Mary Madonna Schlumpberger and on behalf of minor child, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1141

Mary Madonna Schlumpberger and on behalf of minor child,
Respondent,

vs.

Renee Anita Vasko,
Appellant.

Filed July 11, 2022
Reversed
Johnson, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CV-21-537

Mary Madonna Schlumpberger, Mankato, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Renee Vasko, Silver Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Renee Anita Vasko agreed to sell, and Mary Madonna Schlumpberger agreed to
buy, residential real property pursuant to a contract for deed. Vasko and Schlumpberger
later exchanged contentious text messages about the transaction. Schlumpberger asked
Vasko to send any written communications to her through her attorney. Vasko thereafter
sent three text messages directly to Schlumpberger. Schlumpberger petitioned the district
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court for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against Vasko. After an evidentiary
hearing, the district court granted the petition and issued an HRO. We conclude that the
district court erred by concluding that Vasko engaged in harassment. Therefore, we
reverse.
FACTS
In March 2021, the parties agreed that Vasko would sell residential real property to
Schlumpberger for $85,000. Schlumpberger made a down payment of $5,000 on
March 21, 2021. The parties signed a contract for deed on March 29 and April 5, 2021.
The contract requires 60 monthly payments and a balloon payment on April 1, 2026.
Between April 8 and 12, 2021, the parties exchanged numerous e- mail messages
and text messages concerning the means of making monthly payments, a water leak that
had caused damage in a bathroom, and whether Vasko had grounds to cancel the contract
for deed. On April 12, 2021, Schlumpberger sent a text message to Vasko stating, “If you
wish further contact you can call my attorney.” Vasko responded by sending text messages
stating that Schlumpberger’s last text message was “a jumbled mess of numbers and
letters” and that Vasko “had not received [the] attorney information.” Approximately two
hours later, Schlumpberger sent another text message, stating: “Last warning do not
contact me again. Have your attorney contact my attorney . . . with any issues.” Vasko
responded by sending a text message stating that she would apprise Schlumpberger of the
date and time when a contractor would inspect the water leak and water damage, by
suggesting that Schlumpberger close a plumbing valve, and by asking Schlumpberger to
“[p]lease . . . not use” the leaky shower until the water leak was fixed. Schlumpberger did
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not respond. It appears that Vasko did not contact Schlumpberger for the next seven days.
On April 20, 2021, Vasko sent a text message to Schlumpberger, apparently in response to
a message from Schlumpberger requesting Vasko’s PayPal information. Vasko provided
Schlumpberger her PayPal account name, reminded Schlumpberger of other permissible
forms of payment, and stated that she was waiting for a contractor to set a date and time to
inspect the water leak and water damage.
On the same day, April 20, 2021, Schlumpberger petitioned the district court for an
HRO against Vasko. Schlumpberger alleged that Vasko had harassed her by sending her
text messages after being told to contact her only through her attorney, by threatening to
cancel the parties’ contract for deed, and by threatening to enter the residence when
Schlumpberger was not present to inspect or repair a water leak and water damage. The
district court issued a temporary HRO on an ex parte basis. The petition and temporary
HRO were served on Vasko on May 5, 2021. On the following day, Vasko requested a
hearing on the petition. The district court held an evidentiary hearing in late May 2021.
Schlumpberger and Vasko appeared and represented themselves. Neither party called any
other witness.
In June 2021, the district court granted Schlumpberger’ s petition and issued an
HRO, which, for two years, prohibits Vasko from harassing Schlumpberger and from
having direct or indirect contact with Schlumpberger except through Schlumpberger’s
attorney. Vasko requested leave to file a motion for reconsideration, which the district
court denied.
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Vasko appeals and seeks reversal of the HRO. Schlumpberger has not filed a
responsive brief. T his court previously issued an order stating that the matter would be
submitted on the merits pursuant to rule 142.03 of the rules of civil appellate procedure.
DECISION
Vasko argues that the district court erred by issuing the HRO. She contends that
her conduct toward Schlumpberger does not constitute “harassment,” as that term is used
in the applicable statute.
A district court may issue an HRO if it finds “that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that [a person] has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3)
(2020). For purposes of an HRO, the term “harassment” is defined by statute to mean, in
relevant part, “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that
have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the
safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship between the actor and
the intended target.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1). A district court may find harassment only if there
