State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1248

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Keith Allan Baker,
Appellant.

Filed July 18, 2022
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-19-3179

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney , Heather Pipenhagen , Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles S. Clas Jr., Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Je sson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Keith Allan Baker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying
his convictions of firs t- and second-degree cr iminal sexual conduct. He argues that his
convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence because the state failed to prove that
the offenses occurred within the time period specified in the complaint. Because the only
material element relating to time is the ag e of the complainant—and because the state
proved that the compla inant was at all relevant times under the age of 13—sufficient
evidence supports Baker’s conviction, and we affirm.
DECISION
Baker asserts that his two convictions mu st be reversed for insufficient evidence
because the state failed to pr ove that he committed both o ffenses within the time period
specified in the compla int. Due process requires the st ate to prove every element of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Minn. 2019);
see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Guided by this principle, we begin with
our standard of review.
When evaluating the sufficien cy of the evidence, we carefully examine “the record
to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit
the [fact-finder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900
(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). In conducting this analysis, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and assu me that the jury di sbelieved any evidence
3
contradicting the verdict. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). If the jury—
mindful of the presumption of innocence and the state’s burden to prove the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt—could reas onably have fo und the defendant guilty, we will not
overturn the verdict. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d at 900. With this standard in mind, we consider
the offenses of which Baker was convicted.
Here, the jury found Bake r guilty of first- and sec ond-degree criminal sexual
conduct. To prove Baker guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the state had to
show that he engaged in sexual penetration w ith a person under 13 year s of age, and that
he was more than 36 months older than the complainant. Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a)
(2014). To prove Baker guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, the state had to
show that he engaged in multiple instances of sexual contact with a person under 16 years
of age over an extended period of time. Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2014). We
now consider the facts produced at trial in light of these offense definitions.
The state charged Baker w ith one count of se cond-degree criminal sexual conduct
and three counts of first-degree criminal se xual conduct following allegations that he
engaged in sexual contact and penetration with his son’s former girlfriend’s daughter.
1 The
complainant used to go over to Baker’s home fo r childcare from the ages of seven to ten.
When the complainant turned eight, he began to touch her. This lasted until she stopped
going over to Baker’s house.

1 The jury found Baker not guilty of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and
guilty of the remaining counts of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
4
The complainant told her stepmother about what Baker had done when she was 11
years old. After the complainant’s stepmother contacted the police, a detective with special
training in interviewing children who report sexual abuse conducted a videotaped interview
with the complainant. The state played the video of this interview at trial. In the recording,
and in her testimony at trial, the complainant reported multiple instances of Baker touching
and penetrating her intimate parts.
The state proved that Baker committed both first- and second-degree criminal sexual
conduct at trial. With respect to his first-degree conviction, the complainant—who testified
that she was born in August 200 7—was under the age of 13 at all relevant times. Baker,
having been born in 1958, was more than 36 months older than her. “Sexual penetration”
includes “cunnilingus, fellatio” and “any intrusion however slight into the
genital . . . openings . . . of the complainant’s body by . . . any part of the body of another
person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12 (2 014). The complainant testified that Baker
touched the “inside” of her intimate parts and in structed her to perform fellatio on him.
Sufficient evidence supports Baker’s first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction.
With respect to Baker’s second-degree c onviction, the complainant testified that
Baker had sexual contact with her. “Sexual contact” includes “the intentional touching by
the actor of the complainant’s intimate parts” if the act is done with “sexual or aggressive
intent.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11 (201 4). And “sexual or aggressive intent can
readily be inferred” from the act of inappropriate contact itself. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d
676, 687 (Minn. 2006). The complainant testified that Baker touched her intimate parts on
5
many occasions over a two-year period until she was ten ye ars old. Sufficient evidence
supports Baker’s second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction.
But Baker argues that insuffi cient evidence supports both convictions because “the
state failed to prove [he] committed these o ffenses within the time frame charged in the
complaint.”2 But the “precise time” at which an offense was committed “need not be stated
in the indictment,” unless the time is a mate rial ingredient of the offense. Minn.
Stat. § 628.15 (2020). The only element to which the timing of Baker’s actions were
relevant would be his age and the complainan t’s age. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1(a)
(prohibiting sexual penetration of a person younger than 13 years of age if the actor is more
than 36 months older), .343, subd. 1(h)(iii) (prohibiting multiple acts of sexual contact over
extended period of time with person under the age of 16). The comp lainant’s testimony,
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, establishes that she was younger than 13
for all relevant time periods. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 653. B ecause the jury could have
reasonably found Baker guilty, we will not over turn its verdict. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d at
900.
Affirmed.

2 Baker further argues that we should infer that, because the jury found him not guilty on
two counts of first-degree criminal sexual cond uct, the jury must have concluded that the
evidence supporting his other convictions was insufficient. But Baker points to no
precedent supporting his contention that an acquittal on one count should undermine
confidence in a conviction on another count, and our research has revealed none. Instead,
we consider whether the jury, mindful of Baker’s presumed innocence and the state’s
burden to prove that he committed the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, could
have reasonably found him guilty. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d at 900.