State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1171

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Malachi Henessey Rodriguez,
Appellant.

Filed July 25, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Brown County District Court
File No. 08-CR-20-665

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Charles W. Hanson, Brown County Attorney, Paul J. Gunderson, Assistant County
Attorney, New Ulm, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appel late Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Slieter , Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions for third - and fourth- degree criminal sexual
conduct, arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he used coercion to accomplish the crime ; (2) the district court’s evidentiary rulings
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constitute an abuse of dis cretion; and (3) the district court improperly admitted character
evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Malachi Henessey
Rodriguez with (1) third -degree criminal sexual conduct —force or coercion; (2) fourth-
degree criminal sexual conduct —force or coercion; and (3) fifth- degree criminal sexual
conduct—nonconsensual sexual contact. The state alleged that Rodriguez sexually
penetrated the victim without her consent in a hotel room the night before a family
wedding. Following a three-day trial, the jury found Rodriguez guilty of all three crimes.
The jury also returned a special verdict form finding that Rodriguez used coercion to
accomplish the sexual penetration. The district court sente nced Rodriguez to 48 months in
prison. Rodriguez now appeals.
DECISION
I. Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Rodriguez used coercion to
accomplish the sexual penetration.
Rodriguez asserts that his convictions for third - and fourth-degree c riminal sexual
conduct must be reversed because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he used coercion to sexually penetrate the victim .1 To evaluate the sufficiency of the
evidence, appellate courts “carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and
the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the factfinder to reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which

1 Rodriguez does not challenge his conviction for fifth- degree criminal sexual conduct.
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he was convicted.” State v. Waiters , 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted). Appellate courts review the evidence “in the light most favorable to the
conviction” and “assume the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved any
evidence to the contrary.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted). We “will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requireme nt of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
The jury found Rodriguez guilty of third -degree criminal sexual conduct under
Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (2020), which requi red the state to prove that Rodriguez
penetrated the victim without her consent and used force or coercion to accomplish the
penetration. The jury also found him guilty of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under
Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(c) (2020), which required the state to prove that the
defendant used force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact. Coercion is
the use by the actor of words or circumstances that cause the
complainant reasonably to fear that the actor will inflict bodily
harm upon the complainant or another, or the use by the actor
of confinement, or superior size or strength, against the
complainant that causes the complainant to submit to sexual
penetration or contact against the complainant’s will. Proof of
coercion does not require proof of a specific act or threat.

Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 14 (2020).
The jury returned a special verdict form finding that Rodriguez used coercion to
accomplish the sexual act . Ample evidence supports the jury’s determination. The victim
testified that the night before a family wedding, Rodriguez spent the night in a hotel room
with three female relatives, including the victim, the victim’s sister, and the victim’s
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cousin. Rodr iguez shared a bed with the victim , while the other two women slept in the
other bed . The victim was uncomfortable sleeping in the same bed with Rodriguez and
slept “[c]lose to the edge” of the bed , facing away from him. Rodriguez was lying “right
behind” the victim. The victim tried to “scoot” away from Rodriguez, but he remained
close behind her. The victim woke up in the middle of the night when she felt Rodriguez
trying to move her shorts. Rodriguez put his fingers inside the victim’s vagina and he ld
his hands on her waist. The victim “froze” and became scared and upset. Rodriguez then
put his penis into the victim’s vagina. The victim testified she did not fight Rodriguez or
call out to her sister or cousin because she “froze,” “felt scared,” an d “felt dead.” The
victim was also scared because she “[didn’t] know what could have happened if [she]
screamed out loud and everybody was in the hotel.” The victim stated she was scared
because Rodriguez had “anger issues” and “could have done anything” to her. The victim
estimated that the penetration last ed for about one minute. The victim went into the
bathroom to take a shower, then left the bathroom and sat in a chair by the other bed until
the following morning.
The victim’s sister and cousin also testified about the victim’s behavior. The
victim’s sister testified that she woke up in the middle of the night when she heard the
shower running. The next morning, the victim told them that Rodriguez “was touching her
in her sleep and raped her.” The victim’s cousin testified that she woke up in the middle
of the night and noticed the victim was awake and sitting in a chair by her bed, “staring
. . . directly in [cousin’s] face.” Cousin believed the victim was acting “weird,” “was acting
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different than her normal self,” and appeared “nervous.” Cousin testified that the victim
later told her that Rodri guez raped her, and she appeared to be “in shock.”
“Corroboration is not required in criminal sexual conduct cases.” State v. Wright,
679 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2004) . Indeed, a
guilty verdict may be based on the testimony of a single witness . State v. Foreman, 680
N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) . Here, the vic tim’s testimony was corroborated by her
demeanor following the sexual penetration and by the changes in her behavior observed by
the other two women in the room . See State v. Mosby, 450 N.W.2d 629, 635 (Minn. App.
1990) (stating that victim’s demeanor aft er sexual assault corroborated her testimony), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 16, 1990).
Rodriguez claims the state did not offer any evidence th at he coerced the victim
because he did not threaten or physically harm her and did not prevent her from getting out
of the bed or calling out for help. A defendant’s “use of his overwhelming physical size
and strength to cause the victim to submit to penetration against her will fits squarely within
the statute’s prohibition of sexual assault by coercion.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618,
627 (Minn. 2016). Further, conduct that contributes to an “atmosphere of fear” suggests
coercive influence. State v. Gamez , 494 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 23, 1993) ; see also State v. Meech , 400 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn. App. 1987)
(determining defendant used coercion to complete sexual contact where victim was “fearful
and overpowered” when defendant pushed up victim’s nightgown and restrained her
hands).
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The victim testified she was not comfortable sleeping in the same bed as Rodri guez
and slept at the edge of the bed . She woke up when Rodri guez tried to push her shorts
aside, held his hands on her waist, and put his fingers into her vagina. The victim testified
she was afraid of Rodriguez because he “could have done anything.” Rodriguez’s coercive
conduct, and the fear this caused the victim, happened concurrently with the sexual contact.
See State v. Middleton, 386 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Minn. 1986) (“It is enough that the coercive
words or conduct . . . happen concurrently with[ ] the sexual contact.”).
Based on the record, we conclude there is sufficient evidence o f coercion to sustain
the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt .
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the witnesses’ out-
of-court statements into evidence.

