Credo Salon and Spa, Inc., Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1037

Credo Salon and Spa, Inc.,
Appellant,

vs.

Liberty Village I, LLC, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed May 2, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-20-2724

Christopher L. Olson, Pete r J. Frank, GDO Law, White Bear Lake, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Jack E. Pierce, Bernick Lifson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decisions to grant respondents’ motion for
summary judgment, to deny appellant’s mo tion to amend the complaint, and to deny
appellant’s motion to compel additional discovery. We affirm the district court’s decision
to grant summary judgment because the mate rials submitted to the district court in
2
connection with this motion did not contain evidence that could create a genuine issue of
material fact regarding damages. We affirm the denial of appellant’s motion to amend the
complaint because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that permitting the requested amen dment after the close of discovery would
prejudice respondents. Finally, we affirm the denial of appellant’s motion to compel
additional discovery because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that respondents had provid ed sufficient disclosures in response to
appellant’s discovery requests.
FACTS
On July 7, 2020, appellant Credo Salon and Spa, Inc. (C redo) filed a civil lawsuit
against respondents 1 stemming from a commercial leas e. The following facts are not
contested. Liberty Village owns various units in the common interest community Liberty
Village Lofts (hereinafter the property). The units at the property are subject to a common
interest community declaration, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 515B.1-101 (2020).
The declaration provides, among other things, that the units on the second floor of the
property shall be used and occupied “exclus ively for office purposes.” The declaration
also provides that units on the first floor are to be used for “office, commercial, retail,” and
other uses permitted by the zoning code.

