Damon Doss, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1150

Damon Doss,
Appellant,

vs.

St. Paul Area Electrical JATC Registered Apprenticeship Program,
Respondent.

Filed February 28, 2022
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-19-5493

Stephen W. Cooper, St acey R. Everson, The Cooper La w Firm, Chartered, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Justin D. Cummins, Cummins & Cummins, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Flor ey, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this employment-discr imination case, appellant sued respondent, an
apprenticeship program, alleging that he wa s subject to racial discrimination and

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
wrongfully discharged from the program. Appellant brought claims of discrimination
under the Minnesota Human Right s Act (MHRA) and Title VII, violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (section 1981), negligence per se, and breach of cont ract. On appeal, appellant
argues that the district court erred by gran ting summary judgment for respondent on all
claims. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on appellant’s claims of
negligence per se and breach of contract. But because we conclude that the record presents
genuine issues of material fact on appellant ’s claims of discrimination under the MHRA
and Title VII, as well as section 1981, we re verse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on those claims and we remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
This case centers on appellant Damon Doss’s participation as an apprentice in a
program administered by respondent St. Pa ul Area JATC Registered Apprenticeship
Program (JATC). JATC is a private, nonprof it organization that operates an electrician
apprenticeship program. The Minnesota Department of Labo r and Industry (the
department) registers and reviews apprenticeship programs like JATC, and the department
approves all program policies that JATC adopts. See Minn. Stat. § 178.035 (2020).
Under the apprenticeship program, JATC provides electrical training to apprentices
and assigns them to on-the-job training at various job sites with third-party employers. The
employer, rather than JATC, decides the length of an apprentice’s assignment, based on
the apprentice’s abilities and the employer’s business needs. The apprenticeship program
ordinarily takes about five years for an apprentice to complete . When Doss was an
apprentice, several hundred apprentices and ab out 115 third-party employers participated
3
in the program. The JATC policy contai ned provisions that the program would not
discriminate against apprentices based on r ace, and that JATC would take affirmative
action steps to increase minority participation in the program.
Doss’s apprenticeship with JATC
Doss began his apprenticeship through JA TC in April 2015. Doss is African
American. Throughout his initial participa tion in the program, Doss was assigned to
14 different employers in a span of less than three years. This was far more job assignments
than typical, as apprentices generally received five or six assignments over the course of
their five-year apprenticeship.
According to Doss, his employers regular ly treated him differently from other
apprentices and he was sometimes subject to racial remarks. At his second job assignment,
his supervisor told him, “I don’t know about your work ethic, but don’t be here just because
you are black.” During his third job assign ment, the foreperson segregated him from the
other workers and did not provide him with hands-on work instruction. Doss filed a formal
complaint with the department. After Doss ma de the report, the JATC training director
chastised him for reporting the incident, saying that it “caused a whole other chain of
events.” Doss’s supervisor for another job site commented , “if this goes wrong, we’ll
blame it on the minority apprentice,” and said to him, “you have it bad, you are black and
an apprentice.” At yet another job assignment, the foreman said in front of Doss, “Did you
know that Minnesota has a ni--er lake?” Doss contacted the Labor Standards and
Apprenticeship Division about his treatment, and he also told the training director that he
was not receiving on-the-job training.
4
JATC ultimately discharged Doss from the apprenticeship program after he received
five unsatisfactory reviews. Under the previous version of JATC’s disciplinary policy, an
apprentice who received a fourth unsatisfactory evaluation would appear before the JATC
committee for possible removal from the program . JATC revised the policy, effective
September 29, 2016, to alter the appropriate action that JATC would take after each
unsatisfactory employer evaluation. The ne w policy mandated that an apprentice would
be removed from the program after a fifth unsatisfactory evaluation.
Because Doss received more job assignments than most apprentices, he was also
evaluated more often. A worker for JATC acknowledged that th e program depended on
the performance reviews made by employers when evaluating an apprentice’s work. JATC
workers did not speak with an y of the employers who gave Doss a negative evaluation.
