In the Matter of the Welfare of: E. J. M., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1283

In the Matter of the Welfare of: E. J. M., Child.

Filed July 5, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Itasca County District Court
File Nos. 31-JV-18-3700, 31-JV-17-2874

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant E.J.M.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Rachel A. Evenson, Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this juvenile-delinquency case, appellant challenges the district court’s order
revoking appellant’s continuance without adjudication for fifth-degree criminal sexual
conduct and adjudicating him delinquent, arguing that the district court lost subject-matter
jurisdiction over his case because the revocation proceeding was not commenced before
the continuance period ended. We affirm.
2
FACTS
In December 2018, respondent State of Minnesota filed a delin quency petition
charging appellant E.J.M., then 15 years old, with two counts of fifth-degree criminal
sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1(1) (2018), and one count of
disorderly conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2018). On February 20,
2019, appellant pleaded guilty to the two fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct offenses.
The district court ordered a continuance without adjudica tion for both counts “for 6
months” with the option “to extend [an] additional 6 months.” As part of the terms of the
continuance, appellant was ordered to complete a residential sex-offender program at Mille
Lacs Academy once a spot became available.
In June, appellant’s probation officer requested a review hearing, which occurred
on August 7, before the initial continuance period ended. At the hearing, the district court
reviewed an adjustment report recommending that appellant “continue on supervised
probation with all terms and conditions previously imposed.” On August 12, the district
court ordered that probation continue and that “[a]ll prior orders remain in full force and
effect unless modified herein.” The district court did not expressly state that it was ordering
a second continuance period, but it ordered that probation be continued and scheduled a
review hearing for a date within the second continuance period.
1

1 We note that a continuance period of “6 months” was an incorrect articulation of the
permissible length of a continuance without adjudication. Under Minn. Stat. § 260B.198,
subd. 7(a) (2018), “the court may continue the case for a period not to exceed 180 days on
any one order” and has the option to continue the case “for one additional successive period
not to exceed 180 days.” Under these provisions, appellant’s initial continuance period
3
On February 10, 2020 —five days before the second continuance period ended—
appellant’s probation officer filed a probation-violation report. The report alleged that
appellant broke Mille Lacs Academy’s rules by sneaking an iPod and charger into the
facility. At a review hearing on February 11, the district court deferred ruling on the
probation violation, and on February 12 it issued an order setting a hearing for March 16,
2020, and directing that appellant remain at Mille Lacs Academy and comply with terms
of probation. On February 20—five days after the second continuance period ended—the
probation officer filed an “addendum” to the probation-violation report, citing a new
violation of failure to complete the Mille Lacs Academy treatment program.
2
Appellant moved to dismiss the delinquency petition against him, arguing that the
district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction had terminated because the state did not request
revocation before the 360-day continuance period ended. The district court denied
appellant’s motion because the February 10 probation-violation report “was sufficient
. . . to maintain the Court’s jurisdiction.”
At a contested probation-revocation hearing in June 2021, the district court
considered only the probation-violation reports submitted on February 10 and 20, 2020,
although additional reports had also been made. In September 2021, the district court
revoked probation and adjudicated appellant delinquent. It concluded that appellant

ended on August 19 and, after the district court extended the continuance period, the
second continuance period ended 180 days later, on February 15, 2020.

2 The addendum incorrectly identified February 20, 2020, as the date that the continuance
expired—a mistake perhaps attributable to the earlier references to a continuance period of
“6 months.”
4
“violated the terms of his probation in the above files by bringing an unapproved electronic
device and charging cord into Mille Lacs Academy; and by failing to complete sex specific
inpatient treatment at Mille Lacs Academy.” This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court erred by adjudicating him delinquent because
it no longer had subject-matter jurisdiction over his case. “When a statute provides the
basis for the district court’s jurisdiction over the juvenile, the issue of jurisdiction is a
question of law subject to de novo review.” State v. J.E.S., 763 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Minn. App.
2009).
By statute, after the allegations supporting a charge are “duly proven,” and, if doing
so is in the best interests of the child and not inimical to public safety, the district court
“may continue the case for a period not to exceed 180 days on any one order.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.198, subd. 7(a). The district court may extend the continuance period “for one
additional successive period not to exceed 180 days.” Id. The district court may extend the
period “only with the consent of the prosecutor and only after the court has reviewed the
case and entered its order for the additional continuance without a finding of delinquency.”
Id.; see also Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4.
Adjudicating a child for an offense after the child has received a continuance
without adjudication is a probation revocation and “must be accomplished pursuant to Rule
15.07.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(E). A probation-revocation proceeding
“must be commenced” within the statutorily prescribed continuance period; otherwise,
“juvenile court jurisdiction over the charges terminates.” Id., subd. 4(F); see also In re
5
Welfare of M.J.M., 766 N.W.2d 360, 364-65 (Minn. App. 2009) (holding that the district
court lacked jurisdictio n to revoke probation and adjudicate a child delinquent when the
probation-violation report was filed after the continuance without adjudication expired),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 26, 2009).3
Appellant makes two arguments. He first argues that the district court never
extended his continuance without adjudication for a second 180-day period and therefore
erred by considering either probation violation because the continuance period ended on
August 19, 2019. Appellant alternatively argues that, even if the district court extended his
continuance without adjudication another 180 days, the district court erred by considering
the probation-violation report that was filed five days after the continuance period ended
because the district court had lost jurisdiction.
A. The district court extended the continuance without adjudication.

