State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1220

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lejuan Walter Hyde,
Appellant.

Filed July 18, 2022
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-21410

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes , Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Wheelock ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for a downward dispositional departur e from the presumptive guidelines sentence after he
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pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm. Because the record sh ows
the district court carefully evaluated the reasons for and against departure, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Lejuan Walter Hyde was charged with one count of unlawful possession
of a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2018), follow ing a traffic
stop where police found a loaded handgun in the car. Hyde was driving the car, officers
found the gun under the driver’s seat, and subsequent forensic analysis showed the
presence of Hyde’s DNA on the gun. Hyde was previously adjudicated de linquent for
first-degree burglary in Illinois and was therefore prohibited from possessing a firearm.
Hyde pleaded guilty with no agreement as to sentencing, and the district court
ordered a presentence investigation (PSI). At the sentencing hearing, Hyde moved the
court for downward dispositional and durational departures, arguing that his age,
community support, cooperation with court proceedings, and history of substance -abuse
treatment demonstrate his particular amenability to probation. The PSI report did not find
any substantial or compelling reasons to support a dispositional departure, noting that Hyde
reported spending time with one prosocial friend, that he was scheduled to start a GED
program, that he had worked one volunteer shift at the time of the interview, and that he
missed his first two PSI interview appointments. The district court denied the motion for
a downward dispositional departure but granted the motion for a downward durational
departure—imposing a 48- month sentence. Hyde appe als the denial of his
dispositional-departure motion.
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DECISION
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for criminal
offenses. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2018). The district court “must pronounce a
sentence of the applicable disposition . . . unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 ( Supp.
2019). The decision to depart is “an exercise of judicial discretion constrained by statu te
or case law.” Id. Only in a “rare” case will we reverse a sentencing court’s refusal to
depart. State v. Kindem , 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). If the record contains evidence
of factors supporting departure that the district court could have conside red but did not, we
may remand for consideration of those factors. State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925- 26
(Minn. App. 2013) . However, the district court is not required to explain its reasons for
imposing a presumptive sentence. Id. at 925. We “may not interfere with the sentencing
court’s exercise of discretion, as long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully
evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a determination.”
State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
The offender’s particular amenability to probation is one factor in a nonexclusive
list that may serve as the basis for a sentencing departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.D.3.a(7) (Supp. 2019). Particular amenability to probation “distinguishes the defendant
from most others and truly presents the substantial and compelling circumstances necessary
to justify a departure.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.D.303 (Supp. 2019) (citing State v.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2014) ). Consideration of a dispositional departure
typically focuses on the offender’s characteristics to evaluate whether the offender is
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“particularly suitable for individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted) . Factors relevant to
particular amenability to probation that can justify a dispositional departure include the
defendant’s age, prior record, remorse, cooperation, attitude while in court, and the support
of friends or family ; courts sometimes refer to these as the “ Trog factors.” Soto,
855 N.W.2d at 310 ( quoting State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982)). Even if a
defendant would be particularly amenable to probation, a district court is not require d to
impose a downward dispositional departure. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664- 65
(Minn. App. 2009).
Hyde moved the district court for both downward durational and downward
dispositional departures from the guidelines sentence. In granting the motion for a
durational departure, the district court credited Hyde’s accepting responsibility as well as
“circumstances that are not amounting to [a] defense.”1 The district court, however, did
not grant a dispositional departure. Hyde contends that in declining to grant a dispositional
departure, the district court abused its discretion because (1) it failed to carefully evaluate

1 The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide that one mitigating factor that may be used
as a reason for departure is if “[o]ther substantial grounds exist that tend to excuse or
mitigate the offender’s c ulpability, although not amounting to a defense .” Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.3.a(5) (Supp. 2019). The district court did not specify what grounds it
considered to be circumstances not amounting to a defense that would have mitigated
Hyde’s culpability. At the time of the offense in question, Hyde was on conditional release
in a fifth -degree controlled -substance-possession case in Minnesota. When Hyde was
arrested in that case, he was also in possession of a handgun, but the charging prosecutor
failed to note that Hyde was prohibited from possessing a firearm based on his juvenile
adjudication in Illinois and did not charge him with unlawful possession of a firearm. This
was noted on the record by the district court, and Hyde argued at sentencing that th is led
to a misunderstanding as to whether he was permitted to possess a firearm .
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the circumstances for and against a dispositional departure, and (2) substantial and
compelling circumstances support ed a dispositional departure in this case. The record does
not sustain either contention. Therefore, the district court acted within its discretion.
Hyde’s claim that the district court did not carefully evaluate the reasons for a
dispositional departure is not borne out by the record. The court informed the parties at
the sentencing hearing’s outset that it had reviewed the PSI report and the memorandum in
support of Hyde’s departure motion. During the hearing, Hyde argued through counsel in
support of his particular amenability to probation, while the state argued in support of the
presumptive executed sentence. Hyde also made a statement to the court on his own behalf.
The court asked clarifying questions throughout the hearing, indicating it was attending to
and considering the remarks being presented. The record demonstrates that the court also
considered the risk to public safety based on the circumstances and incorporated its
assessment of that risk into its analysis of the dispositional -departure request . See Soto,
855 N.W.2d at 313 (confirming that public safety can be a relevant factor in
dispositional-departure decisions). In particular, we note that the district court, in arriving
at its decision in favor of a durational departure, looked to the testimony and
recommendations provided by the parties. An argument that the court did not carefully
review the same testimony and recommendatio ns to evaluate the appropriateness of a
dispositional departure is unconvincing.
Hyde points to our nonprecedential opinion in State v. Lichtsinn , No. A10- 1555,
2011 WL 1743908 (Minn. App. May 9, 2011), to claim that the district court erred by
6
failing to specifically address the factors weighing for or against dispositional departure. 2
Established precedent maintains that “the district court is not required to explain its reasons
for imposing a presumptive sentence.” Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925. Moreover, Lichtsinn
is distinguishable from this case. 3 Because there is no requirement that the court provide
reasons for imposing a presumptive guidelines sentence, and because the record shows the
district court carefully evaluated the information and argu ments presented regarding both
the dispositional and durational departure requests, we conclude that the district court did
not err on that basis.
Hyde next argues that the district court abused its discretion due to the presence of
substantial and compelling circumstances in support of a downward dispositional
departure. “[T]he presence of mitigating factors does ‘not obligate the court ’” to depart
from the presumptive sentence. Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. App. 2013)
(quoting State v. Wall, 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984)). I f the district court considered
the defendant’s arguments and concluded that the presumptive sentence is appropriate, we