1 In this opinion, we refer to respondents Liberty Village I, LLC, Liberty Village II, LLC,
and Liberty Village Lofts Condominium Association collectively as Liberty Village. There
are also three other respondents: Renew and Recover Massage Therapy LLC, Inner Swan
Aesthetics L.L.C. (referred to as ISA), and Michael Oreck.
3
In May 2012, Credo entered into a lease with respondent Li berty Village under
which terms Credo would operate a salon spa business for a term of 11 years. At the time
of executing the lease, Credo and Liberty Village agreed to a restrictive covenant
prohibiting Liberty Village from leasing additional space at the property to any businesses
offering services similar to those offered by Credo. In September 2015, ISA began leasing
a unit from Liberty Village on the second floor of the property. ISA operates a medical
spa that offers medical-grade services by a licensed physician. Prior to ISA’s lease, Liberty
Village and Credo discussed ISA’s potential tenancy. After receiving a list of services and
products offered by ISA, Credo initially indicated ISA’s business would not interfere with
Credo’s business operations. However, Credo later learned of services that it believed were
similar to its own and subsequently objected to ISA’s tenancy.
In July 2020, Credo served respondents w ith a summons and complaint, asserting
ten claims: breach of the restrictive covenan t; breach of the lease; misrepresentation;
violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Ac t, Minn. Stat. Ch. 235D; unjust enrichment;
tortious interference with a contract; tortious interferenc e with a prospective economic
advantage; violation of the declaration; breach of fiduciary duty; and a claim that
respondents Liberty Village I, LLC and Liberty Village II, LLC were alter egos of
respondent Michael Oreck. Fo r each and every count, Cr edo provided a generalized
estimate of damages, repeating the same statement: “Credo has been damaged in an amount
in excess of $50,000, the precise amount to be proven at trial, toge ther with costs and
disbursements herein.”
4
That same month, respondents filed th eir answer, denying Credo’s claims and
asserting defenses. The parties also submitte d a joint discovery plan which stated that
discovery “should be complete d by November 27, 2020,” and in September 2020, the
district court signed a scheduli ng order requiring that “[a]ll discovery shall be completed
by November 27, 2020.” The scheduling orde r does not mention an y specific deadlines
for disclosure of expert reports.
Respondents served interrogatories to Credo, specifically asking to describe in detail
the damages incurred for each of the claims in the complaint. Credo generally objected,
claiming attorney-client privilege, but did state that “[a]t this time damages are thought to
be in excess of $50,000 to be proven at trial. Discovery is continuing.” In their discovery
requests, respondents requested that Credo “produce all documents reflecting on all
damages you have incurred as a result of any alleged breach of the Restrictive Covenant.”
In response, Credo stated the following: “All doc uments, to the extent they exist, are not
privileged, and have not alrea dy been produced will be provid ed to Defendants at a time
mutually convenient to the parties at th e offices of GDO Law.” Through depositions,
respondents repeatedly questioned multiple witnesses about the damages and any impact
of ISA’s tenancy on Credo’s business. Coun sel for Credo consistently objected and the
witnesses did not provide an y testimony in support of the damages claimed in the
complaint.
On December 31, 2020, respondents mo ved for summary judgment on various
grounds, including that there was insufficien t evidence of damage s to create a genuine
question of material fact on th at element of each claim. Specifically, respondents argued
5
that the disclosures made by the discovery deadline did not include evidence regarding the
amount of damages, the calcu lation of damages, or the ca usal connection between these
damages and ISA’s tenancy. In response to the portion of the summary judgment motion
regarding damages, Credo file d a memorandum of law and two affidavits with attached
exhibits on January 15, 20 21. Credo argued that the summary judgment motion was
premature because an expert was require d to offer an opini on regardi ng Credo’s
hypothetical revenues “in the absence of [re spondents’] breaches of the Restrictive
Covenant and the Declaration.” In addition, Credo argued that disclosure of its revenues
was sufficient to establish da mages: “evidence of its revenu es over the applicable time
frames . . . is all the evidence necessary. . . . The facts that will form the basis of Credo’s
damages claim are its own revenues and the revenues of ISA.” The affidavits and attached
exhibits filed on January 15, 2021, however, do not include any tax documents, information
regarding Credo’s or ISA’s customers, or any documents showing revenues, expenses,
sales, profits, or any other financial information about Credo.
After the case was reassigned to a new dist rict court judge, respondents refiled its
summary judgment motion on February 12, 20 21. Credo subseque ntly filed another
affidavit with attached exhibits on February 26, 2021. In this suppl emental affidavit, the
attorney stated that Credo has retained an expert and attached “a true and correct copy of
the financial records Credo is providing to [t he expert].” The reco rds attached included
documents titled “Employee Service Deduc tions” and “Employee Retail Summary” for
one employee and for the time period October 2012 through October 2020. All of the
annual totals and many of the subtotals on the “Employee Service Deductions” for the time
6
period October 2014 through October 2020 are blacked out. The attached records do not
include tax documents, information regarding ch anges to Credo’s or ISA’s customers, or
any documents showing annual revenues,2 expenses, or profits. Respondents filed a second
reply memorandum of law on March 5, 2021, objecting to the consideration of the February
26, 2021 submissions and reiterating its argument that none of the submissions to the court
regarding the summary judgment motion could create a genuine issue of material fact
regarding lost profits.
Before the district court issued a written decision on the summary judgment motion
on May 7, 2021, Credo filed an informal request, by letter, to “reopen the summary
judgment record.” Credo attached an expert report, supplemental discovery responses, and
an attorney affidavit to the informal request. The letter stated that the supplemental
evidence was not “in existence at the time the motion was taken under advisement.” The
affidavit provided the following three reasons w hy Credo chose to wait to hire an expert
until after the close of discovery and afte r the summary judgment motion was filed:
(1) Credo’s counsel advised Credo that “the Rules of Civil Procedure did not require the
disclosure of expert testimony until ninety days prior to trial;” (2) the “highly specialized”
facts made it difficult to find an expert; and (3) Credo “did not want to incur the cost of an
expert witness and report when the parties were engaged in settlement discussions.”

