Ryan Leroy Smith, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1113

Ryan Leroy Smith,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed February 14, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CV-21-1260

Wilbur W. Fluegel, Fluegel Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Michael C. Van Berkom, Fishman, Carp, Be scheinen & Van Berkom, Ltd, Plymouth,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joe Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Ryan Leroy Smith’s conviction of first-degree driving while intoxicated
was reversed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. He then petitioned the district court for an
order declaring him eligible for compensation based on exoneration. The state joined the
petition. But the district court denied his petition because it determin ed that he had not
been exonerated. Because we conclude that Smith was exonerated, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Smith was convicted of first-degree dr iving while intoxicated and sentenced to
72 months in prison. Two and a half years later, the supreme court reversed the conviction.
After the reversal, the district court vacated Smith’s conviction and entered a judgment of
acquittal. Following the vacation of his conviction, Smith petitioned the district court for
an order declaring him eligible for exonera tion compensation under Minnesota Statutes
section 590.11 (2020). The county attorney joined Smith’s ex oneration-compensation
petition.1 But the district court concluded that Smith had not been exonerated, reasoning
that his conviction had not been vacated “on grounds cons istent with innocence.” As a
result, the district court denied Smith’s petition for compensation.
Smith appeals.

1 The state did not file a brief in this matter. We determine this appeal on the merits. Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
3
DECISION
Smith contends that he is entitled to co mpensation because he was exonerated of the
first-degree driving-while-intoxicated conviction. We review de novo whether a person is
entitled to exoneratio n compensation. Freeman v. State , 944 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn.
App. 2020).
The first step to receive compensation is to petition the district court under
Minnesota Statutes section 590.11, the elig ibility statute, for an order declaring the
petitioner eligible fo r compensation. Id. To be declared eligib le for compensation, the
petitioner must have been exonerated, meaning that the petitioner’s conviction was vacated
or reversed “on grounds consistent with innocence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i).
In turn, “on grounds consistent with innocence” means “exonerated because the judgment
of conviction was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was ordered, and there is any evidence
of factual innocence.” Id., subd. 1(c)(2) (emphasis added). And “the phrase ‘any evidence
of factual innocence’ means any evidence that shows some fact establishing the absence of
the petitioner’s guilt.” Freeman, 944 N.W.2d at 491.
To consider the question of factual innoce nce, we begin with the statute under which
Smith was convicted: first-degree driving while intoxicated. A person is guilty of this
crime if the person drives a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol “within ten years
of the first of three or more qualified pr ior impaired driving incidents.” Minn.
Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2008). And the legislature defined what offenses qualify as
prior impaired driving convictions. Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 20(1)-(5) (2008).
4
When the state charged Smith with first degree driving while intoxicated in 2010, it
asserted that Smith had three qualified prior impaired-driving offenses. One of these was
a 2005 criminal-vehicular-operation conviction.2 The state did not charge Smith with any
lesser-included offenses.
To determine whether Smith was exonerated, we turn to the circumstances of the
reversal of his first-degree driving-while -intoxicated conviction. The supreme court
reversed Smith’s conviction b ecause at the time of that conviction, criminal vehicular
operation was not included in the list of prior impaired-driving offenses. State v. Smith,
899 N.W.2d 120,122-23 (Minn. 2017). Because Smith’s 2005 conviction was not a prior
impaired-driving conviction the supreme c ourt concluded that “the evidence was
insufficient to convict Smith of first-degree driving while impaired.” Id. at 126.
With this ruling in mind, we turn to whether “there is any evidence of factual
innocence” underlying the reversal of Smith ’s conviction. Minn. Stat. § 590.11,
subd. 1(c)(2). The district court concluded that Smith’s conviction was not reversed based
on evidence of factual innocence because the jury found him guilty of the crime of driving
under the influence. The court reasoned that the use of Smith’s prior convictions to
enhance the level of the offense to a felony was “irrelevant to his guilt or innocence”
because he still committed a crime.
We disagree. While Smith may have committed a crime, it was not the crime for
which he was charged. And a conviction fo r that crime, first-degree driving while

2 Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2b(6) (2002).
5
intoxicated, requires three prio r impaired-driving convictions . Minn. Stat. § 169A.24,
subd. 1(1). Here it is undisputed that Smith committed the offense within ten years of only
two qualified prior impaired driving convictions. Smith, 899 N.W.2d at 121 (quotation
omitted). The fact that the state failed to prove a third qualified prior impaired-driving
conviction is evidence of factual innocence because it establishes Smith’s absence of guilt
of the crime charged. See Freeman, 944 N.W.2d at 491 (requiring petitioner to show “some
fact establishing the absence of the petiti oner’s guilt”). As the supreme court stated,
because his criminal-vehicular-operation co nviction was not a prior impaired-driving
conviction, the evidence was “ins ufficient to convict Smith.” Smith, 899 N.W.2d at 126.
Because the state did not charge Smith with any lesser-included offenses, the jury’s finding
that he drove under the influe nce does not disturb this conc l usion. In s um, Smith was
exonerated.3
Our decision in Kingbird v. State, 949 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. granted
(Minn. Nov. 17, 2020), does not compel a different result. Kingbird was convicted of being
a felon in possession of a firearm af ter police found him with a BB gun. Kingbird,
949 N.W.2d at 746. But his conviction was vacated in 2017 following the supreme court’s
clarification that a BB gun is not a “firearm” for purposes of the felon-in-possession statute.
Id. (citing State v. Haywood , 886 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2016). When Kingbird
petitioned for an order declaring him eligible for compensation, the district court denied

3 Smith’s conduct may be relevant in a later proceeding about the amount of compensation
to which he is entitled, but it does not alter th e fact that he was exonerated of the crime
with which he was charged. Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 4.
6
his petition because it concluded that his conviction was not vacated on grounds consistent
with innocence. Id. at 746-47. We affirmed the district court because Kingbird’s conduct
was criminal when he committed the act under then-existing precedent. Id. at 747-50. The
supreme court’s clarification of the law did not qualify as evidence of factual innocence,
we held, because Kingbird “was guilty of the crime charged when he committed it.” Id. at
750. But here, unlike in Kingbird, Smith was never guilty of first-degree driving while
intoxicated because, under existin g law at the time of the inci dent, he did not have three
qualifying prior impaired-driving convictions.4
Because we conclude that Smith’s convi ction was vacated on grounds consistent
with innocence, further proceedings are required.5 We remand this matter to the district
court for a finding that Smith was exonerate d and for additional pr oceedings under the
eligibility statute, consistent with this opinion.6
Reversed and remanded.

4 The supreme court reversed Smith’s conviction in a plurality opinion. The parties agree
that the opinion authored by Ju stice Stras is controlling, inst ead of the concurrence. We
apply the reasoning of the opinion, which re versed Smith’s convic tion on the basis of
existing precedent.
5 We observe that the state stipulated to Smith’s petition before the district court, and that
Minnesota Statutes section 590.11, subdivision 3(a) provides that joinder by the prosecutor
“shall conclusively establish eligibility for compensation.” But be cause Smith did not
argue that subdivision 3(a) establishes his eligibility for compensation, we do not address
its applicability in this appeal.
6 The district court must hold a hearing on Smith’s petition. Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 6.
At the hearing, the parties may submit ev idence and the court may consider whether
Smith’s conduct brought about the conviction. Id., subd. 4. And if, after considering the
files, records, and a ny evidence submitted under subdivision 4, the c ourt determines that
Smith is eligible for compensation, the court shall issue an order indicating the “portion of
the term of incarceration for which [Smith] is entitled to make a claim.” Id., subd. 7.