2 As a nonprecedential case, Lichtsinn is not binding authority, and its usefulness is limited
to its persuasive value. See State v. Mayl , 836 N.W.2d 368, 372 n.2 (Minn. App. 2013)
(appellant’s reliance on an unpublished case “is not binding upon” this court); City of Saint
Paul v. Eldredge, 788 N.W.2d 522, 526- 27 (Minn. App. 2010) .

3 In Lichtsinn, the defendant did not file a motion for a downward dispositional departure,
and the district court understood the defendant ’s request to be for a stay of execution under
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 3, which relies on different factors than a downward
dispositional departure under the sentencing guidelines. Lichtsinn , 2011 WL 1743908, at
*3-4. Thus, Lichtsinn does not support Hyde’s argument that the district court’s lack of
explanation for imposing the presumptive sentence is reason to reverse and remand in this
case.
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will not reverse absent a sufficient showing that the circumstances represent the “rare” case
compelling reversal. Olson, 765 N.W.2d at 665.
Hyde argues that his case is the rare case that compels reversal, and, in his effort to
convince us of this, he argues that he is able to demonstrate his particular amenability to
probation on the basis of nearly every Trog factor. Hyde first relies on his past enrollment
in chemical-dependency treatment programs, his continuing efforts to seek treatment , and
his compliance with pretrial release conditions. The PSI report identified many of the same
facts but did not recommend a dispositional departure, observing that Hyde was
unsuccessfully discharged from his most recent chemical -dependency treatment p rogram
due to attendance and behavior issues and that he admitted that he had used nonprescription
drugs in violation of his conditional release. In assessing Hyde’s amenability to probation
as “questionable,” the PSI report expresse d concern that this of fense occurred less than
three months after Hyde’s prior controlled-substance offense, that he was in possession of
a firearm during the prior offense, and that he was on conditional release for that offense
at the time this offense occurred. While Hyde’s involvement with chemical-dependency
treatment is important, these facts do not present substantial and compelling circumstances
that support reversal of the district court on the basis that Hyde is particularly amenable to
probation and to individualized treatment in a probationary setting. See Soto, 855 N.W.2d
at 308-09 (articulating the standard for justifying a downward dispos itional departure).
Hyde next asserts that his age, prior record, and network of friends and family weigh
in favor of a dispositional departure because his criminal history “does not appear
extensive,” and he has close relationships with his mother, who resides in Chicago, and his
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children, two of whom reside in Minnesota. At age 28, however, Hyde’s record includes
previous convictions for felony aggravated fleeing and misdemeanor reckless conduct,
along with the juvenile felony that resulted in his being prohibited from possessi ng
firearms. With respect to a supportive network, Hyde claims relatively few local
connections. Hyde further contends that his attitude and cooperation with the judicial
process weigh in favor of a dispositional departure . While Hyde attended all court
appearances and remained in contact with probation, the PSI report notes that Hyde missed
his first two PSI interview appointments and used controlled substances in violation of his
conditional release as previously discussed . None of t hese factors establish a rare case
compelling reversal.
Finally, Hyde contends that his GED program enrollment and job- seeking efforts
demonstrate remorse and motivation to change. We recognize that remorse “bears on [the
offender’s] ability to be rehabilitated.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 625. The PSI report states
that at the time of the interview, Hyde had enrolled in a GED program but had yet to begin
classes, was starting part -time work, and had performed one session of volunteering. But
the relative recency of these d evelopments could reflect Hyde’s self -interest in the
sentencing process as opposed to his motivation to change. Furthermore, the record reveals
no expressions of remorse on Hyde’s part; rather, Hyde attempts first to equate reasons he
could be motivated to change with showing remorse, and then he offers justifications for
carrying a gun. Hyde states that he needed protection due to having been shot soon after
moving to Minnesota, knowing few people in the community, and carrying large amounts
of cash bec ause he was unable to open a bank account. These justifications and lack of
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any record evidence demonstrating remorse belie Hyde’s assertion on appeal that he has
shown remorse that makes him particularly amenable to probation and support s a reversal
of the district court’s imposition of an executed sentence.
In determining Hyde’s sentence, the district court carefully evaluated the
information and arguments presented. T he facts on which Hyde relies to support his
arguments on appeal do not establish pa rticular amenability that “distinguishes the
defendant from most others and truly presents the ‘substantial[] and compelling
circumstances’ that are necessary to justify a departure,” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309 (quoting
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1) ; nor do t hese facts support a conclusion that this is the rare
case compelling reversal, Olson, 765 N.W.2d at 665. The district court’s denial of a
downward dispositional departure was not an abuse of discretion, and we will not reverse
its decision.
Affirmed.