State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1108

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stacia Kay Coonradt,
Defendant,

Midwest Bonding, LLC,
Appellant.

Filed April 18, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CR-18-2004

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian W. McDonald, Becker Co unty Attorney, Braden F. Sczepanski, First Assistant
County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

James McGeeney, Doda & McGeeney, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant bail-bonding company challenge s the district court’s order denying
appellant’s petition to reinstate and discharge two forfeited bail bonds it posted on behalf
of defendant. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged defendant Stacia Coonradt with a
felony controlled-substance offense. Appellant Midwest Bonding LLC (Midwest) posted
three separate bonds to guarantee Coonradt’s appearance in subsequent proceedings. The
two most recently posted bonds are at issue in this appeal.
Midwest posted the first bond, in the amou nt of $2,000, in January 2019. After
Coonradt failed to appear for a pretrial heari ng in February 2019, the district court issued
a bench warrant and ordered the bond forfeited. Coonradt was arrested and appeared before
the district court in April 2019. The district court subsequently granted Midwest’s petition
to reinstate and discharge the bond. After Coonradt again failed to appear for a settlement
conference in August 2019, the district court issued another warrant and again ordered the
same bond forfeited. Coonradt was again arrested and taken ba ck into custody later that
year. The district court granted Midwest’s second petition to reinst ate and discharge the
same bond.
In January 2020, Midw est posted the second bond, in the amount of $40,000, for
Coonradt’s conditional release. Between Ja nuary and October 2020, two more warrants
were issued when Coonradt violated conditions of her release by failing to comply with
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GPS monitoring requirements. The warrants were cleared after Coonradt appeared before
the district court on each violation. In October 2020, Coonradt pleaded guilty. The district
court imposed an additional $60,000 bail for presentencing release without conditions. In
November 2020, Midwest posted a third bond on Coonradt’s behalf in the amount of
$60,000, in addition to the $40,000 previously posted.
After Coonradt failed to appear for her sentencing hearing in January 2021, the
district court issued another warrant and ordered both bonds, totaling $100,000, forfeited.
Midwest attempted unsuccessfully to locate Coonradt. According to Midwest, it first tried
to contact Coonradt by phone and ran an elec tronic search of Minnesota jails. Midwest
then hired a fugitive-recovery agency which attempted to locate Coonradt at six addresses
in Minnesota and one address in Iowa. The agency “ran a social media and skip tracing
search” and provided the resu lting information to law enfo rcement. Unbeknownst to
Midwest, Coonradt was apprehended in South Dakota on unrelated charges in
February 2021.
In April 2021, Midwest filed a petition re questing reinstatement and discharge of
the two forfeited bail bonds or, in the alternative, more time to search for Coonradt. The
state opposed the petition and requested a hearing on the matter, noting that Coonradt had
been taken into custody in South Dakota.
In June 2021, after being extradited from South Dakota, Coonradt finally appeared
before the district court. The district court sentenced her in July.
In August 2021, following a motion hearing, the district court denied Midwest’s
petition for reinstatement and discharge. Midwest appeals.
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DECISION
We review a district court’s decision on the reinstatement and discharge of a
forfeited bail bond for an abuse of discretion. State v. Askland , 784 N.W.2d 60, 62
(Minn. 2010). “A district court abuses its discretion when its de cision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark,
927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
“State statute and court rule address the question of reinstatement of a forfeited bail
bond.” Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. When a bail bond is forfeited, a district court “may
forgive or reduce the penalty ac cording to the circumstances of the case and the situation
of the party on any terms and conditions it considers just and reasonable.” Minn.
Stat. § 629.59 (2020); see also Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 702(f) (specifying procedure for
petitioning for reinstatement of forfeited bail bond). In making its determination, a district
court’s decision is guided by four factors identified in In re Shetsky , 60 N.W.2d 40, 46
(Minn. 1953) (the Shetsky factors). Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. The first factor includes
“the purpose of bail, the civil nature of the proceedings, and the cause, purpose and length
of a defendant’s absence.” Id. Bail serves several purposes, including minimizing pretrial
incarceration, ensuring penalty payment, and encouraging sureties “to locate, arrest, and
return defaulting defendants to the authorities.” Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 46;
State v. Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d 539, 541-42 (Minn. 2003).
The second factor is “the good faith of the bond company as measured by the fault
or willfulness of the defendant.” Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. This factor imputes the
“[d]efendant’s willfulness or bad faith . . . to the surety.” State v. Vang, 763 N.W.2d 354,
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358 (Minn. App. 2009). The third factor c onsiders “the good-faith efforts of the bond
company to apprehend and produce the defendant.” Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. The
fourth factor is “any prejudice to the [s]tate in its administration of justice.” Id.
The surety bears the burden of showing that the first three factors weigh in its favor.
Id. But the state bears the burden of proving the fourth factor—prejudice. Id.
In its order denying the petition, the district court concluded that three of the four
Shetsky factors weighed in favor of forfeiture. Midwest argues that the district court abused
its discretion in reaching this conclusion. To determine whether the district court abused
its discretion, we review its assessment of each factor in turn.
1. The Purpose of Bail, the Civil Nature of the Proceedings , and the Cause,
Purpose, and Length of Defendant’s Absence

