State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1196

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Harun Warsame Abdi,
Appellant.

Filed August 1, 2022
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-19-6527

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge .
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his assault conviction, arguing that his constitutional right to
a speedy trial was violated and the district court abused its discretion by admitting the out-
of-court statement of a witness who did not recall the events at trial. We affirm.
2
FACTS
On August 2, 2019, a woman (wife) called 911 to report that her husband, appellant
Harun Warsame Abdi , had assaulted her in their St. Cloud apartment. In a recorded
statement to the responding officer, wife stated that Abdi hit her in the head and choked
her while she was in bed with their baby, causing her to lose consciousness. When she
came to, Abdi w as on top of her , choking her with one hand and striking her in the face
with the other. He then got off the bed and struck her with a clothes hanger and a kitchen
mallet before leaving the apartment. The responding officer photographed wife’s injuries.
Approximately a week later, a neighbor, H.S., gave a recorded statement to police
about the incident . H.S. recounted that wife came to her apartment in the middle of the
night following the assault. H.S. observed that she was crying and upset, could barely talk,
and had facial injuries. She then went to Abdi’s apartment, where she found Abdi holding
the baby. H.S. took the baby from Abdi and returned to wife.
Law enforcement located and arrested Abdi several days later. Respondent State of
Minnesota charged him with felony domestic assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2247,
subd. 2 (2018). At his first court appearance on August 14, Abdi informed the court that
he was not requesting a speedy trial at that time . He posted bail and was released from
custody subject to a domestic -abuse no- contact order . At a settlement conference on
February 7, 2020, Abdi asked the district court to set the case for a two -day jury trial in
“mid to end of April or early May” and confirmed he was making his request “without
regard to time.” The court scheduled the trial for May 5.
3
On March 25, the district court canceled the trial pursuant to the order issued by the
Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court in response to the COVID -19 pandemic.
See Continuing Operations of the Courts of the State of Minnesota Under a Statewide
Peacetime Declaration of Emergency , No. ADM20- 8001 (Minn. Mar. 20, 2020)
(prohibiting the commencement of new jury trials by order of the Chief Justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court); Order Governing the Operations of the Minnesota Judicial
Branch Under Emergency Executive Order Nos. 20 -53, 20-56, No. ADM20- 8001 (Minn.
May 15, 2020) (ext ending the jury moratorium in accordance with the Governor’s
executive orders regarding COVID -19 restrictions). On August 18, Abdi filed a letter
asking the district court not to “set it for trial at this point” in light of ongoing plea
negotiations with the state. After the parties failed to reach a plea agreement, the district
court rescheduled the trial for December 17. Abdi later requested a continuance , and t he
district court rescheduled the trial for May 17, 2021.
On April 27, 2021, Abdi filed a written speedy-trial demand. A t the hearing, the
district court found good cause to again continue the trial because there was only one
courtroom “capable of doing trials during the pandemic” in Stearns County consistent with
then-existing COVID -19 restrictions. See Order Governing the Continuing Operations of
the Minnesota Judicial Branch, No. ADM20- 8001, at 2 (Minn. Mar . 22, 2021) (providing
that in-person criminal jury trials must adhere to the guidelines a nd exposure measures in
certain Judicial Branch COVID -19 Preparedness Plans) . The court indicated it had
“literally no other options than to continue this matter.”
4
Trial commenced on July 6, 68 days after Abdi demanded a speedy trial. Wife di d
not appear at trial , and t he state called H.S. to describe her interactions with wife on the
night in question. H.S. testified that she could not remember anything. The district court
admitted H.S.’s recorded police statement as substantive evidence under the r esidual
exception to the hearsay rule. The jury found Abdi guilty, 1 and he now appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not violate Abdi’s right to a speedy trial.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions afford criminal defendants the right
to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. “Whether a defendant
has been denied a speedy trial is a constitutional question subject to de novo review.” State
v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017). Deprivation of the right to a speedy trial
requires dismissal of the case. Id.
To determine whether a defendant’s speedy-trial right was violated, we apply the
balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972) . Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 627. Under the Barker test, we consider four
factors: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant
asserted his or he r right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the
defendant.” Id. (quotations omitted).

