trust in divorce proceedings ); Marquette
Appliances, Inc. v. Econ . Food Plan, Inc. , 97 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Minn. 1959)
(contemplating the imposition of a constructive trust in garnishment proceedings). Thus,
even if a constructive trust could have been used here as a form of injunctive relief, we
cannot say that all constructive trusts are injunctions.
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constructive trust as one for injunctive relief, it did not review the equitable factors for
injunctive relief, and, in fact, it did not address the requested relief at all. See Howard, 890
N.W.2d at 114–15; Kottschade, 896 N.W.2d at 545 n.1. Thus, we do not treat the district
court order as an order denying injunctive relief appealable under Rule 103.03(b). 6
Because the district court order was not a denial of injunctive relief, we need not address
whether Bicknell’s request for a constructive trust was moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the court of appeals dismissing the
appeal.
Affirmed.

6 Our holding her e addresses only the constructive trust issue , and we do not reach
any other claim for alternative relief, including injunctive relief, during the supervised
administration of this estate.