State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1254

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chris Allen Rivas,
Appellant.

Filed July 18, 2022
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-20-1418

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Edwin Stoc kmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Linnea
Van Pilsum-Bloom (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Daniel McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Ab igail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and first-degree
burglary. He argues that his convictions must be reversed because the district court erred
by concluding that police had probable cause to arrest him and by denying his motion to
suppress evidence discovered as a result of his arrest. Because we conclude that the officers
had probable cause to arrest appellant, we affirm.
DECISION
Appellant Chris Allen Rivas was arrested following a reported theft of a vehicle and
a case containing two handguns from a home in Medford. After Rivas’s arrest, police
observed a handgun in plain view in the car that Rivas had just occupied and obtained the
consent of the car’s owner to search the ve hicle. Police recovered one of the stolen
handguns from the car. Rivas later moved to suppress the evidence relating to the handgun.
Following a contested omnibus hearing, the district court denied the motion. The case then
proceeded to a jury trial, after which Ri vas was convicted of unlawful possession of a
firearm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020), and first-degree burglary
of an occupied dwelling in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (2020).
Rivas contends that the district cour t erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence because police lacked probable cause to arrest him. In examining a pretrial order
on a motion to suppress, we review the dist rict court’s determination of probable cause
de novo. State v. Milton , 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 2012). Our review of a
probable-cause determination involves “an inde pendent review of the facts to determine
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the reasonableness of the police officer’s actions.” State v. Camp, 590 N.W.2d 115, 118
(Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).
A warrantless arrest is reasonable un der the United States and Minnesota
Constitutions if it is supported by probable cause. State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871
(Minn. 2011). Probable cause to arrest exists when police “have a reasonable belief that a
certain person has committed a crime.” In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Minn.
1997). The existence of probable cause must be evaluated “from the po int of view of a
prudent and cautious officer on the s cene at the time of the arrest.” State v. Olson , 342
N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. App. 1984) (quotation om itted). When more than one police
officer was involved in an investigation, Minnesota courts apply the “collective
knowledge” approach to dete rmine whether probable cause existed, under which “the
entire knowledge of the police forc e is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer.”
State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted).
Here, the following facts support the dist rict court’s conclusion that the police had
probable cause to arrest Rivas. The day afte r the theft, and prior to Rivas’s arrest, the
victim obtained video footage of the incide nt from a neighbor’s security camera and
identified Rivas to law enforcement as the man in the video. The video shows a man exit
the victim’s house carrying a case, open and enter a car parked in the driveway, and drive
off down the street. The vic tim reported that he knew Rivas from previous interactions
and recognized him from the way he walked, his mannerisms, and his appearance. The
victim further told law enforcement that Rivas is “hard to fo rget.” Based on the victim’s
identification, law enforcemen t issued a probable-cause-to- arrest notice to other law
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enforcement agencies. Later th at afternoon, police located Ri vas in Faribault. When the
officers first saw him, Rivas was leaning into the back cargo area of a hatchback vehicle
that was parked in a driveway. After Rivas made eye contact with the officers, and as the
officers approached on foot, Rivas dove over the rear seats of the car and maneuvered
himself into the footwell of the front passenger seat. The officers then removed Rivas from
the car via the front passenger-side door and arrested him.
Based on these facts, suffi cient probable cause existe d for Rivas’s arrest. The
victim’s certain identification of Rivas fro m the security camera video combined with
Rivas’s evasive behavior immediately before his arrest could cause police to have a
reasonable belief that Rivas comm itted the burglary and thefts. See State v. Carter , 697
N.W.2d 199, 206 (Minn. 2005) (“Statements from citizen witnesses may provide a basis
for probable cause when the witness is credible.”); Camp, 590 N.W.2d at 118-19
(determining that “evasive action” by indi vidual with defendant, when combined with
other observations, supported probable cause for arrest).
Rivas’s arguments do not persuade us otherwise. Rivas first contends that we may
not consider his attempt to evade the police in our evaluation of pr obable cause because
the state did not identify that fact to the district court as a circumstance supporting probable
cause for his arrest, the district court di d not consider his evasive conduct in its
probable-cause analysis, and the arresting detective testif ied at the contested omnibus
hearing that he arrested Rivas based solely on the probable-cause-to-arrest notice. On these
grounds, Rivas contends that our review on appeal must be narrowly limited to the district
5
court’s determination that the victim’s identification of Rivas supplied probable cause for
his arrest.
This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, it fails to recognize that our
review of the district court’s probable-ca use determination invo lves “an independent
review of the facts to determine the reasona bleness of the police officer’s actions.” Id. at
118 (quotation omitted). This independent revi ew is not limited to those facts identified
by the state to the district court or relied upon by the district court in its order. Second, the
probable-cause inquiry is objective, meaning “[t]he actual, subjective beliefs of the officer
are not the focus” in evaluating the reasonableness of the officer’s actions. State v. Koppi,
798 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Minn. 2011). Here , the objective circum stances that were
collectively known to law enforcement at the time of Rivas’s arrest included both the
victim’s identification of Rivas and Rivas’s attempt to evade police as they approached
him in the driveway. Our review of the record demonstrates that both events occurred prior
to Rivas’s arrest. Accordingly, based on our independent review of the facts, we have no
trouble concluding that Rivas’s evasive beha vior prior to his arrest was one of the
circumstances supporting probable cause for arrest.
Rivas next argues that the police were not entitled to rely on the victim’s
identification based on the secu rity camera video. He contends that the victim’s
identification was not reliable because the vide o was low quality and blurry; the security
camera was located approximately 50 feet away from the victim’s house; the man in the
video did not have a distinctive walk, appear ance, or mannerisms; and the video depicts
the suspect unobstruct ed from view for only approximat ely 15 seconds. Rivas further
6
emphasizes that, when the vic tim identified Rivas to law enfo rcement, he also remarked
that he had interacted with Rivas “a long time ago.” Again, we are unpersuaded. As the
district court found, the suspect’s face is blurry throughout the video, but the video captures
the suspect’s general appearance and manner of walking. Ba sed on those characteristics
and the victim’s prior interac tions with Rivas, the victim expressed certainty that Rivas
was the man in the video. It was therefore reasonable for law enforcement to rely on the
victim’s identification. Combined with th e officers’ observations of Rivas’s evasive
conduct before his arrest, this information provided sufficient probable cause for arrest.
As a final point, we note that the district court concluded that the police lawfully
searched the car and recovered the stolen ha ndgun based both on th eir observation of the
handgun in plain view following Rivas’s arrest and the car owner’s consent to the search.
We discern no error in either basis for the district court’s conclusion.
We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to deny Rivas’s motion to suppress
evidence.
Affirmed.