In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. J. S., Child.

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1046

In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. J. S., Child.

Filed May 31, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-21-158

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, Mitchell S. Zillman (certified st udent attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant A.J.S.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Atto rney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
SYLLABUS
For purposes of Minn. Stat. § 260B.007, subd. 16(c)(3) (2020), a juvenile was
“found to have committed a misdemeanor, gro ss misdemeanor, or felo ny offense” when
the district court accepted the juvenile’s guilty plea and found that the allegations
supporting the delinquency petition were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of
whether the district court later continued the case without adjudication.
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OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant A.J.S. challenges the district court’s order adjudicating her delinquent
and ordering a disposition for misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Disorderly conduct, when
committed by a juvenile, is treate d as a juvenile petty offense rather than a misdemeanor
unless an exception applies. The relevant exception in this case is if the juvenile was “found
to have committed a misdemean or” in a prior matter. Minn . Stat. § 260B.007, subd.
16(c)(3). Appellant argues that the district court erred by applying this exception because,
although she pleaded guilty to a prior misdemeanor offense and the district court accepted
her plea, the prior case was continued without adjudication and she was never adjudicated
delinquent.
We conclude that, under the proper inte rpretation of the statute, appellant was
“found to have committed” the misdemeanor of fifth-degree assault when the district court
in the prior matter found the allegations proved beyond a reasonable doubt following
appellant’s guilty plea. The ex ception in subdivision 16(c)(3 ) therefore applies, and the
district court did not err by treating appella nt’s current offense as a misdemeanor and
adjudicating her delinquent. We affirm.
FACTS
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. In January 2017, in a prior juvenile
matter, appellant pleaded guilty to fifth-de gree assault in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2016). Th e district court accepted her plea and continued the case
without adjudication for six months so lo ng as appellant followed the terms of her
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probation. Appellant successfully completed probation, and the de linquency petition was
dismissed.
The second and current matter began in March 2021, when the state filed a
delinquency petition alleging that appellant, by pulling down her facemask and spitting on
the head of another student on their school bus,1 committed disorderly conduct in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2020). Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge, and the
district court accepted her plea. The district court adjudicated a ppellant delinquent and
placed her on probation fo r 90 days. As part of her probation, a ppellant was required to
participate in a weekend program at the Anoka County Juvenile Center, write an apology
to the other child, and seek counseling if directed.
After the district court announced its di sposition, appellant’s attorney argued that,
because appellant had successfully completed probation for her prior fifth-degree-assault
offense and the petition was dismissed without adjudication, the current offense should be
adjudicated as a juvenile petty offense and not a misdemeanor. The district court disagreed
and concluded that the delinquency adjudication was proper.
This appeal follows.
ISSUES
Was appellant “found to have committe d a misdemeanor, gro ss misdemeanor, or
felony offense” in a previous matter unde r Minnesota Statutes section 260B.007,

1 This conduct took place during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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subdivision 16(c)(3), when the district court accepted appellant’s guilty plea but continued
the case without adjudication?
ANALYSIS
This case presents a single issue of statut ory interpretation, which we review de
novo. See State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017).
The object of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of
the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020); see also Linn v. BCBSM, Inc. , 905 N.W.2d
497, 501 (Minn. 2018). “When th e language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is
assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.” Burkstrand v. Burkstrand,
632 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn. 2010). In determining whet her the statute is unambiguous,
we construe words and phrases according to their “plain and ordinary meaning.” A.A.A. v.
Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 832 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn. 2013). We also read the statute
as a whole and interpret each section in li ght of the surrounding sections to avoid
conflicting interpretations. See Am. Fam. Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616 N.W.2d 273, 277
(Minn. 2000). If we determine that a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable
meaning, the statute is ambiguous. See Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72-
73 (Minn. 2012). We may then apply canons of construction to discern the intention of the
legislature. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010).
