State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1221

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Remona Lysa Brown,
Appellant.

Filed August 22, 2022
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CR-17-852

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Nicholas B. Wanka, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges seven convictions of aiding and abetting theft by false
representation, arguing that (1) insufficient evidence supports her convictions, (2) the

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
district court plainly erred by not granting her a new trial based on legally inconsistent
verdicts, (3) the district court abused its discretion by imposing an upward durational
sentencing departure, and (4) the district court abused its discretion by ordering her to pay
$1.8 million in restitution. She asserts additional claims in a pro se supplemental brief.
We affirm.
FACTS
The Minnesota branch of Caring and Compassionate Healthcare Agency LLC
(CCHA) provided home-care services to clients in southern Minnesota. Appellant Remona
Brown ran the Minnesota branch of CCHA. Her mother owned CCHA and ran its original
branch in Michigan.
In 2011, CCHA enrolled with the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS)
as a home-care agency providing nursing services to clients receiving medical assistance.1
As a home-care nursing agency, CCHA was subject to the following rules and procedures.
To receive reimbursement for nursing services, an agency must first obtain DHS
approval of a service agreement for each client, verifying that the client is eligible for
nursing services and establishing the length of time the agency will provide them. The
agency submits reimbursement claims through an online application. It must submit each
claim individually and provide specific information, including the date of service, the client
who received the service and that client’s service-agreement number, whether a registered
nurse (RN) or a licensed practical nurse (LPN ) provided the service, and how much time

1 CCHA provided various home-care services to private clients and medical-assistance
clients. This case concerns only nursing services provided to medical-assistance clients.
3
was spent providing service (in 15-minute increments). Accurate identification of the
caretaker is vital because the reimbursement rate depends on the caretaker’s credentials—
RNs are paid more than LPNs. Home-care nursing agencies must maintain timesheets
identifying the caretaker and detailing the services provided for five years; DHS can audit
that information. A claim for reimbursement can be considered fraudulent if it is not
supported by documentation, even if services were actually rendered.
Between 2011 and 2015, CCHA submitted thousands of nursing-services claims to
DHS and received millions of dollars in reimbursements.
In 2015, a former CCHA employee and the parent of a former CCHA client filed a
whistleblower complaint alerting authorities to suspected fraud at CCHA. A joint state and
federal investigation led to searches of CCHA’s Minnesota and Michigan branch offices
in January 2016. Authorities seized extensive documentation and several computers , and
conducted a recorded interview with Brown. Investigators examined records to confirm
each employee’s status and compared that information to CCHA’s timesheets and DHS
records of the reimbursement claims CCHA filed. They found fraud in three general
types—claims without a supporting timesheet, claims for services provided by an
unqualified caretaker, and claims for more hours of service than were provided. The fraud
led to approximately 6,000 overpayments totaling $1,860,155.57.
The state charged Brown with 14 counts of aiding and abetting CCHA and her
mother in theft between October 2012 and December 2015. The complaint broke this time
frame into seven distinct periods of time, alleging two counts as to each: theft by false
representation of more than $35,000 and theft of less than $1,000 in public funds.
4
At trial, the state presented the testimony of numerous witnesses, including four
DHS employees, twelve former CCHA employees, the mother of a former CCHA client,
and the investigators who searched CCHA’s offices and interviewed Brown. The state also
presented Brown’s recorded statement, in which she described herself as CCHA’s “CEO”
and acknowledged submitting “some” nursing-services reimbursement claims but stated
that two other employees were primarily responsible for that work. And it presented
extensive documentary evidence, including enrollment documents CCHA filed with DHS,
thousands of pages of CCHA personnel documents and timesheets, and a spreadsheet the
investigators prepared that details every claim CCHA submitted for nursing-services
reimbursement between October 2012 and December 2015.
The jury found Brown guilty on all 14 counts. But with respect to the public-funds
counts, it answered “No” to the following question: “Was the value of the property or
services stolen not more than $1000 and the property taken was public funds belonging to
the state or to any political subdivision or agency?” Brown moved for a judgment of
acquittal on those seven counts, which the district court granted.
The state requested an aggravated sentence for the remaining seven offenses on the
ground that they constitute major economic offenses. Brown waived her right to a jury
determination of the issue. The district court imposed concurrent sentences and sentenced
the last offense as a major economic offe nse, with an aggravated sentence of 93 months’
imprisonment. The district court also ordered Brown to pay $1,860,155.57 in restitution.
5
Brown challenged the restitution order. Following a hearing during which Brown
testified regarding her ability to pay restitution, the district court denied Brown’s restitution
challenge. Brown appeals.
DECISION
I. Sufficient evidence supports Brown’s convictions.
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we examine the evidence “to
determine whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them
would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which [s] he was convicted.” State v. Stewart, 923
N.W.2d 668, 673 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 16,
2019). A conviction that depends on circumstantial evidence warrants a two-step review.
State v. Irby, 967 N.W.2d 389, 396 (Minn. 2021). First, we identify “the circumstances
proved.” Id. at 396-97. In doing so, we resolve all fact questions in favor of the jury’s
verdict, deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations. Stewart, 923 N.W.2d at 673.
Next, we determine whether the proved circumstances are, overall, consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. Irby, 967 N.W.2d at 397.
Brown concedes that the state proved that someone at CCHA committed theft by
false representation by submitting fraudulent claims to DHS seeking reimbursement for
nursing services. 2 She challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence that she played a

