State of Minnesota, Respondent,

1
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1188

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Matthew Christopher Kurtenbach,
Appellant.

Filed July 18, 2022
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-20-1862

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John L. Fossum, Rice County Attorney, Sean R. McCarthy, Assistant County Attorney,
Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues on direct appeal that (1) the state presented insufficient evidence
to support his conviction of receiving stolen property and (2) he is entitled to credit for
time he spent in custody in South Dakota on South Dakota state charges. We affirm.
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FACTS
On August 13, 2020, appellant Matthew Christopher Kurtenbach went to an
automobile dealership in Sioux Falls, South Dakota , and asked to test drive a 2016 Ford
Explorer. Appellant signed a t est-drive agreement, which stated that the vehicle must be
used only for test-drive purposes and must be returned to the dealership by the end of that
day. He then drove away in the vehicle. He did not return the vehicle by the end of the
day. The dealership called the police and reported the vehicle stolen.
Two days later, Faribault police received complaints about a bl ack Ford Explorer
driving erratically. A police officer found the Ford Explorer in the parking lot of the
Faribault Walmart. The officer ran the vehicle -identification number through a database
and discovered that the vehicle had been reported stolen in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The
officer viewed video surveillance of the Walmart parking lot, which showed a ppellant
getting out of the vehicle and entering the store. The officer found appellant shopping in
the store. The officer told appellant that he suspected that appellant possessed a stolen
vehicle and asked if he arrived in the vehicle. Appellant said he did. The officer found the
vehicle’s keys in appellant’s pocket and arrested him.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with receiving stolen property in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2020), for possessing a stolen vehicle. After his
arrest, a ppellant was held in Minnesota jails and then extradited to South Dakota on
September 29, 2020, to face South Dakota state charges. He stayed in custody in South
Dakota until he was transferred back to Minnesota on March 5, 2021. He then remained
in custody in Minnesota until his trial in May 2021.
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After his trial, t he jury found appellant guilty of receiving stolen pro perty. At
sentencing, appellant sought credit for the 156 days between September 30, 2020, and
March 4, 2021, that he was held in custody in South Dakota on South Dakota charges. The
district court denied appellant’s custody-credit request. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The state produced sufficient evidence to prove that the vehicle was stolen.
Appellant argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove that he
received a stolen vehicle because the state’s circumstantial evidence failed to eliminate the
reasonable inference that he took the vehicle with the dealership’s consent and did not
intend to deprive the dealership permanently of possession. We disagree.
For the jury to find appellant guilty of receiving stolen property under Mi nn. Stat.
§ 609.53, subd. 1, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
“receive[d], possesse[d], transfer[ed], b [ought], or conceal[ed] any stolen property . . .
knowing or having reason to know the property was stolen.” Although section 609.53 does
not provide a definition for the term “stolen,” the term includes, at minimum, property
taken without the owner’s consent and with the intent to deprive the owner permanently of
possession. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020) (section defining theft).
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we thoroughly examine the record
to determine whether the state produced sufficient evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, to allow the jury to reach its verdict. State v. Griffin , 887
N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). We use a two -step analysis when reviewing the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence . State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn.
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2013). First, we identify the circumstances proved. Id. We consider “only those
circumstances that are consistent with the verdict,” deferring to the jury’s acceptance of
the proof of those circumstances and its rejection of conflicting evidence. Id. at 599.
Second, we “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted).
We examine independently the “reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn,”
giving no deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id. (quotations
omitted). Because intent is generally proved by circumstantial evidence, see State v.
McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn. 2021) , we apply the circumstantial- evidence test
here.
First, the record reflects that t he state proved the following circumstances at trial .
On August 13, 2020, appellant told a salesperson at the South Dakota dealership that he
wanted to test drive the vehicle. Appellant signed a t est-drive agreement, which stated in
large, bold type that the vehicle must be returned the same day as the test drive. The
agreement also stated that the vehicle could be used for “test drive use only.” Appellant
drove away in the vehicle . The salesperson called appellant an hour later, and appellant
said that he would return soon to purchase it. Appellant did not return the vehicle to the
dealership. The salesperson called appellant approximately 20 times that evening, but
appellant did not answer or return any of those calls. The dealership posted on its Facebook
page that the vehicle was missing. The dealership also reported the vehicle stolen to police.
Two days later, Faribault police received calls that a vehicle matching the description of
the one appellant took in South Dakota was driving erratically. An officer found the vehicle
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parked at the Faribault Walmart and confirmed that it was the vehicle that had been taken
from the dealership and reported stolen. The officer found appellant shopping inside the
Walmart. Appellant told the officer that he arrived in the vehicle, and the officer found the
vehicle’s key in appellant’s pocket. Appellant told the officer that he test drove the vehicle
two days earlier in South Dakota.
Next, viewing the evidence as a whole, we conclude that the circumstances proved
are consistent with appellant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis.
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the circumstances proved is that appellant
took the vehicle without the consent of the dealership and with the intent to deprive the
dealership of possession permanently.
Appellant argues that the state’s evidence did not show that he took the vehicle
without the dealership’s consent because the salesperson testified that appellant had
consent to take the vehicle off the dealership lot on August 13, 2020. But appellant signed
a test drive agreement clearly stating that the vehicle had to be returned the same day as
the test drive, and appellant still had the vehicle two days later. Although appellant initially
had consent to test drive the vehicle on August 13, he did not have consent to take the
vehicle after August 13. Additionally, the t est-drive agreement limited appellant’s use of
the vehicle to “test drive use only.” Police found appellant with the vehicle in a different
state, on a shopping trip, two days after he took the vehicle from the dealership. The
circumstances proved therefore support a reasonable inference that appellant intended to,
and did, take the vehicle without consent. Cf. State v. Lopez, 908 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn.
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2018) (stating that, in burglary context, defendant enters building without consent if he
exceeds scope of consent by entering part of building not open to public).
Appellant also argues that the state’s evidence did not show that appellant took the
car with the intent to deprive the dealership of possession permanently. Appellant points
to the fact that no witness testified that he drove the vehicle to Minnesota; no evidence
showed that he altered, concealed, or tried to sell the vehicle; and he provided a reasonable
explanation for why the vehicle had not been returned. But the state only needed to prove
that appellant possessed a stolen vehicle, not that he tried to alter, conceal, or sell that
vehicle. See Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1. And appellant’s statement to the officer that
he intended to return the vehicle is not a circumstance proved because we defer to the jury’s
rejection of appellant’s explanation for not returning the vehicle. See State v. Moore, 846
N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014) (noting that, because jury evaluates credibility of evidence,
appellate courts view conflicting evidence in light most favorable to verdict when
identifying circumstances proved).
Because the circumstances proved show that appellant took the vehicle without
consent and with the intent to deprive the dealership permanently of possession, and there
is no other reasonable hypothesis, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence
to support appellant’s receiving-stolen-property conviction.
II. Appellant is not entitled to custody credit for the 156 days he spent in custody
in South Dakota for a South Dakota state offense.

