A21-1166 Nonprecedential Reversed and remanded Processed

Amina N. Addow, Relator,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed April 25, 2022

The holding in the court’s own words

And the ULJ did not address the Murack factors in considering whether Addow’s explanation sh owed substantial comp liance with the deadlin e. We therefore conclude that the ULJ erred as a matter of law. We conclude th at the ULJ’s application of a substantial- compliance standard that is too na rrow and failure to consider the Murack factors prejudiced Addow’s substantial rights.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1166

Amina N. Addow,
Relator,

vs.

Monarch Bus Service Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed April 25, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 45798390-4

Amina N. Addow, St. Anthony, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

Monarch Bus Service, Inc., Hastings, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Empl oyment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Pres iding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Relator Amina N. Addow challenges the dismissal of her unemployment benefits
appeal as untimely. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
On May 20, 2021, Addow applied for unemployment benefits. Approximately one
week later, the Minnesota Department of Employment and Ec onomic Development
(DEED) determined that Addow, who had provi ded contract services to a school district,
was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because she had a “reasonable assurance
of employment in the next acad emic year or term,” and because the future employment
would not be substantially le ss favorable than her employment in the preceding year.
DEED’s determination of ineligibility, which was mailed to Addow’s home, provided that
the determination would become final unless she filed an appeal by June 17, 2021.
On June 28, 2021, 11 days after the fili ng deadline, Addow appealed the ineligibility
determination. The next day, an unempl oyment-law judge (ULJ) issued an order
summarily dismissing Addow’s appeal as un timely because it was not filed within 20
calendar days of DEED’s determination of ineligibility letter.
Addow timely filed a request for reconsiderat ion of the dismissal. Her request for
reconsideration included the following statement:
I am requesting reconsideration. After I found out that I am
not eligible for unemployment benefit, I called and spoke to an
agent that told me that I don’t need to do anything as they are
adjusting my benefit and it’ll be different wages and keep
requesting benefit weekly and I’ll get the missing benefit as
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soon as we adjust your account . I called again to ask that I
didn’t received any benefit payment and if my account is
adjusted. That is wh en I found that I need ed to appeal and I
am already missed the deadline. If the agent didn’t assure me
that I didn’t need to do anything I would take an appeal. I
didn’t work since 03/13/2020 for [my employer] they never
called me and I never deny or refused any job.

A ULJ affirmed the decision to dismiss the ineligibility-determination appeal.
Addow appeals.
DECISION
“A ULJ’s decision to dismiss an appeal as untimely raises a jurisdictional question
of law, which we review de novo.” In re Murack , 957 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Minn. App.
2021); see also Godbout v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev., 827 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. App.
2013). “A determination of e ligibility or determination of in eligibility is final unless an
appeal is filed by the applicant or employer within 20 calendar days after sending.” Minn.
Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f) (20 20). Generally, this 20-day time line is “strictly construed,
regardless of mitigating circumstances.” King v. Univ. of Minn. , 387 N.W.2d 675, 677
(Minn. App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 13, 1986).
But the governor’s March 16, 2020 Emer gency Executive Order 20-05 (EEO 20-
05) suspended strict compliance in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Under EEO 20-
05, an untimely appeal of an ineligibility de termination could proceed so long as the
applicant “substantially complied” with the statutory appeal timeframe. See In re Murack,
957 N.W.2d at 131 (stating that, under EEO 20 -05, applicants need not strictly comply
with the 20-day appeal period and remanding for a determination of whether the relator
substantially complied with the statutory timeline); Emerg. Ex ec. Ord. No. 20-05,
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Providing Immediate Relief to Employers & Unemployed Workers During the COVID-19
Peacetime Emergency (Mar. 16, 2020).
In Murack, we considered what it means to substantially comply with the statutory
appeal timeframe. 957 N.W.2d at 130. And we ultimately artic ulated several factors that
a ULJ must consider in deciding whether a party substantially complied. Id. We explained
that substantial compliance may be found when “[a] party . . . has a reasonable explanation
for failing to strictly comply, has taken steps to comply with the statute, and has generally
complied with the statute’s purpose; and there is reasonable notice and a lack of prejudice
to other parties.” Id.
More than 3 months after the Murack opinion was filed and more than 15 months
after the governor issued EEO 20-05, 1 a ULJ summarily dismissed Addow’s appeal as
untimely because she filed it 11 days after the statutory deadline. The ULJ emphasized
that “[t]he determination [of ineligibility], in accordance with Minnesota Statutes, clearly
stated that it would be final unless an appeal was filed w ithin 20 calendar days from the
date of mailing.” The order did not include any discussion of the suspension of strict
compliance resulting from EEO 20-05, substantial compliance, or the Murack factors.
Addow, who is self-represented on appeal, argues that the ULJ erred by dismissing
her administrative appeal as un timely because she was “misled” as to whether an appeal
was required. She contends that, but for the misinformation, she would have timely
appealed. We construe this argument—whi ch Addow first made in her request for