is both “objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser” and “an
objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to harassing conduct.”
Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotations omitted).
Objectively unreasonable conduct includes conduct that “goes beyond an acceptable
expression of outrage and civilized conduct.” Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 846
(Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). Accordingly, statements that are
merely “inappropriate or argumentative” are not, for that reason alone, harassment. Id. at
844 (citing Beach v. Jeschke, 649 N.W.2d 502, 503 (Minn. App. 2002)). This court applies
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a clear-error standard of review to a district court’s findings of fact and a de novo standard
of review to district court’s conclusion that, in light of given facts, a person has engaged in
harassment. Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761.
In this case, the district court made a general finding that Vasko “[m]ade harassing
phone calls or sent harassing text messages to” Schlumpberger. Because there is no
evidence of any telephone calls between the parties, we construe the district court’s general
finding to refer exclusively to text messages. The district court made more particular
findings that “when disputes developed between” the parties about the property, “the
communication quickly escalated from what was necessary and appropriate to a level that
constitutes harassment.” The district court found that Schlumpberger “very clearly and
specifically inform[ed] Respondent that communication should go only through her
attorney” but that Vasko “ignore[ed]” that request and “continued to repeatedly send emails
and text messages to” Schlumpberger. The district court further found that Vasko’s
messages were “negative” and “aggressive” and “had a substantial adverse effect on
Petitioner’s privacy and security.”
On appeal, Vasko contends, “There is no evidence of any harassing behavior or
content in [her] texts or emails towards” Schlumpberger. Vasko also notes that
Schlumpberger contacted her directly, even after requesting that Vasko contact
Schlumpberger only through Schlumpberger’s attorney, and that Vasko sent text messages
directly to Schlumpberger in response to Schlumpberger’s text messages.
The record reveals that Vasko sent three text messages to Schlumpberger after
Schlumpberger’s first request that Vasko contact her only through her attorney. First,
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Vasko responded to Schlumpberger’s first request by stating that Schlumpberger’s text was
a “jumbled mess of numbers and letters,” that she did not have Schlumpberger’s attorney’s
contact information, and that Schlumpberger may be held responsible for Vasko’s attorney
fees. Second, Vasko responded to Schlumpberger’s second request later that day by stating
that she would apprise Schlumpberger of the date and time when a contractor would inspect
the water leak a nd water damage, by suggesting that Schlumpberger close a plumbing
valve, and by asking Schlumpberger to “[p]lease . . . not use” the leaky shower until the
water leak is fixed. Third, Vasko sent a text message to Schlumpberger providing her
PayPal account name (apparently in response to Schlumpberger’s request), asking
Schlumpberger to “[p]lease explain” why Schlumpberger sent a previous text message, and
by stating that she was still waiting for a contractor to set a date and time to inspect the
water leak and water damage.
These three text messages do not satisfy the statutory definition of harassment.
They are “repeated incidents” of “acts” and “words,” and they may have been “unwanted.”
See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). But there is no evidence of “objectively
unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of” Vasko and “an objectively reasonable belief
on the part of” Schlumpberger that Vasko’s “acts” and “words” would have “a substantial
adverse effect” on Schlumpberger’s sense of “security” or “privacy.” See Peterson, 755
N.W.2d at 764. Each of the three text messages at issue had a business purpose: to
complete a real-property transaction or to resolve a dispute concerning the condition of the
property. The district court described the messages as “negative” and “aggressive.” But
statements that are merely “inappropriate or argumentative” are not, for that reason alone,
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harassment. Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 844 . Rather, the statements must be “beyond an
acceptable expression of outrage and civilized conduct. ” Id. at 846. In the context of the
parties’ relationship, each of the three text messages at issue is within reasonable, socially
acceptable limits in terms of language and tone. In addition, the HRO is not properly based
on Schlumpberger’s request that Vasko communicate with her only through her attorney.
Vasko was under no contractual obligation to do so. A communication that does not
comply with such a request is not harassment per se; it is harassment only if it satisfies the
requirements of the statute.
In sum, the facts found by the district court do not support the conclusion that Vasko
engaged in harassment, as that term is defined in section 609.748, subdivision 1(a)(1), of
the Minnesota Statutes. Thus, the district court erred by granting Schlumpberger’s petition
and by issuing the HRO.
Reversed.