In re the Marriage of: Christine Stelben Connolly, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1304

In re the Marriage of: Christine Stelben Connolly, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Sean Timothy Connolly,
Appellant.

Filed May 23, 2022
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-14-8193

Kathleen M. Newman, James R. Todd, De Witt, L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Phillip Gainsley, Law Offices of Phillip Gainsley, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chie f Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
In this post-decree marriage- dissolution appeal, appellant Sean Timothy Connolly
(husband) appeals various decisions made by the district court during its adjudication of

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
respondent Christine Stelben Connolly’s (wife’s) motion to modify spousal maintenance.
We affirm.
FACTS
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The parties married in 1997 and wife petitioned
for divorce in 2014. The district court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order for Judgment and Judgment and Decree (J&D) in September 2016. After amending
the J&D twice, the district court granted wife $3,930 in monthly permanent spousal
maintenance and $1,879 in monthly child suppo rt for the parties’ three minor children. 1
When determining the amount of spousal main tenance, the district court equalized the
parties’ post-tax cash flow.2
During the dissolution trial, husband lost hi s job. Because of this, husband moved
to modify spousal maintenance. The district court granted husband’s motion and reduced
his spousal maintenance obliga tion to $510 per month while increasing his child support
obligation to $1,963 per month. The dist rict court chose the amount of spousal
maintenance to equalize the parties’ post-tax cash flow.
In February 2021, wife move d to modify spousal maintenance. At some point after
the reduction in his spousal maintenance oblig ation, husband found a new job. Wife’s
motion alleged that husband’s income from th is new job increased after he received a

1 Husband’s child support obligation is not at issue in this appeal.
2 While husband suggested this approach to the district court, wife did not stipulate to this
approach. We note that the district court did not conduct the analysis required by Minn.
Stat. § 518.552 (2020). Because neither party challenges this approach by the district court,
we decline to address whether th e district court’s failure to conduct the statutory analysis
is fatal to the award.
3
promotion to an executive level position. Wife also claimed in the motion that her parents
loaned her money to allow her to maintain her marital standa rd of living. Wife served
husband with her motion as well as with interrogatories and demands for documents.
Husband, then acting pro se, neither responded to the motion nor fully responded to wife’s
discovery requests. Wife served and filed an amended motion in March 2021.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on wife’s mo tion in April 2021. 3
Husband appeared pro se. After the district court allowed husband to testify at the hearing,
it orally granted all of wife’s motions. The di strict court then issued its written order on
April 22, 2021, consistent with its prior oral ruling.
As part of the order, the district court stat ed that it would appoint a neutral financial
expert to “effectuate an equalization of the parties’ incomes in a manner that maximizes
the available cash flow.” On May 11, 2021, the district cour t issued an order appointing
the neutral financial expert. The order included the following language:
4. Consistent with Minnesot a Rule of Evidence 706, the
Expert findings in this matter are subject to cross examination
by either party, including the party who calls the witness.
Either party is entitled to retain their own financial expert for
trial in this matter.

Three days later, the district court issued an amended order appointing the neutral financial
expert. That order changed the language of paragraph 4 to read:
4. Consistent with Minnesot a Rule of Evidence 706, the
Expert findings in this matter are subject to cross examination

3 Initially, a referee heard this matter, and the referee made recommendations which were
adopted by the district court. Because the district court adopted the referee’s
recommendations, when we refer to the district court’s actions, we are, in fact, referring to
the referee’s actions. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
4
by either party in the event of a trial or evidentiary hearing,
including the party who calls th e witness. Either party is
entitled to retain their own financial expert in this matter in the
event of a trial or evidentiary hearing.

(Emphasis added.) The amended order also st ated that “[t]his Or der supersedes prior
Orders with respect to [the neutral financia l expert’s] appointment in this matter and the
tasks she [is] asked to perform.” This order, functionally, bifurcated the proceedings into
(1) the April 2021 evidentiary he aring, at which both parties had the opportunity to enter
their financial evidence, and (2) a separate process by which the neutral financial expert
analyzed the financial evidence and submitted recommendations to the district court based
on her analysis of the evidence.
Husband then, after retaining counsel and hi s own expert, sought discovery of wife’s
income and expenses. Wife did not comply with husband’s requests and the district court
denied husband’s request to hold a discovery hearing, stating that its April 22, 2021, order
was a final order relative to wife’s motions.
In August 2021, the neutral financial expe rt issued a report informing the parties’
attorneys of her recommendations and wife then submitted a proposed order based on those
recommendations. In response, husband filed a memorandum objecting to the expert’s
recommendations and wife’s proposed order and requested a hearing.
In September 2021, the district court adopted the neutral financial expert’s
recommendations and issued an order setting the amount of husband’s spousal maintenance
obligation. The district court increased husband’s spousal maintenance obligation to
5
$4,900 per month and decreased his child support obliga tion to $1,534 per month. 4 The
district court set the amount of spousal main tenance to equalize the parties’ post-tax cash
flow. In the order, the district court also rejected husband’s post-hearing submissions.
Husband appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying husband’s requests
for post-hearing discovery, to cross-examine the neutral financial expert, or to
offer post-hearing evidence from his expert.

