Doran-CSM SE I LLC, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1134

Doran-CSM SE I LLC,
Appellant,

vs.

Thomas Stone, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed June 6, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-HC-21-360

Christopher T. Kalla, Douglass E. Turne r, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

John G. Westrick, Samuel A. Savage, Sava ge-Westrick, PLLP, Bloomington, Minnesota
(for respondents)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Pres iding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant-landlord Doran-CSM SE I LLC ch allenges the district court’s dismissal
of its eviction action against respondents-tenants Thomas Stone and Michael Stengrund.
Because the district court did not err in determining that tenants’ conduct was not a material
breach of their lease, we affirm.
2
FACTS
Tenants are a married couple who rent an apartment in a Minneapolis residential
building called “Expo.” They entered a written lease with landlord, effective February 27,
2021 to August 26, 2022.
Landlord commenced an eviction action against tenants on June 24, 2021, alleging
that tenants had breached the lease on May 22, 2021, when th ey “got into a physical
altercation with another resident in the po ol area” and “committed an assault against
another resident.” Tenants filed an answer, a lleging that they were not the aggressors in
the incident and merely acted in self-defense, that they did not seriously endanger others
on the property, and that landlord had waived any actionable breach by accepting rent for
June and July.1
The parties had a court trial in housing c ourt on July 23, 2021. Based on the trial
evidence, which included the testimony of six witnesses and two videos of the altercation,
the district court made the following findings of fact.
On May 22, 2021, a “concierge” summoned police to Expo upon learning of a fight
that had occurred on the pool deck. In addition to police, the senior property manager also
reported to the building, arrivi ng at about 7:00 p.m. The senior property manager spoke
with the involved parties—tenants and another resident, D.M. She observed that tenant
Stone was upset and appeared to be intoxicated, but tenant Stengrund was calm. The senior
property manager ordered tenants and D.M. to stay off the building’s pool deck for two

1 Tenants also raised additional defenses in their answer that are not at issue in this appeal.
3
weeks. After speaking with tenants and D.M ., the senior property manager remained on
the pool deck until 11:00 p.m., calming people down. Following the incident, she received
emails and visits from concerned residents.
The next day, the senior property manager sent Stone an email stating that she had
“gathered all the information” required “to ma ke a solid decision,” including “watch[ing]
all footage.” Because she believed that Stengrund had been involved in the altercation, she
asked Stengrund to “agree not to use the pool and other am enities for a week.” But she
stated that no sanction was warranted for Stone because he “tried to break up the fight to
help . . . Stengrund.”
According to the senior property manager, she did not make the decision to file the
eviction action. That decision was made by K.D., who is the property developer and 50%
owner of Expo.
Tenants and their witness P.E. were the only eyewitnesses to testify at the trial. They
were all on the pool deck with other friends before the fight. D.M., who was also there,
began playing inappropriate music. Stone aske d D.M. to turn down the music, but D.M.
refused. In response, Stone adjusted the position of the speaker. Following this interaction,
D.M. pursued Stone and directed a homophobic slur at him. Then, D.M. escalated the
situation. He threw several canned drinks at Stone and aggressively approached him.
Stengrund blocked the drinks and got between Stone and D.M. D.M. then struck Stengrund
several times. In an attempt to calm D.M. down, Stengrund tried to sit D.M. down or push
him into the jacuzzi. Stone, attempting to aid Stengrund, ultimately pushed D.M. into the
jacuzzi and dunked him in hope of subduing him. When Stone released D.M., however,
4
D.M. struck him. Eventually, P.E., who is a mutual friend of tenants and D.M., removed
D.M. from the jacuzzi and the area. P.E. believed that D.M. was “out of his mind.”
During the fight, Stengrund received minor injuries. He has since reconciled with
D.M.2 Ultimately, no charges were filed.
On June 23, 2021—just before filing the eviction action—K.D. sent tenants an email
that stated,
the insults, derogatory and false statements directed against the
building, ownership and the st aff in phone calls and on the
internet by people that don’t even live in the building needs to
stop. I don’t know if you are aw are of this inappropriate and
defamatory behavior towards us or not or if you know these
people but this stuff will not work.