Appellant argues that, because the district court never explicitly extended his
continuance without adjudication for a second 180-day period, it lost subject- matter
jurisdiction over his case when the first 180-day continuance period ended on August 19,
2019. This argument is unpersuasive.
We have held that a district court may effectively extend a continuance without
adjudication despite a failure to technically comply with the precise statutory procedures
for extensions. See In re Welfare of M.A.R., 558 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Minn. App. 1997)
(“Because the initial order contemplated a term that exceeded 90 days and allowed for an

3 When we decided M.J.M., the statute and rule allowed an initial continuance of 90 days
with the possibility of extending for another 90 days after review. 766 N.W.2d at 363.
6
extension of the term without judicial review, the order did not comply with the precise
requirements of [the statute]. Nevertheless, the state agreed to the initial 180-day term as
part of the plea agreement.”).
Here, the district court held a review hearing on August 7, 2019—within the initial
180-day continuance period. At that hearing, the district court accepted an adjustment
report recommending continued probation. The state requested continued probation to
permit appellant to complete his residential program at Mille Lacs Academy, and appellant
agreed to continued probation. The district court issued a written order after that hearing,
continuing probation and stating that “[a]ll prior orders remain in full force and effect
unless modified therein.” The order scheduled a review hearing in November, indicating
that probation was to extend beyond the first continuance period. Thus, while the district
court’s written order did not explicitly identify a second 180- day probation period, it
certainly provided for a second period. And the district court complied with the procedural
safeguard required by statute: review by the district court before any extension of a
continuance without adjudication. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7(a). Thus, the district
court extended appellant’s continuance without adjudication for a second 180-day period.
B. Because the state timely commenced revocation proceedings, the district
court had continuing subject -matter jurisdiction over appellant and
could consider the February 20, 2020 probation-violation report.

Appellant next argues that the district court erred by relying on the probation-
violation report filed on February 20, 2020, when revoking his continuance without
adjudication because it was filed after the 360-day continuance period expired. We
disagree.
7
As noted above, a probation-revocation proceeding “must be commenced within [the
180 or 360-day stay of adjudication period] or district court jurisdiction over the charges
terminates.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(F) (emphasis added). To commence a
probation-revocation proceeding, the probation officer must file “a written report showing
probable cause to believe the juvenile has violated any conditions of probation.” Minn. R.
Juv. Delinq. P. 15.07, subd. 1.
The February 10 probation-violation report alleging violation of Mille Lacs
Academy rules commenced revocation proceedings before the continuance period ended
on February 15. See i d. Because the state timely commenced probation-revocation
proceedings, the district court’s subject- matter jurisdiction over appellant did not
terminate. Rather, jurisdiction continued until the district court could adjudicate the state’s
allegations that appellant violated the terms of his probation. As a result, the district court
could properly consider the state’s subsequent probation-violation report filed on
February 20, which cited appellant’s failure to complete treatment at Mille Lacs Academy.
This decision is consistent with caselaw regarding termination of a district court’s
jurisdiction. We have reversed probation revocations following a continuance without
adjudication whe n probation officers did not timely file the initial probation-violation
report supporting the revocation. See M.J.M., 766 N.W.2d at 363-64. (“Under rule 15, a
district court loses jurisdiction over a juvenil e after the 180-day continuance period has
expired, even though the juvenile did not comply with the probationary conditions.”) ; In
re Welfare of C.S.N., 917 N.W.2d 427, 433 (Minn. App. 2018) (describing the rules of
juvenile-delinquency procedure as “jurisdictional”). Here, had the probation officer not
8
timely filed the February 10 probation-violation report, the district court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction over appellant would have ended on February 15, compelling us to reverse his
delinquency adjudication.
But the February 10 probation-violation report was timely filed; therefore, the
district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant did not terminate. Appellant then
violated another condition of his probation by failing to complete treatment. We conclude
that the district court properly considered that second violation when revoking appellant’s
continuance without adjudication and adjudicating him delinquent.
Affirmed.