Tyrone L. Hubbard, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1067

Tyrone L. Hubbard,
Relator,

vs.

Preferred Concrete Construction, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed May 23, 2022
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 158039914

Tyrone L. Hubbard, Buffalo, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Preferred Concrete Construction, Inc., Big Lake, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Munazza Humayun, Anne B. Froelich, Minn esota Department of Employment and
Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Tyrone L. Hubbard was employed by Prefer red Concrete Constr uction, Inc., as a
masonry foreman. In late February 2020, he gave a two-week notice of his resignation.
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An unemployment-law judge concluded that Hubbard is ineligib le for unemployment
benefits because he quit his job and did not quit for a good reason caused by the employer.
We affirm.
FACTS
Hubbard was employed by Preferred Conc rete Construction, Inc. (PCC) from April
2019 to March 2020. On Friday, February 28, 2020, he gave PCC a handwritten note
stating, “Please consider this my two-week notice to end employment.” On Wednesday,
March 11, 2020, Hubbard was expected to repa ir deficient work that he had done at a
jobsite. He did not appear fo r work and did not call in to explain his absence. PCC was
unable to contact him that day. On the following day, Thursday, March 12, 2020, Hubbard
again did not appear for work or call in. PCC decided to terminate Hubbard’s employment.
His supervisor left him a voice-mail message informing him of this decision and requesting
the return of all PCC property. In response, Hubbard sent angry text and e-mail messages
in which he threatened the owner of PCC and his family.
Hubbard applied for unemployment benefits with the department of employment
and economic development. He stated in his application that he was unemployed because
of the COVID-19 pandemic. On that basis, the department determined that he was eligible
for unemployment benefits and began paying him benefits in April 2020.
In April and May 2021, the department sought additional in formation from both
Hubbard and PCC. After reviewing Hubbard’s f ile, the department determined that he is
ineligible for benefits on the grounds that he was not unemployed because of the COVID-
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19 pandemic and that he was discharged for employment misconduct. Hubbard filed an
administrative appeal of that determination.
An unemployment-law judge (ULJ) conducted an evidentiary hearing in June 2021.
PCC’s witness testified about the company’s concerns about the quality of Hubbard’s work
and his belligerent conduct toward co-workers. PCC’s witness also testified that Hubbard
angrily gave his two-week notice of resignation on February 28, 2020, after his supervisor
refused his request for a personal loan from PCC. Hubbard, in contrast, testified that he
quit his employment because PCC had failed to pay him at the wage rate required by federal
prevailing-wage laws. PCC’s witness acknowledged that Hubbard had expressed concerns
about his wage rate but denied that PCC had underpaid him.
The ULJ issued a written decision in wh ich she found that Hubbard quit his
employment and did not quit fo r a good reason caused by th e employer. The ULJ found
that Hubbard was “not a credible witness be cause he was extremely rude and combative
toward everyone present,” “consistently cursed during the hearing,” and “refused to answer
several questions.” Conversely, the ULJ found PCC’s witness to be “detailed and
forthcoming” and found her testimony to be “consistent and more plausible.” Accordingly,
the ULJ determined that Hubbard is ineligible for unemployment benefits because he quit
his employment without a g ood reason caused by the empl oyer. Hubbard requested
reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed her earlier decision.
Hubbard appeals by way of a writ for ce rtiorari. He has filed a four-page, pro se
brief, in which he makes three arguments.