2 Given the redactions to the documents in cluded in the appellate record, we cannot
determine any annual totals for the time period after October 2014. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01 (setting forth what constitutes the appellate record); Custom Farm Servs., Inc. v.
Collins, 238 N.W.2d 608, 609 (Minn. 1976) (“An appellant has the burden of providing an
adequate record for appeal.”).
7
The four-page expert report submitted on May 7, 2021, includes three charts,
labelled figures 1, 2, and 3. According to the report, the expert relied on tax documents
and internal financial statements provided to the expert by Credo: “The data used for Figure
1 comes from Credo’s 1120S federal tax filings for the years 2013-2019. The data used
for Figures 2 and 3 comes from internal fina ncial statements generated by Credo.” The
expert assumed compound annual growth rate s of 3.8%, 4.94%, a nd 8.56% to project
Credo’s expected revenues for 2016-2020. By comparing these expected revenues to
Credo’s actual revenues (derived from “feder al tax filings”) and by comparing these
projections to actual annual total sales (deriv ed from “internal financial statements”), the
expert opined that Credo had lost profits in the amount of $292,779. The expert did not
address or rule out any potential causes for the difference between the projected revenues
and the actual revenues.
On June 22, 2021, the district court granted respondents’ motion for summary
judgment. Among other conclusions, the district court determined that the submissions of
the parties did not create a material question of fact regarding damages.3 Specifically, the
district court determined that the submissions did not include any computation of damages
and that Credo’s general statements of damages in its discovery responses were speculative
because “it provide[d] no basis, calculation, or rationale supporting its ‘thought’ of over
$50,000 in damages.” The district court did not consider the expert report filed on May 7,