The juvenile-delinquency chapter of the Minnesota Statutes broadly identifies two
categories of juveniles subject to delinquenc y proceedings: juvenile petty offenders and
delinquent children. A juvenile petty offender is a juvenile who committed a “juvenile petty
offense.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.007, subd. 16(d) (2020). A “juvenile petty offense” includes
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a number of less serious offenses such as certain alcohol-, drug- and traffic-related
offenses. Id., subds. 16, 17, 18 (2020). A “juvenile petty offense” also includes, as a general
rule, offenses that would be misd emeanors if committed by an adult. Id., subd. 16(b).
Certain misdemeanor-level offenses, howe ver, including fifth-degree assault, are
categorically excepted from that general rule and are not treated as juvenile petty offenses.
See id., subd. 16(c)(1) (listing violations of Minn. Stat. § 609.224 among those not treated
as juvenile petty offenses).
Relevant here, the general rule that mi sdemeanor-level offenses are treated as
juvenile petty offenses also has an exception for “misdemeanor-level offense[s] committed
by a child whom the juvenile court previously has found to have committed a misdemeanor,
gross misdemeanor, or felony offense.” Id., subd. 16(c)(3). Under th is exception, if a
juvenile commits a misdemeanor-level offens e that would ordinarily be treated as a
juvenile petty offense, but the juvenile was found to have committed a prior misdemeanor,
gross misdemeanor, or felony, then the current offense is treated not as a juvenile petty
offense but rather as a misdemeanor.2
With that background, we turn to the pa rties’ arguments. Appellant contends that
the language in subdivision 16(c)(3) of se ction 260B.007, “found to have committed a

2 There is another exception—not at issue here—for juveniles who committed two or more
prior “misdemeanor-level juvenile petty o ffense[s].” Minn. Stat. § 260B.007, subd.
16(c)(4). In that situation, a juvenile with multiple prior juvenile petty offenses who
commits an offense that would be a misdemeanor if committed by an adult also will not be
treated as a juvenile petty offender. Id. As noted above, appellant’s previous misdemeanor
fifth-degree assault was categorically excluded from being a juvenile petty offense. See id.,
subd. 16(c)(1). The only exception at issue in this ca se is the exception for prior
misdemeanors, gross misdemeanors, or felonies. See id., subd. 16(c)(3).
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misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony offe nse,” means that the child was actually
adjudicated delinquent by the juvenile court. The state, on the other hand, contends that the
language means that the child was previously found by the juvenile court to have
committed the offense, whether or not the child was later adjudicated delinquent.
The word “found” is not defined in the juvenile-delinquency chapter, and variations
of the verb “find” appear throughout the chapter. In some places, such as here, the word is
used with reference to the juvenile being found to have committed offenses or acts that are
in violation of law. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(a)(11) (2020) (authorizing a
sex-offender assessment as a disposition for a delinquent child “if the child is found by the
court to have committed . . . an act in violati on” of certain statutes). And, in other places,
the word refers to a particular factual finding by a court apart from a finding of a violation
of law. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 260B.008(b ) (Supp. 2021) (allowing restraints to be used
on a child in court only if the “court finds” that restraints are necessary to prevent harm to
the child or others or flight and there are no less restrictive alternatives). Given the use of
the term “find” to relate to conduct and facts found, the state’s argument that the language
in subdivision 16(c)(3) of section 260B.007 means that the juvenile was found to have
committed the charged act is reasonable.
But, elsewhere, the juven ile-delinquency chap ter uses “find” in reference to the
determination of the child as delinquent or a juvenile petty offender. See, e.g., Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.198, subd. 1(a) (2020) (“If the court finds that the child is delinquent, it shall enter
an order making any of the following dispositi ons . . . .” (emphasis added)); Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.235, subd. 4 (2020) (aut horizing dispositions “[i]f the juvenile court finds that a
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child is a petty offender”). Gi ven this use of the term, we conclude that appellant’s
interpretation is also reasonable. Subdivision 16(c)(3) is therefore susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation, meaning it is ambiguous. We thus look further for the
meaning of the phrase “found to have commi tted a misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or
felony offense.”