The JATC worker said that the program did not seek to determine whether the evaluators
were making racially biased decisions, and that it “wasn’t [JATC’s] responsibility” to make
sure that the evaluators were not influenced by race. JATC also admitted that “a significant
portion of third-party employers” did not subm it performance evaluations for apprentices
who worked for them.
Doss received unsatisfactory evaluations for his first three job assignments. His
first unsatisfactory review, in July 2015, commented that Doss was “inexperienced” and
“needs more exposure to the field.” Doss re ceived a second unsatisfactory review in
November 2015. That review stated, “You can tell he had no training. He didn’t have a
clue. I wish there was training provided pr ior to sending him out on a job.” The third
unsatisfactory review, in January 2016, stated that Doss “need[ed] to listen to direction
5
better,” “was very quick to place blame on someone else for his errors,” and “need[ed] to
learn how to use his time better so he can be come more productive.” The second review
came from the employer where the supervisor to ld Doss, “don’t be here just because you
are black,” and the third review was writte n by the same foreperson Doss had filed a
complaint against for segregating him. Another employer sent JATC a “Do not send back”
request about Doss.
After his first three job assignments, JATC assigned Doss to various other
employers, several of which gave him po sitive performance reviews. One review
commented that Doss had a “good attitude” and th at he would “be a very good asset” to
the company. Some of Doss’ s coworkers echoed this sentim ent. An electrician who
worked with Doss and regularly observed his work said that Doss “was a hard worker who
didn’t complain.” According to the coworker, Doss had a st rong work ethic, was willing
to follow directions, and willingly took on job responsibilities. Similarly, a lead electrician
who worked closely with Doss for six months said that Doss “did as he was directed” and
performed his tasks well. The coworker stated that he found Doss to be “productive and a
good listener with an appetite for learning,” and that he believed Doss had the potential to
be a good electrician.
In August 2016, however, Do ss received a fourth unsa tisfactory review. That
evaluation commented that Doss “need[ed] more drive to want to learn and do a good job,”
and that he was laid off because the projec t to which he was assigned “needed a more
advanced apprentice.” Afte r that unsatisfactory review , Doss appeared before the
committee, which issued a one-week non-wo rking suspension and required monthly
6
employer evaluations. Almost a year and a half later, Doss received a fifth unsatisfactory
review in January 2018.
Following the fifth unsatisfactory review, Doss appeared before the committee. The
committee discussed his unsatisfactory evaluations and asked Doss if he believed some or
all of those evaluations were racially motiv ated. Doss told the committee that he was
concerned about “white privilege,” but said that he did not belie ve the unsatisfactory
evaluations were racially motiv ated. The training director told the committee that Doss
had not approached him about allegations of racism. Afte r Doss said that he had had
trouble receiving instructions on one of his assignments, the training director became upset,
called Doss a liar, and left the meeting before it was adjourned. The training director then
had a verbal altercation with Doss in the hallway. The training director became hostile and
yelled in Doss’s face that he was a “lying b- stard.” Ultimately, the committee voted to
remove Doss from the program due to his fi fth unsatisfactory review and “repeated
infractions,” pursuant to the JATC disciplinary policy.
In March 2018, Doss again ap peared before the committe e to appeal the removal
decision. The committee voted to accept Doss back into the program, on the understanding
that he would be removed again for any future violations of JATC’s disciplinary policies.
Doss received two more unsatisfactory employer evaluations in July and August 2018, both
from the same employer. Another employer sent JATC a request to lay off Doss as a
reduction in force, commenting that Doss likely would not “make it in this trade without a
ton of one[-]on[-]one help.” The committee then voted to remove Doss from the program.
This time the removal was permanent.
7
Civil action
Doss brought a civil action ag ainst JATC in June 2019. 1 The complaint alleged
generally that Doss was subject to racially di scriminatory practices with the employers,
that JATC treated him differently from other apprentices, and that it wrongfully discharged
him from the apprenticeship program. The complaint brought several claims against
JATC, including breach of contract, violation of the MHRA and Title VII, negligence per
se, and violation of section 1981.