3 Respondents made their motion for summary judgment on multiple grounds. The district
court also granted summary judgment on se veral of these other theories. Given our
decision regarding damages, we need not address Credo’s challenge to the other bases for
summary judgment.
8
2021, because it was submitted after the summary judgment motion was made, and instead
analyzed the discovery responses and th e evidence submitted pr ior to the summary
judgment hearing.
On the same day that it granted summary judgment in favor of respondents, the
district court also denied Credo’s January 4, 2021 motion to amend its complaint to add a
claim of fraudulent inducement regarding the services that ISA was to provide. Although
the district court first determined that Cre do’s motion to amend was moot because of the
order granting summary judgment, the district c ourt also denied the motion on its merits.
Specifically, the district court determined that Credo had knowledge that the alleged
statements were fraudulent for years prior to filing the original comp laint. Despite this
knowledge, the original complaint did not include a coun t of fraudulent inducement and
the parties conducted extensive discovery prior to the November 27, 2020 deadline. As a
result of the prejudice that respondents woul d experience having to conduct discovery
anew using many of the previ ously deposed witnesses, the district court concluded that
Credo failed to show good cause to amend its complaint.
On June 22, 2021, the district court also denied Credo’s January 4, 2021 motion to
compel discovery. Credo requested that the di strict court compel respondents to disclose
any and all remaining documen ts regarding Credo’s allega tions that Liberty Village
overcharged Credo for the portions of its re nt relating to management fees and common
area maintenance costs. The district court denied the motion because it determined that
respondents had disclosed hund reds of pages of bills and statements from vendors and
contractors who worked in th e common areas of the build ing and because Credo’s CEO
9
conceded that respondents had already provided sufficient documentation on this issue. In
addition, the district court observed that the agreement between the parties allowed Liberty
Village to charge either a minimum monthly management fee of $2, 000 or “an amount
equal to 15% of gross monies collected monthl y.” The district court then concluded that
because Liberty Village only charged the c ontractual minimum amount for management
fees, the alleged deficiencies regarding “gro ss monies collected” by Liberty Village were
irrelevant.
Credo appeals the decisions granting su mmary judgment, denying the motion to
amend, and denying the motion to compel discovery.
DECISION
I. The District Court’s Decision to Grant Summary Judgment
Credo challenges the grant of summary j udgment, arguing that the expert report
submitted on May 7, 2021, and the financial records submitted on February 26, 2021, are
sufficient to create a genuine i ssue of material fact regarding lost profits. We are not
convinced. First, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to consider the untimely expert report submit ted on May 7, 2021. Second, we conclude
that the information submitted to the district court does not include information necessary
to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements of a claim for lost profits
at trial. We, therefore, affirm the decision to grant summary judgment on all counts.
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a ma tter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. A
genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving
10
party on each essential element of a clai m, considering the record as a whole. Lund as
trustee of Revocable Tr. of Kim A. Lund v. Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274, 284 (Minn. App. 2019)
(affirming summary judgment where record contained insufficient evidence of damages),
rev. denied (Minn. March 27, 2019); Leeco, Inc. v. Cornerstone Bank , 898 N.W.2d 653,
657 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2017).
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing “the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d
868, 874 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). However, “[s]peculative assertions are
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on a motion for summary judgment.”
Minn. Sands, LLC v. County of Winona, 940 N.W.2d 183, 197-98 (Minn. 2020) (citation
omitted), cert. denied 141 S. Ct. 1054 (2021). Likewise, “promises to produce evidence at
trial are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Nicollet
Restoration v. St. Paul , 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. 1995) (citation omitted). If the
evidence is merely colorable, summa ry judgment may be granted. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); see also Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225,
230-231 (Minn. 2002) (citations omitted).
As an initial matter, we affirm the district court’s decision not to consider the expert
report and additional submission s filed on May 7, 2021. Minnesota Rule of General
Practice 115.03(b) requires parties responding to dispositive motions to serve and file all
supplementary affidavits and exhibits “at least 14 days before the hearing.” “If irreparable
harm will result absent immediate action by the court, or if the interests of justice otherwise
require, the court may waive or modify time limits . . . .” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.07. In
11
addition to the rules governing timeliness of submissions, a party may make a motion under
rule 56.04 if for some reason that party is not able to disclose facts necessary to respond to
a summary judgment motion. Rule 56.04 gi ves a district court discretion to defer
consideration of the summary judgment motion, deny the motion, allow additional time to
complete discovery, or issue any other appropr iate order, but the rule requires the party
requesting relief under the rule to show “by a ffidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition [to the summary judgment motion].” Minn.
R. Civ. Pro. 56.04. An affidavit filed pursuan t to rule 56.04 “must be specific about the
evidence expected, the source of discovery necessary to obtain the evidence, and the
reasons for the failure to complete discovery to date.” City of Maple Grove v. Marketline
Constr. Cap., LLC, 802 N.W.2d 809, 818 (Minn. App. 2011) (citation omitted).
We review the district court’s decision to exclude evidence from its consideration
on a summary judgment motion fo r an abuse of discretion. Antonello v. Comm’r of
Revenue, 884 N.W.2d 640, 644-45 (Minn. 2016). Similarly, a district court has broad
discretion to permit or deny requests made pursuant to rule 56.04. E.g., Am. Warehousing
& Distrib., Inc. v. Michael Ede Mgmt., Inc. , 414 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Minn. App. 1987)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to consider an
untimely affidavit), rev. dismissed (Minn. Jan. 20, 1988).
In this case, Credo requested that the district court “reopen the summary judgment
record” to accept the report. The affidavit accompanying the expert report explained that
Credo waited until after discovery had closed and after the summary judgment motion was
filed to hire an expert because Credo’s coun sel advised Credo that disclosure of expert
12
testimony was not required until ni nety days prior to trial, the “highly specialized” facts
made it difficult to find an expert, and Credo wanted to avoid the costs of an expert witness
while the parties were engaged in settlement discussions. These three explanations do not
establish the harm required by rule 115.07. Nor do they provide any explanation of the
efforts made to obtain the n ecessary evidence, or of the impediments to completing the
necessary discovery, as required by City of Maple Grove and rule 56.04. It is not sufficient
to simply acknowledge that the report did not exist at the close of discovery or at the time
of the summary judgment hearing. Rule 56.04 requires an explanation why it was not
possible to prepare the report earlier. Given th ese stated reasons and in the absence of an
explanation that satisfies rules 115.07 or 56. 04, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s decision not to consider the untimely report and submissions filed on May
7, 2021, which was more than five months after the close of discovery, and nearly two
months after the summary judgment hearing on March 12, 2021.4
We now turn to the primary issue on appe al: whether the submissions made as of
February 26, 2021, create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the claim of lost profits
in excess of $50,000 for each cause of action.5 To establish lost profits at trial, a plaintiff

