Carlos Orlandos Smith,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A21-1095

Ramsey County Anderson, J.

Carlos Orlandos Smith,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: May 25, 2022
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________
Carlos Orlandos Smith, Moose Lake, Minnesota, pro se.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant Ramsey County
Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. The district court did not err by denying appellant’s claim under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.035 (2020), that it had improperly sentenced him on two convictions that were part of
a single behavioral incident because the claim was without merit.
2. The law of the case doctrine bars appellant’s sentencing challenges.
3. Appellant forfeited review of his claim that the State failed to give proper
notice of its intent to seek an upward durational departure under Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.03 and
2
Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 4 (2020), by failing to raise these arguments in his motion to the
district court.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
Appellant Carlos Orlandos Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and
aggravated robbery in 1994. For the aggravated robbery, the district court imposed a 96-
month sentence, which reflected an upward durational departure. For the first- degree
murder, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of life without the possibility of release.
On direct appeal, we affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentences. In April 2021, Smith
moved to correct his sentence. The district court denied Smith’s motion, and Smith now
appeals that decision, arguing that the court abused its discretion. The district court
correctly concluded that Smith’s claims under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2020) fail on the
merits, the law of the case doctrine bars Smith’s challenges to his sentence, and Smith
forfeited review of his notice claim; as such, we affirm.
FACTS
The relevant facts are not disputed. On the evening of October 5, 1993, Smith and
three companions encountered Marcus Jackson and Raymond Barnett in front of Barnett’s
house, located approximately one block from the intersection of Selby Avenue and Milton
3
Street in St. Paul. 1 Jackson went inside the house, and Smith and his companions
proceeded to assault Barnett after a disagreement about an incident that had occurred days
prior. After beating Barnett, Smith and his companions took Barnett’s shoes and his pager.
Smith possessed a firearm during this altercation.
Smith and his companions then left Barnett’s home and walked to the intersection
of Selby and Milton, where Smith approached Dural Woods to buy marijuana. Smith paid
Woods for the marijuana. But Smith then tried to get his money back from Woods,
claiming that the goods Woods sold him were not what he wanted. Woods refused, a
struggle ensued, and both men drew guns. Smith shot Woods multiple times, killing him.
The police later arrested Smith in Minneapolis; he was ultimately charged with first-degree
murder and second-degree murder for shooting and killing Woods, and aggravated robbery
for his encounter with Barnett.
A jury found Smith guilty of first- degree murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(3) (1996),
and aggravated robbery, Minn. Stat. § 609.245 (1992).
2 The district court scheduled a
sentencing hearing for May 24, 1994. Five days before the sentencing hearing, the State
filed written motions seeking an upward durational sentencing departure and consecutive
sentences.

1 A more detailed description of the underlying offenses can be found in State v.
Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, 586–87 (Minn. 1996).
2 The jury also found Smith guilty of second- degree murder. That offense is not at
issue in this appeal because the district court did not impose a sentence for the offense.
4
During the 1994 sentencing hearing, defense counsel questioned the timeliness of
the State’s sentencing motion. Without citing a specific rule, defense counsel argued that
the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure “require seven days’ notice.” After hearing
the arguments of the parties and the victim impact statements, the district court imposed a
96-month sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction, which reflected an upward
durational departure from the presumptive sentencing range of 44 to 52 months
imprisonment. For the first-degree murder conviction, the court imposed a consecutive
sentence of life without the possibility of release.
Smith filed a direct appeal, arguing among other things that the district court abused
its discretion by sentencing him to a double upward departure for the aggravated robbery
conviction and imposing the life sentence consecutively.3 State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584,
587 (Minn. 1996). We affirmed Smith’s sentences, concluding that the particular cruelty
of Smith’s actions justified the departure and that the consecutive sentence was not a
departure from the guidelines because it was permitted under Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F.2
(1995). Id. at 590.
Nearly 25 years later, on April 5, 2021, Smith moved pro se to correct his sentence
under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Liberally construed, Smith’s motion appeared to
assert four claims. First, Smith claimed that the district court violated Minn. Stat. § 609.04
(2020), which prohibits conviction of a crime and an included offense for the same act,

