Justin McDuff, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1110

Justin McDuff,
Relator,

vs.

Half Moon Clippers, LLC - Great Clips,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed May 16, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 45891807-3

Justin McDuff, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Half Moon Clippers, LLC – Great Clips, Coon Rapids, Minnesota (respondent-employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent-department)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Relator Justin McDuff appeals from an unemployment-law judge’s (ULJ)
determination that he is not eligible for unemployment benefits because he quit his
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employment. Because the record supports the ULJ’s finding that McDuff quit due to his
perception that he was being harassed by his employer, and because that perception did not
constitute a good reason for quitting caused by the employer, we affirm.
FACTS
McDuff began working for Half Moon Clippers, LLC, in November 2018 as a stylist
at a Great Clips franchise. McDuff initially worked at a Great Clips in the Midway area of
St. Paul, but, at the beginning of the COVI D-19 pandemic in spri ng 2020, this location
closed. McDuff then wo rked for Great Clips at a Vadnais Heights location after that
location reopened in June 2020. He was paid $14 per hour plus tips.
When he began working at the Vadnais Heights location, McDuff asked not to work
on Sundays, Mondays, or Tuesdays. McDuff said that he needed thos e days off to go to
Duluth to be with his sister, who was going through a divorce, and to be with his aunt, who
was ill. McDuff’s request was granted. After June 1, 2020, McDuff requested and was paid
unemployment benefits. Jason Rude, the franchise owner, questioned whether McDuff was
legitimately eligible for unemplo yment benefits given that it wa s his desire to work less
than full-time and suggested to McDuff that he was committing fraud.
On March 20, 2021, Rude called McDuff an d asked him when he was going to come
back to work full-time. McDuff responded that he did not intend to return to full-time work
because of ongoing family i ssues. Following the phone call, McDuff decided to quit. He
turned in his key the following day.
McDuff again applied for unemploymen t benefits. DEED administratively
determined that McDuff had good cause to qu it and that he would remain eligible for
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benefits. Great Clips appealed that decision. Following an evidentiary hearing that included
testimony from McDuff and Rude, the ULJ found that McDuff quit because he felt he was
being harassed by Rude, that this was not a good reason caused by the employer, and that
McDuff was therefore ineligible for un employment benefits. McDuff requested
reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed his decision.
McDuff appeals by certiorari.
DECISION
When reviewing a ULJ’s decision, we may affirm the decision or remand for further
proceedings, or we may reverse or modify th e decision if the relator’s substantial rights
may have been prejudiced by l ack of substantial evidence or an error of law. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020). McDuff argues that the ULJ erred by (1) determining that he
did not quit for a good reason caused by his em ployer and (2) declining to order a new
hearing.
I. The ULJ did not err by determining that McDuff did not quit for a good reason
caused by the employer.

An applicant who quits employment is ineligible for unemployment benefits unless
one of ten statutory exceptions applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2020). Here, the
relevant exception is whether the employee quit due to a “good reason caused by the
employer.” See id., subd. 1(1).
The reason why an employee quit is a question of fact. Stassen v. Lone Mountain
Truck Leasing, LLC, 814 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Minn. App. 2012). “In unemployment benefits
cases, we review the ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to the decision and
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will not disturb those findings as long as there is evidence in the record that reasonably
tends to sustain them.” Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016)
(quotations omitted). Whether the reason fo r quitting constituted a good reason to quit
caused by the employer is a question of law. Rowan v. Dream It, Inc. , 812 N.W.2d 879,
883 (Minn. App. 2012). We review that question de novo. Id.
A. The record supports the ULJ’s finding of the reason for the quit.

