In re the Marriage of: Kristin Grace Logdahl, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1053

In re the Marriage of:
Kristin Grace Logdahl, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Roger Duane Logdahl,
Appellant.

Filed August 22, 2022
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-FA-19-1996

Dar Nubson, Nubson Law Office, PLLC, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Steven A. Nelson, International Falls, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
In this marital-dissolution matter, appellant-husband challenges the district court’s
denial of his motion to reopen the judgment and decree based on newly discovered
evidence. We affirm.
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FACTS
In June 2019, respondent-wife Kristin Grace Logdahl 1 petitioned for dissolution of
her marriage to appellant-husband Roger Duane Logdahl.
On January 6, 2020, at a prehearing settlement conference, the district court began
its equitable valuation and division of the parties’ marital assets. Of these assets, the only
issue on appeal is the value of a second home located in Gig Harbor, Washington (the Gig
Harbor property). An amended judgment and decree was entered on June 24, 2020,
awarding the Gig Harbor property to wife and properties located in Bigfork, Minnesota, to
husband. The parties were required “to refinance their property to remove the other party
from the respective mortgage by November 30, 2020, or sell the property.”
In making its valuation of the Gig Harbor property, the district court considered
evidence from both parties as to the estimated market value of the property. Husband’s
suggested value of the property was $335,000, pursuant to an appraisal that was completed
in October 2016. The property’s assessed tax value for the tax period of 2017-2018 was
listed as $332,200. Wife’s suggested value of the property was $380,000 at the time of
trial. The district court concluded that because the tax estimate was the closest in time to
the valuation date, and that there was little deviation in the Gig Harbor property’s value
between tax periods 2016 and 2018, a value of $332,000 was appropriate.
On November 25, 2020, wife moved for an extension of the district court’s
November 30 deadline to refinance or sell the Gig Harbor property. Husband requested

1 Wife’s legal name was changed to Kristin Grace, without a middle name.
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that the district court deny wife’s motion and adjust the valuation of the Gig Harbor
property due to an increase in the property’s value. Husband argued that the Gig Harbor
property should be revalued to reflect what husband asserted was a significant increase in
its value. A December 2020 appraisal of the Gig Harbor property made in connection with
wife’s attempts to refinance the property valued the Gig Harbor property at $517,000.
Husband argued that the district court should reopen its judgment and decree to
update its valuation of the Gig Harbor property based on newly discovered evidence. The
district court determin ed that “[n]either party . . . raised an issue for the change in the
valuation as a mistake, newly-discovered evidence, or fraud, which is required to reopen a
[j]udgment and [d]ecree.”
The district court granted wife’s motion to extend the deadline to refinance or sell
the Gig Harbor property to March 31, 2021, and denied husband’s motion to reopen the
judgment and decree. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to reopen the judgment and decree to revalue the Gig Harbor property.
“Subject to the right of appeal, a dissolution judgment and decree is final when
entered, unless in a timely motion a party establishes a statutory basis for reopening the
judgment and decree.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. App. 2007).
This court will not reverse a district court’s decision to deny a motion to reopen a judgment
and decree except for an abuse of discretion. Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262
(Minn. 2022). The “district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are
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unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against
logic and the facts on record.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The moving party bears the burden
of establishing a basis to reopen the judgment and decree.” Thompson, 739 N.W.2d at 428.
To meet this burden , “[t]he moving party must present more than merely a new set of
circumstances or an unforeseen change of a known circumstance to reopen a judgment and
decree.” Id. at 430-31.
Valuation date