3 Smith also challenged his convictions, arguing that the prosecutor committed
misconduct and, additionally, that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence pursuant to State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965). We rejected these
challenges. Smith, 541 N.W.2d at 588–89.
5
when it convicted him of aggravated robbery and first-degree murder because the offenses
were part of the same act. Second, he claimed that the court violated Minn. Stat. § 609.035,
which prohibits the imposition of sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single
behavioral incident, when it sentenced him on both convictions because the conduct was
part of a single behavioral incident. Third, he claimed that the district court violated
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), when it relied on aggravating factors that
were not found by a jury. Fourth, he claimed the district court abused its discretion because
his sentences unfairly exaggerated his criminality. Smith asked the district court to either
vacate his aggravated robbery sentence or reduce his aggravated robbery sentence to the
presumptive 48-month duration and then run his life sentence concurrently.
The district court denied Smith’s motion to correct his sentence. Relying on a
variety of legal theories, the court concluded that Smith’s claims failed. In analyzing
Smith’s first claim, which alleged that the district court violated section 609.04 when it
convicted him of both robbery and murder because the two offenses were part of the same
act, the court concluded that the claim implicated more than just his sentence and therefore
was not properly brought in a Rule 27 motion. Rather, Smith should have brought the
claim under the postconviction statute, and the claim failed because it was barred by the
postconviction statute of limitations.
In two separate footnotes, the district court addressed Smith’s second claim, which
alleged a violation of section 609.035 on the basis that the aggravated robbery and
first-degree murder convictions were part of a single behavioral incident. In footnote 2 of
the order, the court rejected the claim on its merits, concluding that because Smith’s
6
conduct involved more than one victim, it comprised more than a single behavioral
incident. In footnote 3 of the order, the district court questioned whether Smith’s section
609.035 claim could be raised in a motion to correct a sentence and described in more detail
why the claim failed on the merits.
In analyzing Smith’s third claim, which alleged a Blakely violation, the district court
observed that the Blak ely rule does not apply retroactively. Because Smith’s conviction
became final 8 years before Blakely was decided, the court concluded that Smith’s Blakely
argument failed on its merits.
As for Smith’s fourth claim, which alleged that his sentences unfairly exaggerated
his criminality, the district court observed that under the law of the case doctrine, courts
will not revisit an issue that was previously raised and rejected. Because the issue in
question was raised and rejected in Smith’s direct appeal, the court concluded that the law
of the case doctrine barred Smith’s fourth claim.
On appeal to this court, Smith renews his argument that the district court violated
section 609.035 when it imposed separate sentences for the convictions of aggravated
robbery and first- degree murder because the convictions arose out of a single behavioral
incident. He also asserts that the district court erred by questioning whether his section
609.035 claim could be raised in the motion to correct his sentence. Smith further claims
that the record does not contain aggravating factors that justify an upward departure.
Lastly, Smith contends for the first time that the State violated Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.03, and
Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 4 (2020), by filing its written motion for a sentencing departure
5 days before the 1994 sentencing hearing.
7
ANALYSIS
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to correct a sentence for an abuse of
discretion. Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2016). The district court abuses
its discretion when it “exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, base[s]
its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or [makes] clearly erroneous factual findings.”
Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).
A defendant may move to “correct a sentence not authorized by law” at any time.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9; see Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2016)
(holding that applying the 2-year time bar in the postconviction statute to motions to correct
sentence violates the separation of powers and affirming that motions to correct sentence
have no time limit). A sentence is unauthorized when it is “cont rary to law or applicable
statutes.” State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2015). Additionally, the right to
challenge an unauthorized sentence cannot be waived. State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141,
146–47 (Minn. 2007).
I.
We first address the di strict court’s treatment of Smith’s claim under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.035. Section 609.035 prohibits the imposition of sentences for multiple crimes
arising out of a single behavioral incident. Munt v. State, 920 N.W.2d 410, 416–17 (Minn.
2018); State v. Joh nson, 141 N.W.2d 517, 524 (Minn. 1966). Here, the court properly
8
concluded that multiple crimes did not arise out of a single behavioral incident and thus
correctly denied Smith’s section 609.035 claim.4
To determine whether crimes arise out of a single behavioral incident, we look at
“the factors of time and place” as well as “whether the segment of conduct involved was
motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” Munt, 920 N.W.2d at 416
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Acts committed against separate
victims are not usually “conduct” for purposes of section 609.035 because “the
[L]egislature did not intend in every case to immunize offenders from the consequences of
separate crimes intentionally committed in a single episode against more than one
individual.” Id. at 417 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State
v. Branch, 942 N.W.2d 711, 715 n.4 (Minn. 2020) (explaining that “when a defendant is
charged with crimes committed against multiple victims, a separate analysis under section
609.035 is conducted for each victim”).
The acts that Smith committed against Barnett and Woods are not “conduct” under
section 609.035 because the acts involved multiple victims. Moreover, even if the acts
constituted conduct for purposes of section 609.035, Smith’s section 609.035 claim still
failed on its merits because Smith’s actions were motivated by different criminal