McDuff argues that he quit “due to ha rassing, poor and unpleasant workplace
conditions and a significant reduction to my income due to lack of clients.” McDuff appears
to challenge the ULJ’s factual finding that McDuff quit for one reason—his perception that
Rude was harassing him.
The ULJ’s finding is supported by the re cord. When asked at the hearing if
something happened on March 20 that made him decide to quit, McDuff stated that Rude
had called him and asked when he was going to come back to work full-time. McDuff
objected to Rude’s “approach” and said that it had “got to a point of like accusing [him] of
committing fraud.” When the UL J asked McDuff whether he would have c ontinued to
work at Great Clips if Rude had not “been so insistent about working full-time and accusing
[him] of fraud,” McDuff respon ded, “Yeah. I probably woul d have.” As the ULJ noted,
McDuff had continued to work at the Vadnai s Heights location for nine months even
though it had fewer clients. In addition, following his departure from Great Clips, McDuff
continued to search for work as a hairstylist, despite the entire industry being affected by
the COVID-19 pandemic. The record supports the ULJ’s finding that McDuff quit because
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he felt he was being harassed by Rude a bout his work hours and his receipt of
unemployment benefits, not because of reduced income due to fewer clients.
B. McDuff did not quit for a good reason caused by the employer.

The ULJ concluded that McDuff’s percep tion of harassment did not satisfy the
good-reason exception to the quit rule. We agree.
Good reason caused by the employer is a reason caused by the employer that is
directly related to the employment, is adve rse to the worker, a nd “would compel an
average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed ra ther than remaining in the
employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (2020). Rude questioned McDuff about
when he was going to return to full-tim e work and questioned whether McDuff was
legitimately collecting unemployment benefits. There is nothing in the record to show that
Rude’s questioning affected the terms or conditions of McDuff’s employment, and such
questioning in itself is not adverse to an employee. Moreover, Rude’s questioning would
not have compelled the average employee to quit. To compel is “[t]o cause or bring about
by force, threats, or overwhelming pressure.” Werner v. Med. Pros. LLC, 782 N.W.2d 840,
843 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2010) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 321 (9th ed. 2009)). Harassment on the job can constitute good cause for an
employee to quit. Tru-Stone Corp. v. Gutzkow, 400 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Minn. App. 1987).
But, while Rude’s questioning may have been upsetting to McDuff, it would not have
compelled an average, reasonable worker to quit in the circumstances.
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Because the record supports the ULJ’s determination that McDuff did not quit due
to a good reason caused by the employer, the ULJ correctly concluded that McDuff is
ineligible for unemployment benefits.
II. The ULJ’s denial of an additional hearing was not an abuse of discretion.
McDuff also argues that th e ULJ should have granted him a new hearing. A ULJ
must order an additional hearing
if a party shows that evidence which was not submitted at the
hearing:
(1) would likely change the outcome of the decision and
there was good cause for not having previously submitted that
evidence; or
(2) would show that the evidence that was submitted at
the hearing was likely false and that the likely false evidence
had an effect on the outcome of the decision.

Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(c) (2020). This court will “not reverse a ULJ’s decision to
deny an additional evidentia ry hearing unless the decisi on constitutes an abuse of
discretion.” Kelly v. Ambassador Press, Inc., 792 N.W.2d 103, 104 (Minn. App. 2010).
McDuff requested reconsideration and submitted a letter from an attorney as well
as text messages between McDuff and Rude. The attorney’s letter explains McDuff’s
situation and argues that McDuff quit for a good reason caused by the employer. The text
messages, according to McDuff, corroborate that he quit becau se of reduced hours and
canceled or shortened shifts. The ULJ denied a new hearing, reasoning that McDuff did
not give a reason for not submitting the evidence at the hearing and that the new evidence
would not likely change the outcome.
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McDuff complains that the ULJ made the decision not to grant a new hearing before
receiving the attorney’s letter, but in the decision denying a new hearing, the ULJ expressly
recognized the letter and accompanying documents as new information. The ULJ declined
to order a new hearing because (1) McDuff did not provide good cause for not submitting
the letter and text messages at the hearing and (2) the new information in the documents
was not likely to change the outcome because the issue that the in formation raised—the
reason that McDuff quit—had already been ad equately addressed at the hearing. We
discern no abuse of discretion in those determinations or in the decision to deny a new
hearing.
Affirmed.