In re the Matter of: Kaitlyn Mae Steffenhagen, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1176

In re the Matter of: Kaitlyn Mae Steffenhagen, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Christian Castrillon,
Appellant.

Filed March 14, 2022
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-DA-FA-21-2748

John J. Steffenhagen, Hellmuth & Johnson, PLLC, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Barry S. Edwards, Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith, Tracy
M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s issuance of an order for protection, arguing
that the district court violated his right to procedural due process. We affirm.

FACTS
This appeal stems from the district court’s issuance of an order for protection (OFP)
against appellant Christian Castrillon in favor of respondent Kaitlyn Mae Steffenhagen .
According to the district court’s findings in support of the OFP, Castrillon and
Steffenhagen previously had a romantic relationship and lived together with Castrillon’s
sister. The relationship ended in May 2021. Steffenhagen began dating other people,
which upset Castrillon. On June 1, 2021, Castrillon went to the parties’ former residence
looking for a cat that he had purchased while they were a couple. He pushed Steffenhagen
and later forced his way into her bedroom, breaking the door handle. Steffenhagen had
used a “security bar” to secure her bedr oom door shut. Castrillon picked up the bar from
the floor, and Steffenhagen feared that he would use it as a weapon. Although Castrillon
did not do so, the altercation upset Steffenhagen so much that she vomited. And at some
point during the incident, Steffenhagen sustained minor injuries.
Steffenhagen petitioned the district court for an OFP against Castrillon, and the
district court issued an ex parte OFP. The district court scheduled a remote Zoom hearing
for June 8, 2021. At the June 8 hearing, Castrillon denied the allegations and requested an
evidentiary hearing. The district court continued the matter to June 9 for a Zoom
evidentiary hearing. The continuance order instructed the parties to email copies of their
exhibits to the court and to each other. The order also instructed the parties to prepare a
transcript of any video exhibits and to provide the recording in a playable format . The
record indicates that Castrillon did not receive the continuance order until the morning of
June 9.
At the June 9 Zoom hearing, both parties appeared pro se. At the start of the hearing,
Steffenhagen asked if the district court had received the documents that she had sent on
“Monday.” The district court indicated that it had received the documents and as ked
whether they had been sent to Castrillon. Steffenhagen stated that the documents had not
been sent to Castrillon because she did not know she was required to do so. The district
court asked Castrillon if he wanted a continuance. He stated that he wa nted to move
forward with the hearing.
Steffenhagen testified at the hearing. And she submitted text messages and photos
into evidence. Castrillon did not object to the admission of those exhibits. Steffenhagen
asked to submit a video into evidence. In stead of accepting the video, the district court
asked Castrillon if he would stipulate that the video showed “ a damaged doorknob .”
Castrillon agreed to do so.
Castrillon testified that he caused Steffenhagen’s injuries while acting in self -
defense and that “all [his] efforts were to try to get out of the household.” Castrillon told
the district court that he wanted to submit two videos as evidence but he had “no instruction
on how to do so whatsoever.” According to Castrillon, the videos showed that he did not
direct physical force toward Steffenhagen but was merely trying “ to get out of the
household.” The district court did not refuse his request, but Castrillon was unable to
transmit the videos electronically during the hearing. After his efforts fa iled, the district
court prompted him to move on. Castrillon did so, without objecting or requesting a
continuance or other accommodations.
The district court granted Steffenhagen’s petition for an OFP. In doing so, t he
district court found Castrillon to be less credible than Steffenhagen and described his claim
of self -defense as “not credible.” The district court found that Castrillon had pushed
Steffenhagen while retrieving the cat, left with the cat, returned to Steffenhagen’s bedroom,
and forced his way in by breaking the door handle. The district court found that Castrillon
then picked up the security bar, causing Steffenhagen to fear that he would use i t as a
weapon. The district court also found that Castrillon caused Steffenhagen to suffer minor
injuries. Castrillon appeals.
DECISION
Castrillon contends that the district court violated his right to procedural due process
at the OFP hearing. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that a person
shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. “We conduct a two-step analysis to determine
whether the government has violated an individual’s procedural due process rights.” Sawh
v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012). “First, we must identify whether
the government has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest.”
Id. “If the government’s action does not deprive an individual of such an interest, then no