A. Standard of Review
Rodriguez challenges the district court’s evidentiary rulings. “When the
admissibility of evidence is challenged on appeal, [appellate courts] defer to the district
court’s exercise of discretio n in the conduct of the trial, and we will not lightly overturn a
district court ’s evidentiary ruling.” State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 235 (Minn.
2005).
Our standard of review depend s on whether Rodriguez objected to the district
court’s evidentiary ruling during trial. If an appellant objects to the admission of evidence,
we apply the harmless -error standard. State v. Sanders , 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn.
2009). Under this standard, the appellant bears the burden of showing that the admission
of evidence was erroneous and that he was prejudiced as a result. Id. If the appellant di d
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not object, we review for plain error. State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 650 (Minn. 2018).
Plain error requires the appellant to show an error, that was plain, and that affected the
appellant’s substantial rights . State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 2002) .
“[T]he third prong of the plain error test is the equivalent of a harmless error analysis.”
State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011) .
Rodriguez objected to only some of the witnesses’ out-of-court statements
challenged on appeal. For the reasons below, we conclude that Rodriguez has not satisfied
his burden of proving that an y error occurred regardless of which standard of review
applies. Based on this determination, we need not consider whether Rodriguez was
prejudiced. See Montanaro v. State, 802 N.W.2d 726, 732 (Minn. 2011) (noting that if any
requirement of the test is not satisfied, we need not address the remaining elements).
B. Witness Statements
Rodriguez argues the district court improperly admitted (1) the victim’s out-of-court
statements to the police investigator; (2) the victim’s out-of-court statements to her cousin;
and (3) the v ictim’s out-of-court statements to her sister . Rodriguez claims these
statements conflicted with the victim’s trial testimony and should have been excluded. The
district court held that the witnesses’ statements were admissible as prior consistent
statements. A witness’s prior statement may be admissible if “[t]he declarant testifies at
the trial . . . and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is . . . consistent with the declarant ’s testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating
the declarant ’s credibility as a witness.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) (defining out -of-
court statements that may be admitted as non -hearsay). The admission of a n out-of-court
8
statement is proper so long as it is “reasonably consistent” with the witness ’s trial
testimony. State v. Zulu, 706 N.W.2d 919, 924 (Minn. App. 2005) (noting that “trial
testimony and the prior statement need not be identical to be consistent ”).
The victim’s statements to the investigator and the trial testimony . Rodriguez
claims that three of the victim’s statements to the police investigator during the forensic
interview contained “important inconsistencies from her trial testimony.” Rodriguez’s
objections relate to the following conversation between the victim and the investigator:
INVESTIGATOR : So did [Rodriguez] try to touch you
anywhere else on your body when this [sexual contact] was
going on?