4 To the extent that the documents submitte d on February 26, 2021 , contain unredacted
totals, we observe that these viewable totals differ from those used in the expert report. We
also note that the figures in the expert repor t include additional data not reflected on the
documents submitted on February 26, 2021. In additi on, the report doe s not discuss
customers or address potential causes for the purported decrease in revenue, beyond the
assumption that ISA’s tenancy is the sole cause for any decrease in profits. Nevertheless,
we need not determine whether the expert report creates a genuine issue of fact because we
affirm the district court’s decision to exclude the untimely report.
5 The parties agree that damages is an essen tial element for each cause of action and that
the complaint included identical damages language for each cause of action.
13
must show the following three components by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) profits
were lost, (2) the loss was directly caused by the defendant’s conduct; and (3) the amount
of such causally related loss is capable of calculation with reasonable certainty rather than
benevolent speculation. B & Y Metal Painting, Inc. v. Ball, 279 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn.
1979) (rejecting argument that plaintiff established damages at trial because evidence that
plaintiff’s actual rate of growth fell behind th e expected rate of growth “failed to . . .
establish a causal relationship”); see also Cardinal Consulting Co. v. Circo Resorts, Inc.,
297 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Minn. 1980) (requiring a plaintiff to prove that lost profits were “the
natural and probable consequences of the ac t or omission complained of” and that the
requested amount of lost profits “is show n with a reasonable degree of certainty and
exactness.” (citation omitted)); Polaris Indus. v. Plastics, Inc. , 299 N.W.2d 414, 419
(Minn. 1980) (requiring plaintiff to prove that lost profits resulted from the alleged defect:
“the plaintiff failed to isolat e the losses attributab le to the defective tanks” from “losses
due to all of the other variable and imponderable factors which may have accounted for its
decline in earnings”). “[D]amages need not be proved with certainty; it is legally sufficient
that a reasonable basis for approximating loss is shown.” Jensen v. Duluth Area YMCA ,
688 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Minn. App. 2004) (citing Polaris Indus., 299 N.W.2d at 419).
Neither Credo’s answers to interrogatories nor the responses of the witness deposed
prior to the discovery deadline constitute ev idence of damages. 6 Instead, Credo’s

6 The district court concluded that Credo failed to satisfy the rule governing initial
disclosures regarding damages, which re quires “a computation of each category of
damages claimed by the disclosing party,” and “the documents or other evidentiary
material . . . on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature
14
responses echoed the general statement in it s complaint: Credo believed damages would
be in excess of $50,000, with a precise amo unt to be proven at trial. In terms of
documentary evidence, none of the documents submitted in its initial response to the
motion for summary judgment include information relating to taxes, revenues, changes in
customers, sales, finances, or otherwise relate to lost profits.
Turning to the financial documents subm itted on February 26 , 2021, we conclude
that neither the “Employ ee Service Deductions” record s nor the “Employee Retail
Summary” documents include information rega rding annual revenu es, changes to the
customers of Credo or ISA, expenses, cred its, liabilities, or otherwise indicate what
Credo’s profits were at a given point in time. 7 Nor do these documents, by themselves,
shed any light on whether the lost profits were directly caused by respondents’ conduct.
Likewise, these records do not permit any calculation of lost profits to a reasonable degree
of certainty. Accordingly, we conclude th at summary judgment was appropriate because