K.D. acknowledged that tenants were up to date on their $4,500-per-month rent at the time
of the trial.
Based on the trial evidence—including the “generally credible and consistent”
testimony of tenants and P.E., who were “the only eyewitnesses . . . able to give the court
a first-hand account”—the district court dismissed the action with prejudice. It determined
that tenants had engaged in minor breaches of their lease agreement by being “unruly,
boisterous, and interfering with the peaceful en joyment of others.” But the district court
concluded that tenants’ con duct was not an act of violen ce, which would have been a
material breach of the lease, and that it did not seriously endanger the safety of other

2 Tenants also called D.M. as a trial witness. But D.M., who was represented by counsel,
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and did not testify.
5
residents or others. Moreover, the district court concluded that landlord waived any right
to evict tenants by accepting rent after the incident.
Landlord appeals.
DECISION
Landlord challenges the district court’s judgment in favor of tenants on two primary
grounds. First, landlord argues that the distri ct court erred in conc luding that tenants’
conduct was not an “act of violence” in violati on of a material lease term or conduct that
seriously endangered the safety of others. Second, landlord contends that the district court
erroneously determined that landlord waived any breach of the lease by accepting tenants’
rent.
In an eviction action we generally review a district court’s findings of fact for clear
error. Cimarron Vill. v. Washington, 659 N.W.2d 811, 817 (Minn. App. 2003). “We do
not reweigh the evidence that was before the district court, and we defer to a district court’s
credibility determinations.” See Landmark Cmty. Bank v. Klingelhutz , 927 N.W.2d 748,
755 (Minn. App. 2019); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“[D]u e regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the [district] court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”). A factual
finding is clearly erroneous if “there is no reasonable evidence in the record to support
those findings . . . and [an appellate court is] left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” In re Tr. of Schwagerl , 965 N.W.2d 772, 781 (Minn. 2021)
(quotations and citations omitted).3 “[Appellate courts] review a district court’s application

3 In the Fourth Judicial District—the venue in this case—a party may seek district court
judge review of a housing cour t referee’s confirmed order. See Minn. Stat. § 484.013,
6
of the law de novo.” Harlow v. State, Dep’t of Human Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn.
2016).
We first address landlord’s arguments regarding serious endangerment, which relate
to a series of restrictions on eviction acti ons prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic. To
promote housing stability during the pandemic , the governor issued multiple executive
orders that significantly restricted the ability of landlords to file eviction actions. The final
executive order, EEO 20-79, which was in effect at the time of the pool-deck incident,
continued the suspension of most eviction actions with some narrow exceptions. See
Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-79, Modifying the Suspension of Evictions and Writs of
Recovery During the COVID- 19 Peacetime Emergency (July 14, 2020) (EEO 20-79)
(rescinding previous eviction-suspensi on orders and outlining updated rights and
protections for tenants and landlords). Among other things, the exceptions allowed
eviction actions to proceed where a tenant “[s] eriously endanger[ed] the safety of other
residents” or “[m]aterially violate[d] a resi dential lease by . . . [s]eriously endanger[ing]
the safety of others.” After the pool-deck incident but before the trial, the legislature passed
a session law that “phased out” the protections of EEO 20-79, including the suspension of
certain eviction actions. 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 8, art. 5, § 2 at 1849. When

subd. 6 (2020); Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 611. Landlord chose not to do that. Tenants argue
that attorneys are “ill-advised” to bypass judg e review and that this decision affects the
“scope of review on appeal.” We disagree. A confirmed housing court order is treated no
differently on appeal, as long as the appeal is taken from a final judgment. See Dominium
Mgmt. Servs. LLC v. Lee , 924 N.W.2d 925, 926-27 (Minn. App. 2019) (explaining this
court’s jurisdiction when j udge review is sought); Tonkaway Ltd. P’ship v. McLain , 433
N.W.2d 443, 443 (Minn. App. 1988) (holding that in eviction actions—formerly unlawful-
detainer proceedings—the exclusive mode of appeal is from the judgment).
7
the eviction trial occurred, the phase-out stat ute authorized eviction actions for “material
violations of the lease other than nonpayment of rent.”4
Tenants have never argued that any of the restrictions on eviction actions precluded
landlord from bringing an eviction action. And no party argues that the eviction action
should not have proceeded due to lack of “serious endanger ment.” Thus, like the parties
and the district court, we focus our analysis on the merits of the breach-of-lease ground for
eviction.5
Turning to the merits, landlor d argues that the district court erred in ruling that
landlord failed to satisfy its burden of proving a material breach of the lease. In an eviction
action, a landlord must establish grounds for eviction by a preponderance of the evidence.
Nationwide Hous. Corp. v. Skoglund, 906 N.W.2d 900, 908 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 28, 2018). “Preponderance of the evidence requires that to establish a fact, it
must be more probable that the fact exists than that the contrary exists.” Christie v. Est. of
Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). Landlord contends that

4 Under the phaseout statute, landlords coul d resume filing breach-of-lease actions for
material violations of the lease other th an nonpayment of rent on July 14, 2021. See id.,
§ 2(b)(2)(iii) at 1849.