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DECISION
I. Reason for Quit
Hubbard first argues that the ULJ erred by finding that he did not quit for a good
reason caused by the employer. He asserts th at he quit his employ ment on February 28,
2020, for a valid reason: because PCC was not paying him and othe rs the wage rates
required by federal law.
A person who quits employment generally is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2 020). But an excepti on exists if the employee “quit the
employment because of a good reason caused by the employer.” Id., subd. 1(1). A good
reason caused by the employer is a reason “(1) th at is directly related to the employment
and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to th e worker; and (3) that
would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than
remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(a). This excepti on to the quit rule “must be
applied to the specific facts of each case.” Id., subd. 3(b).
The ULJ considered Hubbard’s testim ony on this issue but found that “a
preponderance of the evidence does not support his contentio n.” Instead, the ULJ found
that Hubbard quit “because PCC declined to extend him another personal loan.” The ULJ
explained that Hubbard “demonstrated an extremely hot temper throughout his
employment and during the appeal hearing” and that “[t]he evidence demonstrates that he
was upset when PCC denied the loan, which he needed to move.”
We review a ULJ’s decision denying unempl oyment benefits to determine whether
the findings and conclusions are affected by an error of law, are unsupported by substantial
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evidence in the record, or are arbitrary and ca pricious. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)
(2020). We generally defer to a ULJ’s factual findings and review them in the light most
favorable to the decision. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App.
2006). We will not reverse a UL J’s factual findings “as long as there is evidence in the
record that reasonably tends to sustain them.” Stagg v. Vintage Place, Inc. , 796 N.W.2d
312, 315 (Minn. 2011). Furthermore, “[c]re dibility determinations are the exclusive
province of the ULJ.” Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 345. We defer to a ULJ’s credibility
determination so long as it is “su pported by substantial evidence.” Ywswf v. Teleplan
Wireless Servs., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. App. 2007).
The ULJ’s factual findings are supported by the evidentiary record. PCC presented
evidence that Hubbard hand-wrote a one-sentence resignation letter immediately after
being denied a personal loan. PCC’s witness testified that Hubbard got “a little angry”
when his supervisor refused his request for the loan. The ULJ’s observation that Hubbard
was hot-tempered during the evidentiary heari ng is supported by the transcript of the
hearing. Hubbard used profanity while talki ng to the ULJ, refused to answer questions
posed by the ULJ related to the prevailing-wage issue, and repeatedly attempted to interrupt
and talk over both the ULJ and PCC’s witness. Accordingly, both the UL J’s credibility
determination and her factual finding are supported by substantial evidence.
We note that Hubbard does not argue that the denial of a personal loan is a good
reason to quit that is caused by the employer. It is not. The ULJ properly reasoned that
Hubbard quit without a good reason caused by the employer “[b]ecause PCC had no
obligation to give Hubbard a loan.”
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Thus, the ULJ did not err by finding that Hubbard quit because he was denied a
personal loan, not because he had complained about the wage rates paid by PCC.
II. Discharge After Quit
Hubbard also argues that his employme nt was terminated on March 12, 2020,
because he had complained about the wage rates paid by PCC. In response, the department
agrees that Hubbard was discharged on March 12, 2020, but argues that the reason for the
discharge is irrelevant.
“A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the employment was, at
the time the employment ended, the employee’s. ” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a).
Conversely, “[a] discharge from employment occurs when any words or actions by an
employer would lead a reasonable employee to believe that the employer will no longer
allow the employee to wo rk for the employer in any capacity.” Id., subd. 5(a).
Furthermore:
An employee who gives notice of intention to quit the
employment and is not allowed by the employer to work the
entire notice period is discharg ed from the employment as of
the date the employer will no longer allow the employee to
work. If the discharge occurs within 30 calendar days before
the intended date of qu itting, then, as of th e intended date of
quitting, the separation from employment is a quit from
employment subject to subdivision 1.

Id., subd. 5(d) (emphasis added).
We accept the department’s concession that Hubbard was discharged on Thursday,
March 12, 2020. But Hubbard previously had given notice on Friday, February 28, 2020,
of his intent to quit on Friday, March 13, 2020. Accordingly, Hubbard was unemployed
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for only one day because of the March 12, 2020 , termination. But, under the statute, his
unemployment after March 13, 2020, is due to his having quit. See id.
The department contends that Hubbard’s one day of unemployment before his quit
date is inconsequential. In eligibility for unemploy ment benefits is effective as of the
Sunday of the week in which the applicant became unem ployed. Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 10(b). In this case, Hubbard is inelig ible for employment benefits as of Sunday,
March 8, 2020, because he quit his employmen t effective Friday, March 13, 2020. He
would be ineligible as of Sunday, March 8, 2020, whether or not he was discharged on
Thursday, March 12, 2020.
Thus, the ULJ did not err by not awarding unemployment benefits to Hubbard for
the one day before his quit date.
III. Finding Concerning Unpaid Loans
Hubbard last argues that the ULJ erred by finding that, on February 28, 2020, he
had not repaid a prior personal loan. As the department correctly notes, this finding of fact
is immaterial. The ULJ reasoned that PCC ha d no obligation to give Hubbard a personal
loan. That is true whether or not Hubbard had repaid a prior personal loan. In either event,
Hubbard’s quit was not for a good reason caused by the employer. Nonetheless, we note
that PCC’s witness testified th at Hubbard had not repaid pr ior personal loans. The ULJ
found PCC’s witness to be credible and found Hubbard to be not credible, and we defer to
that finding of credibility. See Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 345.

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Thus, the ULJ did not err by finding that Hubbard had not repaid a prior personal
loan.
Affirmed.