The district court outlined in detail the considerations encompassed by the first
Shetsky factor—the purpose of bail, the civil natu re of the proceedings, and the cause,
purpose, and length of the defendant’s absence. It then noted that Midwest did not produce
Coonradt after she fail ed to appear for sentencing by Zo om in January 2021, that it was
“the sixth time” Coonradt had failed to appear in court on this charge, and that Coonradt
was on warrant status for about six months in total, with her most recent disappearance
lasting approximately 126 days. Based on these facts, the dist rict court determined that
Midwest failed to meet its burden on the first Shetsky factor.
Midwest argues that this factor weighs in its favor for several reasons. First, it
contends that courts have found the purpos e of bail satisfied when defendants were
apprehended after failing to appear for similar periods of time, citing Farsdale v. Martinez,
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586 N.W.2d 423, 424-25 (Minn. App. 1998), Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 61, and a
nonprecedential decision of this court. 1 Second, Midwest asserts that “this was the first
time [Coonradt] had failed to appear for a hearing while released on [these] bonds and the
fourth time overall during the case . . . not th e sixth.” Third, Midwest emphasizes that
Coonradt was at large for only about a month before being taken into custody in South
Dakota, citing Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 45 n.3, for the proposition that being in custody in
another jurisdiction is a valid reason for a defendant’s failure to appear. Finally, Midwest
suggests that Coonradt may not have had acce ss to the necessary t echnology to attend a
Zoom hearing.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the first
factor favors forfeiture. We reach this conc lusion for several reasons. First, Coonradt’s
failure to appear at her sentencing hearing in January 2021 is attributable to Midwest. And
Midwest did not ultimately secure Coonradt’ s presence, unlike the bond companies in
Askland and Farsdale. Instead, Coonradt was brough t back to court after being
apprehended on other charges and extradited from South Dakota. And, though the purpose
of bail may still be achieved when a defendant is ultimately returned by law enforcement
rather than by a bond company, the bond company’s role in returning the defendant remains
a central consideration. See Askland , 784 N.W.2d at 61, 63 (finding reinstatement
warranted where bond company located, apprehended, and delivered defendant); Farsdale,
586 N.W.2d at 426 (finding reinstatement warranted where bondsman made numerous

1 We are not bound by n onprecedential opinions. D y n a m i c A i r , I n c . v . B l o c h,
502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. App. 1993).
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attempts to locate defendant and requested that law enforcement expand the scope of their
search, which ultimately led to defendant’s arrest).
Second, the fact that Coonradt eventually returned to court after failing to appear is
not dispositive, because bail is intended both to ensure that a defendant appears for trial
and to avoid “delaying, impairing, or undul y burdening the administration of justice.”
Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 46. Because Coonradt failed to appear for sentencing and was then
missing on warrant status for a significant period of time—approximately 126 days—this
purpose was not achieved. Third, while being held in another jurisdiction further delayed
Coonradt’s appearance, it was not the initial reason for her failure to appear and therefore
not a valid excuse. And finally, Midwest pres ented no evidence that Coonradt lacked the
technology needed to attend her scheduled sentencing hearing by Zoom.
Though the district court did mistakenly reference six failed appearances instead of
four, we conclude that this error does not am ount to an abuse of discretion because the
primary reasons for the district court’s determination were Coonradt’s failure to appear for
sentencing and Midwest’s failure to fulfill the purpose of the bonds. We therefore conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the first Shetsky factor.
2. The Good Faith of the Bond Company as Measured by the Fault or Willfulness
of the Defendant

