In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: O. E. M., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1245

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
O. E. M., Parent.

Filed April 25, 2022
Affirmed
Smith Tracy M., Judge

Fillmore County District Court
File No. 23-JV-21-177

Michael D. Schatz, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant-mother O.E.M.)

Brett Corson, Fillmore County Attorney, Melissa Hammell, Assistant County Attorney,
Preston, Minnesota (for respondent Fillmore County Social Services)

Karen Haugerud, Preston, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Ju dge; Reilly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant O.E.M. (mother) argues that th e district court abus ed its discretion by
terminating her parental rights because the re cord does not support the district court’s
determination that respondent Fi llmore County Social Servic es (the county) proved, by
clear and convincing evidence, the presen ce of any of four st atutory grounds for
termination. Because the district court did not err by determining that there was clear and
convincing evidence supporting at least one of those statutory grounds, we affirm.
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FACTS
Mother gave birth to the child who is th e subject of this a ppeal, in April 2018.
Child’s father is unknown. Child tested po sitive for THC at birth, after which mother
admitted to prenatal use of marijuana and al cohol. The county be came involved with
mother and child after a May 2019 report th at child, then 13 months old, was found
crawling down a gravel driveway by a passerby. Later reports to the county stated that
mother fed child by putting food on a dirty fl oor, that mother negl ected to change his
diapers, that mother yelled at child, that mother allowed child to use pill bottles as a rattle,
and that she told providers that she smoked marijuana re gularly. Another report to the
county said that mother was having sex for money and sometimes bringing child with her
to these encounters.
After these reports, mother began volunt ary participation in a parenting program
with the county. In December 2019, the county received another report, alleging that child
was sleeping in a car with mother’s significant other, D.M., while mother was working. On
December 27, 2019, after mother refused additional services, the county filed a petition for
child in need of protection or services (CHIPS). On that same date, the district court ordered
temporary out-of-home placement of the child, and the child was pl aced in nonrelative
foster care, where he has remained through out the case. On Janua ry 8, 2020, mother
entered an admission to the CHIPS petition and admitted that she had left the child
unattended in the home on multip le occasions while she was in the detached garage and
that her child spent overnight hours in her vehicle with D.M. while she was working.
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In January 2020, the district court approved an out-of-h ome-placement plan
(OHPP), which required that mother cooperate with various assessments; provide a safe,
nurturing, and stable home for the child; provide age-appropriate supervision; and continue
to work with the county and service providers. In May 2020, after the county had provided
many services in accordance with the OHPP, the county file d its first termination-of-
parental-rights (TPR) petition. In June 2020, the county filed an updated OHPP that
included additional con cerns and requirements, especially regarding mother’s lack of
stable housing.
The district court held a trial on the county’s petition, spanning seven days over the
period August 26 through October 14, 2020. The trial included testimony from mother, the
primary county social worker, the foster parents, the guardian ad litem (GAL), D.M., and
several providers. On November 12, the dist rict court issued its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, a nd order, dismissing the petition. The district court found that the
county failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence any of the three statutory grounds
for termination asserted by th e county. It found that moth er had substantially complied
with many of the OHPP requirements and expressed concern about the timing of the June
OHPP, noting that mother had not had suffi cient time to complete the requirements.
Though the district court de nied the petition, it determined that the child still needed
protection and services and would remain out of the home while mother continued to work
on the OHPP.
In December 2020, the district court appr oved another updated OHPP, and services
continued. In March 2021, the district court or dered reunification efforts to cease, citing,
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among other problems, concerns raised by the GAL, an attachment assessment that raised
serious concerns about mother’s ability to parent, and mother’s plan to rely on other people
to provide most of child’s care.
The county filed a second TP R petition in April 2021, alleging the existence of four
statutory grounds for termination of parental rights, under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8) (2020). A five-day trial was held in July and August 2021 and included
testimony from mother, the primary county social worker, the foster parents, the GAL, and
several providers. Following trial, the district court terminated mother’s parental rights,
finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support each of the four statutory
grounds argued by the county. Mother appeals.
DECISION
District courts may terminate the rights of a parent to that parent’s child if (1) at
least one of the statutory grounds for termin ation is supported by clear and convincing
evidence, (2) termination is in the best interests of the child, and (3) the county, unless not
required to, has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. In re Welfare of Child. of
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). Additionally, the petitioner must show that the
“conditions justifying termination exist at the time of the trial and will continue to exist for
an indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of D.F.B. , 412 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Minn. App.
1987), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 1987). A district court may terminate parental rights
only for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87
(Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). But parental rights, though safeguarded, are “not
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absolute” and should not be “enforced to the detriment of the child’s welfare and
happiness.” In re Adoption of Anderson, 50 N.W.2d 278, 284 (Minn. 1951).
“[T]ermination of parental ri ghts is always discretionary with the [district court].”
In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014). We defer to the
district court’s decision “because a district court is in a superior position to assess the
credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F. , 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
When reviewing whether there is a statutory basis for termination, we determine whether
the district court’s findings address the stat utory criteria and are supported by clear and
convincing evidence. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 87. We review factual findings for clear error
and the existence of a statutory basis for termination for an abuse of discretion. Id. A
finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted). We do not
engage in fact-finding, reweigh the eviden ce, or “reconcile conflicting evidence.” In re
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted); see In
re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney
in a termination-of-parental-rights appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). Further, we
need not “go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the
correctness of the findings of the trial court.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation
omitted). We review the record “to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision.”
Id. The district court abuses its discre tion if it improperly applies the law. J.K.T., 814
N.W.2d at 87.
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Mother challenges the district court’s dete rmination that four statutory grounds for
termination exist based on cl ear and convincing evidence—spe cifically, that (1) mother
has “substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the
duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationshi p”; (2) mother is
“palpably unfit” to parent; (3) “reasonable efforts . . . have failed to correct the conditions
leading to” child’s out-of-home placement; and (4) child “is neglected and in foster care.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8). Only one of these grounds needs to be
present to satisfy the statutory-ground requirement for termination of parental rights. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2020).
The first statutory ground for termination that the district court determined to be
present is that mother refused or neglected to comply with her parental duties. This ground
is met when
the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the dutie s imposed upon
that parent by the parent and ch ild relationship, including but
not limited to providing the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development, if the parent is physically and financially
able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency
have failed to correct the conditi ons that formed the basis of
the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore
unreasonable.

