In re the Marriage of: Elizabeth Ann Jones Chidothe, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1216

In re the Marriage of: Elizabeth Ann Jones Chidothe, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Edward Chidothe,
Appellant.

Filed August 15, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-19-1748

Timothy D. Lees, Lees Family Law, Ltd., Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Edward Chidothe, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this family dispute, appellant-husband challenges the district court’s decisions
granting respondent-wife’s motion to enforce various provisions of the stipulated judgment
and decree dissolving the parties’ marriage and ordering the appointment of a parenting
consultant. We reject husband’s argument that the district court should have, sua sponte,
granted him more time to respond to wife’s motion. We also conclude that husband has
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forfeited any challenge to the district court’s decision granting wife’s motion and that, even
if we consider his arguments, they fail on the merits. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-husband Edward Chidothe and respondent -wife Elizabeth Chidothe
married in October 2012 and had one child together, born in 2014. The partie s divorced in
June 2020 under a stipulated judgment and decree.
Under the stipulated judgment and decree, the parties were awarded joint legal and
joint physical custody of the child. The stipulated judgment and decree ordered the
appointment of a parenting consultant to help the parties resolve issues involving the child,
and it ordered the parties to “select and retain” the parenting consultant within 30 days after
entry of the judgment and decree. Additionally, the stipulated judgment and decree
provided that, instead of child support, the parties would “share equally” in certain costs of
raising the child (child-related expenses). The party paying a child -related expense was to
provide written verification of the payment to the other party, who then w as to provide
reimbursement within ten days.
Ten months after entry of the judgment and decree, wife brought a motion before
the district court, seeking various forms of relief, including enforcement of several terms
of the stipulated judgment and decree. Among other relief, wife’s motion requested that
the district court (1) appoint an identified person to serve as the parties’ parenting
consultant; (2) order husband to pay wife $2,765.91 for his one -half share of child -related
expenses wife had paid betw een July 2020 and April 2021; (3) order husband to pay wife
$9,701.31 for her one-half share of a 2018 federal tax refund and to pay one -half of a 2016
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California state income tax liability; and (4) order husband to pay wife $80 in court fees
and $3,000 in attorney fees, which she incurred in bringing the present motion. Wife
submitted an affidavit in support of her motion. In the affidavit, wife alleged that husband
had refused to sign a stipulation agreeing to the appointment of a parenting consultant,
husband had not reimbursed wife for child-related expenses she had paid, and husband had
repeatedly failed to respond to wife’s communications about the issues raised in her
motion.
The district court held a hearing on wife’s motion on May 27, 2021. Husband
appeared pro se at the hearing. He did not file any responsive documents opposing wife’s
motion. On the day of the hearing, husband tried to email several documents to the district
court. The district court stated at the hearing that it would not consider any of husband’s
submissions because he did not properly file or serve the documents in accordance with
relevant procedural rules. Husband told the district court that he was traveling out of the
country during some periods when wife had tried to communicate with him and that he did
not receive the documents until he returned to the United States in April 2021. Husband
also asserted that he had asked wife’s attorney for more time to respond to wife’s motion,
but the attorney refused to agree to an extension, so he submitted the documents by email
to the district court.
The district court granted all of wife’s requested relief in a June 16, 2021 order. The
district court issued another order on June 25, 2021, appointing the parenting consulta nt
who the parties had agreed upon, in accordance with the parties’ stipulated judgment and
decree. Husband appeals from the district court’s orders.
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DECISION
I. The district court did not err by declining to grant husband a continuance.
We first consider hu sband’s contention that he could not adequately respond to
wife’s motion. He appears to argue that the district court should have granted him a
continuance to give him more time to submit evidence. The decision whether to grant a
continuance of a hearing is generally within the district court’s discretion. Szarzynski v.
Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 296- 97 (Minn. App. 2007).
Here, husband received both notice and an opportunity to be heard on wife’s motion,
which satisf ies due-process requirements. See id. Notice of the motion was mailed to
husband’s home address in Minnesota more than one month before the motion hearing was
held. Husband had the chance to submit responsive documents to the district court, but he
failed to do so in a timely and procedurally proper manner. And husband appeared at the
motion hearing and was permitted to make arguments before the district court. At the
hearing, husband did not request that the district court grant a continuance, nor did he file
a post-hearing motion seeking such relief. We therefore see no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s failure to grant a continuance that husband did not request .
We are not persuaded otherwise by husband’s various assertions about why he could
not adequately respond to wife’s motion. In his appellant’s brief, husband asserts that
(1) he was outside the country when wife brought her motion; (2) he contracted COVID -
19 while traveli ng; (3) the district court at first agreed to give husband an extension to
respond to wife’s motion but the district court later did not allow him more time; and (4) the
district court’s online submission site was not functioning and he could not submit
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documents. To support some of these assertions, husband included in his appellate
addendum several documents showing his travel arrangements between December 2020
and June 2021, as well as a few email exchanges. But none of these alleged facts or
additional documents were part of the record before the district court. 1 “The documents
filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall
constitute the record on appeal in all cases.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. We “may not
consider matters outside the record on appeal.” Stageberg v. Stageberg, 695 N.W.2d 609,
613 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2005). Because husband never
submitted these documents or evidence of these other facts to the district court, they are
not part of the record on appeal, and we do not consider them .
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1 At the motion hearing, husband told the district court that he was traveling in March 2021
and that he “received the documentation when [he] got back from out of the country in
April.” This fact is part of the record before the district court, and we may consider it. But
this fact does not support husband’s assertion in his appellant’s brief that wife filed her
motion while he was out of the country. The record shows that wife filed her motion on
April 27, 2021, and the district court held a motion hear ing one month later, in late May.
Husband’s reference to receiving “documentation” at the motion hearing appears to refer
to other communications that wife attempted with husband before she filed her motion.

