Billie Edmonds, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1274

Billie Edmonds,
Relator,

vs.

Intermediate School District #917,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed June 27, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 46816254-3

Billie Edmonds, St. Paul, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

Intermediate School District #917, Rosemount, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Relator Billie Edmonds challenges the determination of an unemployment-law
judge (ULJ) that she was discharged for the misconduct of insubordination and asserts that
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the ULJ failed to assist her, as a self-represented litigant, to fully develop the record. We
affirm.
FACTS
Edmonds was employed for approximately four years as a full-time
paraprofessional with respondent-employer Intermediate School District #917 (ISD 917)
until she was discharged on June 7, 2021. Upon her discharge, Edmonds applied for
unemployment benefits with respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development (DEED). DEED found that ISD 917 discharged Edmonds for
employment misconduct and issued a determination of ineligibility for unemployment
benefits.
Edmonds appealed the determination and had a hearing before a ULJ. The evidence
at that hearing was as follows. On November 5, 2020, the principal of the school where
Edmonds worked sent Edmonds a “non-disciplinary letter,” which was intended “to remind
[Edmonds] of the expectations of [her] role as a paraprofessional in [ISD] 917.” The letter
noted that Edmonds had (1) disregarded a directive prohibiting Edmonds from holding any
meetings that were not prearranged and approved by the administration; (2) circumvented
confidentiality protocols when discussing a student with a coworker; (3) lied to ISD 917’s
dean of students about work tasks; and (4) improperly shared inaccurate and confidential
information with a coworker. It provided Edmonds with directives for her future conduct
and cautioned that “[f]ailure to comply with these expectations can lead to progressive
disciplinary action, including termination.”
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On March 19, 2021, the principal sent Edmonds a second “non-disciplinary letter”
noting “continued concerns” about Edmonds’s performance. This letter reminded
Edmonds of the directives included in the November 2020 letter and added a new directive
to “[b]ehave and conduct yourself professionally and respectfully,” along with a
nonexclusive list of professional expectations.
The dean of students, who appeared before the ULJ on behalf of ISD 917, testified
that Edmonds was ultimately discharged in June 2021 for insubordination based on her
repeated refusal to attend mandatory meetings with school leaders.1 According to the dean,
a meeting was scheduled for March 11, 2021 and Edmonds “walked out” before she was
provided with “a letter.” On May 25, 2021, Edmonds “declined a meeting, but then said
that she would be able to meet and then had to reschedule.” And on June 2, 3, and 7, 2021,
Edmonds was a “no show” for meetings. The dean testified that Edmonds claimed she
would not attend scheduled meetings because “it was a hostile work environment” and
because she did not have “any union representation available even though there was union
representation available.” ISD 917 did not initially intend to discharge Edmonds. But
because of the “no show” on June 7, a decision was made to discharge her.
During her testimony, Edmonds disputed the dean’s account of the events. She
denied walking out of the meeting on March 11 and speculated that the dean invented this
fact to “insult [her] character” and make her look like she is “not responsible and

1 On the DEED request-for-information form submitted before the initial determination of
ineligibility, ISD 917 stated that the reason for Edmonds’s discharge was “lack of
professionalism, confidentiali[ty].”
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professional.” Edmonds testified that she did not attend the meeting on May 25 because
she did not “feel safe.” She elaborated that she was uncomfortable at meetings because
she was “disrespected, called out of [her] name . . . [she is] told things, [she is] not being
asked any questions, [she is] there to sit, listen, and not speak.” Edmonds testified that she
was afraid she might be physically injured in a meeting because the school leaders were
“lying multiple times” and “[l]ying has been proven to get people hurt and killed, and shot.”
She explained that her union representative encouraged her to atten d the meeting, so she
entered the meeting to let the dean and the principal know that she felt unsafe and wanted
ISD 917’s superintendent present. While she was in the meeting, the principal instructed
her to wear her face mask, which was mandatory for school staff, but she pointed out that
she was wearing a face shield.2 As to the meeting on June 3, Edmonds explained that she
refused to attend because she had not heard back from the superintendent. Edmonds
testified that she did not attend the meeting on June 7 because her “internet for the school
was disconnected.” Finally, Edmonds alleged that the principal “was caught on record” in
2019 using a racial slur. She testified that she could provide documentation of the 2019
incident, but she did not provide further evidence to the ULJ.
Following the hearing, the ULJ determined that ISD 917 discharged Edmonds for
employment misconduct and that Edmonds was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The
ULJ specifically found that Edmonds’s testimony had not been credible. Edmonds moved
for reconsideration and requested a transcript of the hearing before the ULJ. Although

