Brent A. Ristow, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1204

Brent A. Ristow,
Appellant,

vs.

Amanda Cunningham,
Respondent.

Filed April 18, 2022
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-20-1564

Brent Alan Ristow, West Saint Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Jerome D. Feriancek, Julie R. Benfield, Trial Group North, Du luth, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Brent A. Ristow was denied admissi on to the Minnesota bar based on a
determination by the Board of Law Examiners that he lack s the required good character
and fitness to practice law. He later lear ned that Amanda Cunningham, with whom he
previously had had a romantic relationship, had provided bo th an oral statement and a
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written statement to the board before it made its decision. Ristow sued Cunningham for
defamation. The district court rejected Ristow’s claims on Cunningham’s motion for
partial summary judgment. We conclude th at Cunningham is immune from liability on
Ristow’s defamation claims based on a rule governing admission to the bar. Therefore, we
affirm.
FACTS
Ristow graduated from law school in 2014. He passed the bar examination that year
but was denied admission becau se the board determined, for 14 reasons, that he had not
satisfied his burden to show good char acter and fitness to practice law. See Minn. R.
Admission to Bar 5.B.
Between early 2016 and early 2017, Ri stow and Cunningham had a romantic
relationship. After the relationship ended, Cunningham sued Ristow in conciliation court
to recover $3,641 that she claimed to have lent him to pay for a repair of his vehicle. A
conciliation court judge found that the partie s had not agreed that Ristow would repay
Cunningham for the amount of the repairs and entered judgment in favor of Ristow.
In December 2017, Ristow applied for admission to the bar a second time. He
passed the bar examination in February 2018. The board again cond ucted an assessment
of his character and fitness. In October 2018, a member of the board’s staff called
Cunningham to gather information. Cunningha m told the staff member that Ristow had
threatened to kill her on two occasions. The staff memb er asked Cunningham to provide
an affidavit restating the info rmation that she had shared during the telephone call.
Cunningham submitted an affidavit in which she stated that Ristow twice had said that he
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would shoot her if he ever found her with another man. She also stated in the affidavit that
Ristow had not repaid money that she had lent him.
In February 2019, an attorney representin g the board sent Rist ow a ten-page letter
informing him that his app lication for admission to the bar was denied, for multiple
reasons, including a pattern of dishonesty in financial dealings, failure to timely file
income-tax returns, and false statements to the board and others. The letter did not mention
Cunningham and did not refer to the statements that she had provided to the board.
Ristow pursued an administrative appeal of the board’s adverse determination. The
board held an evidentia ry hearing in July 2019. Cunning ham testified under oath at the
hearing. The board upheld its decision to deny Ristow admission to the bar.
Shortly after the board’s ev identiary hearing, Ristow commenced this action against
Cunningham in the Ramsey County District Court. A month later, Ristow amended the
complaint. In the amended complaint, Ristow alleges that Cunningham defamed him by
making statements in October 2018 to the board staff member that he had threatened to kill
her and that he had not repaid a debt to her. In addition, Ristow alleges that Cunningham
made the same two statements to two other persons.
In May 2020, Cunningham moved for pa rtial summary judgment. Cunningham
argued that Ristow’s claims concerning her statements to the board are barred by the
doctrine of absolute privilege and that she is immune from liability based on rule 13.B. of
the Minnesota Rules Governing Admission to the Bar.
In August 2020, the district court filed an order in which it granted Cunningham’s
motion. In an accompanying memorandum, the district court discussed both the doctrine
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of absolute privilege and the immunity provided by rule 13.B. In the same order, the
district court granted Cunningham’s motion to transfer venue to St. Louis County, where
she lives.
In March 2021, Cunningham moved for summary judgment on Ristow’s remaining
claims, which concern statements Cunningham allegedly made to two other persons. The
St. Louis County District Court granted Cunningham’s second summary-judgment motion
in July 2021. The district court entered final judgment in September 2021.
Ristow appeals. He challenges only the grant of partial summary judgment on his
claims concerning statements that Cunningham made to the board.
DECISION
Ristow argues that the district court erred by granting Cunn ingham’s motion for
partial summary judgment on the ground that her allegedly defamatory statements to the
board are not protected by the doctrine of ab solute privilege. In response, Cunningham
argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on Ristow’s claims based on her statements
to the board for two reasons: absolute privilege and rule 13.B. immunity.
A district court must grant a motion fo r summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. A genuine issue of mate rial fact exists if a
rational trier of fact, considering the record as a whole, could find for the nonmoving party.
Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc. , 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 2008). We apply a de
novo standard of review to the district court’s legal conclusions on summary judgment and
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view the evidence in the light most favorable to the part y against whom the motion was
granted. Commerce Bank v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015).
To prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove that
(1) the defamatory statement was communicated to someone
other than the plaintiff; (2) th e statement is false; (3) the
statement tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and to lower
the plaintiff in the estimation of the community; and (4) the
recipient of the false statemen t reasonably understands it to
refer to a specific individual.