After discovery, JATC moved for summary judgment, arguing that Doss failed to
show a genuine issue of material fact on any of his claims. The district court granted
summary judgment for JATC on all claims. The district court determined that Doss could
not meet his burden on his employment-discrimination claims, reasoning that the evidence
showed that JATC removed Doss from the apprenticeship program because of five
unsatisfactory reviews, and the evidence did not establish that th is was a pretext for

1 In April 2018, Doss filed a complaint with the depart ment under Minn. Stat. § 178.09
(2020), alleging that JATC violated his a pprenticeship agreement and equal opportunity
standards when it discharged him from the pr ogram. The department director issued a
determination that JATC did not violate the agreement and the hearing board affirmed the
director’s determination. Doss appealed to this court by certiorari and we affirmed the
determination. In re St. Paul Area Elec. JATC Registered Apprenticeship Program, No.
A19-0407, 2019 WL 68386 20 (Minn. App. Dec. 16, 2019). As the district court noted,
Doss’s civil action is independen t of the agency action. Given the different standards of
review that we apply to the different actions , our previous decision does not resolve this
case. Compare Kind Heart Daycare, Inc. v. Comm’r of Human Servs. , 905 N.W.2d 1, 9
(Minn. 2017) (explaining that agency decisi ons “enjoy a presumption of correctness and
warrant deference” by appellate courts (quotation omitted)), with Osborne v. Twin Town
Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Minn. 2008) (stating that appellate courts review grants
of summary judgment de novo to determine wh ether there are genuine issues of material
fact).
8
discharging him. The district court also determined that JATC was entitled to summary
judgment on Doss’s claims of breach of co ntract, negligence per se, and violation of
section 1981.2
Doss appeals.
DECISION
Doss challenges the district court’s gran t of summary judgme nt for JATC. We
review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898
N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017 ). We determine “whether there are genuine issues of
material fact and whether the district cour t erred in its application of the law.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
A party is entitled to summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Stringer v. Minn.
Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 753 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. R. Civ.
P. 56.01. “Summary judgment is a blunt instrument that is inappropriate when reasonable
persons might draw different conclusions from the evidence presented.” Montemayor, 898
N.W.2d at 628 (quotations omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P. , 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-
77 (Minn. 2002). We must not weigh facts or make credibility determinations, and “[a]ll
doubts and factual inferences must be resolved against the moving party.” Montemayor,

2 Doss also brought claims of negligence, viol ation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and defamation;
the district court granted summary judgment for JATC on those claims as well. Doss does
not challenge the district court’s decision about those claims.
9
898 N.W.2d at 628 (quotation omitted). But a genuine issue of material fact “must be
established by substantial evidence” and ma y not be shown based on “unverified and
conclusory allegations or metaphysical doubt about the facts.” McBee v. Team Indus., Inc.,
925 N.W.2d 222, 230 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted).
We apply these standards to each claim for which the district court granted summary
judgment for JATC.
I. The district court erred by granting summary judgment on Doss’s MHRA and
Title VII claims.
At the heart of this case are Doss’s clai ms alleging violations of the MHRA and
Title VII. State law, under the MHRA, and federal law, under Title VII, prohibit employers
from discriminating against or dischargi ng employees based on race. Minn. Stat.
§ 363A.08, subd. 2 (2020); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). When interpreting the MHRA,
Minnesota appellate courts may look to federal cases arising under Title VII. Fletcher v.
St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999).
Plaintiffs alleging discrimination under the MHRA may use either direct or
circumstantial evidence to pr ove that the employer acted w ith discriminatory intent.
Hoover v. Norwest Priv. Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2001). Doss argues
that his racial-discrimination claim survives summary judg ment whether based on direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence. He also argues that his discrimination claim survives
based on a theory of reprisal. We address each argument in turn.
