In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1133

In re the Marriage of:

Teresa Corinne MacNabb, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

John Michael Kysylyczyn,
Appellant.

Filed April 11, 2022
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-08-2020

Teresa Corinne MacNabb, Little Canada, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Carl A. Blondin, Oakdale, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Despite a court order stating that re spondent Teresa MacNabb (mother) had
parenting time with her children on Christmas Day, appellant John Kysylyczyn (father) left
a letter at mother’s office in forming her that he would be taking their children on an
extended Christmas vacation. He then followed through with the trip. After father returned
2
two days late into mother’s regular parent ing time, the district court heard motions on
parenting issues, including a request for full custody by father and a request for
compensatory parenting time by mother. The di strict court found that the deprivation of
time by father was intentional and substantial and awarded mother the following Christmas
Day as well as two additional regular parenting days in co mpensatory parenting time.
Father appeals, arguing that his deprivation of mother’s parenting time does not meet the
requirements of the compensatory-parenting-time statute. Because the record supports the
district court’s determination that father’s interference was substantial, we affirm.
FACTS
Father and mother were married in 1999.1 They divorced in 2010. The parties have
two children, a 19-year-old daughter S.C.K. and a 16-year-old son M.A.K. Because S.C.K.
is no longer a minor, the parties’ only joint minor child is M.A.K.
Father filed a motion in December 2020 requ esting in part that he be granted full
legal and physical custody of M.A.K. At the time in question, an existing court order
awarded father holiday parenting time on Chri stmas Eve, and mother holiday parenting
time on Christmas Day and regular parenting time starting January 4, 2021. The order also
required the parties to communicate via the computer messaging application Our Family
Wizard. But before mother re sponded to father’s motion, fa ther took the children on a

1 The facts are not disputed.
3
Christmas vacation, days before initially planned. In a letter dated December 21, 2020, left
at mother’s office, father explained the updated holiday plans, stating:
[Daughter], [son], and I are driv ing to Florida today, first
stopping in Chicago to pick up two additional passengers.
[Son] and I will be back eith er Monday, January 4th or
Tuesday, January 5th.

. . . .

At present time, you have dropped [son] off late at my home
19.5 hours. This only accounts for time you have been late
more than 30 minutes. I think it is petty to be counting time
less than this. You were informed of this in my letter to you
on May 1, 2020. I am willing to consider all of this time to
now be equalized.

Not only did father’s unilateral altera tion of the court-ordered parenting-time
schedule deprive mother of parenting time on Christmas Day, they did not return until
January 6—two days into mother’s regular parenting week.
Mother responded to father’s December motion, reques ting that the district court
deny father’s motion and award her compensatory parenting time.
At a motion hearing, the district court heard testimony on the
compensatory-parenting-time issue. Mother asked for Christmas Day in 2021 and two
make-up days of regular parenting time for her missed time on January 4 and January 5.
She emphasized that, based on father ignori ng past court-ordered compensatory time, the
district court should also require father to pay a cash bond to ensure that the compensatory
4
parenting time occur.2 In response, father stated that mother had a pattern of refusing to
cooperate, pointing to her delay in sending proper paperwork for M.A.K.’s passport to
facilitate travel with father.
In an order following the hearing, the district court concluded that, based on
Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 6(a) (2020) (the compensatory-parenting-
time statute), mother was entitled to compensatory parenting time and ordered three days
of compensatory parenting time including Christmas Day 2021.3 The court reasoned that
father was aware that he was denying mother her parenting time and, as shown by his letter
and testimony, was acting vind ictively due to her being late to parenting exchanges and
failing to sign a document to secure M.A.K.’s passport—separate issues that were unrelated
to mother’s parenting time. The district court also took into account the duration and
significance of the time mother missed.
Father appeals.
4