2 Theft by false representation includes obtaining possession of another’s property “by
intentionally deceiving” that person with a knowing and intentional “false representation.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(3) (2012). False representation includes “the preparation
6
knowing role in the theft, as required for her aiding-and-abetting convictions. See State v.
Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that aiding and abetting means that
the defendant knew her accomplices were going to commit the offense and intended her
presence or actions to further the commission of that offense).
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the state proved the
following circumstances relevant to Brown’s knowledge and intent. Brown managed
CCHA’s Minnesota branch at all relevant times, consistently identifying herself as the chief
executive officer, president, or sole managing employee, even in her January 2016
interview with investigators. In that capacity, she hired and supervised employees and was
familiar with their credentials. She signed the paperwork to enroll CCHA with DHS. She
was the administrator of CCHA’s online account for submitting claims and received
training on how to submit claims correctly. She had access to records of all claims CCHA
submitted to DHS. And Brown was the only person at the Minnesota branch who
submitted nursing-services reimbursement claims to DHS.
3
We next consider the inferences the circumstances proved reasonably support.
Brown asserts that the y support a rational hypothesis that someone else within CCHA
facilitated the theft without her knowledge. We disagree. This hypothesis is not rational
because it relies on evidence that we infer the jury disbelieved — particularly Brown’s

or filing” of a medical-assistance reimbursement claim that “intentionally and falsely states
the costs of or actual services provided by a vendor of medical care.” Id., subd. 2(a)(3)(iii).

3 No more than three or four claims were filed by a Michigan branch employee, and no
evidence indicates any of them was fraudulent.
7
statements to investigators that two other CCHA employees were primarily responsible for
submitting nursing-services reimbursement claims—and facts that are immaterial to her
knowledge and intent regarding the theft, like the processing of payroll at the Michigan
branch. She also emphasizes that there is no evidence that she personally benefited from
the theft. But that is not an element of the theft-by-false-representation offense. And it is
not rational to ignore the extensive evidence tying Brown to the theft simply because she
may not have personally benefited from it. Rather, the only reasonable inference from the
proved circumstances is that Brown knowingly and intentionally authored every fraudulent
claim that CCHA submitted for reimbursement. As such, the evidence supports her seven
convictions of aiding and abetting theft by false representation.
II. The district court did not plainly err by entering judgments of acquittal on the
public-funds counts rather than granting Brown a new trial.