. . . .

VICTIM: Yes.
INVESTIGATOR : Alright and did it start by him like trying to
hug you or trying to come closer to you?
VICTIM: Yea.

. . . .

VICTIM: He would try to move my hands to put it on him, but
I like put my fists like I moved.
INVESTIGATOR : Mmm-hmm.
VICTIM: And I crossed my arms so it wasn ’t able to move.
INVESTIGATOR : Okay.
VICTIM: My hands.
INVESTIGATOR : So was he like rubbing you or caressing
you or anything like that?
VICTIM: Yes.
INVESTIGATOR : And where would that have been?
VICTIM: Been pretty much everywhere.
INVESTIGATOR : Okay. Does he touch your breast?
VICTIM: Mmm—hmm.
INVESTIGATOR : And does he at any time remove your, your
underwear?
VICTIM: He tried to.
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INVESTIGATOR : Okay.
VICTIM: That’s when I woke up.

. . . .

INVESTIGATOR : Okay so, so he tried to move, remove your
underwear and you wouldn’t let him [remove your underwear].
So then he, he gets closer to you and at some point he basically
pulls your shorts and underwear aside.
VICTIM: Yea.

First, Rodriguez claims the victim told the investigator that Rodriguez moved her
hands but did not specifically testify at trial that Rodriguez moved her hands. At trial, the
victim testified that Rodriguez put his hands on her waist and held her. Counsel asked the
victim if Rodriguez “tr[ied] to use [her] hands to touch his body at all.” The victim
responded, “No.” The victim’s trial testimony is sufficiently consistent with her statements
to the investigator. The conversation between the victim and the investigator concerned
how the sexual contact started . Her trial testimony that Rodriguez did not use her hands to
touch his body occurred at a different point during the assault , when Rodriguez put his
fingers into her vagina. These statements, relating to different points in time, are not
inconsistent.
Second, Rodriguez notes that the victim told the investigator that Rodriguez touched
her “pretty much everywhere.” At trial, however, the victim testified that Rodriguez put
his hands on her waist. Again, these comments relate to different points in time. The
investigator asked the victim about how the assault began, while counsel asked the victim
if Rodriguez touched her when he was inserting his fingers and his penis into her vagina.
These statements are not inconsistent.
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Third, Rodriguez notes that the victim told the investigator he tried to remove her
shorts and underwear, but only claimed at trial that he tried to move her shorts and
underwear to the side. These statements are reasonably consistent. The victim told the
investigator that Rodriguez “tried” to remove her underwear, causing her to wake up. The
investigator asked if Rodriguez pulled her shorts and underwear “aside,” and the victim
agreed with this statement. During trial, the victim testified that she woke up because she
“noticed that [Rodriguez] kept on trying to move [her] shorts.” The victim also testified
that Rodriguez tried to move her shorts “to the side.” The victim’s statements to the
investigator are consistent with her trial testimony.
The victim’s statements to her cousin and the trial testimony. Rodriguez claims
the victim made a statement to her cousin that was inconsistent with the victim’s trial
testimony. Cousin testified that the victim told her she had been raped . Cousin testified
that during this conversation, the victim told her that Rodriguez “kept, like, scooting closer
and closer to her, and she kept scooting away . . . and he would just keep getting closer and
closer.” The investigator later interviewed cousin and asked about this conversation.
Cousin told the investigator that
[the victim] said that at night when she was sleeping he started
like scooting closer to her and so she would scoot away and he
just kept like getting closer and closer and she didn’t know
what to do and so I guess he was just trying like to do whatever
and she said when he kept trying she just like eventually just
gave up because she didn’t know what to do . . . .
Rodriguez claims these statements are inconsistent because the victim did not claim
at trial that she tried to move away from Rodriguez. The record does not support this
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argument. During cross -examination, defense counsel asked the victim, “And when
[Rodriguez] was getting close, you didn’t leave the bed, just scooted over, correct?” The
victim replied, “Correct.” Cousin’s statements to the investigator and at trial that the victim
tried to move away from Rodriguez are consistent with the victim’s trial testimony.
The victim’s statements to her sister and the trial testimony. Rodriguez claims the
victim made inconsistent statements to her sister concerning whether Rodriguez ran his
hands up the victim’s legs. Sister spoke to the investigator about her conversation with the
victim and stated,
[the victim] told me that [Rodriguez], when they were sleeping
[she] was facing this way so he thought she was sleeping, . . .
and he was like running his hands up her legs and trying to pull
down her shorts and . . . move [her shorts] out of the way and
. . . then so she just like froze and then it happened.
At tria l, sister testified that the morning after the assault, the victim “ said that, that
[Rodriguez] slowly started pulling down her shorts, and she would raise them back up, and
then . . . he pulled her shorts down, and then she kind of froze, and then it just happened.”
Rodriguez argues that sister’s statement to the investigator conflicts with the
victim’s trial testimony because the victim never stated that Rodriguez touched her legs.
We do not agree. The victim testified she woke up when she felt Rodriguez moving her
shorts and underwear. The victim’s shorts necessarily touched her legs. While the victim
did not specifically emphasize that Rodriguez touched her legs while he was moving her
shorts, the statements are not inconsistent. Thus, the victim’s statements to her sister are
reasonably consistent with the testimony presented at trial.
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In sum, we determine that cousin’s and sister’s testimony, and their statements to
the investigator, are reasonably consistent with the victim’s trial testimony. The victim’s
statements to the investigator were also reasonably consistent with her trial testimony.
Given the record, we determine that Rodriguez has not satisfied his burden of showing that
an error occurred. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
witnesses’ statements.
C. The district court did not improperly admit character evidence.
Rodriguez claims the district court prejudicially erred by admitting character
evidence related to his anger issues. We review the district court ’s evidentiary rulings for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). Where, as here,
the defendant objects to the testimony, we review for harmless error. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d
at 887. An error is harmless if there is “no reasonable possibility that it substantially
influence[d] the jury’ s decision.” State v. Taylor , 869 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted) . The appellant bears the burden of proving that he or she was
prejudiced as a result of an error. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016).
The admissibility of character evidence is governed by Minn. R. Evid. 404.
“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose
of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(a).
Character evidence is generally prohibited to ensure that the jury does not return a
conviction to penalize a defendant for “past misdeeds or simply because [the defendant] is
an undesirable person.” State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1981).
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Rodriguez argues the district court improperly admitted evidence showing that he
was an angry person. During redirect examination, the prosecutor asked the victim why
she did not scream or yell in the hotel room during the sexual assault:
COUNSEL : At the point that you were being assaulted, at the
point that the defendant had his penis in your vagina,
. . . did you feel that you could leave?
VICTIM: No.
COUNSEL : Why not?
VICTIM: Because he has previous —like he has really bad
anger issues that I’ve seen before.