4 In Munt, we stated that, “[b]y its plain terms, section 609.035 limits the imposition
of punishment,” and because of that, Munt’s claim under section 609.035 was properly
brought in a motion to correct the sentence. 920 N.W.2d at 416. Like the defendant in
Munt, Smith challenges his punishment under section 609.035. He does not challenge the
facts underlying his conviction, only the application of the law to those facts for purposes
of sentencing. Thus, the district court erred by questioning whether Smith’s section
609.035 claim could be raised in a motion to correct his sentence. But this error was
harmless because the district court denied Smith’s claim on the merits.
9
objectives. The robbery of Barnett was motivated by a desire for retribution for an incident
that occurred 2 days earlier, while the fatal shooting of Woods was motivated by Woods’s
refusal to return the money that Smith used to purchase the marijuana. Accordingly, the
district court properly concluded that Smith’s section 609.035 claim failed on its merits,
and Smith is not entitled to relief on this ground.
II.
Next, we address the district court’s conclusion that the law of the case doctrine
barred Smith’s challenges to his consecutive sentences and the double upward durational
departure. For the following reasons, we conclude that the district court properly applied
the law of the case doctrine.
The law of the case doctrine functions to bar issues that were previously considered
and denied in the same case. Lynch v. State , 749 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 2008). We
apply this doctrine to a Rule 27 motion when the claim underlying the motion was
previously denied on direct appeal. Townsend v. State, 867 N.W.2d 497, 501 (Minn. 2015).
In considering Smith’s motion to correct his sentence, the district court applied the
law of the case doctrine to deny Smith’s claim that the imposition of consecutive sentences
was an abuse of discretion. The district court did not apply this doctrine to Smith’s
challenge to the double upward durational departure because Smith based his argument on
Blakely. In his brief to us, Smith does not challenge the district court’s denial of his Blakely
10
claim.5 Instead, he argues that the double upward durational departure and consecutive
sentences are unlawful because these two applications of sentencing unfairly exaggerated
his criminality.
The issues of whether Smith’s consecutive sentences and the upward durational
departure unfairly exaggerated his criminality were raised and decided on direct appeal.
See Smith, 541 N.W.2d at 589–90. Accordingly, the district court properly applied the law
of the case to Smith’s consecutive sentence challenge. And although the district court did
not explicitly apply the law of the case doctrine to Smith’s claim that the double upward
durational departure unfairly exaggerated his criminality, the doctrine plainly bars that
claim as well.
III.
Lastly, we turn our focus to Smith’s claim that the State failed to give proper notice
of its intent to seek an upward durational departure at the sentencing hearing. Because
Smith raises this claim for the first time on appeal, we conclude that he has forfeited
appellate review of the claim.
Claims raised for the first time on appeal to this court are generally considered
forfeited. Steward v. State, 950 N.W.2d 750, 756 (Minn. 2020). We construe the motion

5 Because Smith does not challenge the district court’s denial of his Blakely claim,
we need not review that aspect of the district court’s decision. See Ries v. State , 920
N.W.2d 620, 640 (Minn. 2018) (stating that issues not argued on appeal that were argued
below are forfeited). In any case, the district court correctly found that Blakely does not
apply to Smith’s sentences. Blakely does not apply retroactively, State v. Houston, 702
N.W.2d 268, 273 (Minn. 2005), and because it was decided many years after Smith’s
conviction became final, Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, it does not apply here.
11
Smith filed in the district court “liberally and with an understanding eye” because Smith is
representing himself. Id. at 757. But even when so construed, nothing in his motion asserts
that the State failed to give proper notice under section 244.10, subdivision 4, or Rule 7.03.
For that reason, Smith’s notice claim is forfeited.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.