process is due.” Id. If the government has deprived an individual of a protected interest,
we then determine whether the procedures provided were suffici ent. Id. To do so, we
consider three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Id. Those
factors are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government ’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
“The procedures afforded by the government must provide an individual with notice
and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Sawh,
823 N.W.2d at 632 (quotations omitted).
Whether the government has violated an individual’s procedural-due-process rights
is a question of law, which we review de novo. Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785
(Minn. 2014). In addition, three principles apply to our review. First, we do not consider
issues that are inadequately briefed. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers,
Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997). Second, an assignment of error based on “mere
assertion” and not supported by argument or authority is forfeited unless prejudicial error
is obvious. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn.
1971). And third, to obtain relief on appeal, an appellant must show both error by the
district court and prejudice arising from that error. Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr.,
Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975).
Even though Castrillon alleges a procedural-due-process violation, his appellate
brief does not apply the two -step analysis that governs such a determination. Sawh, 823
N.W.2d at 632. When this court questioned his failure t o do so during oral argument,
Castrillon’s attorney suggested that the Mathews factors are inapplicable to his due-process
claim. We are not persuaded. But we need not consider application of the Mathews factors
because the record does not support Castrillon’s due-process challenge.
Castrillon alleges that the district court violated his right to procedural due process
by refusing “to admit his exhibits that were not disclosed before the hearing,” even though
the district court admitted undisclosed exhibits from Steffenhagen. His specific complaint
is that the district court refused to admit his proffered videos as evidence. But the record
shows that the district court did not refuse to admit Castrillon’s videos based on the timing
of his disclosure. In fact, the district court never ruled that the videos were inadmissible.
Instead, the district court directed that the videos be marked as exhibits and asked Castrillon
if he wanted to “screen share” them. Castrillon replied, “I don’t know if I can do that with
the current setup. Can I email [them] or something?” The district court expressed concern
that the videos could not be emailed because of their length.
When it became apparent that Castrillon was unable to transmit the videos to the
district court during the hearing, the district court prompted him to move on, stating, “Well,
I think that you’ve given . . . a good description of the videos . Did you want to call your
witness?” Castrillon, without objection, called his witness.
In sum, the record indicates that the district court was willing to receive the videos
as exhibits, but Castrillon was not prepared to submit them electronically. Castrillon argues
that he was prejudiced by the district court’s inability to view the videos because the y
showed that Steffenhagen was the aggressor and that he acted in self -defense. For the
reasons that follow, we are not persuaded.
Castrillon described the content of the videos as follows:
So the video will show me pleading with [Steffenhagen]
to let me out of the room after I took possession of my cat. It
will show that I had no violent intent, but it was just me trying
to leave the premises. I even attempted to jump out of the third-
story window in an effort to avoid any kind of conflict with
her.

The second video will show -- after the incident -- you
know, it will show me panting, and you will hear her vomiting
in the kitchen -- bathroom. But I locked myself into the
bathroom in an attempt to get away from her. Afterwards, it
becomes all audio because I put my phone in my front shirt
pocket. But you can hear her attack me, completely
unprovoked, while I was just walking around, looking for the
cat.

A valid self-defense claim requires an absence of aggression or provocation by the
party claiming self-defense, and the person acting in self-defense must have no reasonable
alternative. State v. Soukup, 656 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 29, 2003). At the OFP hearing, Castrillon admitted that he broke into Steffenhagen’s
bedroom. That circumstance indicates that he was the aggressor and undermines his self-
defense claim. We do not see how viewing the video content described by Castrillon would
have changed the district court’s determination that neither he nor his self -defense claim
was credible.
On this record, Castrillo n fails to establish a procedural-due-process violation or
other error justifying relief. The district court did not receive either party’s video as
evidence. Instead, the district court accepted each party’s description of their video
evidence, heard ea ch party’s testimony, and determined that Steffenhagen was more
credible than Castrillon. We discern no basis to reverse.
Affirmed.