Brown argues that the jury rendered legally inconsistent verdicts by finding her
guilty of theft of more than $35,000 and theft of less than $1,000 in public funds. She
contends the district court should have granted a new trial —the remedy for legally
inconsistent verdicts. See State v. Christensen, 901 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn. App. 2017) .
But Brown did not seek a new trial; she sought—and obtained —judgments of acquittal on
the public-funds counts. Where a party requests a particular ruling, she generally cannot
challenge that ruling on appeal. State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 2012).
An exception to this “invited error doctrine” applies when an appellant establishes (1) error,
(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects her substantial rights. Id. Brown has not done so.
8
Verdicts are legal ly inconsistent only if “proof of the elements of one offense
negates a necessary element of another offense.” Steward v. State, 950 N.W.2d 750, 755
(Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). Our close examination of the verdicts reveals no legal
inconsistency.
For all seven odd-numbered counts, the jury returned the following verdicts:

And for all seven even-numbered counts, the jury returned the following verdicts:

Brown contends these verdicts are legally inconsistent because they require implicit
findings that the value of the stolen property was both over $35,000 and under $1,000. We
are not persuaded. In each of the 14 verdicts, the jury found the value of the stolen property
was more than $1,000. Nothing about the jury’s verdicts on the even-numbered counts
negated an element of the offenses charged in the odd-numbered counts. In short, the
verdicts are not inconsistent; they reflect the jury’s determination that the state failed to

9
prove an element of the public-funds counts—that the amounts stolen were less $1,000.
Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err by granting Brown’s request for
judgments of acquittal on those counts rather than sua sponte granting a new trial.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward
durational sentencing departure.

We review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive sentence for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). A district court
abuses its discretion when its reasons for departure are legally impermissible or the record
evidence does not justify the departure. Id.
A district court may impose an aggravated sentence for a “major economic offense”
if it finds at least two of the following factors:
(i) the offense involved multiple victims or multiple
incidents per victim;
(ii) the offense involved an attempted or actual
monetary loss substantially greater than the usual offense or
substantially greater than the minimum loss specified in the
statutes;
(iii) the offense involved a high degree of sophistication
or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time;
(iv) the offender used the offender’s position or status
to facilitate the commission of the offense, including positions
of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships; or
(v) the offender had been involved in other conduct
similar to the current offense as evidenced by the findings of
civil or administrative law proceedings or the imposition of
professional sanctions.

Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5a(a)(4) (2012); see Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.b.(4) (2012)
(same). But a court m ay not impose an aggravated sentence based on factors necessarily
10
used in convicting the defendant of another offense or already factored into the seriousness
of the current offense. State v. Thompson, 720 N.W.2d 820, 829-30 (Minn. 2006).
The district court sentenced only the last offense—the theft that occurred between
December 1, 2015, and December 29, 2015— as a major economic offense. In support of
that sentence, the district court found two aggravating factors: (1) multiple incidents per
victim (the public), and (2) the offense involved monetary losses substantially greater than
the usual offense and substantially greater than the minimum loss specified in the charging
statute.4 Brown challenges the district court’s findings as to both factors.
She first asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relying on the
multiple-incidents factor because it looked to conduct underlying all of the offenses. This
argument is unavailing. While the court used imprecise language that the “total number”
of incidents was “highly substantial,” it also referenced the investigators’ spreadsheet,
which details every single fraudulent claim and identifies which claims pertain to each
offense. Review of the spreadsheet confirms that the offense for which the court imposed
an aggravated sentence included 256 incidents not covered by any of the other offenses—
a “highly substantial” number that amply satisfies the multiple-incidents requirement.
Brown next argues that the district court abused its discretion by relying on the
monetary-losses factor because it looked to a factor already encompassed in the offense

4 The court initially stated that the offenses occurred over a lengthy period of time, then
clarified that the offense for which it was imposing an aggravated sentence did not. Thus,
it did not rely on that factor in sentencing Brown. Moreover, any such reliance would have
been harmless since the other two factors support the district court’s sentencing decision.
See Thompson, 720 N.W.2d at 830-31 (upholding aggravated sentence for major economic
offense when district court relied on some improper factors but two proper factors).
11
itself. We disagree. The district court expressly stated that it was not considering the total
but the amount associated with each offense, and that the offense it was sentencing
involved the theft of $101,774.65, which is “almost triple” the $35,000 statutory threshold.
This finding did not rely on conduct underlying other offenses or factors already accounted
for in establishing the seriousness of the offense. Rather, it recognized a distinction of
degree, precisely as contemplated in the “major economic offense” statute and guideline.
In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in relying on the
multiple-incidents and monetary-losses factors to sentence the December 2015 theft as a
major economic offense.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Brown to pay
$1.8 million in restitution.