First, we observe that subdivision 16 (c)(3) uses the phrase “found to have
committed” but does not use the word “adjudicated.” The term “adjudicate” is used in other
provisions of the juvenile-delinquency chapter. For example, under Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.235, subd. 5 (2020), a juvenile court may order an enhanced disposition for an
“adjudicated petty offender” when the juvenile court “finds that [the] child has committed”
a second or subsequent alcohol or controlled-substance offe nse. Minn. Stat. § 260B.235,
subd. 5(a), (c). “[D]istinctions in language in the same context are presumed to be
intentional.” Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Digital Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 759 (Minn. 2014)
(quotation omitted). It is reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not intend to require
an “adjudication” under subdivision 16(c)(3) when it did not use that term there.
Second, the legislature’s use of the term “adjudicate delinquent” in other statutes
outside of the juvenile-delinqu ency chapter bolsters the conclu sion that “found to have
committed” does not mean “adjudicated.” In a number of criminal statutes, the legislature
has provided for enhancements or other consequences based on adjudications of juvenile
delinquency. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1) (providing for predatory-
offender registration if a person “was convicted of or adjudicated delinquent” of certain
offenses), 609.224, subd. 2(a) (providing an enhancement for fifth-degree assault when the
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offense occurs within ten years of “a previous qualified domestic violence-related offense
or adjudication of delinquency” ), 624.713, subd. 1(2) (rest ricting possession of firearms
for a person “who has been convicted of, or adjudicated delinquent or convicted as an
extended jurisdiction j uvenile for committing” a crime of violence) (2020). The explicit
requirement of a delinquency adjudication in those statutes supports the state’s
interpretation here.
In addition, although the Minnesota Rule s of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure were
not promulgated by the legislature, we observe that the state’s argument is consistent with
those rules. Rule 8 outlines the procedure required for a juvenile to enter a guilty plea in a
delinquency proceeding. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 8.04; cf. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P.
17.06 (addressing guilty pleas in juvenile petty or juvenile traffic proceedings). Rule 8.04
requires a district court to “make a finding” within 15 days of a guilty plea either “that the
plea has been accepted and allegations in the charging document have been proved” or
“that the plea has not been accepted.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. 8.04, subd. 4. If the plea is
accepted and the court “makes a finding that the allegations in the charging document are
proved,” the court must schedule “further pr oceedings” under the rules, including under
rule 15. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. 8.04, subd. 5.
Rule 15 outlines the pro cess for determining a delin quency disposition after the
district court accepts the juvenile’s plea or the factfinder finds the juvenile guilty. Minn. R.
Juv. Delinq. P. 15.01. Rule 15 requires the di strict court to “make[] a general finding that
the allegations in the charging document have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt”
before conducting the disposition hearing. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.02, subd. 1. A
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disposition hearing must be “separate from the hearing at which the charges are proved.”
Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.04; see also In re Welfare of M.D.S. , 514 N.W.2d 308, 308
(Minn. App. 1994) (explaining that a judicial finding that the petition allegations are proved
is distinct from the ultimate adjudication fo r a committed offense). Ru le 15.05 sets forth
two possible outcomes for each charge that is “found by the court to be proved”: the court
can either adjudicate the child delinquent or continue the case without adjudication. Minn,
R. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Thus, rule 15 requires the district court to make a finding that
the juvenile committed the offense charged be fore adjudicating the child delinquent or
continuing the case without adjudication. Rules 8 and 15 support the state’s argument that
the exception in section 260B.0 07, subdivision 16(c)(3), is me t when the district court
accepts the juvenile’s guilty pl ea and finds that the charges have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Appellant advances several arguments in favor of her interpre tation, but none are
persuasive. She contends that we already held that subdivision 16(c)(3) requires an
adjudication of delinquency in our decision in In re Welfare of D.T.P , 685 N.W.2d 709
(Minn. App. 2004). We disagree. In D.T.P., we affirmed the district court’s adjudication
of a juvenile as delinquent, rather than as a juvenile petty offender, based on the juvenile’s
prior adjudication as delinquent. 685 N.W.2d at 712. The district court determined that
subdivision 16(c)(3) applied b ecause the juvenile was previo usly adjudicated delinquent
based on misdemeanor criminal contempt of court. Id. On appeal, the juvenile challenged
that previous adjudication, arguing that the juvenile-delinquency statutes did not permit
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him to be adjudicated delinquent based on cont empt of court while he was on probation.