2 Father asserts that there has been no parenting-time issue before. This assertion is false.
Father was held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the parenting-time schedule
and interfering with mother’s parenting time in 2019.
3 The district court ruled that father’s motions to allow S.C.K. to obtain personal property
from mother’s home and for full legal and physical custody over S.C.K. moot because she
became a legal adult. A tax-related motion was reserved.
4 Mother did not file a brief in this appeal and this court or dered that the appeal proceed
under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
5
DECISION
Father does not dispute the factual findings underlying the district court’s order but
argues that the district court erred in awar ding compensatory parenting time because the
interference was not “substantial.”5
The district court has broa d discretion in determini ng parenting-time issues.
Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009). We review issues of
compensatory parenting time for an abuse of discretion. See id. (addressing restricting
parenting time). A district court’s findings of fact underl ying a parenting-time decision
will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Griffin v. Van Griffin ,
267 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. 1978)).
With this standard of review in mind, we turn to the comp ensatory-parenting-time
statute, which lays out different remedies for parenting-time disputes and includes factors
for how to determine the length and type of compensatory parenting time that should be
awarded. The relevant portion for this appeal states:
The court may provide compensa tory parenting time when a
substantial amount of court-ordered pare nting time has been
made unavailable to one parent unless providing the
compensatory parenting time is not consistent with the child’s
best interests.

Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 6(a) (emphasis a dded). Neither this statute nor the marriage
dissolution chapter defines “substantial.”
6 See Minn. Stat. § 518.003 (2020).

5 Father initially argued that the compensatory-parenting-time statute should be interpreted
as requiring a “repeated and intentional” in terference in all compensatory-parenting-time
matters but waived that assertion at oral argument.
6 Father does not propose or point to a definition for “substantial.”
6
Here, based on father’s letter left at mother’s office before Christmas and testimony
at the hearing, the district court found that fa ther deprived mother of slightly more than
50 hours of parenting time. The district c ourt noted that the deviation was significant,
particularly considering the interference with Christmas Day. Given the context that there
is a specific provision about Christmas Eve and Christmas Day in the dissolution judgment
and decree, father was aware that holiday time was important to both parties.7 In sum, the
record supports the district court’s determina tion that father interfered with a substantial
amount of mother’s parenting time. Becaus e the finding was not clearly erroneous, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding compensatory parenting time.
Still, father asserts this court should cr eate a bright line to distinguish between a
de minimis amount of time and the amount c onsidered a “substantial” interference with
parenting time. But this court “will not supply that which the legislature purposefully omits

7 Father argues that we should focus on the word “amount,” and not give any weight to the
“type” of day that was missed, meaning we should remove any significance from
interference during a holiday. Even if we were to ignore the importance of holidays to the
parents, in other circumstances father acknowledged the gravity of fewer missed hours. He
sent one letter to mother ab out a combined 19.5 hours misse d due to tardiness, and an
additional letter complaining a bout an additional 7.25 hours in missed parenting time—
both fractions of the time he interfered with mother’s parenting time in this case.
7
or inadvertently overlooks” when considering statutes. 8 Green Giant Co. v. Comm’r of
Revenue, 534 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1995).9
Because the record supports the distri ct court’s determination that father
substantially interfered with a substantial amou nt of parenting time, the district court did
not err by awarding compensatory parenting time to mother.
Affirmed.

8 Further, we observe that the idea of a mathem atically-based “bright line” rule is simply
inconsistent with the inherently discretionary nature of decisions regarding parenting time.
See Christensen v. Healey, 913 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. 2018) (refusing to create a “bright-
line rule” for determining whether a request to change parenting time was actually a motion
to modify custody, in part because a “m athematical rule” would “conflict[] with the
governing principle that a district court ha s broad discretion in determining custody and
parenting time matters”).
9 There has only been one cas e, albeit nonprecedential, in volving the co mpensatory-
parenting-time statute after the substantia l-deviation language was added. In
Tandoh v. Nelson, we concluded the district cour t did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Nelson intentionally interfe red with court-ordered parenting time by
allowing her child to miss a weekend with the father. No. A18-0807, 2019 WL 418610, at
*3 (Minn. App. Feb. 4, 2019). While we were not asked to and did not define “substantial”
in that case, the amount of time that the parent interfered with parenting time in Tandoh is
roughly the same amount as here. Id. at *1.