Appellant argues that he should receive 156 days of custody credit for time served
in South Dakota on South Dakota state charges because (1) the distinct ion between
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interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional custody credit should be abandoned and (2) the
governor’s decision to extradite him to South Dakota deprived him of credit he would have
received had he been allowed to stay in custody in Minnesota.1 We are not persuaded.
“The district court’s decision whether to award custody credit is a mixed question
of fact and law; the court must determine the circumstances of the custody the defendant
seeks credit for, and then apply the rules to those circumstances.” State v. Roy, 928 N.W.2d
341, 344 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). We review the district court’s fact findings for
clear error but review questions of law de novo. See id. A defendant has the burden of
establishing that he is entitled to c ustody credit. Id. A defendant is entitled to custody
credit for time “spent in custody in connection with the offense or behavioral incident being
sentenced.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B).
The Minnesota Supreme C ourt applies a different test fo r “intrajurisdictional
custody (custody within Minnesota) and interjurisdictional custody (custody outside of
Minnesota).” Roy , 928 N.W.2d at 345. For intrajurisdictional custody credit, courts
consider several factors. Id. But for interjurisdictional custody credit, courts consider only
whether the defendant’s Minnesota offense is “the sole reason” for the custody. Id.
(quotation omitted).
Here, a ppellant concedes that his Rice County receiving -stolen-property offense
was not the sole reason for his South Dakota custody. Rather, he argues that the distinction

1 Appellant made these same arguments in a recent, similar appeal. We rejected them. See
State v. Kurtenbach, No. A21-0526, 2021 WL 4259152, at *4 (Minn. App. Sept. 20, 2021),
rev. granted (Minn. Nov. 24, 2021) and ord. granting rev. vacated (Minn. June 9, 2022).
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between interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional custody credit should be abandoned
because it is unfair. But we are bound by supreme court precedent . State v. Curtis , 921
N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018 ). In Roy, t he supreme court recently applied the
interjurisdictional custody-credit rule and refused to apply the intrajurisdictional custody-
credit factors to a case involving interjurisdictional custody. 928 N.W.2d at 345 -47. We
must therefore also apply the interjurisdictional rule here. Because the interjurisdictional
rule applies and appellant’s Rice County charge was not the sole reason for h is South
Dakota custody, appellant is not entitled to custody credit for the 156 days he spent in
custody in South Dakota.
Appellant next argues that he is entitled to credit for the time he spent in South
Dakota custody because the governor’s decision to extradite him to South Dakota deprived
him of custody credit he would have earned had he been allowed to stay in Minnesota
custody. Appellant relies on State v. Hagdu, 681 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. App. 2004) , rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2004). In Hagdu, we held that a defendant should receive custody
credit for time spent in the custody of the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). Id. at 33. We first determined that the defendant’s INS custody did not
meet the interjurisdictional test bec ause the time spent in INS custody “serve[d] the
separate, non-penal purposes of the INS.” Id. But w e held that the underlying Minn. R.
Civ. P. 27.03 test of “whether the time was served in connection with the offense on
which . . . credit is sought” applied to INS custody and concluded that the defendant’s INS
custody was “in connection with” his Minnesota offense because it was a direct result of
his Minnesota conviction and because “if [the defendant ] had not posted bail, he would
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have remai ned at the [Minnesota correctional facility] and received jail credit .” Id.
(quotations omitted).
Appellant argues that the reasoning of Hagdu applies here because the governor’s
decision to extradite appellant to South Dakota resulted in appellant being confined in
South Dakota instead of Minnesota. Hagdu is distinguishable for two reasons . F irst,
appellant was not in INS nonpunitive detention, he was in South Dakota custody for South
Dakota state criminal offenses. Second, unlike in Hagdu, in which the defendant’s INS
custody was a direct result of his Minnesota conviction, appellant’s extradition to South
Dakota custody was not a result of his Rice County offens e. Rather, it arose from his
unrelated South Dakota state offenses. We therefore conclude that appellant is not entitled
to custody credit based on the governor’s decision to extradite him to South Dakota.
Affirmed.