A district court values “marital assets for purposes of division between the parties
as of the day of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement conference, unless a different
date is agreed upon by the parties, or unless the court makes specific findings that another
date of valuation is fair and equitable.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2020). District
courts have “broad discretion in setting the marital property valuation date.” Grigsby v.
Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2002).
The district court’s valuation of property is a finding of fact and will not be set aside
unless its valuation is clearly erroneous. Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn.
2001) (affording “broad deference” to the district court’s valuation of an asset because,
generally, the valuation is an approximation). A district court’s “finding is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000)
(quotation omitted). In making this determination, we view “the record in the light most
favorable to the [district] court’s findings.” Id. The district court is not required to be exact
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“in the valuation of assets . . . it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a
reasonable range of figures.” Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 1979).
The district court determined that the appropriate valuation date was the prehearing
settlement conference—January 6, 2020. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (providing that
the date of the prehearing settlement conference is the valuation date absent an agreement
by the parties or specific findings made by the district court that a different valuation date
is appropriate). The parties made no agreement, nor did the district court make specific
findings, that another date was required; therefore, the district court was within its “broad
discretion” to choose the date of the pretrial hearing as the valuation date. See Grigsby,
648 N.W.2d at 720.
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider
newly discovered evidence that the Gig Harbor property substantially increased in value
after the valuation date. The district court noted that the “clear intent” of section 518.58,
subdivision 1, “is to provide the [c]ourt a tool to be able to address the change in valuation
from the date of valuation to the date it makes an [o]rder distributing the marital property.”
See Vitamin v. Gordin, No. A17-1686, 2018 WL 3520825, at *4, n.7 (Minn. App. July 23,
2018) (questioning “whether the ‘final distribution’ referenced in Minn. Stat. § 518.58,
subd. 1, is the amended dissolution judgment that divided the parties’ property or the
district court’s order converting appellant’s interest . . . into a monetary award”).
It is within the district court’s discretion to adjust its valuation of an asset prior to
the final distribution of that asset. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. “If there is a
substantial c hange in value of an asset between the date of valuation and the final
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distribution the [district] court may adjust the valuation of that asset as necessary to effect
an equitable distribution.” Id. The use of the term “may” in subdivision 1 is permissive,
giving the district court authority to adjust its valuation of an asset “as necessary to effect
an equitable distribution.” Id.; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2020) (stating that
“‘[m]ay’ is permissive”). Thus, Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1, does not require the district
court to adjust its valuation of an asset.
Even when the value of an asset is subject to market fluctuations, as is the case here,
it is still within the district court’s broad discretion to set the valuation date. See Grigsby,
648 N.W.2d at 720; see also Tagg v. Tagg, No. A13-1962, 2014 WL 1407791, at *5 (Minn.
App. Apr. 14, 2014) (stating that based on section 518.145, subdivision 1, “distribution”
of real property becomes “final” when judgment and decree is entered). Th e final
distribution of the Gig Harbor property occurred on June 24, 2020. If the district court
were to exercise its discretion by revaluing the property before distribution, husband could
have done so before June 24, under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1.
Newly discovered evidence
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the
post-decision appraisal of the Gig Harbor property as newly discovered evidence. In
support of his argument, husband relies on Bender, which states that “newly discovered
evidence can consist of post-decision evidence.” 971 N.W.2d at 266. The district court
denied husband’s motion to reopen the judgment and decree, determining that “[n]either
party [had] raised an issue for the change in the valuation as a mistake, newly-discovered
evidence, or fraud, which is required to reopen a [j]udgment and [d]ecree.” We consider
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whether the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the post-decision
appraisal of the Gig Harbor property was not newly discovered evidence.
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(2) (2020), the district court may grant a party’s
timely motion to reopen a judgment and decree based on “newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 59.03.”2 Section 518.145, subdivision 2, provides
the “sole relief from the judgment and decree.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn.
1997).
In Bender, appellant-mother challenged the district court’s order denying her motion
to reopen the district court’s child-support order (years after judgment and decree), based
on newly discovered post-decision evidence that her adult son was found eligible for Social
Security disability payments. 971 N.W.2d at 261. The supreme court concluded that the
“district courts, in exercising their discretion in weighing whether post-decision evidence
is newly discovered evidence that justifies relief . . . are guided by the timing requirements
of section 518.145 and the standard rules concerning newly discovered evidence.” Id. at
266.
Bender emphasized the portion of section 518.145 that allows the district court to
reopen a judgment “as may be just.” Id. at 263. Bender makes clear that the supreme court
decision in Swanson did not create a “bright-line rule” prohibiting courts from considering