Id., subd. 1(b)(2).
Mother argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by finding that she refused
and neglected her parental duties because she has “done everything right” since before the
first trial and because the conditions lead ing to out-of-home placement have been
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corrected. She asserts that she has complied with her OHPP, has attended sessions with
providers, has spent time with child “when allowed to,” and has provided necessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, and other care.
Refusal or Neglect of Parental Duties
The district court made a number of fa ctual findings supporting its determination
that mother has refused or neglected to comp ly with her parental duties. Its findings are
supported by the record. The district court noted that neither the county nor the GAL have
recommended that a trial home visit occur. It cited issues with failure to understand and
properly apply skills learned in parenting classes and its continuing concern about whether
mother met the child’s basic n eeds, like diaper changes and toilet training. The district
court also found that mother was not able to provide a safe environment for child, noting
mother’s past history of allowing unsafe people to stay in the home, including one
individual who used marijuana in the home and used violence against mother; her
testimony that she would continue to allow unsafe people in the home; and the threatening
behaviors of D.M., as well as D.M.’s own medical needs, which the court found make him
unsafe to care for the child by himself. The district court also pointed to mother’s unstable
relationships with D.M. and others; her lack of an adeq uate support system, which
consisted of D.M. and his parents; and her angry and hostile behavior with the county, the
GAL, and the district court.
The district court also made findings ab out mother’s relationship with child, finding
that mother is “easily irritated and frustrated with [child] when he does not conform to her
expectations” and that she “appears to resent that [child] needs help with things.” Witness
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testimony showed that mother struggled to know what was age- appropriate for child.
Additionally, the district court found that mo ther “does not have the ability to provide
[child] with emotional support, attachment, and comfort,” noting testimony from providers
about mother’s own mental health problems, in cluding an attachment disorder, the foster
family’s testimony about child’s lack of af fection and initial inability to seek comfort,
mother’s statements that “she did her own thing and [child] did his own [thing],” and
observations by providers of child’s lack of attachment and even attempts to leave the room
he was in with mother at visits. The district court also relied on testimony from a provider
who conducted an attachment assessment. That provider testified that mother does not have
the ability to form an attachment with child and that no services would render her fit to
parent.
Other evidence in the record also supports the district court’s finding that the mother
has refused and neglected to comply with her parental duties. For example, child was often
left alone, even for hours, and he often put himself to bed or slept in a car with D.M. while
mother worked. Additionally, mo ther repeatedly refused to shift to a day shift to
accommodate child, even though the day shift was an available option. Mother eventually
switched to a job with a day shift, but the dist rict court noted concern that this was not a
“lasting and genuine change” as mother only made the change right before the second trial.
Further, mother noted that her erratic sleep schedule—which made her extremely tired
when parenting child—would not change with a day shift. Mother also said that she wanted
to be D.M.’s caretaker. Mother’s living situations were also controlled by D.M., first living
in a home with him, and then moving to a trailer that was owned by D.M.’s father.
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Additionally, while mother did attend thera py, there were many concerns about her
progress, including her inability to apply skills and her lack of progress towards addressing
her own trauma. As to parenting classes and substance-abuse treatment, while mother did
show progress, there were concerns from providers that she would revert to bad habits and
substance abuse without support from the county.
There were also several concerns about mother’s visitation with child. Mother
sometimes missed visits and di d not request vi deo visits until late 2020. She also tended
not to check in with the coun ty or the foster parents abou t child. Further, providers noted
that mother was often tired during visits and that she and D.M. sometimes slept while child
was awake. Child often had negative reactions to visits, as noted by his foster parents, who
noticed that certain behaviors, like tantrums, reappeared or increased after visits with
mother. Further, there were recommendations from providers that visits cease and concerns
from child’s therapist.
Evidence about child’s behavior also sup ports the district court’s determination.
There is evidence that child is not used to having his needs met and evidence of concerns