2 In her respondent’s brief, wife requested tha t this court strike the materials in husband’s
submissions that are outside the record on appeal. A party requesting relief from this court
generally must file a written motion. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 127. Because wife did not file
a motion, her request to strike portions of husband’s submissions is not properly before this
court. In resolving this appeal, though, we have confined our review to the scope of the
record on appeal as defined by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01.
We also note that many of husband’s submissions that are outside the appellate
record are contradicted by the record on appeal, or they do not support his contention that
he could not adequately respond to wife’s motion. For these reasons, even if we were to
consider husband’s additional facts and documents, we would not reach a different result.
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Husband also asks this court to grant relief under Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure 59.01 and 60.01. Neither provision applies. Rule 59.01 allows a district court
to grant a new trial for various reasons, including irregularity in the proceedings, or
accident or surprise. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(a), (c). Rule 60.01 allows the district court to
correct clerical mistakes “arising from oversight or omission.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.01.
Husband did not seek relief from the district court under either rule. See Thiele v. Stich ,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (noting that appellat e courts generally address only
those questions previously presented to and considered by the district court); Crowley v.
Meyer, 897 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Minn. 2017) (applying Thiele in a family -law appeal).
Moreover, relief under rule 60.01 is not appropriat e because husband does not assert that
the district court’s errors were merely clerical mistakes. As a result, husband is not entitled
to relief under the rules of civil procedure.
II. The district court did not err by granting wife’s motion.
Husband challenges several aspects of the district court’s June 16 and June 25, 2021
orders. He generally asserts that “[t]he district court erred in determining appointment of
parental consultant, child related expense fees, attorney fees, court fees[,] and tax
obligations and benefits.” But husband’s brief develops no argument about how the district
court erred in reaching any of the se decisions.
This court does not address arguments that are inadequately briefed. State, Dep’t of
Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997); see also
Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-
law appeal). “An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any
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argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal
unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith &
Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) ; see also Braith v. Fischer , 632
N.W.2d 716, 725 (Minn. App. 2001) (applying Schoepke in a family -law appeal) , rev.
denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2001); Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464- 65 (Minn. 1944)
(“[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before
there can be reversal. . . . [T]he burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies
upon it.”). Because husband’s brief contains no legal analysis or argument explaining how
the district court erred in its decision s, we conclude that husband’s argument on these
points is forfeited.
Even if we were to consider husband’s arguments on the meri ts, we would affirm
the district court’s decision. Husband appears to challenge the aspects of the district court’s
decisions relating to : (1) the appointment of a parenting consultant; (2) child-related
expenses; (3) tax obligations and benefits; and (4) attorney fees. We address each in turn.
Appointment of parenting consultant. Under the stipulated judgment and decree,
the parties agreed to select and retain a parenting consultant within 30 days of entry of the
judgment and decree. According to wife’s affidavit accompanying her motion, t he parties
agreed on an individual to use as the parenting consultant in July 2020. But husband never
signed the proposed stipulated order to appoint that person as the parenting consultant . In
its June 2021 orders, the district court appointed the parenting consultant to whic h the
parties had agreed, under the stipulated judgment and decree. The district court did not err
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by enforcing the provisions of the stipulated judgment and decree and appointing a
parenting consultant consistent with the parties’ agreement.
Child-related expenses. Under the stipulated judgment and decree, the parties
agreed to equally share certain child-related expenses, and one party was to reimburse the
party who incurred the expenses. Wife’s affidavit accompanying her motion enumerated
various child-related expenses between July 2020 and April 2021 for which husband had
not yet reimbursed her. Wife alleged that husband’s share of these expenses totaled
$2,765.91. The district court ordered husband to reimburse wife that amount. We conclude
that t he district court did not err when it relied on wife’s submissions and enforc ed the
parties’ stipulated judgment and decree about child-related expenses.
Tax obligation and refund. In August 2020, wife received a notice from the Internal
Revenue Service that she was due a federal tax refund of $19,402.62 for 2018. When wife
did not receive the refund after several weeks, she learned that the refund check had been
sent to the marital residence. Around the same time, wife received a notice from the State
of California that an adjustment had been made to the parties’ jointly filed taxes for 2016,
and that husband and wife owed $5,129.18 in California state income taxes. In its June 16,
2021 order, the district court ordered husband to pay wife $9,701.31 for her one-half share
of the 2018 federal tax refund and to pay his one -half share of the 2016 California state tax
liability. The district court reasoned that, because the tax refund and tax liability related to
years when the parties were married, it was “fair and equitable that both the refund and
liability be shared equally” between the parties.
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We see no error in the district court’s decision. Neither the 2018 tax refund nor the
2016 tax liability was included as an asset or debt to be divided in the stipulated judgment
and decree. The stipulated judgment and decree provided that, if there were any assets that
were not disclosed or divided, the district court retained jurisdiction over those assets “for
the purpose of making an equitable division there of.” And caselaw supports the district
court’s decision to treat the tax obligation as a marital debt, and the tax refund as a marital
asset, when neither was addressed in the stipulated judgment and decree. See Marshall v.
Marshall, 350 N.W.2d 463, 466- 67 (Minn. App. 1984) (remanding for the district court to
order husband to pay wife half of tax refund attributable to income earned before the
parties’ separation agreement). The district court’s decision to divide the tax obligation
and the tax refund equally between the parties is permitted under the parties’ stipulated
judgment and decree and follows our caselaw.
Attorney fees. Wife asked the district court to award condu ct-based attorney fees
under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2020), for fees related to bringing her motion. That
statute provides, “Nothing in this section . . . precludes the district court from awarding, in
its discretion, additional fees, costs, and di sbursements against a party who unreasonably
contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” 3 Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1.
The district court reasoned that attorney fees were appropriate because husband “ignored