Defense counsel objected to this testimony. The district court overruled the objection and
permitted the victim to finish answering the question:
VICTIM: [ Rodriguez] has previous stuff of being—having
anger issues and stuff, so I was kind of scare d. Well, you
know, you shouldn’t be scared of your cousin, but I was at that
moment because I don’t know what could have happened if I
screamed out loud and everybody was in the hotel, and it could
have caused a really big scene, and so I just didn’t say anything.
COUNSEL : . . . [Y] ou said that you were scared; were you
scared of the defendant?
VICTIM: Correct.
COUNSEL : What were you scared he would do to you?
VICTIM: He could have —he could have done anything. I’m
not, like, specific on what he could have done, but —I was just
scared.

Rodriguez argues the victim’s testimony that he had “anger issues” allowed the
prosecutor to use the evidence for the improper purpose of showing that he acted in
conformity with his character as an angry person. We disagree. This line of questioning
was intended to show the victim’s state of mind , establish the nature of their relationship,
and explain why the victim was scared to get out of bed or cry out for help. Rodriguez
admitted during his own testimony that he s exually penetrated the victim but claimed that
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the act was consensual. The victim testified during her direct examination that she “froze”
and was fearful of Rodriguez. During cross-examination, the defense asked the victim if
she yelled or tried to get out of the bed. The victim stated she did not yell or try to leave.
On redirect, the state asked the victim to explain why she did not yell or try to leave . The
victim explained that she believed Rodriguez had anger issues and she was afraid. The
brief testimony related to Rodriguez ’s anger issues was not presented to prove his bad
character, but to help “illuminate” his relationship with the victim. State v. Diamond, 241
N.W.2d 95, 99 ( Minn. 1976). Thus, the statement does not constitute improper cha racter
evidence under rule 404(a), and the district court did not err by admitting it. Because the
district court’s decision to admit the evidence was not error, we need not consider whether
the evidence affected the verdict.
Affirmed.