10
A. Doss has not presented direct evidence of racial discrimination.
Direct evidence of racial discrimination “shows that the employer’s discrimination
was purposeful, intentional or overt.” Goins v. W. Grp. , 635 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn.
2001). Direct evidence may exist when an employer’s statement or policy is discriminatory
on its face. Id. This court recently explained the type of evidence that constitutes direct
evidence. Direct evidence re quires “a specific link betwee n the alleged discriminatory
animus and the challe nged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact
finder that an illegitimate crit erion actually motivated the adverse employment action.”
Henry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #625, 964 N.W.2d 667, 676 (Minn. App. 2021) (quoting Aulick
v. Skybridge Ams., Inc., 860 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2017)), rev. granted (Minn. Oct. 19,
2021). Examples of direct evidence include “evidence of actions or remarks of the
employer that reflect a discriminatory attitude, comments which demonstrate a
discriminatory animus in the decisional pr ocess, or comments uttered by individuals
closely involved in employment decisions.” Id. (quoting King v. United States, 553 F.3d
1156, 1161 (8th Cir. 2009)). On the other hand, stray remarks made in the workplace, or
by individuals who do not take part in the discharge decision, are not direct evidence of
discrimination. Diez v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. , 564 N.W.2d 575, 57 9 (Minn. App. 1997),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 1997).
Doss argues that the following facts show direct evidence of discrimination. JATC
does not use reliable evaluations and cannot en sure that the perform ance reviews are not
tainted by racial bias. The program has higher attrition rates for women and minority
apprentices, and almost no African Americ an apprentices have graduated from the
11
program. Some employers who evaluated Doss made raci al comments and JATC relied
on those unsatisfactory evaluations when deciding to discharge Doss.
None of these circumstances are direct evidence of discrimination. They do not
show a direct link between discriminatory an imus and the decision to discharge Doss.
While racist comments may be di rect evidence in some cases, here those comments were
made by workers with some of Doss’s third- party employers, not by JATC officials, who
made the decision to discharge him. 3 Doss therefore cannot survive summary judgment
based on direct evidence of discrimination.
B. Doss has made a sufficient showing of circumstantial evidence of racial
discrimination to satisfy the three-prong McDonnell Douglas test.
When the record does not contain direct evidence of discrimination, an employee
may show discriminatory motive through circumstantial evidence. See Goins, 635 N.W.2d
at 723-24. Courts analyze employment-dis crimination claims based on circumstantial
evidence by applying the three-part burden-shifting framework established by the United
States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Hansen v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 813 N.W.2d 906, 918 (Minn. 2012). The purpose of this
framework is “to disprove the most obvious legitimate bases for the employment decision,
thereby allowing the inference that the decision was motivated by discrimination.” Friend
v. Gopher Co. , 771 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Minn. App. 2009). Before the district court, Doss
argued a “mixed-motive” theory. A plaintiff may prevail under a mixed-motive theory by

3 As explained below, however, some of these circumstances are relevant under the
“pretext” prong of the circumstantial-evidence analysis.
12
showing that “an employment decision was based partly on legitimate motives and partly
on unlawful ones.” Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1996).
The McDonnell Douglas framework has three prongs: (1) the plaintiff must make a
prima facie case of discrimination; (2) if a pr ima facie case is shown, “the burden then
shifts to the employer to articulate a leg itimate and nondiscrimin atory reason” for the
allegedly discriminatory action; and (3) the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the employer’s proffered explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Hansen, 813 N.W.2d
at 918. We examine each prong in turn.
i. Prima facie case
The first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test requires the plaintiff to show a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. Id. The requirements of a prima facie case vary
depending on the type of employment decision at issue. Friend, 771 N.W.2d at 37. A
prima facie case for discriminatory discharge generally requires the employee to show that:
(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job; (3) he was
discharged from his job; and (4) the employer assigned a person who is not a member of
the protected class to perform the same work. Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918; see also Goins,
635 N.W.2d at 724 (listing three elements of a prima facie case for discriminatory
discharge, as requiring that the employee “(1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was
qualified for the position from which [he] was discharged, and (3) was replaced by a non-
member of the protected class” (quotation omitted)). The burden to show a prima facie
case “is not onerous.” Henry, 964 N.W.2d at 677.