1 EEO 20-05 remained in effe ct for the duration of the ad ministrative proceedings in
Addow’s case.
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reconsideration of the dismissal—as an assert ion that she substantially complied with the
appeal deadline.
In denying Addow’s request for reconsideration, the ULJ referenced substantial
compliance. The ULJ’s order states, “Addow made no efforts to file an appeal within the
20-day appeal period. As such, Addow did not substantially comp ly with the appeal
deadline under Executive Order 20-05. The appeal, therefore, was not timely.”
The ULJ’s focus on whether Addow substantially complied within the 20-day
timeframe for appeal was too narrow, however. Murack does not limit substantial
compliance to acts that occurred within the 20-day appeal period. See Murack, 957 N.W.2d
at 130. Moreover, although Addow submitted an explanation for her untimely appeal when
she moved for reconsideration of the dismi ssal, the ULJ did not order an evidentiary
hearing so that Addow could supplement the record with evidence supporting her
explanation. And the ULJ did not address the Murack factors in considering whether
Addow’s explanation sh owed substantial comp liance with the deadlin e. We therefore
conclude that the ULJ erred as a matter of law.
In turn, we are unable to provide meani ngful review on appeal. Because the ULJ
did not address the Murack factors, we cannot determine whether the record supports the
ULJ’s dismissal of Addow’s appeal of the ineligibility determination. See Turner v. Alpha
Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 68 n.2 (Minn. 1979) (explaining that appellate courts
correct errors rather than find facts).
When a ULJ’s decision prejud iced the relator’s substantial rights, we may remand
an unemployment-benefits case, or reverse or modify the ULJ’s decision. Minn. Stat.
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§ 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020). We conclude th at the ULJ’s application of a substantial-
compliance standard that is too na rrow and failure to consider the Murack factors
prejudiced Addow’s substantial rights.
Because Addow’s substantial rights were prejudiced by the ULJ’s error, we reverse
and remand for fu rther proceedings.2 On remand, the ULJ should address (1) whether
Addow took steps to comply with the statutory administrative appeal deadline, (2) whether
Addow’s explanation for untimely filing the appeal is reasonable, (3) whether Addow
generally complied with the purpose of the statute, and (4) the degree of notice and
prejudice to other parties. See Murack, 957 N.W.2d at 130. The ULJ is permitted to open
the record and conduct an evidentiary hearing should th e ULJ elect to do so. See Minn.
Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(c) (2020).
Reversed and remanded.

2 Recently, in a similar case, In re Moose, No. A21-0881, 2022 WL 433340 (Minn. App.
Feb. 14, 2022), we reversed a ULJ’s dismi ssal of an ineligibility determination and
remanded for further proceedings. The ci rcumstances here differ from those in Moose in
one respect, however. The relator in Moose provided no explanation in the proceedings
below for her failure to timely appeal. By contrast, Addow submitted an explanation for
her untimely appeal with her request for reconsideration of the dismissal.