A district court has broad discretion to award restitution, and we generally will not
disturb a restitution order absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Wigham, 967 N.W.2d
657, 662 (Minn. 2021).
When deciding whether to order restitution, and for how much, a court must
consider (1) the amount of the victim’s “economic loss” from the offense, and (2) the
defendant’s “income, resources, and obligations.” Minn. Stat. § 6 11A.045, subd. 1(a)
(2020). Brown contests both aspects of the restitution order.
With respect to economic loss, Brown asserts that the district court erred by failing
to account for services actually provided but mischaracterized for reimbursement. 5 She

5 For example, she points to instances when an LPN provided services but CCHA submitted
a reimbursement claim at the higher RN rate.
12
contends this failure overstates the actual loss and would place DHS in a “better position
than it was before the crime.” But Brown did not present this argument to the district court.
Her only challenge to the amount of loss was to reiterate her position that the state failed
to prove that she was a knowing participant in the theft, emphasizing the absence of
evidence indicating that she personally received any of the stolen funds.
A defendant has 30 days to challenge the amount of restitution requested. Minn.
Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2020). To do so, she must provide “a detailed sworn
affidavit” that states “all challenges to the restitution or items of restitution, and specif[ies]
all reasons justifying dollar amounts of restitution which differ from the amounts
requested.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (2020). Timely and thorough identification
of all restitution challenges is vital to enable the state to respond with appropriate evidence
to substantiate the amount of loss. See id. Accordingly, a defendant’s failure to comply
results in forfeiture. See id., subd. 3(b) (“A defendant may not challenge restitution after
the 30-day time period has passed.”); see also State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 97 n.7
(Minn. 2019) (stating that arguments may not be raised for first time on appeal); cf. State
v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that the statutory forfeiture
rule applies to challenges to amount of restitution, not challenges to the court’s authority
to order restitution). Because Brown did not ask the district court to account for services
CCHA may have actually provided in connection with the fraudulent reimbursement
claims, she forfeited this challenge.
6

6 Our supreme court recently held, in another case involving medical-assistance fraud, that
“a district court must consider the value of economic benefits, if any, the defendant
13
Regarding her ability to pay restitution, Brown contends the district court
“summarily dismissed” her assertion that she is unable to pay. This argument is unavailing.
A district court is not required to make specific findings on the defendant’s income,
resources, and obligations, but it must “expressly state, either orally or in writing, that it
has considered” those factors. State v. Cloutier, 971 N.W.2d 743, 749 (Minn. App. 2022)
(quoting Wigham, 967 N.W.2d at 659). The district court issued a written order addressing
Brown’s financial circumstances. It noted that Brown lacked any significant current
income or assets and would face economic hardship when released from prison because of
the loss of her nursing license. But it also found that Brown had experience as a truck
driver and that she acknowledged she might be able to regain her licensure and return to
that work after serving her prison term.
The district court also emphasized that Brown’s inability to pay the full amount does
not, in itself, preclude or limit an award of restitution. See Wigham, 967 N.W.2d at 664
n.4 (stating that a court need not “limit a restitution award amount to only what the
defendant can afford”); see also State v. Davis, 907 N.W.2d 220, 227 (Minn. App. 2018)
(stating that “courts can order restitution even when offenders are unable to pay”), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018). Rather, Brown’s financial circumstances require an
appropriate schedule to enable her to make reasonable payments toward restitution. The