2 The dean testified that Edmonds had worn only a face shield on another occasion shortly
after the dean reviewed the school’s masking policy with her.
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DEED timely mailed a recording of the hearing to Edmonds, due to DEED’s clerical error,
she did not receive it before the determination was reconsidered. The ULJ affirmed the
decision on reconsideration. On September 15 , 2021, two weeks after the ULJ issued the
reconsideration decision, DEED staff noticed their clerical error and again mailed the
recording and a transcript of the hearing to Edmonds.
Edmonds appeals by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
I. Substantial evidence supports the ULJ’s finding that Edmonds was discharged
for employment misconduct.

When reviewing the decision of the ULJ, this court may affirm, remand for further
proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the relator have
been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are “(1) in
violation of constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the department; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law;
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).
Edmonds argues that the ULJ erred in concluding that she was ineligible for
unemployment benefits because she committed employment misconduct. Under
Minnesota law, an employee discharged from employment due to employment misconduct
is not eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4 (2020).
Employment misconduct is “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job
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or off the job, that is a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the
right to reasonably expect of the employee.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2020).
Whether an employee engaged in employment misconduct presents a mixed
question of fact and law. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App.
2006). The question of whether the employee committed the act that constituted
misconduct is one of fact. Id. We view a ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable
to the decision, id., and we will not disturb those facts if the evidence substantially sustains
them, Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d). “Substantial evidence” means at least some
evidence that reasonably supports the conclusion. See In re NorthMet Project Permit to
Mine Application, 959 N.W.2d 731, 749 (Minn. 2021) (discussing substantial- evidence
standard). When testimony conflicts, we defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations.
Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Dep’t, 783 N.W.2d 182, 189 (Minn. App. 2010).
On the other hand, whether the employee’s act amounted to employment
misconduct is a question of law that we review de novo. Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 344. “As
a general rule, refusing to abide by an employer’s reasonable policies and requests amounts
to disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn.
2002).
Here, the ULJ found:
Edmonds showed a pattern of insubordination in dealing with
ISD 917’s leadership. She walked out of a meeting on
March 11. She unilaterally cancelled a meeting on May 25 and
then refused a directive to put on her mask. She refused to
attend mandatory meetings on June 3 and 7. Edmonds’s
conduct showed clearly a serious violation of the standards of
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behavior the employer has a right to reasonably expect of the
employee and constituted employment misconduct.

Edmonds challenges the ULJ’s finding . She argues that the testimony of the dean of
students, who testified before the ULJ on behalf of ISD 917, was untruthful. Edmonds also
contends that her conduct was not employment misconduct, but instead, was a “good faith”
response to an “intense hostile work environment.”
The ULJ found that the dean’s testimony was credible, and that Edmonds’s
testimony was not. Moreover, the ULJ explained its credibility determinations. The ULJ
observed that the dean “presented her testimony in a clear and straightforward manner,”
“answered questions without hesitation,” and “quickly corrected her testimony when she
noticed an error,” and that nothing about her testimony “suggested deception.” By contrast,
the ULJ found that Edmonds’s testimony “suggested evasion and an intent to deceive.”
Specifically, the ULJ noted that Edmonds’s responses to questions about whether she was
wearing a mask were clearly dishonest. The ULJ also stated that Edmonds’s manner of
answering questions regarding her claim that attending a meeting would jeopardize her
physical safety “suggested exaggeration and deception.” Given our standard of review, we
must defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations.
Based on our review of the record, we also conclude that substantial evidence
supports the ULJ’s findings regarding Edmonds’s conduct. The dean’s testimony
established that Edmonds refused to attend multiple meetings with school leaders to discuss
her employment conduct. And she refused to follow an order to wear her face mask in
compliance with school policy at the time.
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Finally, applying de novo review, we conclude that Edmonds’s conduct was
employment misconduct. It is reasonable that an employer would expect an employee to
attend and remain in meetings with leadership and follow pandemic masking directives.
See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a). When an employee’s refusal to carry out a directive
of the employer is “deliberate, calculated, and intentional,” then the refusal is misconduct.
McGowan v. Exec. Express Transp. Enters., Inc., 420 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 1998).
Here, where Edmonds refused to attend meetings with school leaders and disobeyed a
directive to where her mask, her conduct was deliberate, calculated, and intentional, and
constituted employment misconduct.
II. Edmonds’s claims of error do not warrant an additional hearing before a ULJ.