13
Here, the parties do not dispute that the first and third elements are met. Doss is a
member of a protected class because he is African American, and JATC discharged him as
an apprentice. We conclude that the fourth element is also met because the record shows
that the apprentices whom JATC hired after Doss’s discharge were mostly white.
The parties mainly dispute whether the second element was met—whether Doss was
qualified for the job. The dist rict court determined, and JA TC argues, that Doss did not
meet his burden to show that he was qu alified because he received five negative
performance reviews. Doss, on the other hand, maintains that his performance reviews do
not show that he is unqualified and that ample evidence in th e record proves his
qualifications as an apprentice. We agree with Doss that he has met his burden.
The record shows that Doss received multiple positive performance reviews.
Several of the positive reviews reflected th at Doss was productive, performed his work
accurately, was careful and responsible in his work, and had the abilities necessary for the
electrical trade. Doss’s coworkers who worked with him on some of his job sites attested
that he performed his tasks we ll. Doss also regularly atte nded and completed electrician
classes to improve his skills. These facts all support Doss’s position that he was qualified
for the apprenticeship program.
The district court, in determining that Doss failed to show that he was qualified for
the job, erred by relying only on Doss’s negative performance reviews. While Doss’s
multiple negative performance revi ews could allow a jury to conclude that Doss lacked
certain skills and experience for the appr enticeship program, at the summary-judgment
stage, we must view the evidence in the light mo st favorable to Doss. STAR Ctrs., 644
14
N.W.2d at 76-77. And at the prima facie case prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, the
plaintiff need not disprove the employer’s reason for firing him. Lake v. Yellow Transp.,
Inc., 596 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2010). Because Doss received some positive reviews and
some negative reviews, we believe that this creates a factual question for a jury on Doss’s
exact level of qualification as an electrician. Viewing the r ecord in a light favorable to
Doss, the facts in the record are enough to show that Doss met the minimal qualifications
of the apprenticeship program. He therefore satisfies the pr ima face case prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test.
ii. Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
Because Doss has made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, the burden
then shifts to JATC to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging him.
See Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918. We conclude that JATC easily satisfi es that burden.
JATC’s policy to discharge apprentices after five unsuccessful evaluations was a legitimate
and nondiscriminatory reason to discharge Doss.
We are not persuaded by Doss’s arguments to the contrary. He points to the
admission by a JATC worker during a deposition th at the decision to set the number of
negative evaluations at five “w as pulled out of the air.” We do not think that the JATC
worker’s response to a single leading question on cross-examination is enough to create a
factual dispute on the legitimacy of the policy. Doss also notes that only five of the thirteen
evaluations he received were uns atisfactory. But an employe r is not legally required to
balance an employee’s positive and negative evalua tions before deci ding whether to
terminate the employee. We are satisfied that the policy is legitimate on its face. JATC
15
adopted the revised policy in September 2016 only after approval by the department. As
the district court reasoned, “The [c]ommittee had the discretion, with [the department’s]
approval, to determine at what threshold an apprentice no longer merited membership in
the [p]rogram.” Thus, JATC’s five-unsatisfactory-reviews policy is enough to satisfy the
second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.
iii. Pretext for discrimination
Because JATC has met its burden to show that its proffered reason for discharging
Doss was legitimate and nondiscrim inatory, the burden shifts back to Doss to show that
the reason was pretextual. See Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918. A plaintiff may sustain this
burden “either directly by pe rsuading the court that a discriminatory reason likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation
is unworthy of credence.” Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. 1986)
(quotation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Doss, we conclude
that the record supports the in ference that JATC’s proffered explanation was pretextual.
We reach this determination based on two sets of facts.