Larson v. Gannett Co. , 940 N.W.2d 120, 130 (Minn. 2 020) (quotation omitted). If a
plaintiff establishes these four elements, a defendant nonetheless may avoid liability if the
allegedly defamatory statement is protecte d by the doctrine of absolute privilege. Minke
v. City of Minneapolis, 845 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Minn. 2014). Absolute privilege applies if
the allegedly defamatory statement is “(1) made by a judge, judicial officer, attorney, or
witness; (2) made at a judicial or quasi-judici al proceeding; and (3) . . . relevant to the
subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 306
(Minn. 2007).
In this case, the district court applied the Mahoney three-part test and determined
that each requirement is satisfied. Ristow challenges the district court’s reasoning with
respect to the second requirement. He contends that Cunningham did not make statements
to the board in a quasi-judicial proceeding because she did not make the statements in an
adversarial hearing for which Ristow was given notice and was in attendance. Rather, he
contends, she made the statements in a privat e telephone call and in an affidavit. The
parties have cited caselaw in which the abso lute-privilege doctrine has been applied to
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statements made in adversarial quasi-judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Jenson v. Olson, 141
N.W.2d 488, 489-90 (Minn. 1966) (civil-se rvice hearing reviewing city employee’s
termination); Cole v. Star Trib., 581 N.W.2d 364, 367, 369 (Minn. App. 1998) (Board of
Pardons hearing); Kellar v. VonHoltum, 568 N.W.2d 186, 189, 191-92 (Minn. App. 1997)
(Department of Commerce bank-charter-application hearing), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 31,
1997); Freier v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 197 , 356 N.W.2d 724, 72 6-27, 729 (Minn.
App. 1984) (school-board hearing concerning employment matter). The parties have not
cited any precedential opinion in which the absolute-privilege doctrine has been applied to
statements made during a government agency’s ex parte, non-adversarial investigation.
We need not decide whether the abso lute-privilege doctrine applies in the
circumstances of this case. Rule 13.B. provides a more straightforward means of resolving
the appeal. That rule provid es, “Any person or entity pr oviding to the Board or its
members, employees, agents, or monitors, a ny information, statements of opinion, or
documents regarding an applicant, potential applicant, or conditionally admitted lawyer, is
immune from civil liability for such communications.” Minn. R. Admission to Bar 13.B.
It is undisputed that Cunningham provided, to an employee of the board, information and
statements regarding Ristow, who then was an applicant for admission to the bar.
Accordingly, rule 13.B. applies. The plain language of the rule provides that Cunningham
is immune from civil liability fo r the information and statements that she provided to the
board. See id.
Ristow mentions rule 13.B. in his brief in only a limited way, asserting that the rule
does not immunize Cunningham from civil liability because the rule is not “law.” Ristow
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does not develop the argument. We note that rule 13.B. was promulgated by the supreme
court. Order Amending the Rules for Admission to the Bar, No. C5-84-2139 (Minn. June
12, 2007); Order Amending the Rules fo r Admission to the Bar , No. C5-84-2139 (Minn.
Aug. 25, 2004); Amended Order Promulgating Rules for Admission to the Bar, No. C5-84-
2139 (Minn. Aug. 26, 1998). The supreme court is vested with exclusive authority to
determine who may practice law, to make rules and regulations governing lawyers, and to
supervise and discipline lawyers. See Minn. Stat. § 480.05 (2020); In re Daly, 189 N.W.2d
176, 179 (Minn. 1971); In re Petition for Integration of Bar of Minn., 12 N.W.2d 515, 518
(Minn. 1943); In re Greathouse, 248 N.W. 735, 737 (Minn. 1933). The plain language of
rule 13.B. makes clear that the supreme court intended to confer civil immunity on persons
who provide information to the board concer ning applicants for ad mission to the bar,
without any qualifications or preconditions, such as the three requirements of the absolute-
privilege doctrine. We are unaware of any reason why rule 13.B. should not be applied in
a straightforward manner to the facts and circumstances of this case.
Thus, Cunningham is immune from liability on Ristow’s defamation claims that are
based on Cunningham’s October 2018 statements to the board. Therefore, the district court
did not err by granting Cunningham’s May 2020 motion for partial summary judgment.
Affirmed.