conferred on the victim as a result of the offense when determining ‘the amount of
economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense.’” State v. Currin, 974
N.W.2d 567, 573 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1)). Because
Brown did not challenge the amount of loss in the district court, she is not entitled to relief
under Currin.
14
district court’s original restitution order assigned probation the task of establishing such a
schedule, as permitted under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 2a (2020). On this record, we
discern no abuse of discretion by the district court.
V. Brown’s pro se arguments do not entitle her to relief.
In a pro se supplemental brief, Brown argues that (1) the district court erred by
denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of CCHA, (2) she was
denied a speedy trial, and (3) a witness gave false testimony. We address each in turn.
A. Suppression of Evidence
When reviewing a pretrial motion to suppress, we review factual findings for clear
error and legal determinations de novo. State v. Marsh, 931 N.W.2d 825, 829 (Minn. App.
2019), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019).
Brown first argues that the search of CCHA exceeded the scope of the warrant. A
search pursuant to a warrant must be limited to the scope of the warrant. State v. Hill, 918
N.W.2d 237, 241 (Minn. App. 2018). “ The test for determining whether a search has
exceeded the scope of the warrant is one of reasonableness.” Marsh, 931 N.W.2d at 830
(quotation omitted). A court examines the totality of the circumstances in determining the
reasonableness of the officers’ conduct in executing a search. Id.
The warrant authorized a search of “suite 6” of a particular office building— the
address that CCHA had provided when enrolling with DHS. The district court found that
the officers executing the search warrant “did clearly search areas outside that authorized
by the plain language of the search warrant” by searching other offices in the building. But
the court determined that the search of those areas was reasonable because the offices were
15
unmarked, Brown’s comments to officers as they began the search led them to understand
that CCHA occupied multiple offices in the building, and there is no indication that the
officers’ reliance on these factors led them to search any areas unconnected to CCHA.
Because the record supports the district court’s findings and Brown identifies no flaw in
its reasoning, she has not demonstrated any error in the district court’s determination that
the scope of the search was reasonable.
Brown next asserts that the affidavit supporting the warrant contained false
statements. A search-warrant application is presumptively valid if, on its face, it provides
probable cause to justify a search. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-65, 171 (1978).
But a defendant may seek to invalidate a search warrant by challenging the truthfulness of
factual statements made in the warrant application. Id. at 155-56, 172. To prevail, the
defendant must show that the affiant “deliberately made a statement that was false or in
reckless disregard of the truth” and “the statement was material to the probable cause
determination.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Brown contends the investigator who requested the affidavit falsely averred that
(1) Brown was a partial owner of CCHA and (2) CCHA filed reimbursement claims with
DHS, when individual users must file the claims. She also requests a Franks hearing. But
while she referenced “false statements” in her motion to suppress, she never advanced any
argument on the issue to the district court and never requested a Franks hearing. She may
not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. See Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 97 n.7.

16
B. Speedy Trial
Whether a criminal defendant was deprived of her constitutional right to a speedy
trial depends on a “constellation” of factors, including the length of the delay, whether the
state or the defendant is responsible for the delay, whether and how the defendant asserted
the right, and any prejudice to the defendant from the delay. State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d
230, 245 (Minn. 2021). Examination of these factors reveals no speedy-trial violation.
We recognize that there was a long delay between when Brown was charged in
September 2017 and her May 2021 jury trial. But the record shows Brown was the primary
cause of the delay, seeking and obtaining seven continuances through January 2020. An
April 2020 hearing was canceled because of pandemic restrictions, but it caused a delay of
only about two and one-half months before trial preparations resumed. See State v. Paige,
___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2022 WL 2826253, at *5 (Minn. July 20, 2022) (concluding that
delay to enable pandemic safety measures is not attributable to the state). At no point did
Brown demand a speedy trial. And no prejudice is apparent from the delay since she was
not subject to pretrial detention and she identifies no specific evidence that was lost or
impaired. On this record, Brown has not demonstrated that she was denied her right to a
speedy trial.
C. False Testimony
Finally, Brown contends she is entitled to a new trial because one of the former
CCHA employees falsely testified that Brown was the “owner” of CCHA. We are not
persuaded. A defendant may be entitled to a new trial based on false testimony if (1) a
court is “reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false,”
17
(2) without the testimony, the jury “might have reached a different conclusion,” and (3) the
defendant “was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to
meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493,
511 (Minn. 2013). Brown cannot meet any of these elements. First, we are satisfied the
statement about Brown’s ownership was not false; it was the witness’s perception of
Brown’s role in the business and reasonably consistent with Brown’s own presentations of
herself as CEO and president. Second, it is inconceivable that this single statement
materially influenced the verdict, given the volume of testimony from numerous other
CCHA employees and Brown’s own statements establishing her position of authority
within CCHA. And third, even in the unlikely event that Brown was surprised by the
testimony, she had ample opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Accordingly, her
false-testimony argument fails.
Affirmed.