State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1120

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Curt Matthew Craven,
Appellant.

Filed April 11, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-CR-19-356

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Chad Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presid ing Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Curt Matthew Craven appeals fro m the district court’s revocation of his
probation. He argues that the district cour t failed to make the required findings before
revoking his probation and that the record doe s not support the district court’s decision.
We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2019, Craven was a rrested for driving with a cancelled driver’s license
and marijuana was found in his possession. Craven believed that the arresting officer had
sexually harassed him in connection with an ea rlier arrest. Based on this belief, Craven
swore at and threatened the o fficer on the way to the jail. He continued to threaten the
officer during recorded phone calls with his family from jail.
As a result of this conduct, Craven was charged with threats of violence, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.713, subd. 1 (2018), driving after cancellation-inimical to public safety, Minn. Stat.
§ 171.24, subd. 5 (2018), possession of mar ijuana in a motor ve hicle, Minn. Stat.
§ 152.027, subd. 3 (2018), disorderly conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2018), and
possession of drug paraphernalia, Minn. Stat. § 152.092(a) (2018).
Craven entered into a plea agreement with respondent State of Minnesota. He
pleaded guilty to threats of violence in exchange for a downward dispositional departure
from the sentencing guidelines and dismissal of the remaining counts. Following the terms
of the parties’ agreement, the district court stayed execution of 30 months’ imprisonment
and placed Craven on probation for five years. The district court ordered Craven to “follow
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all of the general terms and conditions of probati on” and required him to complete a
chemical-use assessment “within the next 45 days.”
Approximately five months later, Craven’s probation officer alleged that Craven
had violated six different conditions of prob ation and obtained a warra nt for his arrest.
When Craven turned himself in on the warrant, a preliminary breath test showed that he
had a 0.127 alcohol concentration. The probation officer added two new violations to her
probation-violation report.
At his first appearance on the probation vi olation, Craven demanded a contested
hearing. Shortly after the first appearance, Craven’s probation officer submitted a letter to
the district court expressing concern about a text message she had received from Craven.
The text message included a veiled threat to one of the probation officer’s family members.
Craven subsequently waived a contested probation-revocation hearing and admitted
to three alleged violations of his probation: failure to complete a chemical-use assessment,
failure to provide his probation officer with a current address, and failure to abstain from
alcohol. During the hearing, he explained that the viola tions occurred because he was
“moving around,” caring for his daughter, running a company with four employees, and “it
just got hectic.” He clarified that he had scheduled a chemical-use assessment, but it was
cancelled due to COVID-19 and he never rescheduled. The district court found that Craven
“made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent wa iver of [his] rights, ” that he “provided
sufficient facts to sup port [his] admission[s],” and that “[ t]he violations were intentional
and inexcusable.”
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Then, the parties presented arguments regarding the appropriate disposition for the
violations. The probation offi cer and the prosecutor asked th e district court to revoke
Craven’s probation and execute his sentence. According to the probation officer, Craven
was not amenable to probation because he had not “made himself available for
supervision.” She also remarked on Craven ’s pattern of intimidating conduct, including
his text message, other threats to her family, and requests to have her investigated. The
prosecutor observed that Craven’s veiled threats and intimidation tactics were “consistent
with his conduct in past cases,” and stated th at “[h]e has a problem with authority, he has
a problem with being told what to do, and so clearly . . . he’s not amenable to probation.”
Additionally, the prosecutor referenced Craven ’s 12 prior felony co nvictions, noting that
“all but three of them [resulted in] either commits or subsequently-executed sentences
through probation violations.” Craven, who was represented by counsel, sought a 30-day
jail sanction and continued probation. He acknowledged his mental-health and chemical-
dependency issues and requested help with those issues through continued probation.
The district court concluded that Craven was not amenable to probation and that
confinement was necessary. Based on this fi nding, the district court revoked Craven’s
probation and executed his 30-month prison sentence.
Craven appeals.
DECISION
Craven argues that the district court erred in revoking his probation. “The [district]
court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation
and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Austin,
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295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). But wh ether the district court made the findings
required to revoke probation is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. State
v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005).
In Austin, the Minnesota Supreme Court directed district courts to consider three
factors (the Austin factors) before revoking probation and to make specific findings on each
of these factors. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. A district court must “1) designate the specific
condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or
inexcusable; and 3) find th at need for confin ement outweighs th e policies favoring
probation.” Id. The third factor requires a district court to further consider several
subfactors, specifically whether “(i) confinem ent is necessary to pr otect the public from
further criminal activity by th e offender; or (ii) the offende r is in need of correctional
treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or (iii) it would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of the violatio n if probation were not revoked.” Id. at 251.
District courts must clearly address the three Austin factors and not merely recite them or
give “general, non-specific reasons for revocation.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608. And
district courts must be cognizant of the fact that “the purpose of probation is rehabilitation
and revocation should be used only as a last resort [i f] treatment has failed.” Id. at 606
(quotation and citation omitted).
Craven challenges the district court’s decision on the third Austin factor. He argues
that, although the district court cited two su bfactors supporting its decision, it did not
adequately explain how Craven’s conduct im plicated those subfactors. Thus, Craven
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contends, the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the need for confinement
outweighed the policies favoring probation.
In addressing the third Austin factor, the district court stated:
I don’t know that there is any treatment that could be provided
for you in the community based on your lack of amenability to
probation. It’s quite clear to me that based on the information
from [the probation offi cer], as well as information from [the
prosecutor], that you are just not amenable to probation. Is that
lack of amenability enough to mean that you go to prison? In
light of the treatment that you need and not being able to be
supervised, not providing your address, not providing your
whereabouts, not following through with a chemical use
assessment, thousands of people during Covid were ordered to
get chemical use assessments and managed to do that and you
admittedly did not. If this were simply an issue of a relapse or
one chemical use, I would reinstate you, but that’s not the case.
You are in need of correcti onal treatment which can most
effectively be provided dur ing an extended period of
confinement. I think that to do anything other than to commit
you to the Commissioner of Corrections would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of thes e violations. You can’t be
helped if you are not willing to submit to supervision. You
have to be able to work with the agent. And the information I
have before me is that neither of those are happening now.