1 Before trial, t he state filed amended complaints adding two counts of misdemeanor
domestic assault and a single count of felony threats of violence . Prior to jury selection,
the state dismissed the felony charges. Abdi was convicted of the remaining misdemeanor
charges.
5
Abdi argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated because trial began more
than 60 days after his speedy- trial demand. When evaluating t he first Barker factor, any
delay beyond 60 days is “presumptively prejudicial,” requiring consideration of the other
three Barker factors. State v. Paige, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2022 WL 2826253, at *4 (Minn.
July 20, 2022) (quotation omitted) ; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09 (stating that once a
defendant enters a plea other than guilty, “the trial must start within 60 days unless the
court finds good cause for a later trial date”). It is undisputed that Abdi asserted his right
to a speedy trial on April 27, 2021, and trial began on July 6, 2021, 68 days later.
Accordingly, both the first and third Barker factors support Abdi’s argument. We now
turn to the remaining factors.
Abdi asserts that the state is solely responsible for the trial delay. We disagree. Our
supreme court recently rejected this argument in Paige. 2022 WL 2826253, at *5-6. There,
the supreme court held “ that trial delays due to the statewide orders issued in response to
the COVID- 19 global pandemic do not weigh against the State.” Id. at *5. And, as in this
case, the trial was postponed pursuant to the Chief Justice’s order and COVID -19
protocols. Id. at *1-3. Following Paige, we conclude that the delay here is not attributable
to the state.
Under the fourth Barker factor, we consider prejudice by focusing on the
defendant ’s interests in: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing
the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense
will be impaired.” State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 253 (Minn. 2021) (quoting State v.
Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 318 (Minn. 1999) ). Impairment of the defense is the “most
6
serious” of these interests . State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 20 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted). Consideration of these three interests undermines Abdi’s assertion that the trial
delay prejudiced him.
Abdi posted bail shortly after being arrested and does not argue that the t rial delay
impaired his defense. But he asserts that he “suffered prejudice in the form of continued
anxiety and concern” because the domestic -abuse no- contact order prohibited him from
“see[ing] his family for over two years,” including not “meet[ing] his youngest child until
after sentencing.” He does not explain how the 68 days between his speedy- trial demand
and the start of trial ex acerbated those effects, let alone how the 8 -day delay beyond the
60-day speedy-trial period did so. Abdi did not invoke his speedy-trial right for almost two
years and asked to continue the trial date several times before he made his speedy -trial
demand.
Having considered the Barker factors, “we turn to the delicate and sensitive
balancing required to answer whether the State brought [Abdi] to trial quickly enough so
as not to endanger the values that the speedy trial right protects.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at
255. On balance, these factors demonstrate Abdi’s constitutional right to a speedy trial
was not violated. Abdi’s trial proceeded 68 days after he demanded a speedy trial . As in
Paige, Abdi’s trial did not begin within 60 days of his demand because of pandemic-related
restrictions that prevented the district court from holding any trials. 2022 WL 2826253, at
*1-3. Given that the delay is not attributable to the state or Abdi , and Abdi makes no
compelling argument that the brief delay prejudiced him in any way, we discern no
endangerment of the values the speedy -trial right protects.
7
II. Any error in the admission of H.S.’s recorded statement was harmless.

Abdi argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting H.S.’s recorded
statement under the residual hearsay exception. Hearsay is “a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence t o prove
the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it
falls into a prescribed hearsay exception. Minn. R. Evid. 802. Statements not covered
under a specific hearsay exception may still be admissible under t he residual exception if
they have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” and the district court
determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it i s
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.

Minn. R. Evid. 807; see State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 292- 93 (Minn. 2019) (stating
that the district court first evaluates “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
[the] hearsay statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness ” and then must
“determine whether the three enumerated requirements of Rule 807 are met ” (alteration in
original) (quotations omitted)).
We review a district court’s “determination that a statement meets the foundational
requirements of a hearsay exception . . . for an abuse of discretion.” Holt v. State , 772
N.W.2d 470, 483 (Minn. 2009). On appeal, the defendant must demonstrate that the district
court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence and that they were prejudiced by its
8
admission. State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. 1997). In determining whether
the erroneous admission of evidence was prejudicial or harmless, we consider whether
there is “no reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly
affected the verdict.” State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 2006) (quotation
omitted). Error is harmless if the jury could have reached the same “verdict based on the
other evidence . . . presented .” State v. Blasus, 445 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 1989). Put
another way, the question is “whether the error substantially influenced the verdict.” State
v. Expose, 872 N.W.2d 252, 260 (Minn. 2015). Based on our careful review of the record,
we conclude the answer is no.
As Abdi himself points out, the trial record contains evidence that is more probative
of the trial issues than H.S.’s recorded statement. In the 911 call recording, wife reports
that her husband hurt and threatened to kill her and identifies Abdi as her husband. She
reiterates th ese facts and describes the assault in further detail in her later recorded
statement to the responding officer . Numerous photographs depict wife’s injuries. And
the responding officer testified at length at trial about what took place on the night of the
assault, which included him identifying wife as the 911 caller and victim and taking
photographs of her injuries. This evidenc e—which is not challenged on appeal —goes to
the relationship between Abdi and wife , Abd i’s threats to wife, the date of the assault ,
wife’s identity as the victim, and wife’s injuries. In short, the record persuades us that any
error in the admission of H.S.’s recorded statement did not substantially influence the
verdict and was, therefore, harmless.
Affirmed.