Husband primarily argues that the district court improperly disregarded his requests
for discovery from wife and to cross-examine the neutral financial expert. Husband argues
that the May 14, 2021, order appointing the neutral financial expert—which supersedes the
May 11, 2021, order—also supersedes all portions of the April 22, 2021, order addressing
the neutral financial expert’s appointment. We disagree.
Generally, we review de novo the interpretation of court orders. Jensen v. Jensen,
440 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Minn. App. 1989). But we defer to a district court’s interpretation
of its own orders. See Potter v. Potter, 471 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Minn. App. 1991) (reviewing
trial court’s implementation of judgment under an abuse of discretion standard). A district
court abuses its discretion “by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is ‘against logic and the facts on record.’”
Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569
N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997)).

4 The district court also ordered husband to pay $5,189 in conduct-based attorney fees. The
attorney fee award is not at issue on appeal.
6
Husband’s entire argument hinges on us agreeing with him that the May 14, 2021,
order superseded the portions of the April 22, 2021, order related to the appointment of the
neutral financial expert. But we do not agree. Instead, the district court’s interpretation of
its orders conflicts with husband’s interpreta tion and the district c ourt’s interpretation of
its orders is reasonable. Potter, 471 N.W.2d at 114.
Husband mistakenly focuses solely on paragraph eight of the May 14, 2021, order.
That paragraph reads: “This Order [supersedes] prior Orders with respect to [the neutral
financial expert’s] appointment in this matter and the tasks she [is] asked to perform.” The
plain text of that paragraph states that th e May 14, 2021, order supersedes prior orders
appointing the neutral financial expert and the expert’s task to make recommendations on
the parties’ spousal maintenance obligations. The April 22, 2021, order is related to neither
appointment of the neutral financial expert nor that expert’s duties. Instead, the April 22,
2021, order states that the neutral fina ncial expert “shall be appointed . . . by a separate
Order to follow .” The April 22, 2021, order then outlines the parties’ obligation to
cooperate with the neutral fina ncial expert. Thus, the Apr il 22, 2021, order was not an
order “with respect to [the neutral financial expert’s] appointment” but an order related to
the parties’ obligations to co mply with the neutral financial expert’s requests. The May
14, 2021, order supersedes only the May 11, 2021, order appointing the neutral financial
expert. To say that the May 14, 2021, orde r also superseded the April 22, 2021, order
would be to say that the district court appo inted a financial expert but—because the May
14, 2021, order superseded the April 22, 2021, order requiring cooperation with the
financial expert—the district court did not require the parties to cooperate with the expert
7
it appointed. This reading of the district court’s orders is counterintuitive (at best), and we
decline to read the district court’s orders in this manner.
We further note that husband’s challenge here is the amount of his and wife’s
incomes as dictated by the district court in its April 22, 2021, order and therefore the
amounts used by the neutral financial expert in her calculation. But the district court’s
April 22, 2021, order decided this issue. After granting wife’s motion to increase
husband’s spousal maintenance obligation, all the district court need ed to determine was
how to divide the parties’ collective income equally as required by the J&D, a
determination that husband does not contest. To that end, the dist rict court appointed a
neutral financial expert. Husband does not contest the neutral financial expert’s
appointment or calculations, but the amounts as found by the district court and utilized in
the neutral financial expert’s calculations. However, the time to contest those amounts was
during the initial motion hearing, not after the district court appointed the neutral financial
expert to analyze the data submitted to the court at that hearing.5

5 Husband also argued that the district court erred by classifying its April 22, 2021, order
as a “final order” or imprope rly entered a default sanction thereby foreclosing his ability
to seek discovery from wife regarding the financial gifts she received from her family and
cross examine the neutral financial expert. We decline to address the merits of husband’s
argument. Because of the district court’ s interpretation of th e April 22, 2021, and
subsequent orders, it is irreleva nt whether the April 22, 2021, order is final. The district
court’s April 22, 2021, order called for the appointment a neutral financial expert and
provided the parties no opportunity to reopen discovery. Further, as we explain, the
purpose of the district court’s subsequent orders was to implement the April 22, 2021,
order.
8
II. The district court did not abuse its discre tion by failing to explicitly adopt a
paragraph related to the parties’ mutu al annual reporting requirement from
the referee’s recommendation.

Husband also argues that the district c ourt committed reversible error by failing to
explicitly adopt a paragraph recommended by th e referee related to the parties’ mutual
annual income reporting requirement. Ap pellate courts are error-correcting courts, see
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988), and, while the district court’s failure
to adopt a paragraph related to the parties’ mutual requirement is a mistake, husband fails
to demonstrate in his brief how this mistake prejudices him, see Minn. R. Civ. P. 61
(requiring harmless error to be ignored); see Goldman v. Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d 279,
285 (Minn. 2008) (citing this as pect of Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 ). And, on this record, we
conclude that the mistake husband complains of is, at most, a de minimis, technical error.
Therefore, it does not require relief on appeal. See Wibbens v. Wibbens, 379 N.W.2d 225,
227 (Minn. App. 1985) (denying appellate relief for de minimis error).
Affirmed.