Craven first argues that the district c ourt did not elucidate why continuing his
probation would unduly depreci ate the seriousness of his violations. We disagree. The
district court noted significant probation violations, including Craven’s failure to notify his
probation officer of his whereabouts or to provide his address. It also observed that he was
“not willing to submit to supervision.” Th ese findings sufficiently explain the district
court’s determination that continued probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of
Craven’s violations, which essentially amounted to a complete failure to participate in
probation.
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Craven also challenges the district c ourt’s determination that he requires
correctional treatment. Again, however, the di strict court identified facts supporting this
finding. It pointed out that Craven failed to complete a chemic al-use assessment as
ordered. And the district court remarked on Craven’s complete failu re to comply with
probation during his five months of supervision. The district court stated that Craven’s
violations were not simply “a relapse or one chemical use.” Rath er, they showed his
unwillingness to participate in probation. These facts support the district court’s
determination that Craven is “in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively
be provided during an extended period of confinement.”1
A district court may revoke probation upon proof of only one of the subfactors.
Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251. Here, the district court based its decision on two subfactors.
Given the rationale provided by the district c ourt, including its find ings regarding those
two subfactors, we are satisfied that it fully considered whether the need for confinement
outweighed the policies favoring pr obation. We therefore reje ct Craven’s argument that
the district court failed to properly consider the third Austin factor.
Alternatively, Craven argues that, even if the district court’s analysis was sufficient,
the record does not support its decision to revoke his probation. He contends that he “took

1 Craven relies on several nonprecedential opin ions where this cour t reversed based on
insufficient consideration of the third Austin factor. But we are not bound by
nonprecedential opinions. See Jackson ex rel. Sorenson v. Options Residential, Inc. , 896
N.W.2d 549, 553 (Minn. App. 2017) (“[W]e are bound by precedent established in the
supreme court’s opinions and our own publis hed opinions.”). None theless, we have
reviewed the cases cited and conclude that they are factually distinguishable from the
circumstances in Craven’s case.
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full responsibility for his conduct” by turni ng himself in on the warrant and “readily
admitted [to the] violations at the outset of his hearing.” Moreover, he points out that “he
had not yet received, let alone exhausted, community-based treatment.”
“[A] district court has broa d discretion in determining whether there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation.” State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 636-37 (Minn. 2008). If
the district court’s findings on the Austin factors are supported by the record, the district
court can exercise its discretion to revoke an individual’s probation. Modtland, 695
N.W.2d at 608. Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that the district
court acted within its discretion by revoking Craven’s probation after making findings on
the Austin factors.
Affirmed.