5 A recent precedential opinion from this court, Fairmont Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. v.
Winter, discusses the effect of termination of EEO 20-79 on pending appeals. 969 N.W.2d
839, 843-48 (Minn. App. 2021). There, the underlying incident, entire eviction action, and
eviction judgment “all occurred before the enactment of the moratorium phaseout.” Id. at
847. The tenants therefore argued, and this court agreed, that the protections in EEO 20-
79 extended to the eviction action. Id. But because the tenants in that case seriously
endangered the safety of other residents, th e district court properly allowed the eviction
action to proceed on the merits. Id. at 849. Here, by contrast, tenants do not argue that the
protections in EEO 20-79 precluded the eviction action.
8
the trial evidence established that tenant s breached the “crime free/drug free housing
addendum” to the lease. That section of the lease provides that an act of violence
constitutes a material breach. The relevant lease provisions state:
5. Resident . . . shall not engage in acts of violence or
threats of violence . . . or any other breach of the Apartment
Lease Contract that otherwise jeopardizes the health, safety, or
welfare of . . . other residents.

. . . .

7. Violation of the above provision shall be a material
violation of the Apartment Le ase Contract and good cause
for the immediate terminatio n of the Apartment Lease
Contract. A single violation of any of the provisions of this
Addendum shall be deemed a serious violation and material
non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the
Apartment Lease Contract. It is understood and agreed that a
single violation shall be good cause for termination of the
Apartment Lease Contract. Un less otherwise provided for by
law, proof of violation shall not require a criminal conviction,
but shall be the preponderance of the evidence as provided by
Management.

(Emphasis added.)
Landlord argues that the videos of the a ltercation that were admitted in evidence
clearly show that tenants committed an act of violence. Thus, landlord contends, the
district court clearly erred in concluding otherwise.
But the district court’s determination that tenants did not commit an act of violence
is supported by detaile d factual findings, which include credibility determinations. We
must defer to those credibility determinations. See Klingelhutz, 927 N.W.2d at 755. And
our task on review is not to reweigh the trial evidence. Rather, we are limited to
9
determining whether the reco rd supports the district court’s factual findings. See
Schwagerl, 965 N.W.2d at 781.
Based on our review of the trial record, we cannot conclude that the district court’s
findings are clearly erroneous. Landlord’s witnesses testified that they did not observe the
altercation firsthand. Although landlord argues that the videos prove that tenants behaved
violently, the district court found that the credible testimony of tenants’ witnesses showed
that D.M. instigated a fight and tenants merely defended themselves. The record supports
this finding. Tenants and thei r friend testified that D.M. in itiated the fight and that they
merely tried to stop D.M. from causing harm. In the process, Stengrund sustained multiple
documented injuries. The dist rict court also found that th e videos were helpful in
understanding the sequence of events. Again, the record supports this finding. One video
shows D.M. throwing something at Stone, punching Stengrund, and pursuing tenants until
he was physically removed from the hot tub by P.E.
Landlord also challenges th e district court’s determination that tenants did not
commit an act of violence because they were merely defending themselves. According to
landlord, the district court sh ould have applied criminal-law self-defense principles, and
the district court erred in determining that te nants established the elements of a criminal-
law self-defense claim.6 Most notably, landlord argues, tenants could not rely on a self-
defense claim because they had an opportunity to retreat from D.M. during the incident.

6 The four elements of a criminal-law self-defense claim are:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he
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We reject this argument. Landlord cites no authority for its assertion that the district
court was required to apply criminal-law sel f-defense principles in determining whether
tenants committed a material breach of their le ase. Moreover, we do not read the district
court’s reference to self-defense as invoking the technical criminal-law concept. Rather,
the order seems to use the term in its colloquial sense to convey that tenants were not the
aggressors but simply acted to defend themselves during the incident.
The record supports the district court’ s finding that tenants did not commit a
material breach of their lease. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing the eviction
action with prejudice.
Landlord also argues that th e district court erred in concluding that landlord’s
acceptance of rent waived any ri ght to evict tenants. Give n our determination that the
district court did not err in finding no material breach of the lease, we need not address the
waiver argument.
Affirmed.

or she was in imminent dang er of bodily harm; (3) the
existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the
absence of a reasonable possibi lity of retreat to avoid the
danger.

State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d
281, 285-86 (Minn. 1997)).