and extent of injuries suffered.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.01(a)(1)(C); see also Minn. R. Civ.
P. 37.03(a) (precluding a party from using a ny information that was not disclosed “to
supply evidence on a motion . . . unless the failure was substantially justified or is
harmless”). The district court also properly noted that the rules distinguish the these
required initial disclosures from rule 26.01(b ), which governs disclosure of expert
witnesses. The issue on appeal, however, is not the sufficiency of the initial disclosures or
whether Credo satisfied the computation requir ements of rule 26.01(a)(1)(C). Therefore,
we need not determine whether Credo satisfied rule 26.01(a)(1)(C).
7 Based on the appellate record, it appears that Credo did not submit tax documents to the
district court or any profit and loss statements in connection with the motion for summary
judgment. While Credo may have disclosed th ese or similar financial records to Liberty
Village prior to the close of discovery, we can only review the documents submitted to the
district court and included in the appellate record.
15
the financial documents that Credo submitted to the district court do not establish a genuine
issue of material fact regarding Credo’s claim for damages.
II. The District Court’s Decision to Deny the Motion to Amend
Credo also challenges the denial of its motion to amend the complaint to add a claim
of fraudulent inducement. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied the motion to amend because its analysis was not against logic or the facts.
Rule 15.01 provides that, after service of a responsive pleading, a party may amend
only by leave of court, and that such leave “shall be freely given when justice so requires.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. Leave to amend, however, should not be granted when doing so
“would result in prejudice to the other party.” Schober v. Comm’r of Revenue, 853 N.W.2d
102, 112-13 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993)).
In addition, district courts consider whether the moving party acted with diligence in their
attempts to amend. Meyer v. Best W. Seville Plaza Hotel , 562 N.W.2d 690, 694 (Minn.
App. 1997), rev. denied, (Minn. June 26, 1997). “Generally, the decision to permit or deny
amendments to pleadings is w ithin the discretion of the di strict court and will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 664 N.W.2d 291,
295 (Minn. 2003); see also Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 761 (“The trial court has wide discretion
to grant or deny an amendment, and its action will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of
discretion.”). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is against logic or the
district court’s uncontested factual findings. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn.
1984).
16
Here, the district court determined th at Credo had knowledge of the alleged
fraudulent statements for many years prior to filing the original complaint and did not
provide a sufficient explanatio n to support the request to amend the complaint after the
close of discovery and after the motion for summary judgment had been filed. In addition,
the district court emphasized the discovery that had occurred prior to the November 27,
2020 deadline and the prejudice that responde nts would experience in having to conduct
discovery with respect to a new claim. For instance, the district court believed that the
proposed fraudulent inducement allegations did not necessarily and entirely overlap with
the waiver defense asserted by respondents, and amendment would require many (if not
all) of the fact witnesses to be deposed again. We discern no clear abuse of the district
court’s wide discretion in our review of the district court’s analysis, and we affirm the
decision to deny Credo’s motion to amend the complaint.8
III. The District Court’s Decision to Deny the Motion to Compel
Credo next challenges the denial of its motion to compel discovery regarding being
overcharged for management fees and comm on area maintenance costs. Again, we
conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion. See

8 The district court also denied the motion to amend on the ground s that the motion was
moot in light of the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment. We acknowledge
that Credo did not make any argument to distinguish the damages resulting from the alleged
fraudulent inducement from the damages resulting from the other claims. Given our
determination that the district court did no t abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
amend, we need not address whether the above discussion regarding insufficient evidence
of damages would also prove fatal to the proposed fraudulent inducement claim. See Bebo
v. Delander, 632 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Min n. App. 2001) (“A moti on to amend a complaint
is properly denied when the additional claim could not survive summary judgment.”), rev.
denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2001).
17
In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. 2007) (“[A] trial judge has wide
discretion to issue discovery orders and, ab sent a clear abuse of that discretion, its
discovery orders will not be disturbed.” (citation omitted)).
In this case, the district court denied the motion because it determined that
respondents had disclosed hund reds of pages of bills and statements from vendors and
contractors who worked in th e common areas of the build ing and because Credo’s CEO
conceded that respondents had already provided sufficient documentation on this issue. In
addition, the district court emphasized that Liberty Village only ch arged the contractual
minimum amount for management fees: $2,000. The discove ry requests regarding gross
rent collected by Liberty Village, therefore, had little relevance because they related to the
calculation of an alternative to the minimum $2,000 charge. The district court’s decision
is consistent with logic, and on this record, we can discern no clear abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.