Id.
We agreed that the juvenile “should not have been adjudged delinquent” in that
previous matter. Id. We held, though, that because appe llant did not appeal his previous
delinquency adjudication, it became “the law of the case” that the juvenile had a prior
misdemeanor under su bdivision 16(c)(3). Id. But D.T.P. does not address the
circumstances here, in which a district cour t accepted a juvenile’s guilty plea to a
misdemeanor and continued the case without adjudication. While D.T.P. concludes that the
law of the case may establish the exception in subdivision 16(c)(3) when a juvenile fails to
appeal an adjudication of delinquency, it does not hold that an adjudication of delinquency
is the only way for a district court to find that the juvenile committed a prior qualifying
misdemeanor offense for purposes of that exception.
Appellant also contends that the state’ s interpretation undermines the rehabilitative
purpose of the juvenile laws and the purpose of a stay of adjudication. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.001, subds. 2, 3 (2020) (identifying purpose of juvenile-delinquency law and
providing that the law be “liberally construed” to carry out that purpose); State v. Krotzer,
531 N.W.2d 862, 865-66 (Minn. App. 1995) (stating that dismissing charges after a
defendant completes a continua nce without adjudication has the same legal effect as
dismissing the charge for any other reason), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds,
548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996). But we cannot conclude that those purposes are subverted
when a juvenile, despite having succeeded on a previous continuance without adjudication
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for a misdemeanor offense, again violates the law and is held accountable for a
misdemeanor rather than for a juvenile petty offense.
Finally, appellant argues that the district court’s application of subdivision 16(c)(3)
violates the principle of fair warning. Th e “fair warning requirement” demands that a
criminal statute be “in language that the common world will understa nd” to ensure that
defendants are given notice of what is and is not criminal activity. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997) (q uotation omitted). Due-process protections, such as the fair-
warning requirement, apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Welfare of J.C.P.,
Jr., 716 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn. App. 2006). Th e state contends that appellant’s fair-
warning argument was forfeited b ecause it was not raised in the district court. Appellant
disagrees, characterizing her fair-warning argument as an invocation of the rule of lenity,
“a canon that requires a court to construe an ambiguous criminal statute in favor of the
defendant.” Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 440. But even when the fair-warning argument
is viewed through the lens of a canon of construction, appellant’s argument is unpersuasive.
The rule of lenity “is a canon of last resort” and is applicable “only when, after consulting
traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Because we are able to determine the m eaning of section 260B.007,
subdivision 16(c)(3), with traditional canons of statutory construction, we need not apply
the rule of lenity here.
In sum, the district court properly interpreted the exception in subdivision 16(c)(3)
to apply when a district court accepts a juvenile’s guilty plea and finds the offense proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court correctly applied this interpretation to the
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facts here. In the previous juvenile matter, appellant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor fifth-
degree assault—an offense that is categorically excepted from treatment as a juvenile petty
offense—and the district court accepted her plea, finding that the offense was proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the previous fi nding that appellant committed
misdemeanor fifth-degree assault, the district court here properly adjudicated appellant
delinquent of misdemeanor disorderly conduct.
DECISION
The district court correctly concluded th at, in a previous matter, appellant was
“found to have committed a misdemeanor” fo r purposes of Minn. Stat. § 260B.007,
subd. 16(c)(3), when she pleaded guilty to committing fifth-degree assault and the district
court found the charge to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, even though the case was
continued without adjudication. Because a ppellant was previously found to have
committed a misdemeanor, the district court did not err by adjudicating her delinquent for
the misdemeanor in this case.
Affirmed.