2 Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.03 (providing that “notice of motion for a new trial shall be served
within 30 days after a general verdict or service of notice by a party of the filing of the
decision or order”).
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post-decision evidence as newly discovered evidence. Id. at 266 (citing Swanson v.
Williams, 228 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Minn. 1975)).
In Swanson, the supreme court stated that “[g]enerally, to be newly discovered
evidence within the meaning of [r]ule 60.02(2) evidence must have been in existence at the
time of trial but not known to the party at the time. This would not include expert testimony
procured following trial.” 228 N.W.2d at 862 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see
Bender, 971 N.W.2d at 263 (stating that “[b]ecause [r]ule 60.02 and section 518.145 are
virtually identical, [appellate courts] use cases evaluating [r]ule 60.02 when addressing the
application of section 518.145” (quotation marks omitted)). Following Bender, this
statement is to now be construed as a general rule and not a universal prohibit ion on the
use of post-decision evidence to justify reopening a judgment. 971 N.W.2d at 266.
The post-Bender rule allows the district court to reopen a judgment, upon a party’s
timely motion, if the moving party shows : (1) the newly discovered evidence was not
discoverable, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, before the relevant proceeding;
(2) the evidence is relevant and admissible; and (3) the evidence is not cumulative,
contradictory, or impeaching, and will likely affect the outcome of the case. Id. “Whether
these factors have been met is within the [district] court’s sound discretion.” Id. at 263.
To be considered timely, the party’s motion must be made “within a reasonable time, and
. . . not more than one year after the judgment and decree . . . was entered.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.145, subd. 2.
Bender noted a distinction between this court’s opinion in Kozak v. Weis, 348
N.W.2d 798 (Minn. App. 1984), and cases reciting a universal prohibition on the use of
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post-decision evidence to reopen a judgment . 971 N.W.2d at 265 n.6 (stating that Kozak
v. Weis “is more factually analogous to Swanson” than cases applying Swanson to
universally prohibit the use on post-decision evidence).3
In Kozak, the appellant challenged the district court’s order denying his motion for
amended findings or a new trial. 348 N.W.2d at 800. Kozak argued that a post-decision
land survey should have been considered newly discovered evidence to establish the
reputed property boundary. Id. at 802. This court noted that “[c]ontact[ing] of the expert,
surveying of the land, and establishment of the reputed boundary . . . were all accomplished
after trial” when “exercise of the same diligence prior to trial may have produced a
competent survey and established the boundary line.” Id. at 803. This court, in affirming
the district court, determined that the evidence was not newly discovered. Id.
Husband’s post-decision appraisal is analogous to the post-decision survey in
Kozak, in that nothing precluded husband from conducting an appraisal of the Gig Harbor
property prior to the valuation date. Here, both parties agreed to the district court’s
valuation date. Prior to the valuation date, each party offered an estimate of the value of
the Gig Harbor property. Neither party had the property appraised in preparation for trial.
The district court valued the Gig Harbor property based on the tax valuation from the

3 E.g., Life Clinic PA v. Anderson, No. A20- 1377, 2021 WL 2201477, at *2 (Minn. App.
June 1, 2021) (applying Swanson to emails sent post-decision, and concluding that because
the emails were not in existence at the time of the underlying proceeding, the emails were
not newly discovered evidence); Adams v. Adams, No. A17-1526, 2018 WL 4201173, at
*2 (Minn. App. Sept. 4, 2018) (applying Swanson to party’s post-decision lay-off, and
concluding that lay-off was not considered newly discovered evidence).
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previous year. Thus, the exception to the Bender-factors for post-decision newly
discovered evidence does not apply to husband’s post-decision appraisal.
Husband fails to explain why the expert evidence could not have been procured
prior to the valuation date. Applying Bender to post-decision expert evidence that—by the
exercise of reasonable diligence— could have been discovered before the valuation date
could foreseeably encourage gamesmanship from parties seeking a more favorable
judgment through post-decision expert evidence.
Based on our reading of the relevant caselaw, we do not agree with husband that
the post-decision appraisal of the Gig Harbor property represents the post-decision newly
discovered evidence considered in Bender; therefore, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying husband’s motion to reopen the judgment and
decree. The value of marital assets has been determined on the valuation date; husband is
bound by the judgment and decree and is not entitled to a second bite at the apple.
Affirmed.