The district court also de termined that the second Shetsky factor weighed against
Midwest, finding that Coonradt’s “appearance track record speaks for itself” and that she
was “clearly unwilling to appear in court voluntarily.” The district court emphasized that
Coonradt failed to appear for multiple hearings and that multiple warrants were issued for
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her arrest. The district court also found that Midwest “took the risk of [Coonradt’s] history
of not appearing, as evidenced by their posting of a bond on her behalf before.”
Midwest argues that this factor weighs in its favor because it made good-faith efforts
to find Coonradt after she failed to appear for sentencing. Midwest contends that the
district court should have ba lanced its good-faith efforts to secure Coonradt’s presence
against Coonradt’s bad-faith failure to appear. Midwest also argues that the district court
should not have considered Coonradt’s previous history of failing to appear as a measure
of her willfulness.
We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in determining that this factor
weighed against Midwest. Midwest’s argument—that the district court erred by failing to
balance Midwest’s good-faith efforts agains t Coonradt’s fault—mi sses the mark. The
second Shetsky factor does not require a balancing of the bond company’s efforts against
the defendant’s fault. It concerns only th e defendant’s fault or willfulness, which is
imputed to the bond company. Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62; Vang, 763 N.W.2d at 358. And
Midwest offered no evidence of a valid justif ication for Coonradt’s failure to appear.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Coonradt’s failure
to appear for sentencing was willful and in bad faith, it did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the second Shetsky factor weighed against Midwest.
3. Good-Faith Efforts of the Bond Co mpany to Apprehend and Produce the
Defendant

The district court found that this factor “slightly favor[ed] reinstatement of the
bonds,” acknowledging that Midwest made good-faith efforts to locate Coonradt. But the
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district court again emphasized that Midwest “took the risk of [Coonradt’s] nonappearance,
knowing her previous poor history of appearing in court.” The district court also noted that
a court is not required to reinstate a bond based on a surety’s good-faith efforts, “especially
when the [d]efendant is actually produced by police.”
Midwest argues that this factor weighs in its favor because it engaged in good-faith
efforts to find Coonradt after she failed to appear for sentencing. Midwest argues that these
efforts, outlined in an affidavit signed by its representative, were sufficient. These efforts
included attempting to contact Coonradt by phone, running an electronic search of
Minnesota jails, hiring a fugitive-recovery agency, looking for Co onradt at multiple
addresses, running a social media and “ski p tracing” search, and providing the resulting
information to law enforcement. The state counters that “[t]oken efforts on the part of the
surety do not necessarily entitle a bond to reinstatement.”
We defer to the district court’s determin ation that Midwest engaged in good-faith
efforts to locate Coonradt rather than merely “token efforts” as argued by the state. We
also conclude that the record supports the di strict court’s determination that this factor
weighed only “slightly” in fa vor of reinstatement—while Mi dwest made some efforts to
locate Coonradt, it could have taken additional st eps that might have led, for example, to
discovering that Coonradt was in custody in South Dakota. We therefore conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the third Shetsky factor.
4. Prejudice to the State in its Administration of Justice

Finally, the district court determined that the fourth Shetsky factor favored forfeiture
because “justice was certainly delayed in this case.” The district court observed that
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Coonradt’s failed appearances caused a significant delay in sentencing for a felony offense
and therefore prejudiced the state. The district court also noted that the state had to seek a
rendition warrant and extradite Coonradt to Minnesota.
Midwest argues that this factor weighs against forfeiture because “the state admitted
it was not prejudiced by having to extradite [Coonradt] and pr ovided no evidence that its
ability to prosecute [Coonradt] was in any wa y affected by her absence.” Midwest also
emphasizes that Coonradt was in custody in another jurisd iction during the delay in her
sentencing. By contrast, the state emphasizes that 1,016 days passed between Coonradt’s
initial arrest and her sentencing and argues that “[t]here can be no dispute that this amount
of time caused prejudice to the [s]tate.”
We again discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in concluding that this
factor weighed against Midwest. Prejudice to the state includes delay in the administration
of justice and the cost of apprehending a defendant. See Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 48. And
the state is prejudiced when it is prevente d from sentencing a defendant for a felony
offense. Vang, 763 N.W.2d at 359 (“The adverse effect on the prosecution because of the
defendant’s unexcused absence weighs heavily against the remittance of the forfeited
bond.” (quotation omitted)). He re, the record supports the district cour t’s finding of
prejudice to the state due to the delay in the administration of justice. Coonradt was absent
and unavailable to be sentenced for a felony offense for five months, and the state incurred
extra costs in extraditing her back to Minnesota. That Coonradt was in custody elsewhere
during that time does not alter th e prejudicial effect of the delay on the state’s ability to
sentence her.
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In sum, the district court did not a buse its discretion in considering the Shetsky
factors and determining that they weighed against reinstatement and discharge. Therefore,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Midwest’s petition.
Affirmed.