Edmonds argues that she is entitled to an additional hearing before a ULJ on several
grounds. She first contends that the ULJ failed to sufficiently assist her in developing the
factual record during the proceedings below. To support this argument, she alleges that
there were multiple deficiencies in the hearing before the ULJ. She points out that the ULJ
held the hearing even though neither party had all of the exhibits considered by the ULJ.
She contends that the ULJ did not review exhibits that were “critical for her
[unemployment-benefits] eligibility.” She appears to argue that she was not permitted to
explain the cause of her termination. She asserts that the ULJ should have considered
camera footage from May 18 through May 25, 2021—which neither party presented—as
evidence. Finally, she argues that the ULJ erred by not conducting “a necessary evidentiary
hearing.”
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A ULJ “must assist all parties in the presentation of evidence,” and “ensure that all
relevant facts are clearly and fully developed.” Minn. R. 3310.2921 (2021). Furthermore,
“ULJs have a duty to reasonably assist pro se parties with the presentation of the evidence
and the proper development of the record.” Thompson v. County of Hennepin, 660 N.W.2d
157, 161 (Minn. App. 2003). But a ULJ does not function as “the unrepresented party’s
advocate; the evidentiary hearing is a fact-gathering endeavor, and, like all judicial and
quasi-judicial fact -gathering endeavors, it is still adversarial and requires the judicial
officer to maintain neutrality to assure fairness to all parties.” Stassen v. Lone Mountain
Truck Leasing, LLC, 814 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2012) (citations omitted).
Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that the ULJ struck the
appropriate balance between ensuring that the factual record was developed and
maintaining neutrality. The ULJ admitted and considered exhibits offered by the parties,
including an exhibit that Edmonds faxed to DEED the day before the hearing and after the
deadline for submitting exhibits. Although Edmonds told the ULJ at the outset of the
hearing that she had not received one exhibit—a series of letters from the school district to
Edmonds, which included the November 5, 2021 and March 19, 2021 nondisciplinary
letters and the June 7, 2021 termination letter—she did not object to the admission of that
exhibit or challenge its contents. The ULJ asked appropriate questions for eliciting relevant
facts. And the ULJ gave the parties ample opportunities to respond to testimony and to
present additional testimony.
In a related argument, Edwards contends that the ULJ made its decision based on
an incomplete factual record. She first presented this argument to the ULJ in her request
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for reconsideration. In seeking reconsideration, Edwards pointed out that there had been
no testimony from an expert witness “regarding mental safety” or a union representative.
She also made a general allegation of missing evidence. A ULJ must order an additional
hearing upon a request for reconsideration “if a party shows that evidence which was not
submitted at the hearing . . . would likely change the outcome of the decision and there was
good cause for not having previously submitted that evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 2(c) (2020). In denying reconsideration, the ULJ noted that its decision was based
on a credibility determination and “there is nothing in Edmonds’s request for
reconsideration that leads the ULJ to change the credibility finding, amend the decision, or
reopen the record.” We see no abuse of discretion in the ULJ’s decision to deny
reconsideration on this basis. See Kelly v. Ambassador Press, Inc., 792 N.W.2d 103, 104
(Minn. App. 2010) (stating that we do “not reverse a ULJ’s decision to deny an additional
evidentiary hearing unless the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion”).
Again, before this court, Edmonds generally alleges that the ULJ should have
considered additional evidence. She also refers to video evidence that neither party offered.
Because Edmonds does not show that additional evidence would likely have changed the
outcome of the proceeding or provide any reason for failing to submit such evidence, we
reject this argument.
Finally, Edmonds argues that she is entitled to an additional hearing because DEED
did not provide her with the record of testimony from the evidentiary hearing during the
request-for-reconsideration period. Edmonds argues that this violated “due process”
because the “information that was present [in the record of testimony on reconsideration]
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was likely false and had an effect on the outcome.” She also contends that she could have
better prepared her request for reconsideration if she had been provided a transcript before
the deadline.
Edmonds cites no authority, and we are aware of none, requiring DEED to provide
a transcript to an applicant before the reconsideration deadline. Nevertheless, DEED
attempted to provide a recording of the hearing to Edmonds. Although it is unfortunate
that the recording did not reach Edmonds before the reconsideration deadline, it did not
impact the ULJ’s decision on reconsideration. As the ULJ noted in denying
reconsideration, the case came down to credibility; the ULJ did not believe Edmonds’s
testimony. Moreover, although Edmonds now has a transcript of the hearing, she does not
identify anything in the transcript that would have warranted the ULJ’s reconsideration
beyond alleging that the dean’s testimony was untruthful.
Affirmed.