First, Doss has shown a genuine issue of material fact that at least some of the five
unsatisfactory performance reviews that sustained his discharge may have been tainted by
bias. His second unsatisfactory review cam e from the job site where Doss’s supervisor
told him, “don’t be here just because you are black.” His third unsatisfactory review was
written by the foreperson whom Doss had filed a written complaint against for segregating
him from the other workers. JATC counters that it is “separate and distinct from the third-
party employers at issue.” But the record sh ows that JATC relied only on the third-party
16
employers’ performance reviews when deciding to discharg e Doss, and it did not follow
up with any of the employers who submitted a negative evaluation. An employer cannot
insulate itself from potentially biased evaluations made by th ird parties when it relied on
those evaluations when deciding to terminate an employee. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp. ,
562 U.S. 411, 420-21 (2011) (re cognizing that a biased em ployee report made by a non-
decisionmaking supervisor may be a causal factor in an employer’s decision to terminate
an employee when the decisionmaker took the supervisor’s report in to account without
independently determining whether the adverse action was justified). These facts, viewed
in a light favorable to Doss, give rise to the inference that at least two of the five
unsatisfactory performance reviews could have been motivated by racial bias, and JATC
blindly accepted those reviews when it decided to discharge him.
Second, the record supports that Doss was treated differently from other apprentices.
Doss is the only apprentice who was discharged under the policy requiring discharge after
five unsatisfactory evaluations.4 And Doss was assigned to 14 different employers, when
apprentices normally were assigned to just fi ve or six during the a pprenticeship. As a
result, he was subject to far more performan ce reviews than normal and a greater chance
at receiving negative reviews. Although the third-party employers, rather than JATC,
determined the length of an apprentice’s j ob assignments, JATC acknowledged that “a

4 JATC asserts that another apprentice, who is white, also received five unsatisfactory
performance evaluations from third-party empl oyers and was also discharged. But the
apprentice to which JATC refers was discharged in July 2015, which was before the five-
unsatisfactory-evaluations policy took effect . Doss is therefore the only apprentice who
was discharged in accordance with that policy.
17
significant portion of third-party employers” never submitted performance evaluations for
their apprentices. The record therefore sup ports that JATC did not uniformly require
performance reviews for all ap prentices. Even if the great er number of job placements
Doss received was not necessarily attributable to JATC, it is responsible for the greater
number of performance reviews that Doss received. And an employer’s failure to follow
its own policies may support an inference of pretext. Lake, 596 F.3d at 874. In short, Doss
was subject to a far greater number of pe rformance reviews—and therefore a higher
likelihood of negative reviews—than most other apprentices in the program.
We conclude that these facts, taken together, are sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to pretext. Pretext may be inferred from a combination of facts showing
a biased atmosphere and unreliable me thods of evaluating employees. In Hamblin v.
Alliant Techsystems, Inc., this court reversed the grant of summary judgment on a claim of
disparate treatment in an age-discrimination case. 636 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn. App.
2001), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2002). We determined that the employee had shown a
genuine issue of material fact on the pretext prong by presenting statistical evidence about
terminated employees, evidence of ageist comments made by corporate executives, and a
lack of uniformity in the criteria for ranking employees. Id. at 153-55. As for the ageist
comments, we recognized that, even wh en such comments were made by non-
decisionmakers, they constitu ted evidence of a biased at mosphere, which supported a
reasonable inference of discrimination. Id. at 154. Similarly, here Doss has shown facts
that, in combination, reasonably give rise to the inference that his discharge was influenced
by race. He has presented evidence of raci al statements and practices by employers who
18
later gave him negative reviews, JATC’s reliance on those negative reviews in discharging
him, and a practice that caused him to have a greater likelihood of receiving negative
reviews than most other apprentices. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to
Doss, we conclude that Doss has put forward enough facts to show pretext.
In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledg e that some facts in the record support
JATC’s position that Doss’s termination may no t have been pretextual. JATC reinstated
Doss in the program and then removed him permanently only after he received more
negative reviews. But for purposes of our analysis, Doss need not definitively prove
pretext; he need only “put forth sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to infer” pretext.
Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 546. And the evidence, viewed in a light favorable to Doss, would
reasonably allow a fact-finder to infer that JA TC’s proffered reason for discharging Doss
was a pretext for racial discrimination.5

5 We recognize that our decision here diffe rs from our previous decision in the agency
action, in which we affirmed the department’s determination that Doss’s discharge did not
violate the apprenticeship agreement. In that case, we determined that Doss’s termination
from the apprenticeship program was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary
or capricious. St. Paul Area Elec. JATC , 2019 WL 6838620, at *5. As noted above, we
are not bound by that decision. We reach a different decision here based on our different
standards of review—in the administrative appeal, we reviewed whether there was
substantial evidence in the record to support the agency’s decision, Minn. Stat. § 14.69(e)
(2020), while here, we review for genuine i ssues of material fa ct precluding summary
judgment, Montemayor, 898 N.W.2d at 628. Even though we affirmed the agency
decision, we also expressed some of the same concerns that we rely on in reaching our
decision here:

We do think that it is concerning that Doss was sent to
13 different jobsites in less than three years, when the average
apprentice has only five or six during their five-year term as an
apprentice. We additionally think it is concerning that Doss
received at least one of his ne gative reviews before he had
19
Thus, we conclude that Doss has satisfied his burden under the McDonnell Douglas
test, and his employment-discrimination clai ms survive summary ju dgment. We reverse
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on these claims, and we remand for further
proceedings.
C. The record does not show any genuine issue of material fact to support
Doss’s claims on a theory of reprisal.
Doss also argues his discrimination claims under a theory of reprisal. He argues
that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether JATC retaliated against him when he
complained about racial discrimination. We disagree.
It is an unfair discriminatory practice for an employer to engage in a reprisal because
an employee opposed a practice forbidden by the MHRA. Minn. Stat. § 363A.15 (2020).
Reprisal claims are also analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas test. Hoover, 632 N.W.2d
at 548. To make a prima facie case for repr isal, a plaintiff must show three elements:
“(1) statutorily-protected conduct by the employee; (2) adverse employment action by the
employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” Id.
We conclude that Doss cannot make a prima facie case of reprisal because he cannot
show a causal connection between his stat utorily protected cond uct and the adverse
employment action. Doss mainly points to th e February 12, 2018 committee meeting as
evidence of reprisal. He notes that, at that meeting, after he complained about racial

received any training as an electr ician. And that one of these
reviews was filled out by an employer that Doss complained
about to the director.

St. Paul Area Elec. JATC, 2019 WL 6838620, at *5.
20
discrimination, the training director called him a liar, and the committee discharged him
immediately afterward. Assuming that Do ss’s complaints at the meeting constitute
statutorily protected conduct, the undisputed facts do not give rise to the reasonable
inference that the committee de cided to discharge him because of his complaints, even
when we view the evid ence in a light favorable to Do ss. Under Doss’s own version of
events, the reason the training director grew angry was that he disputed Doss’s contention
that he did not receive sufficient training. Because the evidence does not show that Doss’s
confrontation with the training direct or resulted from Doss’ s complaints about
discrimination, Doss cannot s how a causal connection betwee n his complaints and the
committee’s decision to discharge him. Doss therefore cannot satisfy the McDonnell
Douglas test for reprisal.
In sum, while we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment for JATC
on Doss’s MHRA and Title VII claims, we affi rm the grant of summa ry judgment on his
reprisal theory.
II. The district court erred by granting summary judgment for JATC on Doss’s
section 1981 claim.
Together with his MHRA and Title V II claims, Doss brought a related claim
alleging that JATC violated his rights under section 1981. Section 1981 is a federal statute
protecting the right of citizens “to make and enforce contracts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). This
right “includes the making, performance, modifi cation, and termination of contracts, and
the enjoyment of all benefits , privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.” Id. (b). Courts apply the same anal ysis for section 1981 claims as for
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Title VII claims. Keefe v. City of Minneapolis , 785 F.3d 1216, 1225 (8th Cir. 2015)
(applying three-prong McDonnell Douglas test).