about his attention span. He has been diagnosed with post- traumatic-stress disorder and
has other behavioral problems. Further, his th erapist testified that mother is a “trauma
trigger” to child. Child is al so doing much better in foster care, where he has formed
attachments with his foster parents and has shown improvement in his behavior.
Mother points to evidence in the record that supports her position. There is evidence
in the record that mother wa s engaging with her provider s, including in therapy and
parenting classes. There is evidence that sh e was learning from those experiences; for
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example, a provider noted that she was applying concepts learned in parenting class to her
parenting of child. There is al so evidence that mo ther displayed appropriate behavior in
visits with child, including changing his diaper, bringing a snack, and properly
reprimanding him. The record also shows that mother tested positive for a substance only
twice and completed her substance-abuse treatment, has maintained a stable job and passed
a nursing-assistant exam during this case, and has had shelter available for child in a home
and later a trailer she shared with D.M.
But the presence of this evidence doe s not undermine the district court’s
determination based on other evidence. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (holding that an
appellate court’s role is to “review . . . the record to confirm that evidence exists to support
the decision” and not to reconcile conflicting evidence). The district court’s specific factual
findings––especially its findings on mother’s lack of attachme nt to child, her inability to
meet basic needs and provide safe housing, her inability to apply skills learned in parenting
classes, her lack of understanding of child’s needs, and child’s negative reactions to
mother––are supported by the record and adequately support the determination that mother
refused or neglected her parental duties.
Reasonable Efforts
A determination that a parent refused or neglected to comply with parental duties
also requires clear and convin cing evidence that “either re asonable efforts by the social
services agency have failed to correct the conditions that fo rmed the basis of the petition
or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore unreasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2).
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The district court made extensive factua l findings about the reasonable efforts by
the county and their failure to correct conditions leading to child’s out-of-home placement.
The district court listed the many services pr ovided to mother and the results of those
services. For example, the district cour t noted the attachment assessment and its
conclusions; therapy for mother, child, and mother and child together; multiple parenting-
education programs; mental-health services; medication management; a parental-capacity
evaluation; chemical-dependency treatment; dr ug and alcohol testi ng; housing services;
payment for insurance; visitati on with child and transport to that visitation; and medical
services for child. The distri ct court found that “[i]t took approximately 28 months of
[child’s] life for the mother to start engaging with parenting education” and that now that
she is engaged, “her lack of understanding and ability to understand is clear.”
Overall, the district court was concer ned that mother was not making lasting
changes and cannot learn the sk ills that she lacks. This in cluded specific concerns that
mother would revert to substance abuse if th e county was not involv ed, especially since
she repeatedly denied having a chemical-dep endency problem. Additionally, the district
court made findings that mother, despite par ticipating in services, was not making much
progress and that “[a]dditional services w ill not likely bring about lasting parental
adjustment enabling a return of [child] to the mother’s ho me in a reasonable period of
time.” Based on the evidence described above, the district court’s findings are supported
by the record.
In sum, we conclude that the distri ct court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that mother refused or neglected her parental duties and that reasonable efforts
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have failed to correct the conditions that fo rmed the basis of the county’s second TRP
petition. Mother ultimately asks this court to hold that evidence in her favor outweighs
evidence that the district court relied on in making its decision. But we do not reweigh the
evidence or reconcile conflicting evidence. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22. Because there
is adequate evidence in the r ecord to support the district court’s determination of the
presence of a statutory ground, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), the district court did
not abuse its discretion when it terminated mother’s parental rights.1
Affirmed.

1 Because the county only need s to prove the presence of one statutory ground for
termination, we do not need to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in
determining that other statutory grounds were present. Id., subd. 1(b).