3 Neither party questions whether Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1, provides a substantive
basis for awarding co nduct-based attorney fees given the supreme court’s order in
Anderson v. Anderson, No. A16- 2006 (Minn. Aug. 6, 2018) (order) . For purposes of this
appeal, we assume without deciding that the statute provides a basis for the attorney- fees
award. See Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 702 (Minn. App. 2019) ( taking same
approach).
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his obligations and requirements to attempt mediation, forcing [wife] to seek the [c]ourt’s
involvement to enforce the parties’ agreement.” We will not reverse the district court’s
award of conduct -based attorney fees unless there is an abuse of discretion. Sanvik v.
Sanvik, 850 N.W.2d 732, 737 (Minn. App. 2014).
The record supports the district court’s finding that husband unreasonably
contributed to the length of the proceeding. Much of the relief that wife requested in her
motion sought to enforce provisions of the stipulated jud gment and decree that husband
was not cooperating with wife to fulfill. The stipulated judgment and decree provided that
the parties were to retain a parenting consultant within 30 days of entry of the judgment
and decree. Despite the parties having agre ed on a parenting consultant in July 2020—
which was within the time contemplated by the stipulated judgment and decree —husband
never signed the stipulated order appointing the parenting consultant . As a result, no
parenting consultant was appointed before wife filed her motion nine months later, in April
2021. The record s upports the district court’s finding that wife’s motion was necessary
only because husband failed to communicate with her and resolve the issues outside of
court. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to order husband
to pay wife’s attorney fees incurred in bringing the motion.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
granting wife’s motion.
Affirmed.