Here, the district court determined that Doss’s section 1981 claim could not survive
summary judgment for the same reasons as his employment-discrimination claims.
Likewise, the parties do not provide any argument differentiating between Doss’s MHRA
and section 1981 claims. Because we revers e the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on Doss’s MHRA claims, we also reverse the grant of summary judgment on the
section 1981 claims and remand for further proceedings.
III. The district court correctly granted summary judgment fo r JATC on Doss’s
claims of negligence per se and breach of contract because those claims are
barred by the MHRA’s exclusivity provision.
Finally, Doss challenges the district cour t’s grant of summary judgment on his
claims of negligence per se and breach of contract. Doss’s negligence per se claim is based
on JATC’s alleged violations of Minn. Stat. § 178.01 (2020) and 29 C.F.R. § 30.1, which
provide for equal employment opportunities fo r apprentices in apprenticeship programs.
His breach-of-contract claim is based on an an tidiscrimination clause in his employment
contract, which stated that he would be gi ven equal opportunity in the apprenticeship
program without discrimination based on race. The district court determined that Doss’s
negligence per se and breach-of-contract claims were both barred by the MHRA’s
exclusivity provision. We agree.
A party generally may bring claims under different statutes if the claims arise out of
the same set of facts, “unless a statute provides that its remedy is exclusive.” Daniel v.
City of Minneapolis, 923 N.W.2d 637, 644 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). The MHRA
22
contains such a provision, wh ich states, “as to acts declar ed unfair by [the MHRA], the
procedure herein provided shall, while pendi ng, be exclusive.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.04
(2020). Courts have held that the MHRA’s exclusivity provision bars other claims based
on the same set of facts. For example, th e Minnesota Supreme Court has held that an
employee alleging discriminatory practices under the MHRA cannot also bring a claim
under Minnesota’s Whistleblower Act. Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., Inc. , 551
N.W.2d 483, 483, 486 (Minn. 1996). And Minnesota’s federal district court has recognized
that a plaintiff pursuing claims under the MH RA may not bring negl igence claims based
on the same underlying facts, unless the negligence claims are “founded on a duty of care
independent from duties owed under the MHRA.” Moss v. Advance Cirs., Inc. , 981
F. Supp. 1239, 1252 (D. Minn. 1997) (determining that plaintiff’s common-law negligence
claims were barred because they arose from the same duty as her harassment claim under
the MHRA); see also Burns v. Wi nroc Corp. (Midwest) , 565 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1068-69
(D. Minn. 2008) (concluding that plaintiff’s claims for negligent supervision and negligent
retention were barred by MHRA’s exclusivity provision because claims were based on
employer’s duty to address racial harassmen t in the workplace, which was imposed by
MHRA).
Doss’s claims of negligence per se and breach of contract are virtually identical to
his claims of racial discrimination under the MHRA. The statutory duties that Doss refers
to are the same that support his MHRA claims. And Doss argues that JATC breached the
employment contract by violating antidiscrimination requirements—duties that the MHRA
23
governs. Thus, the MHRA’s exclusivity provision bars the negligence per se and breach-
of-contract claims.
We also note that Doss’s breach-of-con tract claim is further barred because a
separate statute provides the remedy for alle ged breaches of apprenticeship agreements.
Minn. Stat. § 178.09. Under that statute, a person may bring a complaint with the
department alleging a violatio n of an apprenticeship agreement and the department may
investigate and determine whether any violation occurred. Id., subd. 1. Doss previously
filed a complaint with the department an d this court affirmed the department’s
determination that JATC did not violate the apprenticeship agreement. St. Paul Area Elec.
JATC, 2019 WL 6838620, at *1. Thus, Doss has already unsuccessfully litigated his claim
that JATC breached the apprenticeship agr eement, using the statutorily authorized
procedure.
For these reasons, the district court correctly dismissed Doss’s claims of negligence
per se and breach of contract.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.